tend UN mandatory economic sanctions to include South Africa and Portugal, but would be carried out unilaterally if necessary. We would sharply increase assistance to the black states, and give non-military aid to the liberation movements. Operational Examples -Advocate in UN the extension of mandatory economic sanctions to Portuguese Territories and South Africa because of their evasion of sanctions against Rhodesia. -Toughen present sanctions against Rhodesia to include bans on tourism, postal facilities, telecommunications, and transportation, and include such provisions in eventual sanctions against Portuguese Territories and South Africa. -Reduce representation in South Africa to chargé and small staff, close consulates in white regime countries. -Withdraw NASA tracking station from South Africa. -Afford substantial economic assistance to black states of the region, particularly Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. -Furnish non-sophisticated defense matériel and training in the United States for selected military personnel from Zambia and Tanzania. -Declare public support for the objectives of the liberation organizations and furnish them non-military assistance. -Withdraw USIS and terminate U.S. exchange programs in white-regime areas; expand these programs in the black states. Pros 1. Clear U.S. position on side of majority rule brings our actions into alignment with our declared political position and therefore would increase our influence throughout black Africa. 2. Decisive action by U.S. might induce white regimes to make needed reforms before violence erupts. 3. Policy puts U.S. on eventual winning side, thus undercutting communist influence on liberation effort and insuring long-term dominant U.S. influence in most developed part of Africa. Cons 1. U.S. initiative in UN would be unlikely to gain support of U.K., France and perhaps others, leaving us to go it alone. 2. Experience with Rhodesia suggests that even stringent sanctions tend to increase siege mentality and unify white minorities. 3. Heavy repercussions from sanctions would fall on new, economically weak African states, particularly Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. These would have to be given economic compensation. 4. The U.S. would have sacrificed a range of valuable material interests in the southern region without reasonable assurances that disruptive conflict would be thereby averted. Assistant Secretary David D. Newsom, Bureau of African Affairs At Assistant Secretary Newsom's request, Ambassador Taswell called at 3:00 December 15 to discuss the visa case of US tennis star Arthur Ashe. Taswell reported that Ashe had applied for a South African visa this morning. He was most courteously received, and when an INS photographer asked to take his picture with the South African Consul General, Ashe declined. Taswell said he thought this wise, as it is preferable to avoid publicity over the case while it is being considered. Secretary Newsom said the Ashe visa case is a matter of concern to the US, as the Administration genuinely wishes to improve relations with South Africa. Incidents like those over the visa applications of Congressmen Diggs and Reid have a special importance, as they tend to inhibit actions on the part of the US that might lead to smoother relations with South Africa. He said approval of Ashe's visa application would enable the SAG to show itself in a more favorable light than it had done in the Diggs/Reid cases, and he urged that the SAG give Ashe's application careful, and hopefully favorable consideration. 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, PPT Ashe, Arthur. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Crosby on December 19. Taswell responded that he would relay Secretary Newsom's comments and request to Pretoria, as he had done with Ambassador Rountree's request for an appointment with Foreign Minister Muller and Prime Minister Vorster. Taswell hoped the visa could be issued, but he pointed out the case was difficult both because of hostile statements Ashe had made about South Africa and because of the coincidence of the tennis tournament and South Africa's general elections next April. Secretary Newsom said we have no confirmation that Ashe had actually made the statements attributed to him by Sports Minister Waring. He said Ashe is no extremist, and we believe he wants to play tennis in South Africa, not engage in politics there. Taswell observed that Mr. Reinhardt of USIA had just visited South Africa and asked whether he, a Negro, had found it "indescribably bad". Mr. Newsom said Mr. Reinhardt had been well received and every effort was made to ensure that no incidents took place. Without such special measures, however, it would have been very difficult for him indeed. Taswell replied that numbers of Negro boxers have visited South Africa from the US without incident, but he granted that there is a real problem in the restrictions imposed on non-whites. The meeting concluded after about 15 minutes. 19. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Pretoria, December 16, 1969, 1030Z. 3471. Subj: Ashe Visa. Ref: State 206809.2 1. I met last evening upon my return with Foreign Minister to urge issuance of visa to Arthur Ashe. I explained personal interest of President and Secretary and effects denial of visa could have. 2. Foreign Minister was obviously impressed by what I said. While making clear he not repeat not purporting give me reply at this junc 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, PPT Ashe, Arthur. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Cape Town, Durban, and Johannesburg. 2 In telegram 206809 to Pretoria, December 12, the Department outlined the next steps for Rountree to facilitate Ashe's visa. (Ibid.) ture, he spoke at length about problems confronting government re visa issue. Coming as it does at critical time in election campaign, government's treatment of matter might become very important domestic issue. Moreover, problem increased by highly inflammatory statements made earlier by Ashe and widely reported by SA press. Particularly damaging were alleged statements that Ashe would like to drop bomb on Johannesburg, and that if he should come to SA it would be for purpose of breaking crack in wall of SA racial policies. Foreign Minister had understood Ashe more recently had commented that any visit to SA would be to play tennis, not to engage in politics, but damage had been done. He speculated as to whether visa might be issued on specific conditions, but to this I replied that offer of conditional visa to Congressman Diggs had been considered even more offensive than if visa had been denied outright. Nature and wording of conditions would of course be important aspect. Foreign Minister then speculated as to whether, in lieu of conditional visa, Ashe might unilaterally give "undertaking" concerning his activities while here. To be useful for SA domestic purpose, however, there would have to be some publicity which he and I agreed might present difficult problems. This possibility was not, however, ruled out. 3. Foreign Minister said that he had already spoken with all of his colleagues, including Waring, who might make statements on visa question, and in response to my request made through Ambassador Taswell he thought no South African Government official would make further statements with respect to matter pending completion of our discussions. He expressed strong view that I should see Prime Minister, who presently in remote part of Port Elizabeth area, and asked if I would accompany him on visit there. In light my affirmative reply he later telephoned Prime Minister and arranged that we would meet him in Port Elizabeth on Friday, December 19, returning Pretoria that afternoon. 4. I shall report further after my talks with Prime Minister. Meanwhile I am hopeful SAG will not further reduce flexibility by additional public statements. 5. Would appreciate early indication status Ashe's formal visa request. Rountree 20. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting1 Washington, December 17, 1969. PARTICIPANTS The President Vice President Agnew Secretary of Defense Laird General George A. Lincoln, Director, OEP Attorney General Mitchell Acting Secretary of Commerce Rocco Siciliano Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman, JCS Director of Central Intelligence Helms Ambassador Charles W. Yost, US Rep. to the UN Under Secretary of State Richardson Lawrence A. Fox, Acting Assistant Secretary of Commerce David D. Newsom, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs William Watts, NSC Roger Morris, NSC Clinton Conger, Chief, Presentations Staff, CIA RN-This is a peripheral issue. But we need a frank discussion; we must cover the operational decisions. I will make no final decisions today. It is an important question, as there are moral and domestic political issues involved. Many people have been asking about this. We have put them off by saying that there was an NSC meeting coming up. Rogers-Many of us have worked on this subject for some time, particularly lawyers who have had clients in Southern Africa. RN-Did all of you get to see Ambassador Rountree when he was here recently? He is a very balanced man, and he is sitting on a volcano. Helms (oral briefing given by Helms is attached.)2 Kissinger-We have approached this policy question in two stages: to reach a decision on general posture, first, and then to deal 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-026, National Security Council Meetings, NSC Meeting 12/17/69 Southern Africa. Secret. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room at the White House from 10:03 a.m. to 12:03 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary) 2 The briefing is attached but not printed. The report provided some background on the history of the white minority regimes and the various insurgency movements in the region. The report concluded that due to the strength of these regimes, and the weakness of the insurgents, there was little prospect for change in the region for the foreseeable future. |