(No. 12.)-President Wilson's Note of February 10, 1920.

THE following is the text of a communication from the Secretary of State of the United States of America to the American Ambassador in Paris, which, in accordance with the instructions therein contained, will be delivered by the American Ambassador in Paris to the French Foreign Office, and to the British Embassy in Paris, and which, pursuant to the request of Ambassador Wallace, is furnished to the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and France by the American Ambassador in London, in order that they may be informed thereof at the earliest practicable moment :

"Please communicate the following to British and French representatives :

"The President has carefully considered the joint telegram addressed to this Government by French and British Prime Ministers and communicated by the American Ambassador in Paris in regard to the negotiations on the Adriatic question. The President noted with satisfaction that the French, British and Italian Governments have never had the intention of proceeding to a definite settlement of this question except in consultation with the American Government. The President was particularly happy to receive this assurance, as he understood that M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George, in agreement with Signor Nitti, had decided upon a solution of the Adriatic question, which included provisions previously rejected by the American Government, and had called upon the JugoSlav representative to accept this solution on pain of having the Treaty of London enforced in case of rejection. The President is glad to feel that the associates of this Government would not consent to embarrass it by placing it in the necessity of refusing adhesion to a settlement which in form would be an agreement by both parties to the controversy, but which in fact would not have that great merit, and one party was forced to submit to material injustice by threats of still greater calamities in default of submission. The President fully shares the view of the French and British Governments that the future of the world largely depends upon the right solution of this question, but he cannot believe that a solution containing provisions which have already received the well-merited condemnation of the French and British Governments can in any sense be regarded as right. Neither can he share the opinion of the French and British Governments that the proposals contained in their memorandum delivered to the Jugo-Slav representatives on the 14th January leave untouched practically every important point of the joint memorandum of the French,

British and American Governments of the 9th December, 1919, and that only two features undergo alterations, and both these alterations are to the positive advantage of JugoSlavia.' On the contrary, the proposal of the 9th December has been profoundly altered to the advantage of Italian objectives to the serious injury of the Jugo-Slav people and to the peril of world peace. The view that such positive advantages have been conceded to Italy would appear to be borne out by the fact that the Italian Government rejected the proposal of the 9th December and accepted that of the 14th January.

The memorandum of the 9th December rejected the device of connecting Fiume with Italy by a narrow strip of coast territory as quite unworkable in practice, and as involving extraordinary complexities as regards Customs control, coast-guard services, and cognate matters in a territory of such unusual configuration. The French and British Governments, in association with the American Government, expressed the opinion that the plan appears to run counter to every consideration of geography, economics and territorial convenience.' The American Government notes that this annexation of Jugo-Slav territory by Italy is nevertheless agreed to by the memorandum of the 14th January. The memorandum of the 9th December rejected Italy's demand for the annexation of all of Istria, on the solid ground that neither strategic nor economic considerations could justify such annexation, and that there remained nothing in defence of the proposition, save Italy's desire for more territory admittedly inhabited by Jugo-Slavs. The French and British Governments then expressed their cordial approval of the way in which the President has met every successive Italian demand for the absorption in Italy of territories inhabited by peoples not Italian, and not in favour of being absorbed, and joined in the opinion that it is neither just nor expedient to annex as the spoils of war territories inhabited by an alien race.' Yet this unjust and inexpedient annexation of all of Istria is provided for in the memorandum of the 14th January. The memorandum of the 9th December carefully excluded every form of Italian sovereignty over Fiume. The American Government cannot avoid the conclusion that the memorandum of the 14th January opens the way for Italian control of Fiume's foreign affairs, thus introducing a measure of Italian sovereignty over, and Italian intervention in, the only practicable port of neighbouring people, and taken in conjunction with the extension of Italian territory to the gates of Fiume, paves the way for possible future annexation of the port by Italy in contradiction of compelling consideration of equity and right.

The memorandum of the 9th December afforded proper protection to the vital railway connecting Fiume northward with the interior. The memorandum of the 14th January establishes Italy in dominating military positions close to the railway at a number of critical points.

The memorandum of the 9th December maintained in large measure the unity of the Albanian State. That of the 14th January partitions the Albanian people against their vehement protests, among three different alien Powers.

These, and other provisions of the memorandum of the 14th January, negotiated without the knowledge or approval of the American Government, change the whole face of the Adriatic settlement, and, in the eyes of this Government, render it unworkable, and rob it of that measure of justice which is essential if this Government is to co-operate in maintaining its terms. The fact that the Jugo-Slav representatives might feel forced to accept, in the face of the alternative of the Treaty of London, a solution which appears to this Government so unfair in principle, and so unworkable in practice, would not in any degree alter the conviction of this Government that it cannot give its assent to a settlement which, both in the terms of its provisions and in the methods of its enforcement, constitutes a positive denial of the principles for which America entered the war.

The matter would wear a very different aspect if there were any real divergence of opinion as to what constitutes a just settlement of the Adriatic issue. Happily, no such divergence exists. The opinions of the French, British and American Governments as to a just and equitable territorial arrangement at the head of the Adriatic Sea were strikingly harmonious. Italy's unjust demands had been condemned by the French and British Governments in terms no less severe than those employed by the American Government. Certainly the French and British Governments will yield nothing to their American associate as regards the earnestness with which they have sought to convince the Italian Government that fulfilment of its demands would be contrary to Italy's own best interests, opposed to the spirit of justice in international dealings, and fraught with danger to the peace of Europe. In particular, the French and British Governments have opposed Italy's demands for specific advantages which it is now proposed to yield to her by the memorandum of the 14th January, and have joined in informing the Italian Government that the concessions previously made afford to Italy full satisfaction of her historic national aspirations based on the desire to unite the Italian race, give her the absolute strategic control of the Adriatic and offer her complete guarantees against whatever

aggression she might fear in the future from her Jugo-Slav neighbours.'

While there is thus substantial agreement as to the injustice and inexpediency of Italy's claims, there is a difference of opinion as to how firmly Italy's friends should resist her importunate demands for alien territories to which she can present no valid title. It has seemed to the President that French and British associates of the American Government, in order to prevent the development of possibly dangerous complications in the Adriatic region, have felt constrained to go very far in yielding to demands which they' have long opposed as unjust. The American Government, while no less generous in its desire to accord to Italy every advantage to which she could offer any proper claims, feels that it cannot sacrifice the principle for which it entered the war to gratify the improper ambitions of one of its associates or to purchase a temporary appearance of calm in the Adriatic at the price of a future world conflagration. It is unwilling to recognise either an unjust settlement based on a secret Treaty, the terms of which are inconsistent with the new world conditions, or an unjust settlement arrived at by employing that secret Treaty as an instrument of coercion. It would welcome any solution of the problem based on a free and unprejudiced consideration of the merits of the controversy or on terms which the disinterested Great Powers agreed to be just and equitable. Italy, however, has repeatedly rejected such solutions. This Government cannot accept a settlement the terms of which have been admitted to be unwise and unjust but which it is proposed to grant to Italy in view of her persistent refusal to accept any wise and just solution.

It is a time to speak with the utmost frankness. The Adriatic issue as it now presents itself raises the fundamental question as to whether the American Government can on any terms co-operate with its European associates in the great work of maintaining the peace of the world by removing the primary causes of war. This Government does not doubt its ability to reach amicable understandings with the Associated Governments as to what constitutes equity and justice in international dealings; for difference of opinion as to the best methods of applying just principles have never obscured the vital fact that in the main several Governments have entertained the same fundamental conception of what these principles are. But if substantial agreement to principle, if just and reasonable, is not to determine international issues; if the country possessing the most endurance in pressing its demands rather than the country armed with a just cause is to gain the support of the Powers; if forcible

seizure of coveted areas is to be permitted and condoned, and is to receive ultimate justification by creating a situation so difficult that decision favourable to the aggressor is deemed a practical necessity; if deliberately-incited ambition is, under the name of national sentiment, to be rewarded at the expense of the small and the weak; if, in a word, the old order of things which brought so many evils on the world is still to prevail, then the time is not yet come when this Government can enter a concert of Powers, the very existence of which must depend upon a new spirit and a new order. The American people are willing to share in such high enterprise; but many among them are fearful lest they become entangled in international policies and committed to international obligations foreign alike to their ideals and their traditions. To commit them to such a policy as that embodied in the latest Adriatic proposals and to obligate them to maintain injustice as against the claims of justice would be to provide the most solid ground for such fears. This Government can undertake no such grave responsibility.

"If it does not appear feasible to secure acceptance of the just and generous concessions offered by the British, French and American Governments to Italy in the joint memorandum of those Powers of the 9th December, 1919, which the President has already clearly stated to be the maximum concession that the Government of the United States can offer, the President desires to say that he must take under serious consideration the withdrawal of the Treaty with Germany and the Agreement between the United States and France of the 28th June, 1919,* which are now before the Senate and permitting the terms of the European settlement to be independently established and enforced by the Associated Governments.

American Embassy, London,
February 13, 1920.

"LANSING."

(No. 13.)-Memorandum by the Prime Ministers of France and Great Britain in reply to President Wilson's communication received on February 14, 1920.

THE Prime Ministers of France and Great Britain have given their earnest attention to the communication made to them in regard to the Adriatic settlement on behalf of President Wilson. They are glad that the Government of the United States has set forth its views so fully and with such complete frankness. They do not, however, find it

* Vol. CXII, page 216.