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Would not encourage expectations we cannot meet. Cons:

If this course of action is interpreted as evidence of declining U.S. energy on SWA issue, as it is likely to be, it would reflect adversely on our credibility on southern African issues in general and lend itself to communist exploitation.

Would not offer enough to black African states to head off demands for mandatory sanctions and could thus still pose a veto problem.

Would not persuade South Africa to change its South West African policy or to engage in serious negotiations. Option 2Take Selective Actions in Addition to Present Restrictions To Dissociate Ourselves From South Africa's Illegal Administration of

Territory Posture: Recognizing that there can be no immediate solution to the problem, U.S. would take selective unilateral and multilateral actionin addition to present restrictions—in order to dissociate ourselves more fully from South Africa's administration of SWA and to establish a credible position of upholding UN responsibility for Territory. We would attempt to dissuade the parties from taking actions prejudicial to the interests of the inhabitants or which would make the possibility of future negotiated settlement more remote. Operational Examples:

Depending upon tactical situation, we would take some or all of the following steps in addition to those in Option 1:

Publicly discourage U.S. investment in South West Africa.

Announce that U.S. nationals who invest in the Territory in the future on the basis of rights acquired through the South African Government since adoption of Resolution 2145 cannot expect U.S. Government assistance in protecting such investments against claims of a future lawful government of South West Africa.

Announce cut-off of Export-Import Bank facilities for trade with Territory.

Through our bilateral relations or the Security Council, as appropriate, encourage other countries to take actions parallel to these increased U.S. restrictions.

Support referral to International Court of Justice for advisory opinion on appropriate legal aspects of South Africa's administration of SWA.

Continue support of humanitarian efforts on behalf of South West Africans (UN programs, activities of private American church and legal groups).

To the extent that South Africa showed flexibility, be prepared to take proportionate action to reduce aforementioned restrictions on Territory Pros:

Would be consistent with U.S. support for human rights and self-determination.

Would demonstrate to UN and South Africa that the U.S. is willing to sacrifice some material interests in support of its avowed policy.

Would tend to preserve our freedom of action by limiting our economic stake and involvement in South West Africa.

Would help defer at least temporarily demands for mandatory sanctions and consequent possibility of U.S. veto.

Might secure support of moderate Africans who do not believe stronger measures are feasible. Cons:

Would cost us some trade and investment opportunities in the Territory.

Would still be criticized as inadequate, and would not eliminate likelihood of calls for more drastic measures.

Would not soon bring South Africa to negotiate seriously or make significant concessions on South West Africa. Option 3Join In International Efforts To Assert UN Responsibility for

Territory Posture: U.S. would take further positive steps to implement direct UN responsibility for Territory. Operational Examples:

In addition to steps listed in Options 1 and 2, U.S. would take the following actions:

In the Security Council subcommittee, seek recommendation to the General Assembly on revision of terms of reference of UN Council for South West Africa and/or the establishment of a new continuing body, such as the subcommittee itself, to explore alternative approaches to problem. Be prepared to become a member of such a body if we can be assured of practical terms of reference.

Study and, if feasible, support measures to divert to UN for administrative costs of UN Council for SWA and education expenses of SWA refugees, any foreign corporate taxes generated in Territory in the future.

Consider a Security Council resolution calling upon the UN Secretary General and member states to submit periodic reports on compliance with 1963 Security Council arms embargo on South Africa.


Contribute to a UN training program for South West African refugees.


Would be positive affirmation of U.S. commitment to human rights and self-determination in eyes of most of the world.

Would improve U.S. influence and standing in black Africa.

Assistance to refugees would help to meet humanitarian need and prepare them for future responsibilities. Cons:

Would not meet demands for mandatory sanctions.

Still would not be strong enough to persuade South Africa to accept UN role, much less to relinquish strategic area.

By creating bloc of potential South West African civil servants, refugee training could lead to pressures for government-in-exile.

Would impair U.S. relationships with South African Government, probably reflecting adversely on U.S. material interests in South Africa. VI. Analysis of New Actions under Options

A. Restrictions on U.S. Investment (Options 2 and 3)

Publicly discourage U.S. investment in South West Africa.

Present Policy: At present we neither encourage or discourage U.S. investment in South West Africa. (Options 2 and 3)

Announce cut-off of Export-Import Bank facilities for trade with Territory.

Present Policy: At present we allow short-term (up to 6 months) EXIM credit guarantees for such investment. But we have had only one request for EXIM help in the past 5 years.


. (Options 2 and 3)

Announce that investors subsequent to UNGA Resolution 2145 (October 1966) cannot expect U.S. Government assistance against claims of future lawful governments in SWA.


-Will demonstrate U.S. firmness of purpose to South Africa.

-Will strengthen our moral position in the UN by demonstrating good faith effort to give practical effect to UN resolutions.

-Discouraging further economic ties now would prevent U.S. from becoming "locked" economically—and politically-in SWA.

-Retroactive effect can be avoided, so that U.S. investment already in SWA need not be affected.

-U.S. Government will not in future be embarrassed by claim for protection.


-South Africa is unlikely to change its policy in response to such marginal moves.

-Proposed measures would not entirely cut off further U.S. investment.

-Unlikely that these measures will head off pressures for further and stronger measures.

- To the degree that U.S. investment is hampered, others (especially South Africans, British, and perhaps also the Germans) might

step in.

B. U.S. Policy at the UN (Options 2 and 3)

Support non-mandatory steps by Security Council to have all member States take actions similar to above unilateral steps.


-Will reduce risk of other states taking advantage of our self-abnegation.

-If other states refuse to go along, may ease African pressure on U.S. and divert pressure onto others.


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-Other investing and trading countries unlikely to follow us.

-Even if other nations follow U.S., measures unlikely to change SAG policies. (Option 3)

Consider a Security Council resolution calling on member states and the SYG to submit periodic reports to the Council on their application of the 1963 Security Council arms embargo on South Africa.

Present Policy: We have a strict embargo on the sale of military equipment to South Africa, but others (U.K., France, Italy) are less strict and the French, in particular, are quite lax in implementation.


-Gives us a chance to take political initiative.

- Reaffirming U.S. support for embargo and showing up others' non-compliance would ease African pressure on U.S.

-Tying arms embargo to situation in international Territory would strengthen authority of embargo.


-Would antagonize the French and, to a lesser degree, the British.

— Though our compliance has been better than others', we cannot expect Africans to shift their pressure onto U.K. and France. Africans are already aware of who sells most arms (France) and who trades most (U.K.) with South Africa.

-Will antagonize South Africans without depriving them of arms. (Option 3)

In Security Council subcommittee seek recommendation to General Assembly on revision of terms of reference of UN Council for SWA and for establishment of new continuing body and be prepared to become member if terms of reference are practical.

Present Policy: We abstained on UNGA resolution which created 11-member Council, primarily on grounds that its terms of reference were unrealistic and unachievable. (U.S. not a member.)


-Would allow U.S. to take constructive initiative, instead of remaining on defensive.

-Would strengthen our moral and political position by demonstrating willingness to study ways of effectuating UN responsibility for SWA.

-Might improve our chances of guiding UN discussion and action on the SWA issue.


-Would open up Council's composition and terms of reference to new pressures and bargaining. No guarantee of U.S. control or influence over outcome.

-Afro-Asian sponsors attach importance to Council as it is, and U.S. position might appear a negative one.

-Entities created by the General Assembly are less amenable to U.S. influence than the Security Council, where we have the option of a veto. (Option 3)

Actively support inclusion in UN regular budget of funds for education and training of indigenous Namibian refugees.

Present Policy: U.S. already supports humanitarian efforts on behalf of South West Africans (some UN programs; private U.S. church

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