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Secretary Kissinger: My own judgment is that if you could go to Vorster and say here is a concrete plan; I have the black Presidents and the Patriotic Front agreed to it. The civil service will stay in place; Vorster will agree. But if you give him nothing, he'll simply recite a long series of betrayals, dig himself in and you'll get nothing.

Congressman Young: The Nigerian role was interesting. Garba says he's never heard of Mugabe; that Mugabe is a plant.

Secretary Kissinger: (laughing) Is he our plant? (Turning to Vance) I never did get AF under control.

Mr. Habib: Mugabe may be a bit more responsive to control by Nyerere and not so much by Kaunda.

Secretary Kissinger: It's a bit like dealing with the Harvard faculty. (laughter)

Ambassador Reinhardt: He certainly has no following inside the


Congressman Young: My own feeling is that Muzorewa and Nkomo basically had no following with the guerrillas and no feeling for what they wanted.

Secretary Kissinger: If someone could plausibly tell Vorster that the Patriotic Front is only an instrument for arranging for a ceasefire and an interim government and will then be disbanded, my guess is that Vorster would probably go for it. I think there's about a 60-40 chance. But if this is simply put in some sort of vague form, Vorster is not going to agree.

Congressman Young: Chona has a plan to disperse the


Dr. Brzezinski: The white mercenaries?

Congressman Young: Yes. I don't know precisely how it will work.

Mr. Vance: Well, as I see it, we have a couple of things to do. First, I'll talk to Botha and tell him what we've agreed to. Then I'll ask Peter Ramsbotham whether they really want to go forward.

Congressman Young: I would think the British must be getting awfully tired of this by now.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, and you watch. They'll try to stick us with failure. Frankly, I think Richard should go home after he sees Vorster.

Ambassador Schaufele: My own fear is that the British will say look, we've got the nationalists on board, now you produce South Africa. The British, you know, haven't always kept us very well informed about what they're up to. We don't have any real idea what they're telling the nationalists.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, in my own view, the convincing argument why Richard should not go to Salisbury now, or even in the fore

seeable future, is if you're going to depend on Vorster to bring pressure on Smith, it's going to be harder if Smith is already on record as having rejected your proposals.

Mr. Habib: Publicly.

Secretary Kissinger: Publicly.

Congressman Young: I just can't see Ivor Richard with enough energy to push anything through right now. He should go home and rest.

Secretary Kissinger: My strong advice is I didn't have enough fire power in the remaining days of this Administration to compel either the nationalists or the Rhodesians to be sensible. But I think a halt has to be called to the nonsense. You put together a package that the blacks can agree on, you then can go to Vorster and say this is what we have gotten them to agree to. The white judiciary and civil service and defense will stay in place for the interim government. You tell the Patriotic Front if the whites don't get this, they don't agree. Chona recommended that they agree. I have no reason to believe that they would not agree.

Congressman Young: Is there any financial responsibility, Mr. Secretary, that we might have to take to Congress?

Secretary Kissinger: No, there is none apart from the Zimbabwe development fund, which you know about. We have commitments from a number of countries.

Congressman Young: Are we talking about very much—perhaps a billion dollars?

Secretary Kissinger: No, we're only talking about three or four hundred million and that over a period of five years.

Congressman Young: Would this be administered only by ourselves or could it go through an international institution such as the World Bank?

Ambassador Schaufele: The World Bank is interested in it.

Secretary Kissinger: We have no fixed ideas.
Mr. Vance: What's the best way out of this?
Secretary Kissinger: I should stay out of it.

Ambassador Schaufele: I'll talk to Botha and Peter Ramsbotham. Shall I refer to this meeting?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but just make sure that it's understood that it comes from Cy.

Mr. Vance: Yes, that's fine.

Congressman Young: We can say there's been a meeting of the two Administrations and a review of the policies to see where we are now. We can say we're encouraged by the progress shown so far.

Mr. Habib: I think they are simply waiting it out.

Mr. Vance: Yes, but if they know we're both behind it, it would be an encouraging sign.

Ambassador Schaufele: The South Africans, you know, are being very “iffy” about this. The latest note is very negative.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. I'm surprised and frankly, I gave Botha hell the other day.5

Ambassador Schaufele: He was quite negative on Namibia too. Maybe they're just posturing. I think the South Africans are just afraid the new Administration is going to be very hard on them.

Mr. Vance: Phil?

Mr. Habib: Part of the message to Botha might well be that Richard is going to fail and that they, the South Africans, should not drop the effort to find a negotiated solution just because Richard fails.

Secretary Kissinger: Now wait a minute. The message should be that the new Administration is behind the British effort and will do everything possible to help it succeed.

Mr. Vance: Yes. We want them to know that we will continue to be supportive.

Mr. Habib: And the second part would be not to leave the impression that Richard should go to Salisbury.

Mr. Vance: Oh, no. This is their decision that they have to make. We'll simply say that we believe that with good will and serious intent both sides can find a reasonable solution.

Secretary Kissinger: (laughs at the reference) You know, did I ever tell you the great one that Le Duc Tho played on me? He came up to me at the end of one of the Vietnam meetings and looked me in the eye and said, “You know, I want to talk to you with good will and serious intent-frankly, sincerely, open-heartedly—you're a liar." (great laughter)

Mr. Habib: What should we say to Ramsbotham?

Secretary Kissinger: Tell him exactly what you told the South Africans so they (the British) can't stick you with not having kept them fully informed. Secondly, you can say that we seriously question whether Richard should go to Salisbury because if he does go to Salisbury, Smith will simply reject it and it will complicate the burden Vorster will have of trying to sell Smith.

Ambassador Schaufele: There is an additional problem. If Andy Young goes to Zanzibar, he's going to get stuck with all sorts of questions.

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Congressman Young: I think I should simply say that I've been
sworn in less than a week. I'm there to listen. I'm not there to make

Mr. Vance: That's absolutely right, Andy.

Secretary Kissinger: What's going on in Zanzibar?

Ambassador Schaufele: It's the tenth anniversary of the Declara-
tion of Arusha.

(Meeting ended at 7:30 pm.)


References are to document numbers

Abshire, David M., 50

Abu Dhabi, 234

Acheson, Dean, 5, 11, 20

Aden, 35

Adham, Kamal Sheik, 162

African liberation movements, 68

African Party for the Independence of

Portuguese Guinea and Cape
Verde (PAIGC), 97

Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity
Organization, 92

Agency for International Development

(AID), 17, 52, 68

Agnew, Spiro T.:

NSC policy discussions on Southern
Africa, 20, 23
Portuguese role in Africa, 96
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, 28, 39
South West Africa/Namibia, 32
U.S. arms embargo on Southern
Africa, 40

Ahidjo, Ahmadou, 177

Ahmad Khalifa al-Sawaydi, 234

Alarcon DeQuesada, Ricardo, 132
Alexander, Edward J., 34
Algeria, 91, 160, 166

Allegheny Ludlum Steel, 239

Alves, Maj. Nito, 116

Alvor Accord, 129, 130

AMAX, 45

American Asbestos, 37

American Metal Climax, 53

Amin, Idi, 103, 120, 137, 139, 144

Andersen, Knud Borge, 234

Anderson, Jack, 161

Andrew, Robert, 135

Andrews, E.F. "Andy," 239

Angola (see also Angola and Angolan
subheadings under other subjects;
Political parties and liberation
movements; Popular Movement for
the Liberation of Angola):
Alvor Accord, 129, 130
Competing regimes for diplomatic

recognition, 135, 136, 171
Cuban involvement in, 132

[blocks in formation]

Saudi Arabian, 156, 159, 161, 162
Military situation in, 113, 116
Naval blockade of, 29

Nigerian-RSA talks over, 199
NSC meetings on, 113

OAU role in, 101, 105, 138, 139, 146,
150, 167

Peace talks among parties from, 101,

Portuguese policy toward, 109, 128,
129, 130

Portuguese rule in, 9, 116
Portuguese-U.S. talks on, 131, 160
Refugees from, 99, 103
Rhodesian role of, 113
RSA military role in:

African states' position, 167, 171

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