The other conversation between the parties, recited in the motion, taken together as one transaction, was held by the Court of Common Pleas not to be sufficient evidence of a new promise. The result of the interview was a refusal to pay. The opening of the conversation on the part of the defendant would seem to admit the justice of the plaintiff's demand. The expression of a wish "to settle the note" would seem to imply that it was justly due; but the word "settle" is somewhat equivocal, and taking the whole interview together, we think the Court of Common Pleas made no mistake in law in deciding as it did.

In this opinion PARK and CARPENTER, JJ., concurred.

FOSTER, J. (dissenting). That the paper before us is more correctly described as a due-bill than as a promissory note, is unquestionable. That it would be regarded among business men, in the daily transactions of life, as conferring the same rights, and imposing the same liabilities, as a promissory note, seems to me equally unquestionable. It was so regarded by the parties to it; it was so treated and so spoken of whenever it was alluded to. This is manifest from the record: "The defendant came into the store of said Barker (one of the plaintiffs), and said to him, 'Have you that note?' or, 'Where is that note?' and that he 'wished to settle it.' Barker told him 'the note was in Mr. Stevenson's hands,'" etc. Any writing importing a debt, and an obligation to pay it, especially if it contains the words "for value received," is, in the popular judgment, a note. This instrument is clearly of that character. It was clearly the intent of the parties so to make it. And it is evident that they supposed they had so made it. To hold otherwise would seem to be contrary to the understanding and intent of the parties.

But it is claimed that this instrument is not, in law, a promissory note, and that the legislature, in passing the statutes of limitation, could never have intended to put such contracts on a footing with specialties.

Now if we examine the various works on bills of exchange and promissory notes, we do not find that the learned authors of those treatises agree upon any exact and precise definition of a promissory note. Chitty, Bayley, Byles, Story and Parsons, however, all agree that no particular words are necessary to make a bill or note. "It is sufficient if a note amount to an absolute promise to pay money." Chitty on Bills, 428. Chancellor Kent, following substantially Mr. Justice Bayley, says, "A note is a written promise, by one person to another, for the payment of money, at a specified time, and at all events." 3 Com. 74. Parsons says, "A promissory note is, in its simplest form, only a written promise." 1 Parsons on Notes & Bills, 14.

These definitions imply that a note must contain an express promise to pay. And Mr. Justice Story says: "But it seems that, to constitute a good promissory note, there must be an express promise upon the face of the instrument to pay the money; for a mere promise implied by law, founded upon an acknowledged indebtment, will not be sufficient." Story on Prom. Notes, 14. Courts of the highest authority, however, both in England and in this country, hold otherwise; nor are all the text writers so to be understood. "No precise words of contract are necessary in a promissory note, provided they amount, in legal effect, to a promise to pay:" Byles on Bills, 8. "It is settled that a

note need not contain the words 'promise to pay,' if there are other words of equivalent import." 1 Parsons on Notes & Bills, 24. What words are of "equivalent import," and are sufficient to raise a promise to pay, has occasioned much discussion. "The distinction be tween the cases on this point," says Mr. Justice Story, in a note on the section above quoted, “is extremely nice, not to say sometimes very unsatisfactory." As long ago as 1795, Chief Justice Eyre, sitting at Nisi Prius, held an "I. O. U. eight guineas," to be merely an acknowledgment of a debt, and neither a promissory note, nor a receipt: Fisher v. Leslie, 1 Esp. 425. In 1800, in the case of Guy v. Harris, reported in Chitty on Bills, 526, Lord Eldon, whose authority is certainly not inforior to that of Chief Justice Eyre, held a similar paper to be a promissory note, and ruled it out when offered in evidence, because it had not a stamp. "I owe my father 4701. Jas. Israel: "-This paper was offered in evidence before Lord Ellenborough, and he said: "I entertain some doubts whether this paper ought not to have been stamped as a promissory note, but on the authority of Fisher v. Leslie, 1 Esq., I will receive it in evidence, though unstamped:" Israel v. Israel, 1 Camp. 499. Childers v. Boulnois, 8 Dow. & Ry. Nisi Prius Cas. 8, decided by Chief Justice Abbott is to the same effect. See also Tompkins v. Ashby, 6 B. & C. 541; 9 Dow. & Ry. 543; 1 M. & W. 32; s. c. If a time be named for payment these instruments are differently construed. In Brooks v. Elkins, 2 M. & W. 74, "I. O. U. 201., to be paid on the 22d inst.," was held to be either a promissory note, or an agreement for the payment of 10l. and upward, and in either case required a stamp. "I. O. U. 85l., to be paid May 5th," was held to be a good promissory note. Waitham v. Elzee, 1 C. & K. 35.

The cases are numerous where an instrument has been held to be a good note without an express promise to pay. "I do acknowledge myself indebted to A. in l., to be paid on demand for value received." On demurrer to the declaration, the court, after solemn argument, held that this was a good note within the statute. Casborne v. Dutton, 1 Selwyn's Nisi Prius, 320. In the case of Morris v. Lee, the words were, "I promise to be accountable to J. S., or order, for 50%., value received by me," and it was held a good promissory note. The court say they "will take the word accountable as much as if it had been pay." They also notice the words value received. Fortescue, J., said, "This is a debt, being for value received, and not said on account:" 8 Mod. 352; 1 Strange, 629; 2 Ld. Raym, 1396; s. c.

Turning to the American cases, we find in our own court the case of Smith v. Allen, 5 Day, 337. This was brought on a paper in these words: "Due John Allen $94.91, on demand." The declaration counted on a promissory note, and alleged a promise to pay in the usual form, setting out the note in the declaration. The defendants demurred, and the Superior Court held the declaration sufficient. On writ of error brought, the Court of Errors sustained the decision.

Here was manifestly no express promise to pay; but the court held that there was one implied, and so sustained the claim of the plaintiff. The difference between this and the case at bar is very slight. This contains the words "on demand," that at the bar the words" value received." The one by its terms is due on demand, and the promise to pay is, therefore, implied by law, the other is, in legal effect, due on demand, and it is difficult to see a good reason why the

law does not as readily imply a promise to pay such a debt, as one due on demand by its own terms. Besides a valuable consideration is expressed in the case at bar by the words "value received," while none is expressed in the case of Smith v. Allen. Since the case of Edgerton v. Edgerton, 8 Conn. 6, and the case of Bristol v. Warner, 19 Conn. 7, it is quite clear that, by the law of this state, a promissory note, not negotiable, and not purporting on its face to be for value received, does not imply a consideration. Smith v. Allen, and the case at bar, are alike in omitting the words "or order," and or bearer," and so are alike non-negotiable. Such notes however are regarded as within the statute of 3 and 4 Anne: Smith v. Kendall, 6 T. R. 123.

66

Passing from this decision in our own court to the court of New York, where we are accustomed to find questions of mercantile and commercial law as ably discussed and as intelligently decided as in any of our sister states, we find the case of Russell v. Whipple, 2 Cow. 536. The suit was on this paper, "Due S., or bearer, $10." This differs from the case at bar in adding the words "value received." The court said it was a promissory note, and that the case was too plain for argument.

In Kimball v. Huntington, 10 Wend. 675, this paper. "Due R. $325, payable on demand," was held admissible in evidence as a promissory note. Judge Nelson says: The acknowledgment of indebtedness, on its face, implies a promise to pay the plaintiffs, and the payment by its terms is to be money, absolutely, on demand."

In Luqueer v. Prosser, 1 Hill, 259, Judge Cowen says: "If there be in legal effect an absolute promise that money shall be paid, all the rest is a dispute about words. * **The whole inquiry is, does the paper import an engagement that money shall be paid, absolutely? If it do, no matter by what words, it is a good note."

In Sackett v. Spencer, 29 Barb. 180, this paper, "Due S. or bearer, $340, for value received with interest," the court say "is a good promissory note, and if it specifies no time of payment, it is, in legal effect, payable immediately, and without grace."

In Franklin v. March, 6 N. H. 364, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held this paper, "Good to R. C. or order, for $30, borrowed money," to be a good promissory note.

In addition to the cases above cited the following are very strong authorities to sustain the claim that this is a promissory note: Cummings v. Freeman, 2 Humph. 143; Harrow v. Dugan, 6 Dana, 341; Fleming v. Burge, 6 Ala. 373; Finney v. Shirley, 7 Mo. 42; McGowan v. West, id. 569; Lorne v. Murphy, 9 Geo. 338. In Johnson v. Johnson, 1 Ala. 261, the court say: "The acknowledgment of a debt, due for a valuable consideration, clearly implies a promise to pay it on request.

The record discloses the fact that the paper before us was given for the purchase of clothing, and that the price of it has never been paid. Our statute of limitations bars all right of action upon it, unless it is recognized as a promissory note. So to recognize it will in my opinion do much less violence to law, than will be done to justice if we permit this defendant thus to escape the payment of an honest debt for the necessaries of life.

I would admit the paper offered in evidence in support of the first count in the declaration.

In this opinion Phelps, J., concurred.

COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT.
AGREEMENT.

Notice to terminate. This action was brought to recover possession on the ground of wrongful detention of a $1,000 United States bond, deposited by plaintiff with defendant, under an agreement between plaintiff and other manufacturers of lead, not to change or vary prices without notifying each other, and for other purposes. Each of the parties to the contract were to deposit, and did deposit, $1,000, or securities to that amount, with defendant, who was selected as custodian, which was to be forfeited by the depositor in case the contract was violated. The agreement contained this clause: "This agreement to be binding for five years, or until ten days' notice in writing shall be given by any party of his or their desire to withdraw from the same. But the money or security which such party may have deposited with Joseph M. Strong, custodian, shall remain in his possession, or continue until the expiration of this agreement, in order to give full opportunity for the inquiry as to the faithful observance of the provisions of this agreement, or otherwise, by the party thus withdrawing, prior to the expiration of the notice which he or they may give, according to the provisions of this agreement." One of the depositors having served notice of his intention to withdraw, after the expiration of ten days, plaintiff demanded his bond, claiming that the association was dissolved. Defendant refused to surrender it. The main question in the case was, whether the contract was terminated by the notice, as to all the parties at the end of ten days, so as to entitle them to their deposits at that time, or whether the contract continued as to the others, and the custodian was entitled to retain their deposits until the end of the five years, or until the contract was terminated by consent of all. Held, that by the service of the notice the contract was terminated as to all at the end of ten days thereafter, and that plaintiff was then entitled to receive his bond. McCullough's Lead Co. v Strong. Opinion by Grover, J.

APPEAL.

Order appointing referee. - This is an appeal by Charles W. Durant from an order of the general term of the Supreme Court, affirming an order of the special term, denying a motion by appellant to vacate an order, granted under section 401 of the Code, appointing a referee to take the deposition of the appellant, to be used on behalf of plaintiff upon two motions herein, and requiring said appellant to appear and attend before the referee, having refused to make an affidavit claimed to be necessary for the purposes of said motions. Appellant claimed that the order appointing said referee, having been made by a judge out of court, was void, and that therefore he had a legal right to have it set aside. Held, that if the order was void, an application to have it set aside was unnecessary; that if it was not void, the refusal to set it aside did not affect a substantial right of the appellant, and the appeal should be dismissed; that such an order is not reviewable in this court. Rogers v. Durant. Opinion by Rapallo, J.

REFEREE.

Findings of fact: written testimony.-This action was brought to recover for a quantity of timber alleged to have been sold to defendant. The answer alleged that defendant purchased as agent of the B. H. & E. R. R. Co., of which facts plaintiffs were aware at the

time of the sale, and that they gave the credit to said company. The action was tried by a referee, who found in favor of the plaintiffs; the judgment was reversed by the general term on the law and the facts. The testimony consisted principally of extracts from books of account, letters and other written memoranda. The Court of Appeals held, that while the findings of a referee on questions of fact should usually receive much weight, yet, that as written testimony has the same aspect in one court as in another, and as it clearly indicated that plaintiffs dealt with the company and looked to it for pay, the referee's findings of fact and the conclusions of law therefrom that defendant was personally liable, were erroneous. Bigler et al. v. Barnes. Opinion by Folger, J.

STOCK.

Dividends: construction of contract.-This was an action on a contract under which plaintiffs transferred to defendant twenty shares of the stock of a corporation, agreeing that all profits and dividends upon said stock up to January 1, 1872, should be paid to plaintiffs. There were no dividends declared until April 9, 1872, when a divivend of $15 on each share was declared. The case was tried before a referee, who found, that $250 of the dividends were derived from an increase in the value of the assets of the company prior to January 1, 1872, and, as a conclusion of law, that plaintiffs were entitled to recover the $250. Held (Church, Ch. J., dissenting), error; that defendant had no legal title to the profits or dividends of the corporation until a division had been made, and that his contract with plaintiffs included only the dividends and profits as ascertained and declared by the company, and not those ascertained by third persons or courts of justice upon an investigation of the accounts and transactions of the company, and that plaintiffs could not recover any portion of the dividends. Hyatt et al. v. Allen. Opinion by Andrews, J.

SALE ON EXECUTION.

Redemption: officer's memorandum as evidence: certificate.- Under the provisions of the Revised Statutes (2 R. S. 370, § 46) the right of a judgment debtor, whose title has been sold on execution, to redeem, does not depend upon the condition of his title at the time of the sale or redemption. The right follows the person, not the land, and continues for the period prescribed by the statute, although the debtor meanwhile may have parted with his title. Co-existent rights of redemption in the judgment debtor and in his grantee are not inconsistent.

Within the purview of the statute (2 R. S. 370, § 45) authorizing payment on redemption, the sheriff or his deputy (if the latter made the sale), is "the officer who made the sale," and payment may be made to either. It seems, that prior to the act of 1847 (chap. 410, Laws of 1847), in reference to executions against property, a receipt given by a sheriff acknowledging payment on redemption was within the scope of his authority and duty, and after the death of the parties concerned in the transaction such receipt is competent prima facie evidence of the fact and of the time of payment.

A written memorandum made by an officer against his interest in respect to a matter pertaining to his official duty, is, after his death, evidence as well of the fact against his interest as of other incidental and collateral facts and circumstances contained in it; and is admissible, irrespective of the question whether any

privity exists between the officer and the party against whom it is offered. Section 5 of said act of 1847), which directs the officer making the sale to execute to the person making a redemption a certificate "truly stating all such facts transpiring before him as shall be sufficient to show the fact of such redemption," applies to redemption made either by the judgment debtor or by creditor, and a receipt given by a sheriff stating all the facts necessary to show a redemption, although not formally stated to be a certificate, is a substantial compliance with the statute.

The rights of the parties are not affected by an omission to have the certificate proved or acknowledged, where the debtor or his grantee is in possession; the sheriff has no power to convey the land after the redemption, and no title passes by his deed, and the possession is constructive notice of title as against a purchaser claiming under such a sheriff's deed, although he took his deed without actual notice of an adverse title. Livingston v. Arnoux. Opinion by Andrews, J.

SURETY.

Mortgage: subrogation.-Plaintiff brought this action as surety, having paid the debt of his principal, to be subrogated to the rights of the creditor in, and to obtain the benefit of certain collateral securities given by the original debtor. It appeared that the Second Nat. Bank of C-, held notes of defendant C., indorsed by a firm composed of defendants W. F. L. & R. L., and as collateral two mortgages given by C.; the bank also held a note of C., indorsed by plaintiff. Upon the release and cancellation of the two mortgages, C, executed and delivered to the bank two other mortgages on the same property, as continuing collateral security for all his indebtedness. Defendant, W. F. L., bought all the bank's claims against C., and took an assignment of the two mortgages, and then sued plaintiff on the note indorsed by him, and collected the amount thereof from him. Held, that plaintiff had a right to be subrogated; that the bank was obliged to preserve the security unimpaired so far as he was concerned, so that he could have the benefit of it for his own indemnity upon payment of the note; that, although, the bank by releasing the former securities may have incurred a liability to the L's, or may have released them from liability, this gave them no superior equities under the new arrangement and did not affect the plaintiff's rights; and that W. F. L. after his purchase from the bank, C's obligations and receipt of a transfer of the securities, occupied the same position as did the bank, and acquired no additional rights.

The mortgages given were for a less amount than the principal debt, and were each for a specified sum, payable at a stated time with interest, the debts secured not being specified. Held, that it was fairly inferable that the parties intended that the interest should accumulate to cover the deficiency, and that payment of interest, from time to time, as the notes were renewed, did not extinguish the interest on the collaterals.

It also appeared that defendant, W. F. L., foreclosed one of the mortgages, claiming only a portion of the interest due, and it appearing affirmatively that he might have realized the full amount, held, that he should account to plaintiff for that amount.- Cory v. Leonard et al. Opinion by Church, Ch. J.

CARRIER OF PASSENGERS.

1. Ferry company: negligence.-This action was brought to recover damages for injuries received by plaintiff

while a passenger on one of defendant's boats, alleged to have been caused by defendant's negligence. It appeared that upon each of the steps of the main stairway of the boat a brass plate or covering was put, which was corrugated, except where it turned over the edge of the step, where it was smooth and slippery. Plaintiff's evidence tended to show that, as she was passing down the stairway to leave the boat, she slipped on the edge of the step and was injured. The stairs were finished in the same manner as upon the best river boats, and upon American sea-going steamers. The boat had been used for a year, and had carried on an average a thousand passengers a day, and no injury of the kind had happened before. Several witnesses of experience testified that this mode of covering the stairs was the best in use. Defendant moved

for a nonsuit, which was denied. Held error; that there was no evidence showing negligence. Crocheron v. North Shore Staten Island Ferry Co. Opinion 'by Andrews, J.

2. Evidence of negligence. This action was brought to recover damages for injuries alleged to have been occasioned by defendant's negligence. This case, upon a former appeal, is reported in 47 N. Y. Rep. 83. Plaintiff, who was a boy 12 years of age, was traveling in one of defendant's cars with his mother; not having a seat, has asked his mother to permit him to go forward into the smoking-car. She consented, and carefully directing and cautioning him, and requested him to return to her at noon. The boy went into the smoking-car, and some hours afterward, on the arrival of the train at noon, in attempting to leave the smokingcar and return to his mother, he was thrown under the train and injured. The case turned upon the question of fact as to whether the train had stopped before he attempted to leave the smoking-car. Plaintiff's evidence tended to show that it had, and as he got upon the platform it started up with a sudden jerk, which threw him off under the cars. The evidence of the conversation between the plaintiff and his mother before going into the smoking-car was received under objection. Held, that the conversation had no bearing upon the question, as to whether the cars were stopped when plaintiff left the smoking-car, and this having been fairly submitted to the jury, their finding could not have been affected by it. The only other question was as to whether the verdict was against the weight of evidence. Held, that there being some evidence, and the general term having refused to set the verdict aside as against the weight of evidence, its decision could not be reviewed. Downs v. New York Central R. R. Co. Opinion by Rapallo, J.

CORPORATION.

Trustees: individual liability. This was an action under section 13, chap. 40, Laws of 1848, brought by plaintiffs as creditors of the B. F. G. Co., against defendants, who were trustees of said company, for the purpose of charging them individually with the payment of an indebtedness of the company, upon the ground that defendants, while such trustees, declared and paid to the stockholders of said company a dividend which diminished the amount of its capital stock. It appeared that the defendants agreed with H. to sell him all the property of the company, except debts due the company, and some articles of personal property, the sale to be consummated by a transfer of the stock. The stock was transferred, and the consideration received paid to the stockholders, in proportion to the

amount of stock held by each. The property reserved was afterward transferred to the secretary to be converted into money to pay debts and liabilities, and the residue distributed among the stockholders, who assented to the agreement with H. Held, that the legal effect of the contract with H. was a sale of the stock by the stockholders consenting, H. thereby becoming the principal stockholder, the company still remaining in existence and retaining its property, and this transaction did not therefore make defendants individually liable under said section; but that the subsequent transfer, sale and division of a portion of the proceeds was, in substance and effect, the declaring and paying a dividend which took from the assets of the company the amount so distributed, and as the whole assets were of less value than the amount of capital stock, to that extent diminished its capital, and this transaction rendered defendants liable.

Trustees are not liable under said section for the costs in a judgment against the company, perfected after they have ceased to be trustees. Rorke et al. v. Thomas et al. Opinion by Church, Ch. J.

EXTRADITION OF CRIMINALS.

In the matter of Angelo Di Giacomo, surnamed Ciccariello, a case recently before Judge Blatchford, of the United States Circuit Court, the question of the retroactive effect of treaties relating to fugitives from justice was considered. The charge against Giacomo was, that on August 27, 1867, he killed one Avigliano in Italy. He was arrested in this country in 1874, under the treaty of 1868 between the United States and Italy. A writ of habeas corpus was issued to try the question, whether the treaty covered the offense of Giacomo.

The preamble of the convention sets forth, that it is expedient "that persons convicted of or charged with the crimes hereinafter specified, and being fugitives from justice, should, under certain circumstances, be reciprocally delivered up." The first article sets forth that the two governments "agree to deliver up persons who, having been convicted of, or charged with, the crimes specified in the following article, committed within the jurisdiction of one of the contracting parties, shall seek an asylum, or be found, within the territories of the other." The second article provides that "persons shall be delivered up, who shall have been convicted of, or be charged, according to the provisions of this convention, with any of the following crimes," including murder. The third article provides that "the provisions of this treaty shall not apply to any crime or offense of a political character; and the person or persons delivered up for the crimes enumerated in the preceding article shall in no case be tried for any ordinary crime committed previously to that for which his or their surrender is asked." Judge Blatchford holds that there is nothing in the treaty which excludes extradition for crimes previously committed. The learned judge further says: "I am not prepared to admit that a person who has committed a crime abroad, and fled to this country, has acquired a right of asylum here as a personal right, so that under a subsequent law, whether treaty or statute, he cannot be delivered up as a fugitive from justice. If there be any want of power to deliver him up, it must be found in a constitutional restriction upon the power to make a treaty, or to pass a statute, covering extradition for a crime previously committed. The general right to make treaties for extradition, and to deliver up fugitives thereunder, cannot be denied to the government

of the United States. The restriction, in article 4 of the Amendments to the Constitution, against violating the rights of the people to be secure in their persons against unreasonable seizures, and the restriction, in article 5 of such amendments, against depriving a person of liberty without due process of law, are restrictions which, if applicable at all to the subject of extradition, would extend to cases of extradition for crimes committed after the making of a treaty as fully as to crimes committed before. But they have no relation to the subject of extradition for crimes, as regulated by the treaty in question, and the statutes of the United States passed on the subject.

"But the Constitution contains (art. 1, §9) a provision, that no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed;' and a provision (art. 1, § 10), that no State shall pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law. Assuming that a treaty must be regarded as a law within the inhibition, is this treaty, in the particular in question, an ex post facto law or a bill of attainder? A bill of attainder is defined to be ‘a legislative act, which inflicts punishment without a judicial trial,' where the legislative body exercises the office of judge, and assumes judicial magistracy, and pronounces on the guilt of a party without any of the forms or safeguards of a trial, and fixes the punishment. Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 323. This treaty does none of these things, nor do any of the statutes for carrying the treaty into effect contain provisions which fall within such definition.

By an ex post facto law is meant, one which imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time it was committed, or imposes additional punishment to that then prescribed, or changes the rules of evidence, by which less or different testimony is sufficient to convict than was then required. Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 326. It is said in Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 390, that the meaning of the prohibition against passing ex post facto laws is, that laws shall not be passed after a fact done by a subject or citizen which shall have relation to such fact, and shall punish him for having done it.' It is also there said: Every ex post facto law must necessarily be retrospective, but every retrospective law is not an ex post facto law.' It is contended, in the present case, that the effect of extradition for a crime committed before the making of the treaty is to punish the party by depriving him of his liberty, and sending him out of the United States, and delivering him up to a foreign authority and to punish him for remaining and being found in the United States, when he could not have been thus punished at the time the treaty was made. But, the fact of extradition cannot properly be regarded as punishment, within the sense of that word, as used when considering the subject of ex post facto laws. There is no offense against the United States, and no trial for any such offense, and no punishment for any such offense. It is true that extradition relates only to criminal offenses, but it relates only to criminal offenses committed abroad; and no treaty for extradition, nor any statute passed in relation to extradition, purports to punish the fugitive for the offense. Both treaties and statutes assume that he is to be tried upon the charge, if not already convicted. With the question of punishment, or its kind or degree, they have no concern. They merely declare that the protection of this government shall not be interposed between the fugitive and the laws he has violated; and that if he flees hither for such protection, the injured govern

ment may take him hence and shall be aided therein. This government neither assumes nor exercises any power to punish for the crime. The fact that the fugitive is deprived of his liberty does not make such deprivation a punishment. Loss or suffering to the party supposed to be punished is not punishment, in a legal sense, unless the punishment is inflicted as a penalty for the commission of crime. If extradition for an anterior crime is punishment, extradition for a subsequent crime is equally punishment. But it is an incorrect idea of punishment, to say that the United States, in every case of extradition, is punishing the party for the offense committed abroad by extraditing him. It being assuined that the prisoner committed a murder abroad and then fled to the United States, and that the treaty was afterward made, it is not a punishment of the prisoner to deprive him of his liberty under the treaty, and surrender him to the foreign authority, so as to make the treaty obnoxious to the objection that it is an ex post facto law.

"As this question is a novel and important one, and has arisen in a circuit court, I have thought it proper to submit these views to the circuit judge, and I am authorized to say that he concurs in them."

THE LEGAL PROFESSION.

The legal profession-its past, its present, and its duty was the subject of an address delivered recently by W. G. Hammond, LL.D., before the Iowa State University-Law Department. In the course of his address, Dr. Hammond took occasion to advert to the prevailing dissatisfaction of the people with the legal profession; but the edge of the non-professional rebuke is very much blunted by the fact that these "complaints are no louder or more severe just now than at any time for the last six or seven centuries." But Dr. Hammond thinks that the lawyers themselves are beginning to believe that the bar has lost character within the memory of the present generation. Nevertheless there is no time to mourn over this condition of things, but we should immediately set about ascertaining in what respect the American bar has deteriorated, and what are the causes of the change. In speaking of this, Dr Hammond says:

"When the generation after the Revolution passed away, there passed with it most of the causes that had given a factitious importance to the legal profession. The work of organizing society on a new basis, of building States and shaping constitutions, was done. At the same time, the vast material prosperity of the nation opened new avenues of employment. A host of new professions sprang up, dividing with the three older ones the attention of the most active minds. The number of these at the present day is great-teaching, journalism, civil engineering, mining, the various applications of chemistry to the arts and agriculture, all call for trained intellects, and reward them with such advantages of fortune and social position as still remain of the original birthright of law, physic, and divinity. Commerce, once regarded as only a better sort of peddling, has now become a liberal pursuit, in which educated men find all their powers fully employed. If successful, it offers prizes to which the average gains of the lawyer bear no comparison. Thus the bar has lost its privileged position, and its members stand on the same broad social platform with the rest of that great army who earn their bread by the labor of their brains, rather than their hands. But it is untrue,