time, first, that it nowhere appeared on the face of the examinations that they were taken by or before any Justices of the Peace, having jurisdiction in and for the borough of Birmingham, inasmuch as it did not appear that the said C. R. Moorson and Thomas Beelby, in the jurat of the said examinations named, were Justices of the Peace for the said borough of Birmingham. Secondly, that it appeared, on the face of the examination of Anne Brown, that she was a markswoman, and that neither in the jurat nor attestation of the examination was it shewn that her examination, as taken in writing, was read over to her, or that she knew the contents thereof. Thirdly, that it did not appear, on the face of the examinations, that sufficient, or any, search or inquiry had been made to discover the settlement of Thomas Brown, the husband of the said Anne Brown, or that he had no settlement. Fourthly, that it did not appear, on the face of the examinations, by any legal evidence, that the said Anne Brown, before or at the time of making the said order, was chargeable to the parish of Birmingham. Fifthly, that the said order was bad so far as it regarded Henry, the son of the said Anne Brown, inasmuch as it purported to remove the said Henry as legitimate, whereas it appeared, on the face of the examination of the said Anne Brown, that he was illegitimate. In answer to the first and second of these objections, it was contended, for the respondents, that the appellants were not entitled, under their grounds of appeal, to be heard on them; and with regard to all the several five last-mentioned objections the respondents contended that the examinations and order were sufficient. The recorder was of opinion,—first, that the appellants were entitled, by their first ground of appeal, to be heard on the said first two last-mentioned objections taken by them to the said examination; but he overruled all the said five last-mentioned objections, and granted a case at the request of the appellants, for the opinion of this Court upon all the points last aforesaid. If this Court should be of opinion that the said order ought to have been quashed by the said recorder, either on the ground on which it was quashed, or upon any or either of the other objections, so taken as aforesaid by the appellants, then the order of the

Court of Quarter Sessions was to be confirmed; otherwise to be quashed, and the order of removal to be confirmed.

Sir F. Kelly (Solicitor General) and Greaves, in support of the order of Sessions. -First, it does not sufficiently appear, on this examination, that there was any service by the pauper under the yearly hiring, nor any residence in Cheltenham under that hiring. Every examination must contain a clear statement of a settlement, and nothing is to be left to implication and inference. The facts here were specially within the knowledge of the pauper, and ought to have been more distinctly stated. They cited on this point-The Queen v. St. Sepulchre, Northampton (1), The Queen v. the Justices of Kesteven (2), The Queen v. the Recorder of Pontefract (3), The Queen v. the Inhabitants of Pilkington (4). And it was competent to the appellants to raise this objection under their first ground of appeal. It is true there are other specific objections to the examinations, but they are not objections to the settlement therein set up, but to collateral points. The cases of The Queen v. Middleton in Teesdale (5), The Queen v. Staple Fitzpaine (6), and The Queen v. Flockton (7), therefore, do not apply. Secondly, the Justices, who signed the jurat, should sign as Justices, and be so described. It does not appear that the two persons who signed had authority to take the examinations: their names do not appear in the body of the examinations-The Queen v. Shipston-on-Stour (8). Thirdly, every examination is, in substance, an affidavit; it ought to appear that this examination was read over to the witness, who was a markswoman. This course should have been adopted upon general legal principles, and according to the usual practice of this Court as to affidavits.

[COLERIDGE, J.- Every examination

(1) 14 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 8.

(2) 13 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 78.

(3) 2Q.B. Rep. 548; s. c. 12 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) M.C. 81.

(4) 13 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 61.

(5) 10 Ad. & El. 688; s. c. 9 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 55.

(6) 2 Q.B. Rep. 488; s. c. 11 Law J. Rep. (N.S.)

should be read over to the examinant before he signs it, whether he can read and write, or not; but there is no case which says that it is necessary that this should appear to have been done. What right have we to impose such a rule upon the Magistrates? And why are we not to presume that they did all that was right and necessary?]

Fourthly, Henry, being as the examination shews, the illegitimate child of the pauper, should have been described as such in the order-The Queen v. the Inhabitants of Totley (9), The King v. Wyke (10). The effect of the order, if confirmed, would be conclusive against the appellants, as to the legitimacy of the child, which they would not be allowed hereafter to controvertThe King v. Headcorn (11), The King v. Silchester (12), The King v. Binegar (13). But, when he arrived at the age of sixteen, his settlement, as a bastard, would no longer be that of his mother. Fifthly, the examinations do not shew that any search or inquiry whatever was made to ascertain the settlement of the pauper's husband; and, . until it appeared such search had been made with due diligence, and that no such settlement could be discovered, his widow was not removable to her maiden settlement. It is to be presumed that the husband had some settlement; from his name it would appear he was an Englishman; and, on his marriage, his wife's settlement merged in his, and was extinguished. The rule is properly laid down in The King v. St. Matthew, Bethnal Green (14), "That no recourse shall be had to the mother's settlement till that of the father can be traced no further." The King v. Harberton (15), which may be cited on the other side, has not been acted on, and is inconsistent with the earlier authorities. The cases in which proof of the wife's maiden settlement has been held sufficient, have been, either where the husband was a foreigner, or his settlement could not be discovered-St. Giles's v. St. Margaret's (16),

The King v. Chiddingstone (17), The King v. Westerham (18), The King v. Ryton (19), The King v. Woodsford (20).

Mellor and Spooner, contrà.-As to the first objection, the appellants were not entitled to be heard upon it, under these grounds of appeal. Under a general ground of appeal, that the examinations are defective, appellants may go into specific objections of substance; but if there be also grounds of appeal specifying objections to the examinations, appellants are confined to such specific objections. [On this point they were stopped.]

LORD DENMAN, C.J.-It is a very important principle, and should, by this time, be well understood, that where, by the grounds of appeal, particular objections to the examinations are pointed out, appellants shall not afterwards be at liberty to avail themselves of the ground of appeal, objecting to the examinations generally, and go on to insist under it upon other defects which they have not pointed out. It is important that this rule should be adhered to, and for this reason: if particular objections are pointed out, and the attention of the removing parish is directed to them, they may either admit the defect and abandon their order, or, if they think the objections invalid, they go down to trial in the belief that no other objections to the examinations can be raised. It is true, that the first ground of appeal here does not mention the settlement; but it is a general objection to the sufficiency of the examinations, and then come the fifth and eighth grounds of appeal, which specify particular objections to the same document. To these particular objections, therefore, the appellants must be confined. This

disposes, also, of the objections raised as to the sufficiency of the jurat, and the attestation of the signature of the pauper as a markswoman.

PATTESON, J. and COLERIDGE, J. 'concurred.

Fourthly, the order of Sessions would not be conclusive as to the legitimacy

(17) 1 Stra. 683.

(18) 2 Bott, P.L. 108,

(19) Cald. S.C. 39.

(20) Ibid. 236.

of Henry. The appellants will be at liberty to controvert that fact hereafter, if necessary; but, in any case, the order is only bad pro tanto. Lastly, there was no necessity to make any search for the settlement of the husband, before removing the wife to the place of her maiden settlement. The rule is expressly stated in Nolan, p. 293.-" Although the pauper is removed as a married woman, it will be sufficient to prove, in support of the order, that her maiden settlement is in the place to which she is removed; and the other side must shew a settlement elsewhere to get rid of it, and that, whether he is dead or living. Neither will it make any difference, if it appears that the parish, proving this kind of settlement, have not used due diligence in endeavouring to procure the husband's attendance, or accounting for his absence, or in inquiring as to his settlement, or that he is described in the marriage register as being of another parish, for that is no evidence of his settlement"-The King v. Edisore (21), The King v. Yspytty (22). The King v. Harberton has been expressly recognized in The Queen v. Yelvertoft (23), and The Queen v. St. Margaret's, Westminster (24).

[COLERIDGE, J.-In The Queen v. Yelvertoft enough appeared to shew that the inquiry would have been useless. The pauper's father said, "I was born, I believe, in London, sixty-four years ago; but in what parish I never heard."]

The present is even a stronger case, for the search must have been all through England, instead of London only. Where was the search to begin? No one knew any of the relatives of the husband. The sufficiency of the search, and the reasonableness of making it, is a question for the Justices who make the order, and for the Sessions to decide-The Queen v. Kenilworth (25). And here they have decided it to have been sufficient.

extent to which it is applicable. In the first place, the statement that Henry is the child, that is, the legitimate child of Anne Brown, is an untruth, and, therefore, ought not to appear in the order, although we may not be able at once to see what the consequence of that false statement may be ; but it would be easy to suppose cases in which such a statement might damage the parties, and in which a parish might be bound to support him as a legitimate child, when they would not be so bound if he were illegitimate. Moreover, the statement misleads the parish, and points them to a different mode of inquiry into the settlement from that which they might otherwise adopt. It is no answer to say, that it appears from the examinations that the child was born before marriage. Appellants are not to be forced to spell out the examination, in order to obviate the mistakes which the respondents have made in their order. As, therefore, according to The Queen v. Totley, a statement that A. is the child of B. must be understood to mean, that he is his legitimate child, the untrue description of this child must not be allowed in this case, upon the chance that the misstatement may never occasion any injury to any one. With regard to the remaining objection, it raises a question of considerable general importance, which ought to be well considered, and the practice settled for the future.

Cur. adv. vult.

The further judgment of the Court (26) was delivered (Feb. 14) by

LORD DENMAN, C.J.-The only question that remained undecided in this case, was, whether a widow and children were well removed to her maiden settlement, where the inquiry after that of her husband had been, certainly, very scanty. We lately held, in The Queen v. Yelvertoft, that such removal was proper; where, in answer to such inquiries, the removing parish had obtained no other information respecting the husband's settlement, than that he was believed to have been born in some parish in London. We acted on the authority of The King v. Harberton. It was observed in the late argument that

(26) Lord Denman, C.J., Patteson, J., and Coleridge, J.

The King v. Harberton had been decided without reference to authority. None, indeed, is there quoted; but, on the present occasion, some early cases were brought to our notice, which may well be taken to have produced a general impression in favour of the practice then sanctioned by Lord Ellenborough, and the other Judges of this court. We wished for time to consider the subject, and are desirous of laying down a convenient general rule, conformable to legal principle. And we think it is laid down in the judgment of Bayley, J., in The King v. St. Mary, Beverley, “Where the respondents' evidence makes out a maiden settlement, and contains nothing to shew that any subsequent settlement which would supersede the maiden settlement, has been gained, that constitutes a prima facie case, and the onus of proof that the pauper was not settled there lies upon the appellants." The widow's true settlement, of course, is that of the husband, if he had one, and the duty of the Magistrates requires them to inquire into, and, if possible, ascertain that fact; but it can hardly be said that there is any general presumption of law, or of fact, that he must have had one. If he bore a foreign name, or was a negro, the probability would be the other way; and, supposing the complexion to be white, and the name perfectly English, he might be a native of Ireland, Scotland, or America. If, indeed, it should be proved that he had gained a settlement in England, but that no one could prove in what parish it was, the wife could not be properly removed to the maiden settlement, nor to any place, until knowledge was obtained of the place of her husband's settlement. Thus, if it had been clearly proved that the husband had been hired, and served for a year in one of the parishes of London, but no one could tell in what parish, the removal to the widow's maiden settlement could not have been correctly made; but if no settlement of the husband is made to appear, the place of the maiden settlement of the wife is prima facie that to which she must be taken. The question as to the sufficiency of a search for the husband's settlement, will not arise either at the sessions, or in this court: the wife's being taken to continue till it is proved to have been displaced will cast the burden of

Where the Sessions have granted a case for the opinion of the Court, the Court will not, on the argument on such case, entertain any question not raised by the Sessions for their decision. If it be intended to object to the order of Sessions as bad on the face thereof, upon any grounds not raised by the special case, the certiorari must be moved for in open court, and such additional grounds of objection stated.

Two Justices of the county of R. made an order for the removal of a lunatic pauper to a licensed house in the county of S. The pauper was removed accordingly, his settlement not being then adjudicated on, though the Justices of R. had, at the time of making the order, made inquiry into and received some evidence respecting his settlement:Held, that, after the removal of the pauper to S, the order adjudicating his settlement could be made only by Justices of the county of S, under 9 Geo. 4. c. 40. s. 42.

On appeal against the after-mentioned order of two Justices of the county of Radnor, in the matter of John Palfrey Wood, a pauper lunatic, the Sessions, in April 1844, confirmed the order, subject to the opinion of this Court on the following

CASE.

The order appealed against was in these words:-"County of Radnor, to wit,-Tothe overseers of the poor of the parish of Heyop, in the said county of Radnor. Whereas, in pursuance of and by an order under the hands and seals of us, the undersigned Edward Rogers, Esq., and the Rev. James Richard

Brown, clerk, two of her Majesty's Justices of the Peace, acting in and for the said county of Radnor, bearing date the 13th day of November 1843, one John Palfrey Wood, single man, a pauper, chargeable to the parish of Knighton, in the said county of Radnor, having been proved before us, on the evidence of Henry Warren, of Knighton aforesaid, surgeon, to be insane, and inquiry having been made by us into the last legal settlement of the said John Palfrey Wood, we, the said Justices, by the said order, did direct the overseers of the said parish of Knighton to convey, or cause to be conveyed, the said John Palfrey Wood to an asylum, or a house duly licensed for the reception of insane persons, situate at Shrewsbury, in the county of Salop. Now we, the said Edward Rogers and James Richard Brown, in pursuance of the statute in such case made and provided, and from satisfactory legal evidence received by us touching the legal settlement of the said John Palfrey Wood, do hereby adjudge the settlement of the said John Palfrey Wood to be in the parish of Heyop, in the said county of Radnor, and we do hereby order the overseers of the said parish of Heyop to pay the sum of 10s. weekly, and every week, from the date of the first-mentioned order unto the keeper of such licensed house or asylum for insane persons situate at Shrewsbury aforesaid, for the medicine, clothing, and care of the said. John Palfrey Wood, which the said keeper is willing to accept, and which sum appears to the said Justices to be a reasonable sum in that behalf. Given under our hands and seals this 30th day of November 1843. (Signed)

"Edward Rogers (L.s.) "James R. Brown (L.S.)" The recited order of the 13th day of November was in these words :—

"County of Radnor (to wit). Whereas, it appears to us, Edward Rogers, Esq., and James Richard Brown, clerk, two of her Majesty's Justices of the Peace in and for the said county of Radnor, having called to our assistance Mr. Henry Warren, surgeon, that John Palfrey Wood, chargeable to the parish of Knighton, in the said county, is of unsound mind, you are directed to cause the said John Palfrey Wood to be conveyed to the Lunatic Asylum situate at Kinsland, in the county of Salop, duly licensed for the reception of insane persons.

Given under our hands and seals this 13th
day of November 1843.
(Signed)

"Edward Rogers (L.S.)
"James R. Brown (L.s.)"

"To the overseers of the poor of the parish of Knighton, in the county of Radnor."

The surgeon's certificate, that the pauper was insane (which was set out), was exhibited before the said Justices on the 13th of November.

A counterpart of the order of the 30th of November, and copies of the examinations, were sent by the overseers of Knighton, at whose instance the orders were made, to the appellants on the 4th of December 1843. The case set out the examinations at length. The examination of Ann Wood (the pauper's mother) purported to be taken on the 13th of November 1843. It stated that "about forty years ago she was lawfully married to her late husband, James Wood, at the parish church of Ludford, in the county of Hereford, by whom she had one child, viz. John Palfrey Wood, the present pauper, aged thirty-nine years; and that she hath been informed, and verily believes, that her husband, the late James Wood, had a settlement in the parish of Heyop, where his father and mother were settled inhabitants, and that the said James Wood the father gained a settlement in the said parish of Heyop, having freehold messuages and dwelling-houses (as his own property) in the said parish of Heyop." The rest of the examinations purported to be taken on the 30th of November, and contained direct evidence that the pauper's grandfather was the owner of two houses in Heyop, and had acquired a settlement by estate thereby, which settlement had descended to the pauper.

The appellants, in December 1843, delivered to the Justices who made the orders, and to the clerk of the peace, a notice and statement of grounds of appeal against the order of the 30th of November. The first, second, and third grounds of appeal stated objections to the order of the 13th of November. Fourth, that the order of the 30th of November, and the examinations sent therewith, are bad, informal, and insufficient in law upon the faces thereof, respectively. Fifth, that the order of the 30th of November does not order the over