certiorari should not issue to remove the above order of Sessions,

Howarth shewed cause.. -The proceedings were correct. Section 81. of the Poor Law Amendment Act requires the grounds of appeal to be sent fourteen days at least before the sessions at which the appeal is intended to be tried; the sessions, therefore, which were held on the 9th of April were impracticable for trial of the appeal, as being held within fourteen days from the time of the removal. Such being the case, the appeal was not obliged to be entered and respited at the April Sessions, but might be entered at the July, as being the first practicable sessions after the execution of the order-The King v. the Justices of Kent (1), The King v. the Justices of Devon (2), The King v. the Justices of Buckinghamshire (3), The King v. the Justices of Wilts (4). Then the appeal being once properly lodged, the Sessions had the power to adjourn it-The King v. the Justices of Wilts (5). It does not appear by the affidavits, whether the appeal was respited as a matter of course, or on special grounds; but, at all events, as the Sessions have exercised their discretion, this Court will not interfere with their determination in a matter upon which they had competent authority to decide.

M. Smith and Hawkins, contrà.—Admitting that the appellants might pass over the Easter Sessions, still they were bound to try, and not merely to enter and respite the appeal at the July Sessions. The statutes giving the right of appeal are 13 & 14 Car. 2. c. 12. and 3 & 4 Will. & M. c. 11, which have been construed to apply to the next practicable sessions. Formerly it was held necessary to enter and respite at the first sessions, although not a practicable sessions; but in The King v. the Justices of Kent and The King v. the Justices of Devon that was decided to be an useless act. The power of respiting is derived from the 9 Geo. 1. c. 7. s. 8, which is imperative in the cases to which it extends, but it only applies to the first sessions, whether practicable or not. The King v. the Justices of Monmouth

(1) 8 B. & C. 639.

(2) Ibid. n.; s. c. 7 Law J. Rep. M.C. 78.

(3) 3 East, 342.

(4) 8 B. & C. 380; s. c. 6 Law J. Rep. M.C. 97. (5) 13 East, 352.

shire (6) shews that it was not compulsory on the Sessions to adjourn the appeal at the second sessions. In no case can the final determination of the appeal be postponed beyond the second sessions after the grievance. But the case, on the other side, is rested on the general authority which the Sessions have to adjourn an appeal when once entered. It is not disputed that, if an appeal be properly entered for the purpose of trial, the Sessions have such authority, and that this Court will not interfere in such a case- -The King v. the Justices of Wilts and The King v. the Justices of the West Riding of Yorkshire (7) ;· but a mere entry ex parte, for the purpose of respiting the appeal, as this was, is not such an entry as will give the Sessions jurisdiction over the appeal, independently of the statute, which, it is submitted, does not apply to the July Sessions. The July Sessions, therefore, had no authority to adjourn the appeal, and consequently, the appeal was not properly continued to the Michaelmas Sessions.

[WIGHTMAN, J.-It comes to the question, whether, for all purposes, the first sessions within 9 Geo. 1. c. 7. s. 8. means the first actual or the first practicable sessions.]

Cur. adv. vult.

Judgment was now (Nov. 17th) delivered by

WIGHTMAN, J.-In this case an order of removal was made in February, and the paupers were actually removed on the 27th of March. The next sessions were holden in the early part of April, but there was not sufficient time to give the requisite notices and grounds of appeal in order to try, and nothing was done by the appellants at those sessions. At the July Sessions the appellants entered and respited an appeal ex parte, and without any notice to the respondents. On the 28th of September the appellants gave notice of appeal for the October Sessions, and delivered the grounds of appeal. The appeal came on to be heard at those sessions, and it was objected by the respondents that the appellants were too late, and that the Court had no jurisdiction,

(6) 3 Dowl. P.C. 306. (7) 4 Mau. & Selw. 327.

and that the appellants ought to have given their notices, &c. in time for the July Sessions, instead of merely entering and respiting the appeal ex parte. This objection was overruled by the Court, who heard and determined the case in favour of the appellants; and the question is, whether they had jurisdiction so to do. By the 13 & 14 Car. 2. c. 12. and 3 & 4 W. & M. c. 11, parties thinking themselves aggrieved may appeal to the next Quarter Sessions. The words of the statute, taken strictly, would oblige the complaining parties to appeal to the next sessions, however near it may be; but as a reasonable time must be given to the appellant parish to determine whether they will appeal or not, and due notice of the grounds of appeal must be given to the respondent parish, it might be impossible to try at the very next sessions consistently with those preliminary conditions; and it has therefore been determined that "the next sessions" means the next practicable sessions, that is, the next sessions that are consistent, in point of time, with enabling the appellants to make due inquiry, and give the requisite notices. In accordance with this construction of the statute, it is held unnecessary, in such a case, to take any steps whatever at the sessions immediately succeeding the order appealed against; this, which was determined in The King v. the Justices of Essex(8) and The King v. Thackwell (9), and recognized in all the subsequent cases, must be considered as settled law. The appellants, then, in the present case were not bound to take any notice of the April Sessions whatever. But it is said, on the part of the respondents, that the appellants were bound, at all events, to give notice and serve the grounds of appeal, so as to enable them to try at the July Sessions, and that it was not enough merely to enter and respite the appeal at those sessions. When once it was settled that the first practicable sessions were the next sessions within the meaning of the statute, it would seem to follow, as a consequence, that they must be so for all purposes, and if so, the statute of 9 Geo. 1. c. 7. s. 8, directing the Justices to adjourn the appeal to the next Quarter Sessions, when reason

(8) 1 B. & Ald. 210.

(9) 4 B. & C.62; s. c. 3 Law J. Rep. K.B. 139.

able notice has not been given, would apply, and the Justices would be bound in that case to have adjourned the appeal: but whether it did or not apply, the Justices would have jurisdiction when the appeal was entered, and might, of their own authority, adjourn the consideration of it; for which, if it were necessary to cite authorities, the two cases of The King v. the Justices of Wilts, mentioned in the argument, are in point. If the Justices had jurisdiction to adjourn the appeal, the question, whether they properly exercised their discretion in adjourning this appeal ex parte, when no notice was given, would not be entertained by this Court, which will not review the decision of the Court of Quarter Sessions on matters within their jurisdiction. The adjournment having then been made from the July to the October Sessions by a court of competent jurisdiction, it appears to me that the order of the Court of Quarter Sessions in October cannot be impeached; and I may observe, that the judgment of Mr. Justice Williams, in The Queen v. the Justices of Sussex (10), is in accordance with the present decision; as is also that of Mr. Justice Patteson, in the case of The King v. the Justices of Monmouthshire, or as far as the facts of that case render it applicable to the present. The rule must be discharged.

Bastardy Order-Evidence-Defects in Form-7 & 8 Vict. c. 101.-8 Vict. c. 10.

An order in bastardy, made under 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101, did not state that the evidence of the mother was given on oath, but substantially followed the form given in the schedule to 8 Vict. c. 10, which was passed for the purpose of curing defects of form in orders under the former act:-Held, that as the latter statute rendered valid all orders made according to the form given in the schedule, or to the like tenour and effect, the above

(10) 8 Dowl. P.C. 618.

This was a rule, calling upon the Justices of the Peace for the county of Chester to shew cause why a writ of certiorari should not issue directed to them, to remove into this court all and singular orders made by them, at a General Sessions of the Peace holden at Chester, in and for the said county, on an appeal by Thomas Fernyhough against an original order of affiliation, under the hands and seals of two of the Justices of the said county, together with the said original order, and all things touching the same. The order, which was confirmed upon appeal, was made at a petty session held on the 15th of November 1844, and, after reciting the summons and appearance of the putative father, proceeded as follows:-" And it being now proved to us in the presence and hearing of the said T. F. that the said child was on the 13th of September 1844, that is to say, since the passing of an act passed in the 8th year of the reign of her present Majesty, intituled, An act for the further amendment of the laws relating to the poor in England,' born a bastard of the said Ann Hayes, and we having, in the presence and hearing of the said T. F, heard the evidence of such woman, and such other evidence as she hath produced, and having also heard all the evidence tendered on behalf of the said T. F, and the evidence of the said A. H, the mother of the said child, having been corroborated in some material particular by other testimony to our satisfaction, do hereby adjudge," &c.

Pashley shewed cause (June 3rd), and contended, that this being an order and not a conviction, it was not necessary that the evidence should appear to have been taken upon oath, as it would be intended that the order was rightly made when jurisdiction was once shewn.

Townsend, in support of the rule, argued that no jurisdiction was shewn, as the evidence did not appear to be legally taken, and that, therefore, no intendment could be made to support the order, which was in the nature of a criminal proceeding (1).

(1) On this point, on which no decision was given, the following authorities were cited:-Co.

On a subsequent day (June 12th)

WIGHTMAN, J. referred to the 8 Vict. c. 10, as governing this case. Section 1. enacts, that where any proceedings have been had or taken before the passing of this act, or shall hereafter be had or taken in matters of bastardy, under the provisions of the said recited act (7 & 8 Vict. c. 101.), and shall have been set forth according to the forms in the schedule hereunto annexed, or to the like tenour and effect, the same shall be taken respectively to have been and to be valid and sufficient in law."

Townsend.-The form given in the schedule, No. 8, for an application by a woman after birth (2), leaves a blank after the words

Litt. 283, a; Tomlin's Law Dictionary; 1 Lilly's Practical Register, 547; 1 Starkie on Evidence, p. 10; The King v. Venables, 2 Ld. Raym. 1405; Ladbroke v. James, Willes, 199; Sollers v. Lawrence, Willes, 413; The King v. All Saints, Southampton, 7 B. & C. 785; s. c. 6 Law J. Rep. M.C. 55; The Queen v. Silkstone, 2 Q.B. Rep. 520; s. c. 12 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 5; The Queen v. the Justices of Buckinghamshire, 14 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) M.C. 45; The Queen v. Toke, 8 Ad. & El. 227; s. c. 7 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 74; The King v. Lord Downshire, 4 Ad. & El. 698; s. c. 5 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 72; The Queen v. Lewis, 13 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 46; In re Tordoff, 13 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 145; In re Gray, 14 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 26; The Queen v. Lewis, 8 Ad. & El. 881; s. c. 8 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 4; The Queen v. Read, 9 Ad. & El. 619; s. c. 8 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 19; The King v. Bissex, Sayer, 304; The Queen v. Rotherham, 3 Q.B. Rep. 776; s. c. 12 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 17; The King v. Eriswell, 3 Term Rep. 707; Fletcher v. Calthorp, 14 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 49. Stat. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101; The King v. Bowen, 5 Term Rep. 159; Taylor v. Clemson, 2 Q.B. Rep. 996; s. c. 11 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Exch. 447; Paley on Convictions, p. 33; Dalton's Justice, c. 6. s. 6; Hawkins' Pleas of the Crown, b. 11. c. 46; The King v. Manning, 1 Burr. 377; The King v. Hulcott, 6 Term Rep. 583; Day v. King, 5 Ad. & El. 359; s. c. 5 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) M.C. 130; Christie & Unwin, 11 Ad. & El. 373; s. c. 9 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Q.B. 47.

(2) The following is the form No. 8, in the Schedule referred to:

to wit.-At a petty sessions of Her Majesty's Justices of the Peace, for the county of

holden in and for the in the said county, at

division of

on the in the year of Our Lord 1840 Her Majesty's Justices of the

day of before us Peace for the said county. Whereas, one

day of having been

single woman, residing division did,

in the year of Our delivered of a bas

"having heard the evidence of such woman," which, it is contended, must be filled up with the words "on oath," or "on affirmation." It cannot be intended for the name of the woman, for that would be insensate. The only operation of the act is to render "such other evidence" valid, if not on oath. Nothing can be intended in favour of an explanatory statute.

Pashley referred to The Queen v. Milner (3), where Coleridge, J. held that the recent

tard child within twelve calendar months prior thereto, make application to one of Her Majesty's Justices of the Peace acting for this division, for a summons to be served upon one of whom she alleged to be the father of the said child; and the said Justice thereupon issued his summons to the said to appear at a petty session, to be holden on this day for this division in which the said Justice usually acts, to answer her complaint touching the premises. And whereas the said having been duly served with the said summons, within forty days from this day, and now appearing in pursuance thereof, and the said having now applied to us the Justices in petty sessions assembled, for an order upon the said according to the form of the statute in such case made and provided; and it being now proved to us in the presence and hearing of the said that the said child was, since the passing of an act passed in the eighth year of the reign of her present Majesty, intituled "An Act for the further amendment of the laws relating to the poor in England," (that is to say) on the day of in the year of Our Lord

;

born a bastard of the body of the said and we having, in the presence and hearing of the said heard the evidence of such woman, and such other evidence as she hath produced, and having also heard all the evidence tendered by the said and the evidence of the said the mother of the said child, having been corroborated in some material particular, by other testimony to our satisfaction, do hereby adjudge the said to be the putative father of the said bastard child; and, having regard to all the circumstances of this case, we do hereby order, That the said do pay unto the said , the mother of the said bastard child, so long as she shall live, and shall be of sound mind, and shall not be in any gaol or prison, or under sentence of transportation, or to the person who may be appointed to have the custody of such bastard child, under the provisions of the statute, the sum of per week for the first six weeks from the birth of the said child, and from the expiration of such six weeks the sum of per week, until the said child shall attain the age of thirteen years, or shall die, or the said shall marry: And we do hereby further order the said to pay to the said being the costs incurred in obtaining this order. Given under our hands and seals, at the session aforesaid.

the sum of

(3) 14 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 157.

Cur. adv. vult. Judgment was now (Nov. 17) delivered by

WIGHTMAN, J.-This case, which was argued before me at the end of last term, was an application to quash an order in bastardy, made under the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101, for a defect on the face of it, in not stating the evidence to have been given on oath; and the objection was founded upon a decision before me in this Court in the case of The Queen v. the Justices of Buckinghamshire. It becomes unnecessary to consider the various points and the various authorities that were cited before me, because it appeared that two days before the argument the act of the 8 Vict. c. 10. was passed for the express purpose of removing questions which appear to have been raised, as is stated in the preamble, to the validity of orders made under the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101, and which were wholly beside the merits of the cases; and it does appear to me that this act expressly remedies the defects which were taken to the present order. It recites that "whereas divers questions have been raised as to the validity of certain orders in bastardy, made by Justices under the act of last session (alluding to the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101), which questions are wholly beside the merits of the case, and it is desirable to remove such questions and to prevent a recurrence of the same or similar questions in future" it then proceeds, "Be it enacted, that when any proceedings have been had or taken before the passing of this act, or shall hereafter be had or taken in matters of bastardy under the provisions of the said recited act, and shall have been set forth according to the forms in the schedule hereunto annexed, or to the like tenour and effect, the same shall be taken respectively to have been and to be valid and sufficient in law." It was contended, as appears to me to be the case, that this act, which is retrospective as well as prospective in its ope

ration, renders the order in question valid, and removes the objection which was taken upon the argument, for the order does in substance and in effect follow the form which is given in the schedule. When, however, the act was mentioned, an objection to its applicability to the present case was made upon this ground, that the schedule in that part of it in which the evidence of the woman is stated, contains a blank occurring in the place which I am now about to read : "We, having in the presence and hearing of the said" (blank for the name of the man) "heard the evidence of such woman," and then there is a blank, “and such other evidence," &c. And it was contended, that the only mode in which that latter blank could be possibly filled up was by inserting the words on oath." Now, I confess I do not agree with the learned counsel who contended for that proposition. What was meant by the legislature, if anything, by leaving the blank, I know not; but I do not feel warranted in filling it up by the words "on oath," or "on affirmation;" and it therefore appears to me, that the order in the present case being in accordance with the form given in the schedule to the act of parliament, the objection fails, and that the rule in this case ought to be discharged. Rule discharged (4).

An order of affiliation, made under 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101. and 8 Vict. c. 10, must shew, upon the face of it, that it was applied for within forty days after the service of the summons on the putative father of the child.

A notice given to Justices of an intention to move for a certiorari in six days from the giving of the notice, or as soon after as counsel can be heard, is sufficient.

A rule had been obtained, calling upon Thomas Bailey Rose, Esq., and Philip B.

(4) See the next case.

Broad, Esq., two Justices of the county of Stafford, to shew cause why a writ of certiorari should not issue, directing them to return into this court an order made under their hands and seals, on the 10th of May 1845, whereby Thomas Pratt was adjudged to be the putative father of a bastard child, born of the body of Jemima Snow. The order purported to be made "at a petty session of Her Majesty's Justices of the Peace, for the county of Stafford, holden in and for the borough of Stoke-uponTrent, and certain places adjoining, in the county of Stafford, held at the police court, Stoke-upon-Trent," &c. The order recited the complaint to have been made on the 22nd of March, but did not, upon its face, disclose that it had been applied for within forty days from the service of the summons on the said Thomas Pratt. It was objected that the order did not appear to have been made by Justices acting for a petty sessional division of the county of Stafford, as it appeared by the affidavits that Mr. Rose was a stipendiary Magistrate appointed to act only within the borough of Stoke-upon-Trent, and certain places adjoining thereto (1), and that the place where the petty sessions were holden was not within the borough of Stoke-upon-Trent, but within the Pirehill division of the county of Stafford. [The argument on this point is omitted, as no decision was given upon it.] He also objected, that the order was bad for not shewing jurisdiction, as it did not appear to have been applied for within forty days after the service of the summons on the putative father. Notice had been given to the Justices of an intention to move for a certiorari "in six days from the giving of this notice, or as soon after as counsel can be heard."

E. Yardley now shewed cause.-The notice to the Justices was insufficient within 13 Geo. 2. c. 18. s. 5. It does not shew that the application would not be made within the six days. In re Flounders (2) is in point. Then, as to the objection to the order, it was in fact made within the forty days limited by the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101. s. 4; but it is said that this fact should be disclosed on the face of the order itself. It is contended, that this is not necessary in the (1) Under statute 2 Vict. c. 15. (2) 4 B. & Ad. 865.