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-Britain would appoint a representative in Salisbury and Parliament would pass a new act which would give the British government the powers it needs to carry out its responsibilities.

-The act would contain provisions to protect officers of the present government from prosecution or civil suit for acts retrospectively determined illegal.

- The precise form of interim government remains to be worked out; to an important degree it will have to be negotiated between the present regime and the African nationalists. However, it is understood that Britain will play a role in the government; the interim regime would include both blacks and Europeans.

Economic Incentives and Assurances

The economic section of the plan defines the undertakings of the international community as well as those of the future Rhodesian government. The plan, moreover, addresses the country's future economic development, public and private investment, and the economic security of the European community.

-It is understood that no third country contributing resources to the Rhodesian economic program would do so until those resources had been approved under normal constitutional processes.

- The system of economic assurances as it relates to the future of European community is designed to maximize incentives for white Rhodesians to stay rather than leave, to improve prospects that the new government will honor its commitments, and to guarantee the security of new investments, both foreign and domestic. The assurances are based on the fundamental principle that the new government will be committed to the respect of private property or fair value compensation, should property be nationalized.

- The plan spells out a program of special arrangements for the European community in four important areas:

(a) Pensions. The existing terms of public service with respect to pensions and severance pay would be maintained for all pensionable officials, police and members of the armed forces.

(b) Household Property. To maintain the value of household property, stand-by purchase arrangements would be made which would provide 30 percent of the 1975 value of a house if it were sold in the first year of Rhodesian independence and 75 percent if it were sold in the fifth. To guard against inflation, house values would be index-linked. Transactions could be carried out under a special residential property holding corporation.

(c) Farm Lands. A new agricultural land commission would be established to repurchase agricultural properties being vacated by Europeans. Compensation would take place along the lines similar to that designed for the repurchase of houses. However, payments would be spread over a longer period of time.

(d) Transfer of Assets. The new government would permit a reasonable flow of remittances. A European deciding to leave immediately could convert and remit 10 percent of his liquid assets or a lump sum of, for example, RH $5000 in the first year and an additional 10 percent in each year thereafter. Incentives would be designed to encourage Europeans to keep earnings, savings and profits within Rhodesia by providing for larger remittances in future years.

— The international community would be organized to underwrite the special assurances of the new government to its European community and a mechanism in the form of an internationally managed trust fund would be set up. While acquisition of lands, homes and pension payments would be financed from internal Rhodesian sources, the trust fund would back up government commitments and provide seed capital. The fund would also provide the Rhodesian government with the foreign exchange necessary to enable it to maintain remittances.

— The British Government would assume responsibility for bringing together the international trust fund. The United States Government would assist the British Government in this regard. The size of the fund is yet to be decided.

-Special attention is given in the plan to the generation of foreign investment resources for Rhodesia's development-particularly in the most promising sectors of the nation's economic activity, national (natural?)“ resources and agriculture. Development could be a cooperative, international, public and private sector undertaking. The IBRD would be asked to sponsor an international consortium of private resources firms which would encourage and guide the flow of investment.

– The independent government would be eligible to adhere to the Lome Convention and benefit from the European Development Fund.

-Finally, the plan addresses the question of foreign economic assistance to improve the situation of Rhodesia's black majority. International consultative arrangements would be made under World Bank supervision to coordinate government to government aid. In the first instance, aid would be directed on a priority basis to the development of black skills and agriculture.

7

6 Bracketed insertion by the editor.

The Lome Convention, signed on February 28, 1975, was an agreement between the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Countries (ACP) group and the European Community that aimed at supporting the ACP states' development efforts.

Memorandum of Conversation!

Washington, August 17, 1976, 2:45–3:03 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Charles W. Robinson, Deputy Secretary of State
Amb. Philip C. Habib, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Amb. William E. Schaufele, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
Frank G. Wisner, Country Director for South Africa
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

Schaufele: We have the British beef. (He gives the Secretary Frank Wisner's report, at Tab A.)?

Kissinger: [Reads it:) I didn't know Sir Anthony Duff was going to Fourie.

Schaufele: We just found out yesterday.

Kissinger: The British perception is 100% the opposite of ours. They want to tie up the South Africans totally before any other move.

Schaufele: And they want more traditional negotiations.

Lord: Two out of three of their gripes are hogwash. Obviously the time frame has to be short, and obviously they're not bound unless the others are.

Kissinger: Their method will lead to a stalemate. Fourie will say no; that immediately stalemates their efforts in black Africa.

Wisner: The Duff mission was first meant to backstop yours, and to show it has British full faith and credit.

Kissinger: Bullshit. It's our full faith and credit that's important to South Africa.

Lord: If you give the South Africans the full text, they'll nitpick.

1

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 347, Department of State, Memoranda, Memoranda of Conversations, Internal, August 1976. Secret; Nodis. Initialed by Rodman. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office. Brackets, except those that indicate corrections, are in the original.

2 Tab A is a memorandum from Wisner to Schaufele, August 17, summarizing British reservations about a summary (Tab B to Document 199) that Kissinger gave Botha on August 16. The British reservations were that the summary implied the British would assume responsibility for Rhodesia during the interim period; that the summary did not emphasize that majority rule had to be reached within one and one-half to two years; and that the summary did not stipulate that the plan had the full financial and political support of the British Government. The British wanted Botha to have the full text, not just the summary:

Kissinger: No, I gave them only the summary because the full text was too favorable to the whites. I'm afraid we won't be able to deliver it all.

Get Samuel in and tell him: We'll make absolutely sure the South Africans understand it's a summary. Second, we agree it should be under two years; in fact we think it should be one year.

Third, we urgently disagree with passing the full document because once that's accepted, it deprives us of all flexibility in the negotiation. Once we get off it, it'll lead to massive difficulties.

In addition, their method won't work. Support [Suppose] Fourie says fine; Duff will run up to Dar and give the document there. It will explode.

Maybe they think they'll conduct the negotiations.
Schaufele: They know the South Africans don't trust them.

Kissinger: They may think that with the South Africans signed up, they can do it.

My objection was that the document was too favorable to the Rhodesians and deprived us of flexibility. We want their general agreement so we can wrap it up in one final assault. Instead of this stately process.

Robinson: Is there any difference between the summary and final document?

Schaufele: I don't think so. The qualifiers aren't there, though.

Kissinger: The inconsistency is between what we want and what they want. They want to topple Smith; we want a solution. They think they can conduct the negotiation.

Robinson: Did they accept the text?
Kissinger: It's their text.

Wisner: They have a domestic problem with overextending their responsibilities. They can say to Parliament this is as far as they can go.

Kissinger: They misread the South Africans. And if they go to the blacks and say it's accepted by the South Africans, they certainly won't accept a South African plan. We'll give the blacks even less.

Wisner: That's their assumption. Samuel knows that.

Kissinger: Why should we give to the South Africans now, to hang onto, the concept of three rolls?

Tell Samuel I'll meet with Vorster in Europe and then I'll give him the full text. If he jumps off, that'll give us a safety margin.

When he says, "His government," that means Duff.
Schaufele: And Rowlands, the Minister of State.
Rodman: Duff is a nitpicker.

Schaufele: Here is something in Tanzania. (He hands the Secretary the report of his meeting with Tanzanian Ambassador Bomani, Tab B.13

Kissinger: Did you tell him we haven't agreed with Vorster on anything?

Schaufele: Yes.
Kissinger: The whole point of the exercise is to get his agreement.
What did you say about factions (point 2 of Bomani's complaint]?
Schaufele: I said the whole point was to avoid another Angola.
Kissinger: And on the third point?
Schaufele: The third point is Namibia. I told him we were doing it.

Kissinger: (Turns to talking points drafted for Schaufele/Rogers trip to Africa:) These talking points are inadequate.

Don't make it liberal bullshit about bloodshed. They don't mind bloodshed.

Lord: Make it in terms of a rapid settlement versus a protracted

one.

Kissinger: Yes, put it in terms of a protracted conflict with its increasing possibilities of outside intervention: I need the backing of the Africans; I'm not going there to produce a South African solution. But we have to prepare the ground.

If Duff wants to leave the paper there, OK. But I think it could be embarrassing to the South Africans. Tell Samuel they have our absolute assurance that if we fall off the paper, if anything it'll be more onerous on the Rhodesians. They're so beaten up by Ian Smith they think we'll use the latitude to strengthen the restrictions.

We're trying to create the conditions where South Africa can bring pressure. We're asking them to bring pressure on Namibia and Rhodesia too, and there is a limit to what the traffic will bear.

And hint here [in the trip talking points) that the British role isn't that crucial.

Robinson: Will these be reviewed with Duff?
Schaufele: No. Later, yes.
Kissinger: Say, I want to review the concept with them.

Don't give them the 1978 date yet. We'll do it later. I don't even want to give it to the British.

“We know there are reservations." Shall I send a violinist along? We're not paying people to stay. We're creating incentives to staythey get paid only for leaving, but they get paid less if they leave ear

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