short time the rout became general, and the enemy's fire was silenced except from a one gun battery, so far down the river as to be out of the reach of heavy ordnance, and our light pieces could not silence it. A number of boats now passed over unannoyed, except from one unsilenced gun. For some time after I had passed over, the victory appeared complete; but in the expectation of further attacks, I was taking measures for fortifying my camp immediately the direction of this service I committed to Lieut. Totten, of the engineers. But very soon the enemy were reinforced by a detachment of several hundred Indians from Chippewa-they commenced a furious attack, but were promptly met and routed by the rifle and bayonet. By this time I perceived my troops were embarking very slowly. I passed immediately over to accelerate their movements; but to my utter astonishment, I found at the very moment when complete victory was in our hands, the ardor of the unengaged troops had entirely subsided. I rode in all directions--urged men by every consideration to pass over-but in vain. Lieut. Col. Bloom, who had been wounded in action, returned, mounted his horse, and rode through the camp; as did also Judge Peck, who happened to be here, exhorting the companies to proceed-but all in vain.

At this time a large reinforcement from Fort George were discovered coming up the river. As the battery on the hill was considered an important check against their ascending the heights, measures were immediately taken to send them a fresh supply of ammunition, as we had learnt there was left only twenty shot for the eighteen pounders. The reinforcement, however, obliqued to the right from the road, and formed a junction with the Indians in the rear of the heights. Finding, to my infinite mortification, that no reinforcement would pass over; seeing that another severe conflict must soon commence; and knowing that the brave men on the heights were quite exhausted, and nearly out of ammunition, all I could do was to send them a fresh supply of cartridges. At this critical moment, I despatched a note to Gen. Wadsworth, acquainting him with our situation-leaving the course to be pursued much to his own indgment-with assurance, that if he thought best to retreat, I would endeavor to send as many boats as I could com

mand, and cover his retreat by every fire I could safely make. But the boats were dispersed-many of the boatmen had fled, panic struck-and but few got off. But my note could but little more than have reached Gen. Wadsworth about 4 o'clock, when a most severe and obstinate conflict commenced and continued about half an hour with a tremendous fire of cannon, flying artillery and musketry. The enemy succeeded, in repossessing their battery; and gaining advantage on every side, the brave men who had gained the victory, exhausted of strength and ammunition, and grieved at the unpardonable neglect of their fellow-soldiers, gave up the conflict.

I can only add, that the victory was really won; but lost for the want of a small reinforcement. One third part of the idle men might have saved all.

I cannot in justice close this without expressing the very great obligation I am under to Brigadier-General Wadsworth, Col. Van Rensselaer, Col. Scott, Lieut. Cols. Chrystie and Fenwick, and Capt. Gibson. Many others have also behaved most gallantly. As I have reason to believe that many of our troops fled to the woods, with the hope of crossing the river, I have notbeen able to learn the probable number of killed, wounded and prisoners.* The enemy have suffered severely.

GENERAL BROCK, is among their slain, and his aid-decamp mortally wounded.

I have the honor to be, &c.

STEPHEN VAN RENSSELAER.

CHAPTER V.

Documents accompanying the President's Message of
November 4, 1812.

Mr. Monroe to Mr. Russell.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, July 27, 1812.

SIR-I wrote you on the 26th of June, by Mr. Foster, a letter which he promised to deliver to you in person or by a safe hand.

* It is since ascertained that 90 regulars and militia were killed, and 386 regulars and 378,militia, 82 being wounded, made prisoners.

In that letter you were informed, that the Orders in Council, and other illegal blockades, and the impressment of our seamen by Great-Britain, as you well knew before, were the principal causes of the war, and that if they were removed, you might stipulate an armistice, leaving them and all other grounds of difference, for final and more precise adjustment by treaty. As an inducement to the British government to discontinue the practice of impressment from our vessels, by which alone our seamen can be made secure, you were authorised to stipulate a prohibition by law, to be reciprocal, of the employment of British seamen in the public or commercial service of the U. States. As such an arrangement, which might be made completely effectual and satisfactory by suitable regulations and penalties, would operate almost exclusively in favor of GreatBritain, for as few of our seamen ever enter voluntarily into the British service, the reciprocity would be nominal; its advantage to G. Britain would be more than an equivalent for any she derives from impressment, which alone ought to induce her to abandon the practice, if she had no other motive for it. A stipulation to prohibit by law the employment of British seamen in the service of the U. States, is to be understood in the sense and spirit of the constitution. The passage of such law must depend of course on Congress, who, it might reasonably be presumed, might give effect to it.

By authorising you to secure these objects as the grounds of an armistice, it was not intended to restrict you to any precise form in which it should be done. It is not particularly necessary that the several points should be specially provided for in the convention stipulating the armistice. A clear and distinet understanding with the British government on the subject of impressment, comprising in it the discharge of men already impressed, and on future blockades, if the Orders in Council are revoked, is all that is indispensable. The Orders in Council being revoked, and the proposed understanding on the other points, that is, on blockades and impressment, being first obtained, in a manner, though informal, to admit of no mistake or disagreement hereafter, the instrument providing for the armistice may assume a general form especially if more agreeable to the British governmeut. It may for example

be said in general terms that both powes being sincerely desirous to terminate the differences which unhappily subsist between them, and equally so, that full time should be given for the adjustment thereof, agree, 1st, that an armistice shall take place for that purpose to commence on the day of.

2. That they will forthwith appoint on each side commissioners with full power to form a treaty, which shall provide, by reciprocal arrangements, for the security of their seamen from being taken or employed in the service of the other power, for the regulation of their commerce, and all other interesting questions now depending between them. 3. The armistice shall not cease without a previous notice by one to the other party of days, and shall not be understood as having other effect than merely to suspend military operations by land and sea.'

By this you will perceive that the President is desirous: of removing every obstacle to an accommodation which consists merely of form, securing in a safe and satisfactory manner, the rights and interest of the U. States in these two great and essential circumstances, as it is presumed may be accomplished by the proposed understanding; he is willing that it should be done in a manner the most satisfactory. and honorable to G. Britain, as well as to the U. States. I have the honor to be, &c..

JAMES MONROE.

Mr. Graham to Mr. Russell.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Aug. 9, 1812.

SIR-The Secretary left this city about ten days ago,. on a short visit to Virginia. Since that period Mr. Baker has, in consequence of some despatches from his government addressed to Mr. Foster, made to me a communication respecting the intentions of his government as regards the Orders in Council. It was of a character, however, so entirely informal and confidential that Mr. Baker did not feel himself at liberty to make it in the form of a note verbal or promemoria, or even to permit me to take a memorandum of it at the time he made it. As it authorises an expectation that something more precise and definite, in and official form, may soon be received by this government, it is the less necessary that I should go into an explanation of

the views of the President in relation to it, more particularly as the Secretary of State is daily expected, and will be able to do it in a manner more satisfactory.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN GRAHAM.

Mr. Graham to Mr. Russell.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Aug. 10, 1812.

SIR-Thinking that it may possibly be useful to you, I do myself the honor to enclose you a memorandum of the conversation between Mr. Baker and myself, alluded to in my letter of yesterday's date. From a conversation with Mr. Baker since this memorandum was made, I find that I was correct in representing to the President that the intimation from Mr. Foster, and the British authorities at Halifax was was to be understood as connected with a suspension of hostilities on the frontiers of Canada. Yours, &c. JOHN GRAHAM.

Memorandum referred to in the above letter.

Mr. Baker verbally communicated to me for the information of the President, that he had received despatches from his government addressed to Mr. Foster, (dated I believe about the 17th of June) from which he was authorised to say, that an official declaration would be sent to this country, that the Orders in Council, so far as they affected the U. States, would be repealed on the 1st of August, to be revived on the 1st of May, 1813, unless the conduct of the French government, and the result of the communications with the American government, should be such as, in the opinion of his majesty, to render their revival unnecessary. Mr. Baker moreover stated that the Orders would be revived, provided the American government did not, within fourteen days after they received the official declaration of their repeal, admit British armed vessels into their ports, and put an end to the restrictive measures which had grown out of the Orders in Council.

t

The despatches authorising this communication to the American government expressly directed that it should be made verbally, and Mr. Baker did not consider himself at liberty to reduce it to writing, even in the form of a note verbal, or promemoria, or to suffer me to take a memorandum of his communication at the time he made it. I under