get into a place of more safety. I therefore (very reluc tantly) deferred renewing the attack upon the ships and forts until a more favorable opportunity. In our passage through the bay of Quanti, I discovered a schooner at the village of Armingstown, which we took possession of, but finding she would detain us (being then in chase of the Royal George) I ordered Lieut. Macpherson to take out her sails and rigging and burn her, which he did. We also took the schooner Mary, Hall, from Niagara, at the mouth of Kingston harbor, and took her with us to our anchorage. The next morning, finding that she could not beat through the channel with us, I ordered the sailing master of the Growler to take her under convoy and run down past Kingston, anchor on the east end of Long Island, and wait for a wind to come up on the east side. I was also in hopes that the Royal George might be induced to follow for the purpose of retaking our prize, but her commander was too well aware of the consequences to leave his moorings. We lost in this affair one man killed, and three slightly wounded, with a few shot in our sails. The other vessels lost no men and received but little injury in their hulls and sails, with the exception of the Pert, whose gun bursted in the early part of the action, and wounded her commander (sailing master Arundel) badly, and a midshipman and three men slightly. Mr. Arundel, who refused to quit the deck although wounded, was knocked overboard in beating up to our anchorage, and, I am sorry to say, was drowned. The Royal George must have received very considerable injury in her hull and in men, as the gun vessels with a long 32 pounder were seen to strike her almost every shot, and it was observed that she was reinforced with troops four different times during the action. the It was thought by all the officers in the squadron that enemy had more than thirty guns mounted at Kingston, and from 1000 to 1,300 men. The Royal George protected by this force was driven into the inner harbor, under the protection of the musketry, by the Oneida, and four small schooners fitted out as gun boats; the Governor Tompkins not having been able to join in the action until about sun down, owing to the lightness of the winds, and the Pert's gun having burst the second or third shot. I have the honor to be, &c. ISAAC CHAUNCEY. Gen. Van Rensselaer to the Secretary of War. SIR-As the movements of the army under my command, since I had the honor to address you on the 8th inst. have been of a very important character, producing consequences serious to many individuals; establishing facts actually connected with the interest of the service and safety of the army; and as I stand prominently responsible for some of these consequences, I beg leave to explain to you, sir, and through you to my country, the situation and circumstances in which I have had to act, and the reasons and motives which governed me; and if the result is not all that might have been wished, it is such, that when the whole ground shall be viewed, 1 shall cheerfully submit to the judgment of my country. In my letter of the 8th inst. I apprized you that a crisis in this campaign was rapidly advancing; and that (to repeat the same words) the blow must be soon struck, or all the toil and expence of the campaign go for nothing; and worse than nothing, for the whole will be tinged with dishonor.' Under such impressions, I had on the 5h inst. written to Brigadier-General Smyth, of the U. States' forces requesting an interview with him, Major-General Hall, and the commandants of the U. States' regiments, for the purpose of conferring upon the subject of future operations. I wrote Major-General Hall to the same purport. On the 11th, I had received no answer from Gen. Smyth ; but in a note to me on the 10th, Gen. Hall mentioned that Gen. Smyth had not yet then agreed upon any day for consultation. In the mean time, the partial success of Lieut. Elliot, at Black Rock, (of which however, I have received no official information) began to excite a strong disposition in the troops to act. This was expressed to me through various channels in the shape of an alternative; that they must have orders to act; or at all hazards, they would go home. I * forbear here commenting upon the obvious consequences to me personally, of longer withholding my orders under such circumstances. I had a conference with as to the possibility of getting some person to pass over to Canada and obtain correct information. On the morning of the 4th, he wrote to me that he had procured the man who bore his letter to go over. Instructions were given him; he passed over-obtained such information as warranted an immediate attack. This was confidently communicated to several of my first officers, and produced great zeal to act; more especially as it might have a controling effect upon the movements at Detroit, where it was supposed Gen. Brock had gone with all the force he dared spare from the Niagara frontier. The best preparations in my power were, therefore, made to dislodge the enemy from the Heights of Queenston, and possess ourselves of the village, where the troops might be sheltered from the distressing inclemency of the weather. Lieut. Col. Fenwick's flying artillery, and a detachment of regular troops under his command, were ordered to be up in season from Fort Niagara. Orders were also sent to Gen. Smyth to send down from Buffaloe, such detachments of his brigade as existing circumstances in that vicinity might warrant. The attack was to have been made at 4 o'clock in the morning of the 11th, by crossing over in boats from the old ferry opposite the Heights. To avoid any embarrassment in crossing the river, (which is here a sheet of violent eddies) experienced boatmen were procured to take the boats from the landing below to the place of embarkation. Lieut. Sim was considered the man of greatest skill for this service. He went ahead, and in the extreme darkness, passed the intended place far up the river; and there, in a most extraordinary manner fastened the boat to the shore and abandoned the detachment. In the front boat he had carried nearly every oar which was prepared for all the boats. In this agonizing dilemma, stood officers and men whose ardor had not been cooled by exposure through the night to one of the most tremendous north-east storms, which continued,unabated, for 28 hours, and deluged the whole camp. The approach of day light extinguished every prospect of success, and the detachment returned to camp. Col. Van, Rensselaer was to have commanded the detachment, After this result, I had hoped the patience of the troops would have continued until I could submit the plan suggested in my letter of the 8th, that I might act under, and in conformity to the opinion that might be then expressed. But my hope was idle; the previously excited ardor seemed to gain new heart from the late miscarriage-the brave were mortified to stop short of their object, and the timed thought laurels half won by an attempt. On the morning of the 12th, such was the pressure upon me from all quarters, that I became satisfied that my refusal to act might involve me in suspicion and the service in disgrace, Viewing affairs at Buffaloe as yet unsettled, I had immediately countermanded the march of General Smyth's brigade, upon the failure of the first expedition; but having now determined to attack Queenston, I sent new orders to Gen. Smyth to march; not with the view of his aid in the attack, for I considered the force detached sufficient, but to support the detachment should the conflict be obstinate and long continued. Lieut. Col. Chrystie, who had just arrived at the four mile Creek, had late in the night of the first contemplated attack, gallantly offered me his own and his men's service; but he got my permission to late. He now again came forward; had a conference with Col. Van Rensselaer, begged that he might have the honor of a command in the expedition. The arrangement was made. Col. Van Rensselaer was to command one column of 300 militia; and Lieut. Col. Chrystie a column of the same number of regular troops. Every precaution was now adopted as to boats, and the most confidential and experienced men to manage them. At an early hour in the night, Lieut. Col. Chrystie marched his detachment, by the rear road, from Niagara to camp. At 7 o'clock in the evening, Lieut. Col. Stranahan's regiment moved from Niagara falls at 8 o'clock, Mead'sand at 9 Lieut. Col. Blan's regiment marched from the same place. All were in camp in good season. Agreeably to my orders issued upon this occasion, the two columns were to pass over together; and as soon as the heights should be carried, Lieut. Col. Fenwick's flying artillery was to pass over; then Maj Mullany's detachment of regulars and other troops to follow in order. At dawn of day the boats were in readiness, and the troops commenced embarking, under the cover of a commanding battery, mounting two eighteen pounders, and two sixes. The movements were soon discovered, and a brisk fire of musketry was poured from the whole line of the Canadian shore. Our batteries then opened to sweep the shore; but it was for some minutes, too dark to direct much fire with safety. A brisk cannonade was now opened upon the boats from three different batteries. Our battery returned their fire and occasionally threw grape upon the shore, and was itself served with shells from a small mortar of the enemy's. Col. Scott, of the artillery, by hastening his march from Niagara Falls in the night, arrived in season to return the enemy's fire with two six pounders. The boats were somewhat embarrassed with the eddies, as well as with a shower of shot; but Col. Van Rensselaer, with about 100 men, soon effected his landing amidst a tremendous fire directed upon him from every point; but to the astonishment of all who witnessed the scene, this van of the column advanced slowly against the fire. It was a serious misfortune to the van, and indeed to the whole expedition, that in a few minutes after landing, Col. Van Rensselaer received four wounds-a ball passed through his right thigh, entering just below the hip bone-another shot passed through the same thigh, a little belowthe third through the calf of his leg-and a fourth cartused his heel. This was quite a crisis in the expedition. Under so severe a fire it was difficult to form raw troops. By some mismanagement of the boatmen, Lieut. Col. Chrystie did not arrive until some time after this, and was wounded in the hand in passing the river. Col. Van Rensselaer was still able to stand; and with great presence of mind ordered his officers to proceed with rapidity and storm the fort. This service was gallantly performed, and the enemy driven down the hill in every direction. Soon after this both parties were considerably reinforced, and the conflict was renewed in several places-many of the enemy took shelter behind a stone guard-house, where a piece of ordnance was now briskly served. I ordered the fire of our battery directed upon the guard-house; and it was so effectually done, that with 8 or 10 shot the fire was silenced. The enemy then retreated behind a large store house; but in a |