of the insurance. But no resort to a court of equity for specific performance was necessary in this case, by reason of the action of the agent in filling up the blank policy, which was duly attested, as he should have done immediately after the preliminary arrangement with the assured. The agent was authorized to do after the fire that which he had previously stipulated to do on behalf of the company. * * * The filling up of the policy was a voluntary specific performance of the preliminary agreement. And when filled up, the policy was, by express stipulation, to be held by the agent, in his safe, for the assured, and no actual manual transfer was, under these circumstances, essential to perfect the latter's title. It then became his property, and upon a refusal of the defendant to surrender it, two courses were open to him: either to proceed by action to recover the possession of the policy, or to sue upon the policy to recover for the loss; and in the latter case to prove its contents upon failure of the company to produce the instrument on the trial." In support of these positions the following cases were cited: Kohne v. Insurance Co., 1 Wash. C. C. 93; Sheldon v. Conn. Mut. Insurance Co., 25 Conn. 207; Lightbody v. North American Insurance Co., 23 Wend. 18; City of Davenport v. Peoria Marine & Fire Insurance Co., 17 Iowa, 277.

FINANCIAL LAW.

THE VALUE OF FOREIGN COIN.

The

The recent decision of the United States Supreme Court, in the case of Arthur v. Iselin, to which we alluded the other day, is one of considerable interest to the commercial world. The point directly presented was the legal value of the franc of France. plaintiff, Iselin, in 1874, entered, at the custom-house, goods imported from France and invoiced in francs. By an act of Congress, passed May 22, 1846 (9 Stats. at Large, 14), it was provided that "in all computations at the custom-house, the franc of France and of Belgium shall be estimated at eighteen cents six mills." The plaintiff claimed that the dutiable value of the goods was to be determined at this rate of estimation. On the other hand Mr. Arthur, the Collector, relied on the act of March 3, 1873, entitled "An act to establish the custom-house value of the sovereign or pound sterling of Great Britain, and to fix the par of exchange (17 Stat. at Large, 602). Speaking of the act of 1873, the court says:

"It seems to us (although that is a matter of legislative cognizance) that the statute adopts the true method of computing the value of foreign money. The basis of our dollar of account (when not affected by the exceptional condition of legal-tender notes) is the standard gold dollar of 25.8 grains, containing onetenth alloy. The actual coinage in circulation may be slightly diminished in value by abrasion, and this may have some effect on the dollar of account. But the same thing is true in other countries as the assays at the mint have shown; and the true method of comparing their money of account with ours, when both are based on actual coin, is to compare the standard coins of the two countries in a perfect state, and to ascertain the actual amount of pure metal in each. This is the result at which Congress seems to have arrived, and, as we think, wisely.

"In making the comparison of the moneys of different countries their gold coins, if they have such, are employed for the purpose; gold having become the general medium of international exchange, whilst silver

is regarded more as a domestic coin, and is usually made a legal tender for only limited amounts. This practice, together with the rejection of the alloy from the estimate, is in accordance with the rules laid down on the subject by the most enlightened economists. "Computed in the manner required by the law, the value of the franc is asertained to be 19 cents 3 mills, as contended for by the government, This is the result of the examination and estimate made by the director of the mint, and announced by the Secretary of the Treasury."

"The court also held that the rule established by this act, abrogated all previous regulations on the subject, and was the rule to be followed whenever the value of foreign coins is material to be known.

NATIONAL BANKS AND STATE USURY LAWS. The decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Central National Bank v Pratt, 115 Mass. 539, to which we last week referred, and which hold that the usury laws of a State do not apply to a national bank, is based upon the following line of argument: "The power of the government to create a bank is supreme; from its nature it includes the power to endow it with all such faculties as are appropriate to accomplish its object. It is clear, as stated in Osborn v. United States Bank, 9 Wheat. 738, that the faculty of lending and dealing in money is an appropriate and necessary faculty for a bank, and that without it the bank would want the capacity to perform its public functions in the most efficient manner. The rate of interest to be charged for the use of money is a necessary incident of a loan, and the power in Congress to authorize a bank to lend money involves the power to fix the rate of interest and the penalty for taking a greater rate. If a State may fix the rate of interest, it may practically destroy this faculty of the bank. The power to create a bank includes the power to fix the limitations within which it may exercise its functions and faculties, and to determine the causes for which, and the manner in which, it may be destroyed. The power vested in Congress is inconsistent with a power in any State or Territory to affix penalties upon the bank for taking unlawful interest or for any other violation of the act of Congress. We are of opinion that it was within the constitutional power of Congress to fix the rate of interest which a national bank might take upon a loan of money, and to determine the penalty to be imposed for taking a greater rate; that such power, when exercised by Congress, is exclusive of State legislation; that the provision of the thirteenth section of the act of Congress we are considering, imposing a penalty for taking unlawful interest, applies as well to banks established in States where a rate of interest is fixed by law as to banks in States where no rate is fixed, and therefore that the laws of New York imposing penalties for taking usury do not apply to national banks established within its limits."

It was urged by counsel in the case of the First National Bank of Decatur v. Home Savings Bank, recently decided by the United States Supreme Court, that a national bank is not authorized to issue letters of credit, but the court declined to consider the question on the ground that it was not raised in the record. The point decided in the case was, that a letter of credit guaranteeing "drafts on shipments of cattle," covered drafts on shipments of hogs-or, in other words, that "hogs" are cattle."

COMMISSION OF APPEALS ABSTRACT.

BILL OF LADING.

Transfer as security for loan: rights of holder. This action was brought to recover possession of sixty-two bales of cotton. One D., a cotton dealer, called at plaintiff's banking house and told its president that he had sixty-two bales of cotton which he wished to ship to S. & D. at N. Y., and asked the president to cash his sight draft with bill of lading attached, with the proceeds of which D. would pay for the cotton. Plaintiff cashed the draft and received it with the bill of lading attached; the draft was forwarded to New York by plaintiff and duly presented to S. & D., who refused payment; the cotton was thereupon demanded of S. & D. on behalf of plaintiff; they said they would give it up on the order of the consignor; this order was subsequently obtained, but S. & D. refused to deliver the cotton. Meanwhile S. & D. commenced an action against the consignor on an alleged prior indebtedness and had the cotton attached, sold the cotton and kept the proceeds. Held, that the indorsement by and delivery of the bill of lading, as collateral security for the draft discounted by plaintiff, operated the same as a delivery of the goods, and plaintiff was entitled to hold them, as far as was necessary to pay the discounted paper, as against the consignees or any other person. That plaintiff, if not absolute owner, stood in the position of a mortgagee in possession, and it was not required to file the papers as a chattel mortgage. First Nat. Bank of Cincinnati v. Kelly, sheriff, etc. Opinion by Reynolds, C.

COMMON CARRIER.

This

Limitation of liability for loss of baggage. action was brought to recover the value of a trunk and its contents, which was intrusted to defendant, as common carrier, and lost. It appeared that plaintiff took passage on one of defendant's steamers for Europe. On paying her passage-money she received a printed ticket signed by defendant's agent, which contained a clause which stated substantially, that the company was not to be held liable for loss or damage to baggage in any sum, unless the same shall have been proved to have been occasioned by the gross negligence of the company, or of its agents, nor in any event beyond $50, unless a bill of lading or receipt was signed therefor, specifying the articles and their values, and that money, jewelry and all valuables were at the risk of the passenger, unless placed in the company's charge and a bill of lading or receipt signed therefor. When plaintiff went on board her trunk was delivered into the custody of defendant's agents, who assumed to take charge of it. At the end of the voyage defendant did not produce the trunk or in any way account for it. Held, that there was sufficient evidence to sustain a finding by a jury of gross negligence, but that in the absence of a bill of lading or receipt, as specified in the contract, a recovery could not be had for over $50, and no recovery could be had for jewelry or silverware.

Also held, that the rule, that, in the absence of fraud, concealment or improper practice, the legal presumption is that stipulations contained in a common carrier's receipt for freight, limiting his common-law liability, were known and assented to by the person receiving it, applies to carriers of passengers with their baggage. Steers v. L., N. Y. & P. Steamship Co. Opinion by Johnson, C.

CONVERSION.

What constitutes.-This action was brought to reeover for the conversion of a quantity of lumber. The defendant purchased a quantity of lumber which had been wrongfully cut from plaintiff's land and was lying in rafts in the river C. The purchase was made in good faith and without notice of any defect in the title of the vendor. On the same day, while engaged in rafting the lumber down the river, defendant was informed of plaintiff's claim by the latter's agent, who demanded the lumber and requested defendant to take the rafts and land them at C., where plaintiff would pay the expenses. Defendant assented to this and landed the rafts at C., except one which got fast in the river before reaching C.; he left them moored to the river bank, and did not at any time afterward interfere with any of the lumber. After the lumber had arrived defendant saw plaintiff at C., who asked him to deliver the lumber to him; defendant replied that he would do nothing about it, that he would leave the lumber where it was, and would not then take the expenses. Several weeks afterward plaintiff called upon defendant at his house thirty miles from C., and demanded the lumber, defendant replied that he did not want any trouble, was willing to do what was right, and that he would not give it up, unless he could get relieved from paying therefor. Held, that defendant was not liable.

Where words are relied upon to constitute a conversion they must be uttered in proximity to the property, and under circumstances that show a determination to exercise dominion and control over it, and a defiance of the owner's rights. (Dunning v. Austen, 34 Vt. 330, disapproved, and Wooster v. Sherwood, 25 N. Y. 278, limited and distinguished.) Gillet v. Roberts. Opinion by Earl, C.

CORPORATION.

Liability of officers for salaries of agents.-This action was brought by plaintiff to recover an amount alleged to be due for salary. It appeared that defendant S. held himself out to be the president of a corporation duly organized, employed plaintiff to act as its superintendent. Defendant R., thereafter, supposing the company to be legally incorporated, subscribed and paid in $5,000, and was elected president. He notified plaintiff of his election and directed him thereafter to report to him. Plaintiff drew drafts on R., as president, to carry on the business, which R. accepted and which were paid by the acting treasurer. The business proved to be a failure and was abandoned, and R. gave the directions as to the disposition of the books. The corporation never in fact existed. It did not appear that this fact was known to R. before the business was abandoned. Held, that R. was not liable, that in order to charge him it was necessary to show that he was acting as a partner in the enterprise at the time the contract with plaintiff was made. Fuller v. Rowe, impleaded, etc. Opinion by Gray, C.

FIRE INSURANCE.

Rights of insured: apportionment of loss.—This was an action brought upon a policy of fire insurance. It appeared that plaintiff leased to C. certain premises, with the privilege of purchasing at a stated price, the tenure to commence April 1, 1861. One installment of rent was paid by C. in advance, and proposing to make improvements, with the knowledge and consent of all the parties, C. procured a policy of insurance for $3,000, to be issued by defendant, dated March 30, 1861, in

terms insuring the plaintiff, the loss, if any, payable to C. The policy was intended for the benefit of plaintiff and C., the latter, in case of loss, to be entitled to an indemnity for rent and money expended in repairs. C. took possession about April 1, 1861, but made no repairs. A loss occurred to the amount of $2,100. C. assigned his interest in the policy to plaintiff, and the latter made due proof of loss. No notice by or on behalf of C. was given. Held, that plaintiff was entitled to recover the full amount of the loss.

There was a clause in the policy that in case of loss, the insured should not recover more than the proportion thereof, which the amount thereby insured bore to the whole amount of the insurance. Plaintiff then had a policy in another company, which provided for notice to, and written assent of, the company, in case of other insurance, or in case of default, that the policy should be wholly void. There was no notice given of the insurance effected with the defendant, or any assent obtained. When notice of the loss was given to the president of the other compony, he refused to pay on account of the failure to comply with said provision. No proofs of loss were served on said company, and no measures taken to collect of it. Held, that as there was no express agreement that the insured should continue other insurance plaintiff had a right to cancel the other policy without defendant's assent, and she was not bound to attempt to enforce it, as by its terms it became wholly void, and there being no other insurance in force defendant was not entitled to have the loss apportioned, but was liable for the full amount. Hand v. Williamsburgh City Fire Ins. Co. Opinion by Lott, Ch. C.

PARTNERSHIP.

Parol agreement: rent: firm debt.-This action was brought to charge defendant with certain installments of rent reserved in a lease from plaintiff of a store in the city of Rochester. It appeared that one G. held a lease from plaintiff of a store in which he was carrying on business; that the unexpired term of the lease was over two years, when G. formed a copartnership with defendant for the term of one year and one month. In the preliminary negotiations it was agreed, by parol, that in consideration that G. should put the lease into the partnership, they would regard the rent for the whole unexpired term as a partnership liability, and as a debt created on account of the firm. It was stipulated by the written agreement that each partner should be equally liable for "all debts and liabilities suffered or created by, or on account of," the firm business. The lease was not mentioned in the agreement. After continuing business for about eight months, the firm was dissolved, and the business was soon after assigned to another, who went into possession. The rent, which this action was brought to recover, accrued more than a year after the partnership was formed. Held (Reynolds and Johnson, CC., dissenting), that defendant was not liable; that he could not be liable as assignee of the lease, because such liability, if it ever existed, continued only as long as the privity of estate continued, and ceased upon the transfer and surrender of possession; that the rent could not be made a firm debt, as such a term could not be created or assigned by parol (2 R. 8. 135, §8); and an agreement to pay the rent for the whole time, as it could not, by its terms, be performed within a year, was void. 2 R. 8. 136, § 2. Durand v. Curtis. Opinions by Earl, C., and Reynolds, C.

SALE.

Breach of warranty. This action was brought upon a promissory note, which was given in payment of the purchase-price of ten tons of xx pipe iron, which plaintiff contracted to sell and deliver to defendants, plaintiff agreeing that the iron should be of a quality suitable and proper for use in defendants' manufacturing business. It appeared that plaintiff knew what defendants' business was, and that he delivered ten tons of iron apparently of the kind and quality specifled, but, in fact, of a quality unfitted and worthless for use in defendants' business. The quality of the iron was not discoverable by inspection merely, but might have been ascertained by breaking it with a sledge. The iron was received, and a portion of it used, by defendants, without any previous test to ascertain its quality. Held, that plaintiff's agreement as to quality was a warranty; that defendants were not bound to apply a test upon receiving the iron, and as the defect was not open and visible, defendants were entitled to counter-claim their damages on account of the breach of the warranty. Dounce v. Dow et al. Opinion by Lott, Ch. C.

Practice in Probate Courts comprising also the Law of Wills, Executors, Administration, etc., with complete forms for practice. By Robert H. McClellan. Albany: William Gould & Son, 1875.

This work is designed as a book of ready reference in which the profession can find "clearly pointed out the rights and remedies offered by the Probate Courts with forms easily adapted." A work of this character is unquestionably a desideratum. Mr. McClellan was formerly surrogate of Rensselaer county and consequently has acquired considerable practical knowledge of this department of law.

In the chapter relating to "The Surrogate's Court and the powers and duties of the Surrogate generally," the author has contented himself with setting forth the statute law on the subject without the citation of cases by way of illustration. In the chapter on "Wills, their Execution and Probate," quite a number of authorities are cited and commented upon. We notice a considerable number of cases set forth in other chapters, especially those relating to the "Appointment of Appraisers and the Inventory;" and to the "Collection and Care of the Estate, Compromising Debts due the Estate, and Advertising for Claims." The work thus partakes of the nature of an extended treatise, although the author tells us that his object was not to make a "treatise to give elementary instruction." The work is generally accurate, although it is proper to say that in some parts the latest authorities are not referred to. Thus on page 27 in speaking of the effect of partial obliteration of wills, Quinn v. Quinn, 1 N. Y. Sup. 437, is not cited. This was a case decided at general term, in September, 1873, and was very elaborately considered. It is the more important inasmuch as it holds the reverse of the doctrine in Mr. McClellan's text. Quinn v. Quinn holds that there can be no revocation of an executed will by obliteration, except an entire obliteration with intent to revoke the whole will. Mr. McClellan states in effect that a will may be partially revoked, under our statute, by obliteration.

The work is, however, particularly valuable in furnishing the practitioner with the statutes in a convenient shape and with reliable and convenient forms of practice.

The Morality of Prohibitory Liquor Laws. An Essay, by William B. Weeden. Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1875.

This book is designed to show that it is wrong to enact prohibitory laws relating to liquor. The nucleus of the book was a paper read by Mr. Weeden before the Unitarian National Conference at Saratoga. That paper has been expanded into a book of over two hundred pages, containing the arguments of those who oppose prohibitory legislation. The author shows the distinction between temperance and abstinence; he maintains that the true province of legislation is in respect to the abuse of liquors; and asserts that prohibition refuses to recognize the natural laws of the body, and ignores both science and common experience. In the progress of the discussion Mr. Weeden demonstrates the self-evident proposition that prohibitory laws cannot be fully or completely enforced; and that such laws render the States where they exist notorious for the number of evasions of law.

The author advocates the system of regulating the sale and use of intoxicating liquors; and proposes the introduction into this country of a system which has been adopted in Sweden, and which is said to consist in a concentration of the licenses in a city or town into one association or corporation. In Gothenburg all the public-house licenses are held by a single "retailing company," incorporated by royal charter. This company keeps public houses in different parts of the city; into each it puts a manager, whom it supplies with spirituous liquors, and who is to pay over all that is received for liquors, his remuneration consisting of profits on sales of tea, coffee, cigars and eatables. The company's affairs are subject to municipal inspection, and the entire net profits are paid into the treasury. The plan is said to work well, and drunkenness has diminished. The author thinks the system would require some change, but not much, to adapt it to our American life. The proposition to introduce this system into this country is the only one of any great importance which we find in the book. We have tried prohibition and license; now it is proposed to create a close monopoly.

The style of the book is somewhat above that of the average statement of the pros and cons on this subject; but it is not sufficiently removed from the doubtful metaphors and phrases of the temperance platform to warrant sincere commendation. Still, there are some things in the book which merit the attention of the publicist and the legislator.

CORRESPONDENCE.

PROMISE TO ONE FOR BENEFIT OF ANOTHER. NEW YORK, February 24, 1875. Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

DEAR SIR-The remarks in your last number (p. 121) make it pertinent to call attention to the following, in Etna National Bank v. Fourth National Bank, 46 N. Y. 90, opinion of the court per Allen, J.: "It was not without a struggle that the doctrine, that upon a promise to A for the benefit of B, the latter could maintain an action, was established, and judges have yielded assent to it with reluctance; and in general, there has been some trust, or the defendant has been charged, as for money which, ex aequo et bono, belonged to the plaintiff, and a privity of contract has been spelled out. See Mellen v. Whipple, 1 Gray, 317. The doctrine will not be extended to new or doubtful cases." In the same opinion, Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y.

268, after being distinguished as an express promise to pay a sum of money received by the defendant from a debtor of the plaintiff, to the plaintiff, and the promise was the consideration upon which, and upon which alone, he received the money; also that "the money was appropriated by the debtor" to pay the plaintiff "and intrusted to the defendant upon an express promise to pay that debt "-(that looks like bad law and bad fact, for the money was not ear-marked) - slurs the case, as "decided by a divided court and those who acquiesced in the judgment differing as to the grounds" of it. In view of the above-quoted remarks and of Merrill v. Green, 55 N. Y., which you discussed in your article, the holding in Lawrence v. Fox may, perhaps, be regarded as overruled or unsettled and the question open. B. W. HUNTINGTON.

CURIOSITIES OF THE REPORTS.

NEW YORK, February 8, 1875.

Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

The JOURNAL has, not infrequently, interested itself to notice the whimsicalities, as well as the practicalities of the reporters. It has previously reported the cause grotesque of State v. Linkhaw, 69 N. C. 214, whose drollest feature, after all, perhaps, is, that a Methodist society should not be equal to pricking up a brother who sang hymns one line behind hand. And, one cannot but reflect, that had the society itself expelled, instead of asking the aid of the Supreme Court, there is very little probability that Mr. Linkhaw could, in law or equity, have restored himself, except by stipulating to "keep up" with the chorus.

In handling the reports of the various States, one stumbles upon many queer cases, and it is because the JOURNAL has furnished me with a precedent, that I venture to cite one or two for its columns.

Coggswell v. State, 49 Ga. 103, was a case where a new trial was refused on the grounds that one of the jurymen, Patrick Whelan, by name, was "at times asleep during the trial, during the delivery of a part of the testimony, during the argument of counsel, and during the charge of the court." To add to the enormity of Patrick Whelan's conduct, to say nothing of his unimpressible nature the trial was one for murder, and the verdict "guilty."

Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146, was where two persons, a man and a woman, agreed to commit suicide together. The woman did so kill herself, but the man's courage failed him and he survived, only to be indicted for murder. He may have possibly expected, as the result of his timidity, a suit for specific performance or for the breach of his contract, by the representatives of the departed; but this ultra legem appears to have taken him by surprise.

Yule v. New Orleans, 25 La. An. 394, might be of interest to property holders. This was an appeal from a petition which alleged that on a day named "at about the hour of half past three, P. M., a fire broke out on the square in which the petitioner's property was situated, but remote from it, and that it was all destroyed; that when the fire occurred, nearly all the flremen, with their engines, hooks and ladders, were, by permission of the common council of New Orleans, at the 'fair grounds, some miles distant from their engine-houses where, by law, they should have been, and where they spent the day in feasting, fun and frolic," instead of being where they were wanted, and saving the property of citizens. Held, that the city was not liable. J. A. M.

COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS.

The following decisions were handed down in the New York Court of Appeals, February 26, 1875:

Judgment reversed and new trial granted, costs to abide the event - Fisk v. Fisk.—Judgment affirmed with costs-Daubney v. Hughes; Kimmerle v. Gorham; Carr v. New York Central Railroad Co.; Richardson v. Kropf; The First National Bank of New Berlin v. Church. - Judgment reversed and proceedings dismissed without costs in any court- - Wood v. Squires. - Appeal dismissed with costs-Hassack v. Heyer

dahl.

The court adjourned until March 22, 1875. No new calendar is to be made.

NOTES.

The Daily London News is informed that the Lord Chancellor has intimated that it is not his intention to create any new queen's counsel at present. Mr. Justice Honyman has now definitely resigned his seat in the Court of Common Pleas, owing to ill-health. Sir George was called to the bar at the Middle Temple in 1849, and went the home circuit. He was made a Q. C. and bencher of his inn in 1866. The learned judge's judicial career has been a particularly short one, he having only been appointed in the early part of 1873, upon the retirement of Mr. Justice Byles.The Liverpool Post states that an action involving the question of the right to throw bouquets to actresses is about to be brought against the manager of a Liverpool theater. An elderly gentleman almost nightly for some time took his place in the stalls, prepared with bouquets, and threw them with great regularity to certain actresses at certain points of the performance, sometimes rising on their acceptance of the nosegays and acknowledging the honor by profound obeisances. The manager at length interfered, and legal proceedings are threatened.- An English lord has been sued at Northampton by the town authorities for a sum of £17, the expenses incurred by the town fire brigade in extinguishing a fire on his estate, and which amount he refused to pay.

Bishop Clark, of Rhode Island, and President Robinson, of Brown University, have been making arguments before a committee of the Rhode Island legislature on the subject of church taxation. The former favored a limited exemption, holding that churches are of sufficient public benefit to exclude them from taxtation. The latter favored State inspection, placing each church relieved from taxation under the supervision of the State.- The Law Times, in reviewing a work entitled "The Civil Laws of France up to the Present Time," by David Mitchell Aird, remarks, that "it requires little penetration on the part of an observer to note the new aspects of legal studies as evidenced by the law books which issue from the press from time to time. They contain frequent proofs that law is being studied more and more as a science. They show that a large body of readers and students are becoming familiar with other codes than our own. The lawyer who wishes to make a mark in his profession as a lawyer, will doubtless soon find it necessary to devote more or less of his time to the subject of comparative jurisprudence. Indeed, with questions of codification and law reform constantly presenting themselves, it is well that we can turn to the digest and to the codes of the continent, imperfect as they

are. Hence is derived the chief value of a book like Mr. Aird's. With all the defects of the Code Napoleon, it is of great value to the student in many ways. Not its least value is that it enables him to compare a living code with its original."

The Belgian Times says that the Tribunal de Justice at Mons was lately the scene of an affair which, though ending in no alarming results, was sufficient to render it uncomfortable for the judge and others present. A bankrupt was being examined as to the genuineness of his statement of accounts, and the "Procureur du roi " hinted that he had made away with some of his property. This so enraged the individual that he immediately drew a revolver from his pocket and took aim at the "Procureur," who made a hasty flight, and then at the judge, who followed the example of the "Procureur." In half a minute the whole court was cleared; the bankrupt followed the example of the others, and has not been heard of since.- -The Law Journal refers to the case of Vaughan v. Hampson, where there had been a meeting of creditors under the English bankruptcy act, at the office of a solicitor, one gentleman who was present as holding a creditor's proxy, made himself in some way obnoxious to some one, whereupon, the Journal says, "the proprietor of the room - being, as we suppose, thoroughly posted in Wood v. Leadbitter, 13 M. & W. 838-commanded the proxy-holder to depart, and on his refusal to go molliter manus imposuit, and turned him out. An action for assault was brought, and the Court of Exchequer gave judgment for the plaintiff. The court held that the case was not within the principle of Wood v. Leadbitter, because the proxy-holder had a license coupled with an interest. The decision seems fair enough to the unsophisticated mind; but who can suppress a sigh at such an invasion of the maxim that a solicitor's office, like any other man's house, is his castle!"

The law in relation to actions for breach of promise brought by males is thus expounded by Brett, J., in the recent case of Townsend v. Bennett: "If a man had been for years kissed by a woman, he certainly was not much the worse for it- but if a woman had been for years kissed by a man, and the engagement was broken off, would that render any other man quite so desirous as he might otherwise have been to kiss her? If a woman happened to be jilted, people were apt to consider before they determined to be a second suitor. But did this apply to a man? A man could not go crying about the world that he had been jilted by a woman. Again, when women got toward middle life it happened that they did not readily get married: but a middle-aged man had much less difficulty in getting a wife than a woman had a husband. The jury must judge why that was; he was sure he did not know. All women were creatures that should be worked for by men, and no man — - that was, no real man - had any other thought; and women, except in the case of a few strong-minded ladies, thought that their business was to stay at home and mind the family; and men thought so too. When a woman became engaged she looked forward to a comfortable home, where she would be worked for; and that prospect she would lose by the engagement being broken off. A man, however, after the breach of such an engagement, would have the same power of working for himself as before, and in this respect, therefore, the man was not