stood from him that the despatches had been opened by Mr.. Foster at Halifax, who in consequence of a conversation he had had with Vice Admiral Sawyer, and Sir J. Sherbroke, had authorised Mr. Baker to say, that these gentlemen would agree, as a measure leading to a suspension of hostilities, that all captures made after a day to be fixed, should not be proceeded against immediately, but be detained to await the future decision of the two governments. Mr. Foster had not seen Sir George Prevost, but had written to him by express, and did not doubt but that he would agree to an arrangement for the temporary suspension of hostilities. Mr. Baker also stated that he had received an authority from Mr. Foster to act as charge d'affairs, provided the American government would receive him in that character, for the purpose of enabling him officially to communicate the declaration which was to be expected from the British government; his functions to be understood, of course, as ceasing on the renewal of hostilities. I replied, that although, to so general and informal a communication, no answer might be necessary, and certainly no particular answer expected, yet, I was authorised to say, that the communication is received with sincere satisfaction, as it is hoped that the spirit in which it was authorised by his government, may lead to such further communications as will open the way not only to an early and satisfactory termination of existing hostilities, but to that entire adjustment of all the differences which produced them, and that permanent peace and solid friendship which ought to be mutually desired by both countries, and which is sincerely desired by this. With this desire, an authority was given to Mr. Russell on the subject of an armistice as introductory to a final pacification, as has been made known to Mr. Foster, and the same desire will be felt on the receipt of the further and more particular communications which are shortly to be expected with respect to the joint intimation from Mr. Foster and the authorities at Halifax, on the subject of suspending judicial proceedings in the case of maritime captures, to be accompanied by a suspension of military operations. The authority given to Mr. Russell just alluded to, and of which Mr. Foster was the bearer, is full proof of the solicitude of the government of the U. States to bring about a general suspension of hostilities on admis

sible terms, with as little delay as possible. It was not to be doubted therefore, that any other practical expedient for attaining a similar result would be readily concurred in, Upon the most favorable consideration, however, which could be given to the expedient suggested through him, it did not appear to be reducible to any practicable shape to which the executive would be authorised to give it the necessary sanction, nor indeed is it probable that if it was less liable to insuperable difficulties, that it could have any material effect previous to the result of the pacific advance made by this government, and which must it favorably received, become operative as soon as any other arrangement that could now be made. It was stated to Mr. Baker, that the President did not, under existing circumstances, consider Mr. Foster as vested with the power of appointing a charge d'affairs: but that no difficulty in point of form, would be made, as any authentic communication through him, or any other channel, would be received with attention and respect.

Mr. Monroe to Mr. Russell.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Aug, 21, 1812. Extract.] SIR-My last letter to you was of the 27th of July, and was forwarded by the British packet Althea, underthe special protection of Mr. Baker. The object of that letter, and of the next preceding one of the 26th of Jnne, was to invest you with power to suspend by to suspend by an armistice, on such fair conditions as it was presumed could not be rejected, the operation of the war, which had been brought on the U. States by the injustice and violence of the British government. At the moment of the declaration of war, the President, regretting the necessity which produced it, looked to its termination and provided for it, and happy will it be for both countries, if the disposition felt, and the advances made on his part, are entertained and met by the British government in a similar spirit.

You will have seen by the note forwarded to you by Mr. Graham, of Mr. Baker's communication to him, that Mr. Foster had authorised him to state that the commanders of the British forces at Halifax would agree to a suspension, after a day to be fixed, of the condemnation of prizes, to await the decision of both governments, without however

preventing captures on either side. It appears also, that Mr. Foster had promised to communicate with Sir George Prevost, and to advise him to propose to our government an armistice.

Sir George Prevost has since proposed to General Dearborn, at the suggestion of Mr. Foster, a suspension of offensive operations by land, in a letter which was transmited by the General to the Secretary of War. A provisional agreement was entered into between General Dearborn and Colonel Baynes, the British adjutant-General, bearer of General Prevost's letter, that neither party should act offensively before the decision of our government should be taken on the subject.

Since my return to Washington, the document alluded to in Mr, Foster's despatch, as finally decided on by the British government, has been handed to me by Mr. Baker, with a remark, that its authenticity might be relied on. Mr. Baker added that it was not improbable, that the Admiral at Halifax might agree likewise to a suspension of captures, though he did not profess to appear to be acquainted with his sentiments on that point.

On full consideration of all the circumstances which merit attention, the President regrets that it is not in his power to accede to the proposed arrangement. The fol lowing are among the principal reasons which have pro

duced this decision.

1st. The President has no power to suspend judicial proceedings on prizes. A capture, if lawful, vests a right over which he has no control. Nor could he prevent captures otherwise than by an indiscriminate recal of the commissions granted to our privateers, which he could not justify under existing circumstances.

2d. The proposition is not made by the British government nor is there any certainty that it would be approved by it. The proposed arrangement, if acceded to, might not be observed by the British officers themselves, if their government, in consequence of the war, should give them instructions of a different character, even if they were giv en without a knowledge of the arrangement.

3d. No security is given, or proposed, as to the Indians, nor could any be relied on. They have engaged in the war on the side of the British government, and are now pro

secuting it with vigor, in their usual savage mode. They can only be restrained by force, when once let loose, and that force has already been ordered out for that purpose.

4th. The proposition is not reciprocal, because it restrains the United States from acting where their power is greatest, and leaves Great-Britain at liberty, and gives her time to augment her forces in our neighborhood.

5th. That as a principal object of the war is to obtain redress against the British practice of impressment, an agreement to suspend hostilities even before the British government is heard from on that subject, might be considered a relinquishment of that claim.

6th. It is the more objectionable, and of the less importance, in consideration of the instructions heretofore given you, which, if met by the British government, may have already produced the same result in a greater extent and more satisfactory form.

I might add, that the declaration itself is objectionable in many respects, particularly the following

1st. Because it asserts a right in the British government to restore the Orders in Council, or any part thereof, to their full effect on a principle of retaliation on France, under circumstances of which she alone is to judge; a right which this government cannot admit, especially in the extent heretofore claimed, and acted on by the British gov

ernment..

2d. That the repeal is founded exclusively on the French Decree of the 28th of April, 1811, by which the repeal of the Decrees of Berlin and Milan, announced on the 5th of August, 1810, to take effect on the 1st of November, of that year, at which time their operation actually ceased, is disregarded, as are the claims of the U. States arising from the repeal on that day, even according to the British pledge,

3d. That even if the U. States had no right to claim the repeal of the British Orders in Council prior to the French Decree of the 28th of April, 1811, nor before the notification of that Decree to the British government, on the 20th of May, of the present year, the British repeal ought to have borne date, from that day, and been subject to none of the limitations attached to it.

These remarks on the declaration of the prince regent, which are not pursued with rigor, nor in the full extent which they might be, are applicable to it, in relation to the state of things which existed before the determination of the U. States to resist the aggressions of the British government by war. By that determination, the relations between the two countries have been altogether changed, and it is only by a termination of the war, or by measures leading to it, by consent of both governments, that its calamities can be closed or mitigated. It is not now a question whether the declaration of the prince regent is such as ought to have produced a repeal of the non-importation act, had war not been declared, because, by the declaration of war, that question is superceded, and the non-importation act having been continued in force by Congress, and become a measure of war, and among the most efficient, it is no longer subject to the control of the Executive in the sense, and for the purpose for which it was adopted. The declaration, however, of the prince regent, will not be without effect. By repealing the Orders in Council without reviving the blockade of May, 1806, or any other illegal blockade, as is understood to be the case, it removes a great obstacle to an accommodation. The President considers it an indication of a disposition in the British government to accommodate the differences which subsist between the two countries, and I am instructed to assure you, that, if such a disposition really exists, and is persevered in, and is extended to other objects, especially the important one of impressment, a durable and happy peace and reconciliation cannot fail to result from it.

Mr. Russell to Mr. Monroe.

LONDON, Sept, 1, 1812. SIR-You will perceive by the enclosed copies of notes which have passed between lord Castlereagh and me, that the moderate and equitable terms proposed for a suspension of hostilities, have been rejected, and that it is tention to return immediately to the United States.

my

in

My continuance here, after it has been so broadly intimated to me by his lordship, that I am no longer acknowledged in my diplomatic capacity, and after a knowledge that instructions are given to the British Admiral to nego