NOTES.

APPLICATION was made last week in the Supreme

Court at New York city, for the discharge of a person who was confined under a charge of forging a deed to a house. Representations were made to the effect that the accused was a man of unusual literary attainments, being the author of several works on astronomy and mathematics, and for this reason was not likely to be guilty of the crime. This assertion drew from the judge the remark that, because he was a learned man, it was not to be supposed that he was incapable of committing a crime; the greatest and most accomplished forger in the history of the State was a man of great ability and learning.—The Psychological and Medico Legal Journal for April, 1875, contains papers on "Monomania, as affecting Testamentary Capacity," by Edward Patterson; "Chronic Localized Basilar Meningitis," by T. M. B. Cross; "Observations on European Insane Asylums," by L. A. Tourtellot; "A New Dynameter," by Allan McLane Hamilton.

The Chicago Legal News states that Judge White, of Texas, has removed the sheriff of Gaudaloupe county several times, but, as often as the judge removes him, the people re-elect him, much to the annoyance of the judge. "He should know, by this time, that the people of Texas believe in the old maxim, vox populi vox dei, and let the sheriff alone."-The following characteristic passage occurs in the decree of ex-Chief Justice McKean, committing Brigham Young for contempt in refusing to obey the order for payment of alimony in the case of Ann Eliza v. Young: "And since this court has not one rule of action where conspicuous and another where obscure persons are concerned; and since it is a fundamental principle of the Republic that all men are equal before the law; and since this court desires to impress this great fact, this great law, upon the minds of all the people of this territory," etc. After inserting this gushing passage in a common order for commitment for contempt, it is no wonder that the judge was removed. In the case of Nightingale v. Perry, in which counsel moved for a rule to show cause why the damages in a breach of promise of marriage case should not be reduced, an English contemporary states that Mr. Baron Bramwell, while agreeing that there should be no rule, remarked that had he been on the jury, he should have given the plaintiff one farthing, and wondered why she brought the action. It was as if she had put her hand into a bag and pulled out the defendant's name. The correspondence was foolish, and the love talked of preposterous. It was fortunate the bargain was not concluded, as the woman wished to enter into a solemn engagement with as little precaution as she would use in taking a week's lodging. He was aware, however, that his opinions were not those universally received.

The hearing of the case of Count Von Arnim, on appeal, has been fixed for July 15. The Pall Mall Gazette says Russia, annoyed at England's persistent refusal to participate in the St. Petersburg Conference and the coldness of the other countries, intends giving force of law to the declaration of the Brussels Conference, and negotiating separately with the powers to induce their adherence thereto. We have received the annual catalogue of the School of Law of Boston University. The faculty consists of William F. Warren, President; George S. Hilliard, Dean and Pro

fessor; Edmund H. Bennett, Professor of the Law of Contracts and Sales, and N. St. John Green, Professor of the Law of Torts, Crimes, etc. Among the lecturers we notice the names of Bigelow, Lawrence, Ordronaux, Wharton and others distinguished in special departments. This law school seems to be in a prosperous condition and is well furnished with facilities for instruction. The faculty of Boston University has two co-operating faculties, one at Athens and one at Rome. By virtue of a special agreement with the Athenian and Roman Universities, members of Boston University in any of the departments (law included) can pursue approved courses of study in Athens and Rome, without additional expense for instruction, and on returning take their appropriate degrees from Boston University. This is a post-graduate course.

The Irish Law Times observes that "Nothing would tend so much to sharpen our wits and improve the general tone of conversation as a knowledge that the perpetrators of poor or ill-timed jests were liable to be mulcted in heavy damages by a court of law. A step in this direction was taken lately at Nairn, in Scotland, where a fish-curer named Rose sued an auctioneer named Gordon in the Small Debt Court for £12 damages, for using insulting and contumacious language toward him at a public sale. It appeared that the auctioneer was selling, among other things, some wires for filing letters, and when some of them were purchased by the fisherman remarked that they would 'do fine for hanging cod.' This observation cut Rose to the very quick, inasmuch as it called public attention to his profession in such a manner as to make him a laughing-stock to the crowd.' On the other hand, Gordon, while admitting that he had made a remark to the effect stated, urged that it was simply a harmless joke at which he never dreamt Mr. Rose would be offended.' Judgment was given in favor of the defendant, the sheriff thinking the joke was 'a poor one,' but not such as to justify the award of damages. Gordon has had a narrow escape, for, if the poverty of the jest had been actionable, the decision would evidently have gone against him; he was only saved by its harmlessness. All's well that ends well; but the fact that one joker has only escaped narrowly is sufficient to create a widespread feeling of uneasiness in jocular circles."- -In Grimmoldly v. Wells the English Common Pleas recently decided that where goods are sold by sample and the vendee finds that they are not equal to sample, it is sufficient to give the vendor notice that they are rejected and that they remain at the vendor's risk. The vendee is not obliged to return the goods or offer to do so.

The Hour is informed that the Right Hon. Sir Lawrence Peel has signified his intention of resigning his position in the judicial tommittee of the privy council. Failing health is the cause.— -John C. Breckinridge, who died at his home in Lexington, Ky., on Monday, was born near that city January 21, 1821. He was the grandson of John Breckinridge, who was attorneygeneral under Jefferson. He was educated at Center College, Kentucky; spent a few months at Princeton College, N. J.; studied law at Transylvania Institute, and was admitted to the bar at Lexington. He migrated to Burlington, Iowa, but in a short time returned to Lexington, where he practiced his profession with considerable success.— -The Solicitors' Journal says: "The unexpected death of Mr. Baron Pigott,

which occurred last Wednesday, will be deeply regretted by all, and he will be long remembered by those who have watched his judicial career as an upright and high-minded judge. No one would claim for him a place among distinguished lawyers; his merit was of a different kind. Without any extensive legal acquirements, and without either the breadth or the subtlety of mind which distinguish the high legal intellect, he brought to his work excellent common sense, a most conspicuous honesty of purpose, and painstaking and conscientious industry. The want of the former qualities would have prevented him from ever shining in banc, but his success in presiding at Nisi Prius is a singular proof how far the latter qualities will go, and how safely they will guide a man in the discharge of one of the most arduous and important of judicial duties."

The Pall Mall Gazette announces that the vexed question of the late John Mitchell's qualification for a seat in Parliament is to be judicially determined. "The application to set aside the petition against the last return for Tipperary, on the ground that Mr. Mitchell was dead on the day the petition was presented, has been dismissed by the Irish Court of Common Pleas. The judges were unanimously of opinion that to set aside the petition would be contrary to the principle of the law that there should be no wrong without a remedy; that the rights of the petitioner, and the still higher rights of the electors, had always been jealously guarded in the laws and in the practice of the House of Commons relating to election petitions; and that the contention that no petition could be entertained because notice could not be served on the person returned was absurd, as it will equally apply in the case of a member who died on the day after election. Mr. Justice Keogh cited cases in which the member died before the election, after the election, before the petition was presented, after the petition was presented, before the hearing and during the hearing; and in all these cases he said the election tribunal of the House of Commons had entertained the petition. We may now, therefore, expect a formal judicial decision, not only on the main question whether Mr. Mitchell was qualified to sit in Parliament, but also, and incidentally it may be hoped, on the still more important collateral question whether a judicial sentence of transportation or penal servitude for a term of years expires by mere effluxion of time and without the convict having undergone the whole or (for the same arguments hold good in both cases) any part of the punishment imposed upon him."

In the section of Jurisprudence of the American Social Science Association, at the Detroit meeting last week, papers were read by Prof. William G. Hammond of Iowa city, on "Legal Education in the West and North-west; " and by Prof. Emory Washburn of Harvard Law School, on "Decisions of the Supreme Court."A New York non-professional contemporary gives the following case relating to raised checks: "In January, 1871, Messrs. H. J. Cipperly & Co. gave ⚫ a check for $24 on the Security Bank of New York. This check was subsequently raised to $4,222 26-100, and having been thus raised it was certified by the bank. Having thus been certified, the check was presented to the Bank of the Republic and paid. The latter bank sent the check through the Clearing House, after which the Security Bank paid the money on the same to the Bank of the Republic. It having been

ascertained that the check had been raised, and the Bank of the Republic refusing to make the amount good, suit was brought by the Security Bank against the Bank of the Republic for the amount in excess of the original check. The case came to trial before Judge Leow in the Court of Common Pleas. The main question was as to the legal interpretation to be given to the certification of a check by a bank. It was claimed that, under a decision of the Court of Appeals, certification is simply as to the genuineness of the signature, and that there is money in the bank to meet the check, and not as to the genuineness of the body of the check. An effort was made to introduce evidence showing the custom prevailing among banks as to the interpretation given to the certification of a check. Judge Loew decided to admit this evidence, when the plaintiff raised a question of "surprise," upon which a juror was withdrawn and the trial postponed until next term."

The following scene is reported to have occurred in the trial of a cause recently before Judge Sutherland at New York: The assistant district attorney, Mr. Rollins, had been asking a witness what part of a counter was burned, as it was a material point to know whether only the top or both top and sides were touched by the flames. Mr. Stewart, counsel for the prisoner, spoke up from his seat, interrupting the witness: "It was plain the whole side was burned-why, I saw it with my own eyes." "I must protest," said Mr. Rollins, "against this outrageous proceeding on the part of counsel. He is continually making observations respecting his own knowledge. If he is so anxious to become a witness, let him go on the stand and I will cross-examine him." "Oh, go on, go on!" said Judge Sutherland with irritation. Later Mr. Rollins called attention a second time to similar remarks on the part of the prisoner's counsel. The judge repeated the directions to "go on," and added that the jury were "too sensible to pay any attention to what he says." Again Mr. Rollins protested: "A court has never been so insulted in my experience as has this one by these observations of counsel as to his knowledge." Mr. Stewart began to assert that he meant no insult, when the judge called order by rapping violently with his gavel, and repeating his order to go on. When Mr. Stewart spoke in a similar way a fourth time the court rebuked him, saying, "You have no right to talk before the jury in that way." Mr. Stewart replied, "I don't know why I should always be reprimanded; there seems to be a good deal of general talking on all sides.". - In the British House of Commons, Sir G. Bowyer asked the attorney-general whether Her Majesty's government had decided on discontinuing for the future the ancient degree and dignity of serjeant by refusing to grant the coif. The attorneygeneral said: In answer to the question of the honorable member, I have to state that the selection of gentlemen for the degree and dignity of serjeant-at-law does not rest with the government, but with the lord chancellor, who is alone responsible for the selection he may make. Under these circumstances my honorable friend will, I think, see that I am not in a position to give any more definite answer to his question. I may, however, mention that, by section 8 of the Supreme Court of Judicature, act of 1873, it is enacted that no person appointed a judge of that court should thenceforth be required to take, or to have taken, the degree of serjeant-at-law.

All communications intended for publication in the LAW JOURNAL should be addressed to the editor, and the name of the writer should be given, though not necessarily for publication.

liberal like Lord Selborne has given place to a conservative like Lord Cairns." Lord Cairns is a Doctor of Laws of Oxford and a D. C. L. of Cam

CURRENT TOPICS.

In Watkins v. Wilcox, 6 N. Y. Sup. 539, the general term of the Supreme Court of New York decided an important question in ecclesiastical law. The case holds that the majority of corporators in a religious corporation in this State have the right to control, and that they are free from any ecclesiastical restrictions. It appeared that a very large ma

.the capitol for the appointment of a reporter of the Supreme Court of this State. The event is one of considerable professional importance, as it is likely to result in a cessation of those things which have, early and late, made the reporting of that court a reproach. The editors of the New York Supreme Court Reports" brought about a reform in the methods of reporting in this State, which makes a return to the haphazard ways of Barbour and Lansing quite impossible, and which, if steadily and skillfully followed up by the new appointee, will very shortly result in cutting off all but the one series- which is one of the chief ends sought for. In spite of some apprehension and, we believe, some assertions to the contrary, there is not the slightest probability that, if a capable and industrious reporter is appointed, he will meet with competition. In the first place an attempt to compete would only be attended with a loss of money; and, in the second place, whoever the appointee may be, the judges are morally bound to give him their entire support and to refuse their opinions to all other reporters. This done, and no more will be heard of "opposition."

He was

The London Law Times gives an excellent portrait of Lord Chancellor Cairns, with a biographical sketch. Lord Cairns is the second and only surviving son of an Irish gentleman who was connected with the mercantile interests of Belfast. born in 1819 and was educated at Trinity College, Dublin, where he obtained honors in the classics and a high place in mathematics. He early went to England and entered himself as a student at the Middle Temple, where he was "called" in 1844. He soon gained distinction for his legal learning and eloquence, and while yet a young man was employed in several leading cases. In 1852 he entered parliament. He afterward became Solicitor-General and Attorney-General; and in 1868 he became Lord Chancellor for the first time. He is now Lord Chancellor for the second time, taking the place of Lord Selborne. On the question of law reform Lord Cairns is not so enthusiastic or advanced as his predecessor, but the Law Times is of the opinion that "there is no reason for believing that law reform will be really retarded because a reformer or VOL. 11.- No. 22.

Reformed Church under Laws of 1813, chap. 60, § 2, voted to change their ecclesiastical connection and become a congregational church, and did so. It was held, that they had the right to do so, and that the minority, who did not favor the change and kept their connection with the Dutch Reformed body, were not entitled to retain control of the property of the congregation. Learned, P. J., delivered an elaborate opinion, at the close of which he gives the following reason for the decision, which is elegantly and admirably expressed: "In spite of written symbols, the beliefs of men change and have changed; and I look with no favor on a rule which would permit the past generations to appropriate property to the support of their beliefs, so permanently as to deprive the present of the use of such property, in case those old beliefs shall have passed away." The case was decided under a statute of this State; and the common law as administered in Pennsylvania and some other States is different; but we are of the opinion that the better rule is as laid down by Judge Learned, and that it will ultimately prevail throughout the country.

We last week referred to the case of Lawrence, the alleged silk smuggler, stating that the adjudged cases appeared to be in favor of the proposition that, although he was extradited on a charge of forgery, he could also be tried on a charge of smuggling. Mr. E. W. Stoughton has made an argument before the President in favor of Lawrence, and has procured an order directing a suspension of action upon the indictment for smuggling, until the Solicitor-General reports to the President as to whether or not the prisoner can be tried for that crime. Mr. Stoughton's argument was an able presentation of that side of the case, and appears to be in accordance with sound reason, although the adjudications are against this view. Wharton in his Criminal Law, section 2,965 a, thus states his opinion on the subject: "The sole object of extradition is to secure the presence of a fugitive in the demanding State for the purpose of trying him for a specified crime. The process is not to be used for the purpose of subjecting him collaterally to criminal prosecutions other than that specified in the demand. Provisions guaranteeing to the fugitive the right to leave

the demanding country, after his trial for the offense for which he is surrendered, in case of acquittal, or in case of conviction after his endurance of the punishment, are incorporated in many treaties. When not, they should be made the subject of executive pledge." The case of Lawrence will probably result in an authoritative decision on this vexed question.

Some excellent comments appear in Appleton's Journal on "obsolete laws." Ou. contemporary remarks that these laws, remaining on the statute books, often place the community at the mercy of the caprice and idiosyncracies of individuals. An instance of the inconvenience which sometimes arises from the existence of statutes which are a "dead letter," is related as having occurred in England recently. According to a statute passed nearly a hundred years ago, "any house or place kept open for entertainment or amusement during any part of Sunday, and to which people are admitted by payment, shall be deemed a disorderly house," and its keeper is liable to a heavy fine. The law has been broken constantly for half a century or more; but its enforcement has seldom been even attempted. But now a gentleman of position and stringent views has made his appearance, and insisted that the Sunday openings of the Brighton Aquarium come under the statute. He has, accordingly, prosecuted the Aquarium proprietors for keeping a "disorderly house," and the courts have been compelled to sustain him. The prosecution was thus able to defy the whole mass of his countrymen, as the Journal says, with the rustiest of legal weapons.

The case of Bowditch v. City of Boston, which was tried recently before Judge Lowell, of the United States District Court at Boston, involves the liability of the city for damages resulting from the blowing up of buildings for the purpose of checking a con. flagration. General Burt, the postmaster of Boston, and several other persons were authorized in writing by Chief Engineer Damrell to blow up buildings and remove goods. The part of the city toward which the fire was advancing was districted, and General Burt was assigned to the section which contained the building in question. It seems that a Massachusetts statute provides that a building may be destroyed to check a conflagration by the act of three fire-wards in a city. The members of a board of engineers of Boston were the fire-wards of the city. But when the authority was given to General Burt, by the chief engineer, only one other engineer was present. Burt and three or four others attended to the blowing up in his district. The court held, that the plaintiff could not recover for the building blown up, on the ground that the city could not be held responsible for the destruction of the property, except as provided in the statute. No evidence had

been presented showing that three fire-wards or engineers had ordered the destruction of the building. This decision is sustained by Judge Dillon in his work on Municipal Corporations, section 757, where it is said that the liability in such cases is purely statutory, and in order to change it the case must be clearly and fairly within the enactment. In Coffin v. Nantucket, 5 Cush. 269, it was held, that where the statute allows such a recovery only when a building is demolished by the order of three firewards, a destruction by the order of one of these officers creates no liability against the corporation. A by-law authorizing one officer to exercise these powers in urgent cases was therefore adjudged void. And at common law, in cases of imminent and urgent public necessity, an individual or municipal officer may raze or demolish houses and other combustible structures in a city to prevent the spreading of a conflagration, the city thereby incurring no responsibility.

The address of Mr. David Dudley Field to the graduating class of the Albany law school, which we publish in this issue, is sure to attract wide attention. Mr. Field chose for his theme the "Responsibility of American Lawyers for the Government of their Country," a subject which is peculiarly appropriate at this time and in this country. The wide scope of the profession in this country, its influence in all departments of life, and its potentialities in politics are referred to as giving the American lawyer an extraordinary opportunity to correct abuses in government and to ameliorate the laws. It will be seen that Mr. Field advocates that trials such as the Tilton-Beecher trial, should not be public. He also deprecates the course which the newspapers have taken in trying that remarkable case independent of judge or jury. The address is an able and admirable production.

NOTES OF CASES.

N Shader v. Railway Passengers Assurance Co., 5 N. Y. Sup. 643, the New York Supreme Court, General Term, gave a construction to a clause in an accident insurance policy. The policy in suit contained a condition that "no claim shall be made under this policy where the death or injury may have happened while the insured was, or in consequence of his having been, under the influence of intoxicating drinks." The insured was accidentally shot, while intoxicated, by a companion with whom he had been drinking. The court below instructed the jury that there could be no recovery if the shooting happened in consequence of the insured having been under the influence of intoxicating liquor; but that the question was not simply whether he was under the influence of intoxicating liquor at the time, but whether the injury occurred in consequence of that whether the injury was the natural or reasonable