Nyerere: I said the UN presence could be symbolic, provided the Secretary-General accepts this and comes. He can say, "I'm glad you're getting together." And he can leave. He could leave someone there, for all I care. We could agree beforehand on a neutral chairman.

Kissinger: In Zurich, Vorster would hear nothing of South African participation.

Nyerere: Then he doesn't want to settle.

Kissinger: In Germany [June 23–24] I had urged him to accept moving the conference to Geneva, so we didn't put great weight on it.2 Nyerere: He might have said no.

Kissinger: But I added it only when I became aware of the feeling of the black Africans.

Nyerere: A Constitutional Conference must involve the colonial power. If they don't come, leave it to the United Nations. I think they would like this less than the first. It is we who should be embarrassed by this. If they are embarrassed, we can say "Get out-the UN can take over."

Kissinger: My understanding is they are not participating in Windhoek right now.

Nyerere: No. It is my misunderstanding too; I thought they were. I discovered later the South Africans say they are not in there. So both of us were misled. I'm sorry.

Kissinger: That's not the point. In a serious negotiation no one can mislead anybody because it will come out.

Nyerere: We assumed all the time the South Africans were there. It turns out they were not.

Kissinger: All right. I understand the problem. I don't know what I can achieve. We will have to see when I come back.

Now on Rhodesia, just to clarify my thinking:

It is my understanding, when we talk about these various guarantee schemes, this is not an issue in black Africa.

It is a little more complicated than buying out the whites. It is a fund to put money into the economy, and also for the whites. I have got confirmation from Britain, Germany, France-and Callaghan is in Canada.

Nyerere: This idea is my child! I told Mr. Wilson they would only be deciding where they go.

Kissinger: It's easier for us domestically if we say it is to make them stay.

2 See Document 196.

Nyerere: I understand completely.

Kissinger: It is better if they don't all go at once. You personally have no problem with it?

Nyerere: No problem whatsoever. No problem.

Kissinger: The third issue is: You said a Chissano Government is all right.

Nyerere: Yes. What I précis as a Chissano Government.

Kissinger: That was a white High Commissioner.

Nyerere: Yes.

Kissinger: This is instead of one white governor; it's a body that has three whites but some black participation. We can leave it to the British.

Nyerere: I'd go easy on that one. Let's leave it to the British. What they want is a formula that restores their authority, their presence, before independence.

Kissinger: They could do it with the Governor; it makes no difference.

Nyerere: In Maputo, the High Commissioner had his own staff and Chissano had his own staff.

Kissinger: And it avoids a white panic.

Nyerere: I understand completely. The British can do it how they

want.

Kissinger: So there is a misunderstanding.
Nyerere: During the transition.

Kissinger: During the transition we need a white presence that gives confidence to the white community and we don't have to decide how to do it one man, or one man with advisers, or a body. The Constitutional Conference can do it.

Nyerere: The British have lots of experience with it.

Kissinger: I understand.

Let me see if I have any other questions. [Looks at folder and checklists.]

Okay, I think that's all the substantive issues.

Let's decide what we say to the press. I'll say we had good talks. I'll be asked "Was progress made?" I'll say "This isn't the place to make progress. I came here to get ideas to take to the other side. But the attitude was constructive and in this sense, the talks were useful."

I'll be asked if President Nyerere approves the guarantee plan. Can I say this is between the outside powers and the settlers? Or can I say there is no objection?

Nyerere: I have no objection on my part. You can say that.

rule.

Kissinger: That is the easiest.

What are the procedures?

Nyerere: It depends on whether Rhodesia will accept majority

Kissinger: On Namibia, if we can avoid going into too much detail. I can say I understand what President Nyerere considers the essential requirements, and we have to see what Pretoria considers its essential requirements.

Nyerere: No problem.

Kissinger: I can say the United States believes SWAPO has to be represented.

Nyerere: No one will ask me about the presence of South Africa because the press assumes they will be there. If they ask me, I'll say so. But I think I'm going to be quite safe.

Kissinger: To follow you is no easy task. You're a master!

Nyerere: If I have no answer, I just smile. [Laughter]

Muganda: You said you wanted our press to ask a question.

Kissinger: About SWAPO participation. I'll say our position is it should include all significant groups and SWAPO is one. I can't say now that SWAPO is the only one. But you can.

Nyerere: I will. But I really won't. Because I don't want to prejudice the South Africans' decision.

Muganda: What excuse does Vorster give for not talking with

SWAPO?

Kissinger: Because he thinks they are a bunch of gangsters. [Laughter] But he says there was a time when SWAPO didn't want to talk to him.

Nyerere: But they changed! South Africa will change.

Kissinger: The question is whether we can organize the conference before South Africa changes. Because I think once the conference begins, world public opinion will be on the side of SWAPO. The outcome is inevitable.

step.

Nyerere: I agree.

Kissinger: So I see the convening of the assembly as the decisive

Nyerere: I take your point. I agree.

Kissinger: Because South Africa probably won't agree right away. South Africa will say it is Windhoek plus SWAPO. You will say it is SWAPO plus Windhoek. But reality will take over. Why should Namibia be the only state in Africa organized by tribes and not by national movements? The U.S. has no interest. This, incidentally, is a better as

surance than anything I can give. Because a new Secretary of State could change his mind.

In Zurich he said no, he wouldn't come in any capacity, so it may be theoretical. In Zurich, he said he wouldn't pay for the conference. That is what he said.

Nyerere: The United Nations can pay for it.

Kissinger: I told him not to worry about it; someone would pay. Maybe Nelson Rockefeller would pay for it.

Nyerere: Or Lonrho. The uranium companies.

Kissinger: Who gets the uranium?

Nyerere: The British and the Germans.

Kissinger: Giscard said: When you ask Schmidt, he will say Provision 114 (b) of the Constitution prohibits it. I asked Schmidt. He said "Provision 114 (b) of our Constitution prohibits it." I asked him about Namibia, and he said that there it was possible.

I'll tell Kaunda on the 22nd. He told me he would come back. Can you be there?

Nyerere: I'll talk to him.

Kissinger: Probably Vorster will agree to all your points—UN participation, SWAPO participation, South African participation.

Nyerere: South Africa is the colonial power. The UN can be symbolic.

Kissinger: I appreciate my talks with you, Mr. President.

Nyerere: I hope you will get these two conferences going. Kissinger: I received a message from President Asad: He thinks the South Africans must be advising the Lebanese because they are so stubborn. [Laughter]

Kissinger: In Rhodesia, there is one issue: Will Smith agree? If he doesn't, we fail. In Namibia, the issues are more complicated. We will know when I come back.

205.

Memorandum of Conversation1

Lusaka, September 16, 1976, 4 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Kaunda

Foreign Minister Mwali

Mark Chona, Special Assistant to the President for Foreign Affairs

Ambassador Peter Kassanda

Secretary Kissinger

Under Secretary Rogers

Assistant Secretary Schaufele

Assistant Secretary Reinhardt
Mr. Wisner, Notetaker

Kaunda: Welcome, Mr. Secretary of State, to Zambia. You are on a difficult but important mission.

Kissinger: I want to thank you, Mr. President, for a truly warm welcome and your gracious words. The general atmosphere which you have set is particularly helpful after the events of yesterday in Tanzania. You know that the press has reported President Nyerere is hostile to our undertaking. Press reports of that sort encourage all of the wrong forces in the United States. You will recall after my speech in Lusaka all hell broke loose in the southern states. I really appreciate the friendly reception. Mr. President, this entire initiative started here in Lusaka. It was based, in fact, on your visit to the United States when you brought to our attention the problems of your region.2 You are on the front line and you have made courageous efforts to achieve peace. We are now learning how difficult peace can be. We are beginning to understand the cast of characters with which you are so familiar. Your advice and assistance has been invaluable. Which of the two problems we need to discuss would you like me to address first?

Kaunda: I have brought in several colleagues who can add their comments on the events of recent weeks.

Kissinger: There are really three problems. Namibia, Rhodesia and finally the situation in South Africa. With regard to Zimbabwe, it is my observation that the procedure is quite easy, but substantively the problem is difficult. If the Salisbury authorities accept majority rule, we can organize a conference which will work out the steps leading to in

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 345, Department of State, Memoranda, Memoranda of Conversations, External, September 15-17, 1976. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held at State House.