meet on Sunday; so our press concluded it was to protest against the Philadelphia speech.? Crosland: On Rhodesia, a question about this fund. Because we have published our expenditure. A question also about your visit to Paris. Should we express support for Giscard's African funds and link it to this? Kissinger: I think we can get the Germans to put money into Namibia, either through that fund or directly. I suspect we'll have massive problems getting the South Africans to put money into Rhodesia. Crosland: Really. Kissinger: He made that clear in June. Palliser: There are a lot of South Africans living in Rhodesia who would benefit. Duff: 55,000-60,000. Kissinger: Are they Afrikaners or British? Duff: Afrikaners. Schaufele: Vorster described them as having rights of residency. Crosland: On the basis of it. Kissinger: That that is what we will take to the Africans. Crosland: Yes. You will be back here Monday' to talk to the Prime Minister. Of course, we're not committed formally to anything as a government. If the omens are good on Monday... Kissinger: I'm, of course, assuming you're prepared to proceed on a jointly prepared paper. Crosland: It is virtually certain. But I can't tell what the Prime Minister will do. Kissinger: The paper is the same. Duff: The new Annex C deals with the Interim government. 7 Kissinger delivered a speech entitled "The Challenges of Africa" on August 31 before the Opportunities Industrialization Centers in Philadelphia, in which he criticized apartheid and South Africa's continued involvement in Namibia. (Department of State Bulletin, September 20, 1976, pp. 349-357) 8 In May President Giscard d'Estaing proposed a fund to be composed of contributions from Western donors for the purpose of assisting development in African nations. President Ford approved U.S. membership in the African Development Fund in November. See Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, volume E-6, Documents on Africa, 1973-1976, Documents 49, 52, 54, 56, and 57. 9 September 6. Kissinger: Can you give us Annex C? If we agree with it, we can give it to the South Africans. Duff: Yes. (He gives the Secretary Tab A)10 Kissinger: Can we talk about Namibia? Crosland: Yes. Kissinger: I see no essential differences between the two positions. Kissinger: I appreciate that our two delegations spoke to the Africans in practically identical terms. Crosland: Yes. Kissinger: I appreciate it. On both Rhodesia and Namibia. As I see it, the issue is to have the Windhoek Conference moved to Geneva, and have SWAPO participate, and some UN involvement. And maybe get some prisoners released. What may not be possible is to turn the Geneva Conference immediately into a SWAPO-South African negotiation. We get two signals. One is that one side can call it one thing and the other will call it another. That doesn't bother me. The other signal is that we will get more demands—that South Africa immediately withdraw its troops. My feeling is that once the Conference is assembled, it will be the outcome of independence. But I think there is a limit to how far Vorster can go in the first round. So this is the area of uncertainty. We can probably figure out some way for South African participation. We need some way to get this Conference going. Once it gets going, it will develop its own logic. If it were just one, we could say this. But when they're all together, what Neto advises them no one knows. Grennan: I don't think there will be problems on these others, but the basic precondition was unstated—that South Africa participates. I don't see how SWAPO can participate in the Conference, call it what you will, if South Africa demonstrably refuses to participate. Kissinger: We'll see. The problem is what we got is what Nyerere asked for in June. And we got a date for independence, which he didn't ask for. Grennan: Probably Nyerere got it wrong and assumed the South Africans were there, at the Windhoek Conference. Kaunda said it didn't make any difference if the tribal groups, the "racist puppets," were there because the South Africans were. The other preconditions would drop away. 10 Tab A is an undated British discussion paper entitled "Rhodesia: Possible Constitutional Arrangements for the Period of Transition." Kissinger: I feel that too, unless these guys lock themselves into something in Dar. What will Neto do? The Soviet Ambassador made an attack on us-he lumped us together. Ramsbotham: I wonder if it is worth considering whether a British message to Nyerere, urging them not to tie themselves to something... Kissinger: I'm more worried about what they say publicly. Schaufele: I'm more worried about what they say publicly on Namibia than on Rhodesia. Crosland: We could say that after the visits of Duff and Rowlands, it would be useful if they don't make any public statements. We are keeping the door open and we think they should. (To Schaufele:) You still oppose it? Kissinger: He was against our doing it. If you told him it was your judgment, based on your conversations, or your impression of our attitude, that they shouldn't commit themselves to anything ...... Schaufele: Not to Kaduma. Lord: There's some advantage in doing it today, before you see Vorster. Kissinger: They know we're meeting. We settled Africa. Now to the rest of the world. [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Rhodesia and Namibia.] 203. Memorandum of Conversation1 Zurich, September 6, 1976, 8:30 a.m.-12:06 p.m. PARTICIPANTS South Africa: Balthazar Johannes Vorster, Prime Minister Amb. B.G. Fourie, Secretary for Foreign Affairs Gen. H.J. Van den Bergh, Director, Bureau of State Security, Security Adviser to Amb. R.F. Botha, Ambassador to the U.S. and Permanent Representative to the U.S.: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State William D. Rogers, Under Secretary for Economic Affairs Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Executive Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Under Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff Amb. William E. Schaufele, Jr., Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff [The Secretary and the Prime Minister conferred privately in the Secretary's suite from 8:30 to 9:00 a.m. [At 9:00 a.m., they were joined by Mr. Rogers and the members of the South African delegation. [After a few minutes the South African Prime Minister and delegation went to the adjoining room to confer on the documents for Rhodesia and Namibia. [At 9:35 a.m., the other members of the U.S. delegation joined the Secretary and Mr. Rogers.] Kissinger: Win, my instinct tells me your darlings are going to kick me in the teeth. Have you seen the Dar newspapers? They are debating whether to "invite me" to Africa to continue the negotiations. They are saying the blacks will never be party to anything that "perpetuates imperialism in Africa." It's the Soviet line. It is what the Soviet Ambassador in Zambia was saying. They are determined not to allow what happened in the Middle East to happen again. Especially because in Africa we have no cards. 1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 345, Department of State, Memoranda, Memoranda of Conversations, External, September 4-14, 1976. Secret; Nodis. Initialed by Rodman. The meeting was held in the Dolder Grand Hotel. Brackets are in the original. [Fourie comes out of the side room.] Fourie: All right, we are ready. Kissinger: I want to speak to the Prime Minister alone for a few minutes. [At 10:02 a.m, the full meeting began downstairs in the meeting room:] Kissinger: To me, the amazing thing in the Syrian-Israeli negotiations is that both sides are nearly identical in their approach to negotiating. Yet each one thinks it is morally superior to the other. I got a massage in the hotel in Jerusalem. The masseur said he prayed for me every night. I said "How many kilometers are you willing to give up?" He said: "Kilometers? None!" [Laughter] Gentlemen, Mr. Prime Minister, we have to discuss two things: the substance of where we are going, and the contingencies that may arise and the procedures we would follow. On substance, we have three papers. -One, the paper Britain handed us on Rhodesia ["Annex C" at Tab A].2 My estimate is it is substantially agreed, allowing for the margin of negotiations. -Second, the document on economic and political guarantees for Rhodesia as agreed between Rogers and Fourie [Tab B]. Vorster: And the period. Kissinger: That is in the document. Vorster: The period for this interim government. That, gentlemen, you must just accept from me: It's in the interest of both blacks and whites that it be as long as possible. Kissinger: But as we agreed privately-I will state it as my viewwhat will determine the outcome of the negotiation is not what is in the interest of whites and blacks but the power relationship. Vorster: The blacks will have their view, but they will want it as long as possible. I don't mean the Dar blacks but Nkomo and Gabella. I am sure. Kissinger: We won't oppose a longer period, but we can't be for more than 18 to 24 months. If the Rhodesian blacks want it, in a manner that can express itself, we won't oppose it. In the formal plan, it will be 18-24 months unless both parties agree to extend it. 2 Tab A, "Annex C," is attached but not printed. The document is entitled "Rhodesia: Possible Constitutional Arrangements for the Period of Transition." See footnote 10, Document 202. 3 Attached at Tab B is a paper entitled "International Economic Support for a Rhodesia Settlement," drafted by Rogers on September 5 and designated "Rev[ision]— 2." |