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sions on gold. (Reuss's Joint Economic Subcommittee has just issued a report opposing any settlement with South Africa.)
The U.S. proposal was developed solely on its monetary merits, however, and will be readily justifiable. The understanding will clearly be part of an international endeavor, with the European countries and the IMF, and Treasury's press release makes this clear. The agreement should not cause any significant foreign or domestic political problems; failure to settle would clearly have caused problems with some of the Europeans, and now was the best time to settle in view of the mechanism of the gold price and hence South Africa's negotiating position. State was fully involved in the development of the U.S. position and concurs with it.3
In a December 22 memorandum to Kissinger, Bergsten noted: “State in fact helped Treasury draw up the negotiating position for the understanding and fully agreed with it.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 744, Country Files, Africa, South Africa, Vol. I) On December 29, Nixon wrote at the bottom of the last page of Kissinger's memorandum: “I approve-We had better look after our own interests where national security + int'l monetary matters are involved."
Based on the meeting of the National Security Council on December 17,2 the President has made the following decisions with regard to U.S. policies toward Southern Africa:
1. Our Consulate in Salisbury, Rhodesia, will be retained so long as the legal question of U.S. recognition does not arise. If this question does arise—through British withdrawal of accreditation or by the Rhodesians' raising the question of the Consulate's status—the President will review our policy.
2. With regard to the issue of imports of chrome from Rhodesia, the Departments of State, Treasury, Justice and Commerce should study the Union Carbide case under the chairmanship of the Justice Department to clarify its status under present regulations, with interdepartmental differences to be resolved by Justice. This study should be submitted to the White House by February 15.' With this case clarified, the more general issue of our policy on imports of Rhodesian chrome should be presented again to the President for decision.
3. Naval vessels should continue through 1970 to limit calls at South African ports to emergencies only.
4. The arms embargo on South Africa will be maintained.
5. Non-lethal equipment which has dual civilian and military uses will be excepted from the arms embargo on Portugal.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-213, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 38. Top Secret; Nodis. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
2 See Document 20.
6. Southwest African issues should be played down at the U.N. to head off the prospect of a U.S. veto, until the situation clarifies. Once the outcome of the U.N. Security Council debate is clear, the issue may be presented again through the NSC system to the President for long-range decision.
7. The President has directed that individual provisions of this NSDM be communicated for purposes of implementation strictly on a need-to-know basis. He expects the security classification and very limited dissemination of the memorandum as a whole to be observed scrupulously.
The President has directed a study of U.S. policy on Southwest Africa (Namibia) in light of NSDM 382 and the United Nations Security Council's decision to establish an ad hoc subcommittee to recommend further steps to carry out relevant UN resolutions.3
This study should:
--briefly summarize past developments, the current situation, and likely prospects both in Africa and the United Nations;
-examine U.S. interests and objectives;
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 19 SW AFR. Secret. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence.
2 Document 23.
3 For details on the establishment of the ad hoc subcommittee (Resolution 276 of January 30), its recommendations, and actions taken by the Security Council and General Assembly, see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1970, pp. 734-746.
-propose optional U.S. policy courses for the longer term, including any specific proposals needed to implement them over the coming months.
This paper should be drafted by an ad hoc group chaired by a representative of the Secretary of State including representatives of the action addressees of this memorandum and of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.
The paper should be submitted to the NSC Review Group by Feb
Henry A. Kissinger
Memorandum for the Record
Washington, February 27, 1970.
British Démarche on Rhodesia
The British Minister came in at his request to request clarification of Ron Ziegler's statements to the press today2 concerning the status of our Consulate in Salisbury following the declaration of the Republic of Rhodesia. Roger Morris participated in the discussion. Mr. Millard was furnished the text of Ziegler's comments at the afternoon briefing today and was also referred to McCloskey's statement at noon today.
Millard then said on instructions that he wished to convey the utmost concern of HMG concerning our Consulate and to ask that a decision to withdraw it be made before midnight on Sunday. We explained that a decision one way or the other was unlikely in this time frame but that the status of the Consulate would of course be reviewed in the light of the new situation, as our public statements had indicated.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 726, Country Files, Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. II. Confidential. Sent to Kissinger. Printed from a copy that Haig initialed.
2 Telegram 30031 to Salisbury, February 28, transmitted Ziegler's statement that the L'nited States would maintain the Consulate in Rhodesia following the declaration of a Rhodesian republic, however, “this did not constitute recognition of Salisbury regime." (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 RHOD)
3 March 1.
Millard said he had come to the White House, rather than the State Department because it was thought that the matter had come up between the President and Prime Minister. I said I could not recall whether it had but that of course the Secretary of State had told Foreign Secretary Stewart that declaration of the Republic would bring about a new decision point. We told Millard that he should feel free to convey his instructions to the Department of State.
Millard was visibly disturbed about the possibility that no US decision would be forthcoming in the next two days. He said the British were asking us to withdraw because they hoped this would inhibit others who might be thinking of recognition (he did not know what countries might do this) and would also induce those countries maintaining consulates to withdraw them.
I assured Millard that I would bring his comments to the attention of Mr. Kissinger, noting at the same time that we were of course already fully aware of HMG's views.
See Document 16.
Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate in
Washington, February 28, 1970, 2233Z.
30186. Conakry for Asst Sec Newsom. Subj: British Démarche on AmConGen Salisbury. Ref: 29574.2
1. UK Minister Millard called on Acting Assistant Secretary Moore February 28 to deliver urgent British démarche calling for closure AmConGen Salisbury.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 RHOD. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Bruce and Jacobs, cleared in AF/S, and approved by Moore. Repeated Priority to Conakry and London; and repeated to Pretoria, Cape Town, Lusaka, and USUN.
2 Telegram 29574 to all African diplomatic posts, February 27, informed recipients of the dissolution of the Rhodesian Parliament on March 3 and the Department of State's response to press inquiries regarding the Consulate in Salisbury. (Ibid.)