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Number three, very strong feelings by Nyerere and Machel hoping that there will be no British colonial role. As you know, the most would be a diplomatic role.
Kissinger: Nyerere tells us he gives you credit for resisting American pressure. (Laughter)
Crosland: Number four is our impressions of Machel.
Rowlands: I don't know if Bill agrees, but we thought Machel was most impressive and had stronger insights.
Kissinger: More than Nyerere?
Rowlands: Because his experiences are more recent. And he is pragmatic. Because he fears an armed struggle on his territory.
Rowlands: Yes. He fears internationalization of the struggle. He is perceptive about the transition period. He feared an undefeated white army, and a police problem.
Kissinger: Did FRELIMO really win, or did the situation in Portugal collapse?
Duff: FRELIMO history is that they defeated Portugal.
Kissinger: But what are the facts? Our impression is neither FRELIMO nor the Angolan groups were gaining much until Portugal collapsed. But it's irrelevant, because it's the myth.
Rowlands: He feared a divided security situation with the Rhodesian army and his forces intact. So he felt it should be telescoped. He thinks he can win by peaceful means anyway: If the guerrillas participate in the negotiations, he feels his people can win.
He was also extremely suspicious about our approach—thinking we're trying to put in a Western-based government, a puppet.
Kissinger: He's right!
Rowlands: He's afraid we're trying to perpetuate a colonial system. He'll be more critical of the guarantee scheme.
Kissinger: You didn't give him the scheme.
Rowlands: No. We said something like this might be important for the economic development of Zimbabwe.
Crosland: Their impressions were, number one, personal—his intelligence—and number two, that he doesn't want an internationalization of the war. And number three, he is genuinely sympathetic to our proceeding on these lines.
Rowlands: He was extremely shaken by these attacks from Rhodesia. He hadn't expected that.
Kissinger: That impression coincides with ours. He approached us after the attack, and expressed a real interest in what we were doing.
Rowlands: He was the only one who had a brief, and had read into it.
Crosland: (gesturing at the Secretary's lack of a briefing book:) That's not a terribly tactful thing to say. (Laughter)
Kissinger: We briefed you, as you did us, on a daily basis. Our impression substantially coincides with yours.
With respect to Rhodesia, the various leaders including Machel wish us well in the effort, but have confused and slightly disagreeing notions of how to bring it to a conclusion.
All of them distrust Smith. All of them give you credit for rejecting our proposal for colonial rule. (Laughter) All of them agree the government won't be headed by Nkomo but must be more broadly based.
But the question is what they mean by these general formulations. They're all, except Machel, totally mystified by how they'll unify the Zimbabwe nationalists. It is easier to blame the white governments than themselves.
I have the impression, which may be wrong, that they are scarcely less terrified we won't deliver Smith than that we will deliver Smith.
Secondly, these leaders—again except for Machel—are uncertain what they can deliver. Nyerere and Kaunda, if alone, would be fairly responsive to the kind of plan we have, and willing to take two risksthat Smith will not accept, or that Smith will accept and they will be accused by Machel of selling out the others. So they are torn between fear of failure and fear of success.
Machel knows what he is doing. He wants a Rhodesian government as analogous to his as he can get, and achieved by methods as analogous to his as he can get.
The formula they have all hit on as a way out of this is to put in a transitional government now, with a black majority, and after that they will unify the Zimbabwean nationalists.
Rogers: It's Kaunda's view.
Grennan: What Machel wants overridingly is a peaceful settlement. The other is secondary.
Kissinger: The problem we have—I don't know about the U.K.-I don't see how we can put in a black government unconditionally without any prior assurances of what it will be like.
Duff: We haven't seen that.
Kissinger: No, we haven't any proposals like this. They say it orally: if the transitional government is put in, their fear of Smith's duplicity disappears.
Duff: With us, they all accepted the interim stage to negotiate a new government. He said to us: who is going to be the negotiator with the Zimbabwean nationalists?
Kissinger: There are two possibilities: A white government different from Ian Smith negotiates majority rule with British non-colonial assistance. The second situation is they insist a black majority government is put in immediately, with some white participation, and that negotiates a constitution.
Rowlands: Nowhere did we have difficulty with the idea of a white caretaker government to negotiate with the blacks. Machel kept asking who will be the “new force" the Zimbabweans would negotiate with? We said the caretaker government. Machel didn't demur at that.
Kissinger: For how long would it be?
Kissinger: I can see a white government without Smith negotiating. It's not for us to say how long, but ten days to two weeks means in effect immediately. A serious negotiation for guarantees wouldn't be years but at least months.
Rowlands: I think without Smith, they would be more flexibleten days or three months.
Kissinger: We don't mind if they settle. But is it a serious negotiation, or an immediate handover?
Rowlands: We weren't sure how far we could go in our initial soundings. We both fudged it because we didn't want to unveil the package.
Kissinger: The experience of the two Bills was that whenever they discussed the package, the Presidents said: “This is mechanics."
Rowlands: Yes. They said: "Smith must go."
Kissinger: Your conclusion is: Number one, Smith must go. Number two, there must be a negotiation between a successor white government and a black negotiating team. They will then agree on a provisional government. Independence comes into being some stated period thereafter. Full independence, Bill?
Rogers: You have come away with a clearer impression than we did of a serious negotiation.
Kissinger: Our impression is they are really saying to us: “Hand over power first, and we will sort out the unity of the Zimbabwean nationalists." Nyerere is saying: "Let's first sort out the unity of the Zimbabwean nationalists and then hand over power.
Frankly, this would greatly affect my discussions with Vorster.
Duff: Nyerere didn't want to get into the mechanics, but he said: “Maybe with a new white government, that in itself would be a catalyst for the blacks to get together.”
Kissinger: Caretaker means a white government?
Palliser: One element is the very deep suspicion of these Africans of Smith, Vorster, and your relationship with them. We think if it is clear Smith is for the birds, the other difficulties will go.
Kissinger: They ask us to use our influence with the South Africans; then when we do it, they are suspicious.
Rowlands: Their suspicions would grow if they see no results, if Smith hangs around. If they see results, I think the problems will disappear.
To summarize: Kaunda is not willing to talk about beyond stage one, but I think if Smith is delivered, he'll go along.
With Nyerere, we went over the caretaker government. He didn't demur; he said it's mechanics which we could talk about. His concern is he couldn't organize the blacks. The blacks would come in; we would legalize it; and he would be left holding the “hot baby," as he put it.
With Machel, I went over the caretaker idea. Then the interim government I said would be responsible for the security situation. Then he said it would be short.
Kissinger: What about guarantees?
Kissinger: So it will all depend on who controls the interim government.
Crosland: Your fear is we may end up with a black government that may drive out the whites. If we proceed down this road, this is one risk we have to take. This looms larger than five weeks ago.
question is, do we proceed?
Kissinger: To describe the worst thing that can happen: A white government that comes in under massive American pressure. The blacks then break apart, and war breaks out, and you have an Angola in Rhodesia.
Rowlands: But they are all against it.
Kissinger: But the question then is, why did it have to be us? Americans would rather, I think, see the blacks overthrow the whites than see us do it.
Crosland: It wouldn't come to that. The blacks would not have the power to drive them out.
Kissinger: After my Lusaka speech,? I received 1800 letters, 23 of which supported it. After months of public education, I have received 120 letters of which 36 support it. So I have moved from 99% against to 66% against
Crosland: My experience is the same. My constituency in Grimsby is restrained by illiteracy, and most of the mail concerns whether I wear white tie with the Queen.
But there will be a military confrontation in Rhodesia, because the whites will fight.
Kissinger: Would David Smith be able to fight?
Grennan: The four Presidents would be eager for a political settlement.
Kissinger: Will they remain united?
Kissinger: Can any black President take a position less radical than any other?
Rowlands: Only if the end is in view.
Kissinger: So we're back at the position of before: The British view is that the removal of Ian Smith unlocks everything. My view has been no, but I'm open minded.
Rowlands: We couldn't tell them how Smith would be got to yield. Neither I nor Bill could tell them how. So they weren't focusing on beyond that
Kissinger: Are they saying this because the problems are so overwhelming on their side that they want to blame it on the whites, or is it what they really believe? Really the reason I ask is that they send us imploring letters not to move "on the ground” because they're not