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certiorari should not issue to remove the shire (6) shews that it was not comabove order of Sessions,

pulsory on the Sessions to adjourn the Howarth shewed cause.—The proceed- appeal at the second sessions.

In no case ings were correct. Section 81, of the Poor can the final determination of the appeal be Law Amendment Act requires the grounds postponed beyond the second sessions after of appeal to be sent fourteen days at least the grievance. But the case, on the other before the sessions at which the appeal is side, is rested on the general authority intended to be tried ; the sessions, therefore, which the Sessions have to adjourn an appeal which were held on the 9th of April were when once entered. It is not disputed impracticable for trial of the appeal, as that, if an appeal be properly entered for the being held within fourteen days from the purpose of trial, the Sessions have such time of the removal. Such being the case, authority, and that this Court will not inthe appeal was not obliged to be entered and terfere in such a case- - The King v. the Jusrespited at the April Sessions, but might be tices of Wilts and The King v. the Justices entered at the July, as being the first prac- of the West Riding of Yorkshire (7);- but a ticable sessions after the execution of the mere entry ex parte, for the purpose of order— The King v. the Justices of Kent(1), respiting the appeal, as this was, is not such The King v. the Justices of Devon (2), The an entry as will give the Sessions jurisdiction King v. the Justices of Buckinghamshire (3), over the appeal, independently of the staThe King v. the Justices of Wilts (4). Then tute, which, it is submitted, does not apply the appeal being once properly lodged, the to the July Sessions. The July Sessions, Sessions had the power to adjourn it— The therefore, had no authority to adjourn the King v. the Justices of Wilts (5). It does appeal, and consequently, the appeal was not appear by the affidavits, whether the not properly continued to the Michaelmas appeal was respited as a matter of course, or Sessions. on special grounds; but, at all events, as [WIGHTMAN, J.-It comes to the questhe Sessions have exercised their discretion, tion, whether, for all purposes, the first this Court will not interfere with their de- sessions within 9 Geo. 1. c. 7. s. 8. means termination in a matter upon which they had the first actual or the first practicable competent authority to decide.

sessions. ]

Cur. adv. oult. M. Smith and Hawkins, contrà.-Admitting that the appellants might pass over the

Judgment was now (Nov. 17th) delivered

byEaster Sessions, still they were bound to try, and not merely to enter and respite the WIGHTMAN, J.-In this case an order of appeal at the July Sessions. The statutes removal was made in February, and the giving the right of appeal are 13 & 14 Car. 2. paupers were actually removed on the 27th c. 12, and 3 & 4 Will. & M. c. 11, which of March. The next sessions were holden have been construed to apply to the next in the early part of April, but there was not practicable sessions. Formerly it was held sufficient time to give the requisite notices necessary to enter and respite at the first and grounds of appeal in order to try, and sessions, although not a practicable sessions; nothing was done by the appellants at those but in The King v. the Justices of Kent and sessions. At the July Sessions the appelThe King v. the Justices of Devon that was lants entered and respited an appeal ex decided to be an useless act. The power of parte, and without any notice to the respiting is derived from the 9 Geo. 1. c. 7. respondents. On the 28th of September s. 8, which is imperative in the cases to the appellants gave notice of appeal for the which it extends, but it only applies to the October Sessions, and delivered the grounds first sessions, whether practicable or not. of appeal. The appeal came on to be heard The King v. the Justices of Monmouth- at those sessions, and it was objected by

the respondents that the appellants were too (1) 8 B. & C. 639.

late, and that the Court had no jurisdiction, (2) Ibid. n. ; 8. c. 7 Law J. Rep. M.C. 78. (3) 3 East, 342. (4) 8 B. & C.380 ; s. c. 6 Law J. Rep. M.C. 97.

(6) 3 Dowl. P.C. 306. (5) 13 East, 352.

(7) 4 Mau. & Selw. 327.

and that the appellants ought to have given able notice has not been given, would apply, their notices, &c. in time for the July Ses- and the Justices would be bound in that case sions, instead of merely entering and re- to have adjourned the appeal: but whether spiting the appeal ex parte. This objection it did or not apply, the Justices would have was overruled by the Court, who heard and jurisdiction when the appeal was entered, determined the case in favour of the appel- and might, of their own authority, adjourn lants; and the question is, whether they had the consideration of it; for which, if it were jurisdiction so to do. By the 13 & 14 Car. 2. necessary to cite authorities, the two cases c. 12. and 3 & 4 W. & M. c. 11, parties of The King v. the Justices of Wilts, thinking themselves aggrieved may appeal mentioned in the argument, are in point. to the next Quarter Sessions. The words If the Justices had jurisdiction to adjourn of the statute, taken strictly, would oblige the appeal, the question, whether they prothe complaining parties to appeal to the perly exercised their discretion in adjournnext sessions, however near it may be; but ing this appeal ex parte, when no notice as a reasonable time must be given to the was given, would not be entertained by this appellant parish to determine whether they Court, which will not review the decision will appeal or not, and due notice of the of the Court of Quarter Sessions on matters grounds of appeal must be given to the within their jurisdiction. The adjournment respondent parish, it might be impossible having then been made from the July to to try at the very next sessions consistently the October Sessions by a court of competent with those preliminary conditions; and it jurisdiction, it appears to me that the order has therefore been determined that “the next of the Court of Quarter Sessions in October sessions” means the next practicable sessions, cannot be impeached; and I may observe, that is, the next sessions that are consistent, that the judgment of Mr. Justice Williams, in point of time, with enabling the appel- in The Queen v. the Justices of Sussex (10), lants to make due inquiry, and give the is in accordance with the present decision; requisite notices. In accordance with this as is also that of Mr. Justice Patteson, in construction of the statute, it is held unne- the case of The King v. the Justices of Moncessary, in such a case, to take any steps mouthshire, or as far as the facts of that case whatever at the sessions immediately suc- render it applicable to the present. The ceeding the order appealed against; this, rule must be discharged. which was determined in The King v. the

Rule discharged. Justices of Essex(8) and The King v. Thackwell (9), and recognized in all the subsequent cases, must be considered as settled law. The appellants, then, in the present case were not bound to take

any notice of BAIL COURT. the April Sessions whatever. But it is said, 1845. on the part of the respondents, that the

June 3,12;

CHESHIRE ex parte FERNYappellants were bound, at all events, to Nov. 17. give notice and serve the grounds of appeal,

Bastardy Order-Evidence-Defects in so as to enable them to try at the July Sessions, and that it was not enough merely

Form7 8. 8 Vict. c. 101.-8 Vict. c. 10. to enter and respite the appeal at those An order in bastardy, made under 7 & 8 sessions. When once it was settled that Vict. c. 101, did not state that the evidence the first practicable sessions were the next of the mother was given on oath, but substansessions within the meaning of the statute, tially followed the form given in the scheit would seem to follow, as a consequence, dule to 8 Vict. c. 10, which was passed for that they must be so for all purposes, and the purpose of curing defects of form in if so, the statute of 9 Geo. 1. c. 7. s. 8, orders under the former act :-Held, that directing the Justices to adjourn the appeal as the latter statute rendered valid all orders to the next Quarter Sessions, when reason- made according to the form given in the sche

dule, or to the like tenour and effect, the above (8) 1 B. & Ald. 210. (9) 4 B. & C.62; s.c. 3 Law J. Rep. K.B. 139.

(10) 8 Dowl. P.C. 618.



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omission was immaterial, and that the words On a subsequent day (June 12th)

on oath" were not required to be inserted in the form given in the schedule.

Wightman, J.referred to the 8 Vict. c. 10,

as governing this case. Section 1. enacts, This was a rule, calling upon the Justices that “where any proceedings have been of the Peace for the county of Chester had or taken before the passing of this act, to shew cause why a writ of certiorari or shall hereafter be had or taken in matters should not issue directed to them, to remove of bastardy, under the provisions of the said into this court all and singular orders made recited act (7 & 8 Vict. c. 101.), and shall by them, at a General Sessions of the have been set forth according to the forms Peace holden at Chester, in and for the said in the schedule hereunto annexed, or to the county, on an appeal by Thomas Ferny like tenour and effect, the same shall be hough against an original order of affiliation, taken respectively to have been and to be under the hands and seals of two of the valid and sufficient in law.” Justices of the said county, together with Townsend.—The form given in the schethe said original order, and all things touch- dule, No. 8, for an application by a woman ing the same. The order, which was con- after birth (2), leaves a blank after the words firmed upon appeal, was made at a petty session held on the 15th of November Litt. 283, a ; Tomlin's Law Dictionary; 1 Lilly's 1844, and, after reciting the summons and

Practical Register, 547 ; 1 Starkie on Evidence,

p. 10; The King v. Venables, 2 Ld. Raym. 1405; appearance of the putative father, pro

Ladbroke v. James, Willes, 199; Sollers v. Law. ceeded as follows :-“ And it being now rence, Willes, 413; The King v. All Saints, S. uthproved to us in the presence and hearing of ampton, 7_B. & C. 785; 8. C. 6 Law J. Rep. the said T. F. that the said child was on

M.C. 55; The Queen v. Silkstone, 2 Q.B. Rep.

520; 8. c. 12 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 5; The the 13th of September 1844, that is to say,

Queen v. the Justices of Buckinghamshire, 14 Law since the passing of an act passed in the J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 45; The Queen v. Toke, 8 Ad. & El. 8th year of the reign of her present Majesty, 227; 8. c. 7 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 74; The intituled, "An act for the further amend

King v. Lord Downshire, 4 Ad. & El. 698 ; s. c. 5

Law J. Rep. (n.s.) M.C. 72; The Queen v. Lewis, ment of the laws relating to the poor in

13 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 46 ; In re Tordoff, 13 England,' born a bastard of the said Ann

Law J. Rep. (n.s.) M.C. 145 ; In re Gray, 14 Law Hayes, and we having, in the presence and J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 26; The Queen v. Lewis, 8 hearing of the said T. F, heard the evidence Ad. & El. 881; 8. c. 8 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. of such woman, and such other evidence as

4; The Queen v. Read, 9 Ad. & El. 619; 8. C.

8 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 19; The King v. she hath produced, and having also heard

Bissex, Sayer, 304 ; The Queen v. Rotherham, 3 all the evidence tendered on behalf of the Q.B. Rep. 776; 8. c. 12 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. said T. F, and the evidence of the said

17; The King v. Eriswell, 3 Term Rep. 707 ; A. H, the mother of the said child, having

Fletcher v. Calthorp, 14 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 49.

Stat. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101; The King v. Bowen, 5 been corroborated in some material parti- Term Rep. 159; Taylor v. Clemson, 2 Q.B. Rep. cular by other testimony to our satisfaction, 996 ; 8. c. 11 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Exch. 447 ; Paley do hereby adjudge,” &c.

on Convictions, p. 33; Dalton's Justice, c. 6. s. 6; Pashley shewed cause (June 3rd), and

Hawkins' Pleas of the Crown, b. 11. c. 46 ; The

King v. Manning, 1 Burr. 377; The King v. Hul. contended, that this being an order and not cott, 6 Term Rep. 583; Day v. King, 5 Ad. & a conviction, it was not necessary that the El. 359 ; 8. c. 5 Law J. Rep. (n.s.) M.C. 130; evidence should appear to have been taken

Christie & Unwin, 11 Ad. & El. 373 ; s. C. 9 Law upon oath, as it would be intended that the J. Rep. (N.s.) Q.B. 47. order was rightly made when jurisdiction was

(2) The following is the form No. 8, in the

Schedule referred to : once shewn.

to wit.-- At a petty sessions of Her Townsend, in support of the rule, argued Majesty's Justices of the Peace, for the county of

holden in and for the that no jurisdiction was shewn, as the evi

division of

in the said county, at dence did not appear to be legally taken,

in the year of Our Lord 1840 and that, therefore, no intendment could be before us

Her Majesty's Justices of the made to support the order, which was in the

Peace for the said county. nature of a criminal proceeding (1).

Whereas, one

single woman, residing at

within this division did, (1) On this point, on which no decision was

on the

in the year of Our given, the following authorities were cited :-Co. Lord

having been delivered of a bas.

on the

day of

day of

“having heard the evidence of such woman,” act cured all defects in form in bastardy which, it is contended, must be filled up orders. with the words “ on oath,” or “on affirma- (WIGHTMAN, J.-If the blank in the tion." It cannot be intended for the name form is intended to be filled


there cerof the woman, for that would be insensate. tainly may be a doubt as to the validity of the The only operation of the act is to render order. Except for this statute, the woman "such other evidence” valid, if not on oath. ought to appear to have been sworn. I Nothing can be intended in favour of an will take time to look into the act.] explanatory statute.

Cur. adv. vult. Pashley referred to The Queen v. Milner (3), where Coleridge, J. held that the recent

Judgment was now (Nov. 17) delivered

bytard child within twelve calendar months prior

WIGHTMAN, J.—This case, which was thereto, make application to

one of Her

argued before me at the end of last term, Majesty's Justices of the Peace acting for this division, for a summons to be served upon one

was an application to quash an order in of whom she alleged to be the father of bastardy, made under the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101, the said child; and the said Justice thereupon

for a defect on the face of it, in not stating issued his summons to the said

to appear the evidence to have been given on oath ; at a petty session, to be holden on this day for this division in which the said Justice usually

and the objection was founded upon a de

cision before me in this Court in the case acts, to answer her complaint touching the premises. And whereas the said having been duly

of The Queen v. the Justices of Buckingserved with the said summons, within forty days hamshire. It becomes unnecessary to confrom this day, and now appearing in pursuance thereof,

sider the various points and the various and the said having now applied to us the Justices in petty sessions asseinbled, for an order

authorities that were cited before me, beupon the said

according to the form of cause it appeared that two days before the the statute in such case made and provided ; and argument the act of the 8 Vict. c. 10. was it being now proved to us in the presence and hearing passed for the express purpose of removing of the said

that the said child was, since the passing of an act passed in the eighth year of

questions which appear to have been raised, the reign of her present Majesty, intituled “ An

as is stated in the preamble, to the validity Act for the further amendment of the laws relating of orders made under the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101, to the poor in England,” (that is to say) on the and which were wholly beside the merits

day of in the year of Our Lord born a bastard of the body of the said

of the cases; and it does appear to me that and we baving, in the presence and hearing of the

this act expressly remedies the defects which said heard the evidence of such woman, were taken to the present order. It recites and such other evidence as she bath produced, and that whereas divers questions have been having also heard ull the evidence tendered by the

raised as to the validity of certain orders in , and the evidence of the said the mother of the said child, having been corrobo- bastardy, made by Justices under the act of rated in some material particular, by other testi- last session (alluding to the 7 & 8 Vict. mony to our satisfaction, do hereby adjudge the c. 101), which questions are wholly beside said to be the putative father of the said

the merits of the case, and it is desirable to bastard child; and, having regard to all the circumstances of this case, we do bereby order, That the

remove such questions and to prevent a resaid do pay unto the said

the currence of the same or similar questions mother of the said bastard child, so long as she in future :" it then proceeds, “Be it ensball live, and shall be of sound mind, and shall not

acted, that when any proceedings have been be in any gaol or prison, or under sentence of transportation, or to the person who may be ap

had or taken before the passing of this act, pointed to have the custody of such bastard child,

or shall hereafter be had or taken in matunder the provisions of the statute, the sum of ters of bastardy under the provisions of the per week for the first sir weeks from the birth of the said recited act, and shall have been set said child, and from the expiration of such six weeks the sum of per week, until the said child

forth according to the forms in the schedule shall attain the age of thirteen years, or shall die,

hereunto annexed, or to the like tenour and or the said shall marry : And we do hereby effect, the same shall be taken respectively further order the said

to pay to the said

to have been and to be valid and sufficient the sum of being the costs incurred

in law.” It was contended, as appears to in obtaining this order. Given under our hands and seals, at the session aforesaid.

me to be the case, that this act, which is re(3) 14 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 157.

trospective as well as prospective in its ope





ration, renders the order in question valid, Broad, Esq., two Justices of the county of and removes the objection which was taken Stafford, to shew cause why a writ of cerupon the argument, for the order does in tiorari should not issue, directing them to substance and in effect follow the form which return into this court an order made under is given in the schedule. When, however, their hands and seals, on the 10th of May the act was mentioned, an objection to its 1845, whereby Thomas Pratt was adjudged applicability to the present case was made to be the putative father of a bastard child, upon this ground, that the schedule in that born of the body of Jemima Snow. The part of it in which the evidence of the order purported to be made " at a petty woman is stated, contains a blank occurring session of Her Majesty's Justices of the in the place which I am now about to read : Peace, for the county of Stafford, holden “ We, having in the presence and hearing in and for the borough of Stoke-uponof the said” (blank for the name of the Trent, and certain places adjoining, in man) “heard the evidence of such woman,” the county of Stafford, held at the police and then there is a blank, “and such other court, Stoke-upon-Trent," &c. The order evidence," &c. And it was contended, that recited the complaint to have been made the only mode in which that latter blank on the 22nd of March, but did not, could be possibly filled up was by inserting upon its face, disclose that it had been the words “ on oath.” Now, I confess I applied for within forty days from the serdo not agree with the learned counsel who vice of the summons on the said Thomas contended for that proposition. What was Pratt.—It was objected that the order did not meant by the legislature, if anything, by appear to have been made by Justices acting leaving the blank, I know not, but I do for a petty sessional division of the county not feel warranted in filling it up by the of Stafford, as it appeared by the affidavits words " on oath," or on affirmation ;” and that Mr. Rose was a stipendiary Magistrate it therefore appears to me, that the order in appointed to act only within the borough of the present case being in accordance with Stoke-upon-Trent, and certain places adthe forın given in the schedule to the act of joining thereto(1), and that the place where parliament, the objection fails, and that the the petty sessions were holden was not within rule in this case ought to be discharged. the borough of Stoke-upon-Trent, but within Rule discharged (4).

the Pirehill division of the county of Stafford. [The argument on this point is omitted, as no decision was given upon it.] He also

objected, that the order was bad for not BAIL COURT.

shewing jurisdiction, as it did not appear to 1845.

have been applied for within forty days Nov, 25. OTHER, JUSTICES, &c.

after the service of the summons on the Bastardy7 8 8 Vict. c. 101.-8 Vict.

putative father. Notice had been given to c. 10.-Order - Jurisdiction - Certiorari,

the Justices of an intention to move for a Notice of

certiorari in six days from the giving of

this notice, or as soon after as counsel can An order of affiliation, made under 788 be heard." Vict. c. 101. and 8 Vict. c. 10, must shew, E. Yardley now shewed cause.

se. - The upon the face of it, that it was applied for notice to the Justices was insufficient within within forty days after the service of the 13 Geo. 2. c. 18. s. 5. It does not shew that summons on the putative father of the child. the application would not be made within

A notice given to Justices of an intention the six days. In re Flounders (2) is in to move for a certiorari in six days from the point. Then, as to the objection to the order, giving of the notice, or as soon after as it was in fact made within the forty days counsel can be heard, is sufficient.

limited by the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101. s. 4; but

it is said that this fact should be disclosed A rule had been obtained, calling upon on the face of the order itself. It is conThomas Bailey Rose, Esq., and Philip B. tended, that this is not necessary in the

(1) Under statute 2 Vict. c. 15. (4) See the next case.

(2) 4 B. & Ad. 865.


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