In the case of Green v. Sparrow (cited 3 Swanst. 408), a rent of £600 a year was reserved in a lease of coal mines, the first quarter to be payable at the next feast after the tenant should have worked one thousand stacks of coal. He covenanted that he would dig the thousand stacks without delay. It was alleged that the defendant, after having entered, had worked before the first quarter-day the thousand stacks of coal, except a small quantity, and had then fraudulently avoided completing the quantity before Lady-day in order to escape the stipulated payment on that feast. Lord Chancellor King considered that there was fraud in preventing the digging before the quarter-day, in order that the rent might not commence so soon, and that this fraud required the interposition of the Court. It was therefore decreed, that the defendant should pay the first quarter's rent at Lady-day, on the ground that the thousand stacks would have been dug by that day had it not been for the fraudulent delay of the lessee. The As to a covenant to work coal uninterruptedly, efficiently, and according to the usual or most improved practice, with a reservation in the lease of a dead rent, the case of Wheatley v. Westminster Brymbo Coal Company (9 Equity Rep. 533) is important. plaintiffs had leased coal to the defendants, reserving a minimum rent of £750, to be increased to £1,000, if pits should be sunk on the estate, with a royalty on all coal gotten beyond a certain quantity. The lessees entered into the covenant above-mentioned. They paid the dead rent, but only raised small quantities by working through an adjoining mine, and sunk no pit on the plaintiff's property. The latter filed a bill for specific performance, expecting that the defendants would be compelled to sink. But it was held that there was no obligation to sink pits, though that might be the most efficient method; and that, so long as the dead rent was paid, the defendants could not be compelled to work the mine at all, and that if the lessees had committed a breach of contract, their remedy was by an action at law, as the Court of Equity would not refer to the Master to direct the management of a coal mine. Two other cases relating to the construction of covenants in colliery leases are valuable guides. In the case of Quarrington v. Arthur (10 M. & W. 335), the plaintiff had demised to the defendant all the mines and beds of coal which had been, or during the demise should be, discovered or opened under certain lands, at the yearly rent of £20, to be paid whether the coal should be worked or not, together with 7d. per ton for every ton of coal raised. And the defendant covenanted that he would at all times during the demise work the mines in a workmanlike manner. The breach of covenant assigned was that he permitted the mines to lie and that no coals were gotten. To this it was pleaded that the mines were never before the demise worked or gotten, and that the defendant had never at any time since or during the demise worked or got the mines. It was held that under these circumstances the defendant was not liable on this covenant, because the subject matter of the demise was not all the mines under the lands, but only such as had been or should be discovered or opened. In the case of James ". Cochrane (22 Law Journ. Ex. 201), the lessees had covenanted to leave unworked a barrier between their works and the adjoining mine, except where the lease gave them liberty to break through it. The liberty reserved was to make "outstrokes," or other communications through the barrier for the purpose of conveying coals underground got in any of the adjoining collieries belonging to the lessees, from such colliery into the demised mine, and by such outstrokes and communications to convey underground the coals from such adjoining collieries into the mine, and from thence to convey and carry away all such coals, and also draw to bank at any of the pits or shafts sunk or to be sunk by the lessees, in any of the lands and grounds demised, the coals from such adjoining collieries. It was held that this liberty extended to authorise the lessees to break through the barrier for the winning coal of such adjoining mines, though the coal of such demised or adjoining mines, when won, was not to be, nor was, brought to the surface through a shaft in the demised land, and although no such pit in fact existed. Some provisoes in the lease also spoke of shafts in the demised lands, but there was no express covenant to make any shaft. There was also a covenant that the lessees would draw to bank at some of the shafts of the said colliery, provided they should be shafts from which the coals of the demised colliery should not be worked by an outstroke. It was held that under these provisoes there was neither express nor implied engagement by the lessees that bound them to sink a shaft in the demised land. There was also a covenant that the lessees would keep the levels, drifts, and necessary staples for air in good repair, order, and condition. It seemed to be the opinion of the Court that the fact of allowing the workings and air courses of an old seam of the mine which had been partially worked, but was now being worked no longer, to remain full of water, was not a breach of this covenant. A valuable judgment in connection with the working of coal under certain covenants was given in the case of Lewis v. Fothergill, L. R. 5 Ch. App. 103 on appeal, on an application for an injunction. Mr. Fothergill had taken a large tract of minerals from the plaintiff. He also worked other minerals adjacent to these, under a different owner and lease. In order to avoid the outlay of £30,000 at least in sinking on the Lewis estate, he approached those minerals from his previous workings. It was sought to restrain him from so doing by means of any headings or instrokes from the other estate or from any workings to the rise of the Lewis estate, and from working in such a manner as to prejudicially affect the working of the other seams in the said estate, and otherwise than in a workmanlike manner, and unless adequate means of draining the coals and minerals under the Lewis estate shall have been provided. The remainder of the dispute will be best gathered from the language of the Vice-Chancellor James, before whom the case first came. He said: "The agreement which I have to construe, as applying to the facts proved in this case, is the mere ordinary mineral agreement, the covenants are mere ordinary covenants in an agreement for a mineral lease. It is a lease of a certain farm containing 245 acres at least of the minerals under the farm, with a dead rental or royalty of so much a year, with a proviso that if the quantity of coal worked in any year shall not amount to the annual rental of £500, then instead thereof the annual rent or sum of £500 at least shall be paid as fixed or dead rent. There is then a proviso with respect to that fixed or dead rent, as follows: The fixed or dead rent of £500 not to be charged at all for the three first years, provided the necessary steps are bona fide taken, with ordinary despatch, to win and work the said coal, but the dead rent, or royalty, is only during those three years to be charged upon the quantity, if any, actually worked. Then the lease is to contain a five years' average clause, to the intent that no more than £2,500 shall be paid by the lessees for sleeping or dead rent, and royalties in any five years of the said term of 99 years, unless the quantity of minerals actually worked in the same five years shall amount to more. There is, I believe, every covenant that is usually included in a mineral lease specified here. There is then a covenant for working the said coal and mines in a proper and workmanlike manner; then I should say that the lease is to be for 99 years; and then there is a power given to the lessees to take so much land as they may require, and upon that land to make any roads that may be necessary for conveying the minerals, to sink pits, drive headings, and to do all other acts and deeds necessary for working the same. I do not know that there is anything in that document more than I have read, which is material for the proper construction of the instrument. The contention on the part of the plaintiff is this, that this being a lease of minerals under a farm of very great extent, there was to be |