HIS MAGNANIMITY

adroitly leading the foe past Plymouth, which was then little fitted to sustain a siege.

The King's personal example inspired his subjects; his ardour was unquenchable; he visited military camps, reviewed troops, and spoke personally words of encouragement to officers and men. Had an

invasion actually occurred, George would never have been satisfied with any other post than that at the head of the troops. "The King's magnanimity," said Germain to Clinton, "is not to be shaken by the nearness of danger."

On 27th June he wrote to North: "The enclosed papers which I return confirm me in an opinion long entertained, that America, unless this summer supported by a Bourbon fleet, must sue for peace, and that it would ever have been unwise to have done more than what is now adopted: the enabling the commander-in-chief to put provinces at peace.

Propositions must come from them to us, no further ones be sent from hence; they ever tend only to increase the demands. I can never agree to healing over an uncured wound-it must be probed to the bottom; if it then proves sound, no one will be more ready to forget offences. But no one sees more forcibly the necessity of preventing the like mischief by America's feeling she has not been a gainer by the contest; yet after that I would show that the parent's heart is still affectionate to the penitent child."

On 11th October the King wrote: "The intelligence from America is far from unpleasant ; it shows that with the force, small as it was, that

was sent this summer, had it arrived early much might have been done this year. The reinforcement the next must at all events be sent by the first week in March. Clinton must be kept there at all events."

66

By this time North

North's reiterated appeals to be relieved of office at length induced the King to consent to his once more casting about for some capable successor. can set my sentiments in three words. I order Lord North to continue, but if he is resolved to retire, he must understand the step thought necessary by him is very unpleasant to me." seems to have become convinced that the continuance of the American war was futile. Futile it certainly was if one looked to the means by which it was intended to compass the loyalists' ends. Never was Britain so badly served as she was in the American contest. But the loyal spirit in America was not yet crushed; events might yet happen to retrieve disaster. If many of the counties of England were already beginning to sicken of the conflict and to hold meetings of protest, so also were many of the American Whigs. One British victory after another diminished the hopes and courage of the American revolutionaries. Washington grew despondent, and pinned all his faith to French intervention. George, throughout, continued firm as a rock. He would not retreat, he would not waver, he would be true to the trust the Empire reposed in him. "I do believe," he wrote, "that America is nearer coming into temper to treat than perhaps at any other period, and if we arrive in time at Gibraltar, Spain will not

OVERTURES TO SHELBURNE

succeed in that attack, which will very probably allay the fury of the Spanish monarch, and make him more willing to end the war.

It is undeniable that the British Ministry had shown much weakness. Gower, who had supported the American war, altered his views, and resigned in November 1779. Previously Jenkinson, afterwards Lord Liverpool, succeeded Barrington as Secretary of War. Jenkinson was one of George's personal friends, and he had great confidence in him. Weymouth gave way to Hillsborough; Germain's shortcomings were at this stage so apparent that the King reluctantly admitted that he was "of no use in his department."

In deference to North's wishes George empowered Thurlow, the Lord Chancellor, to treat with Shelburne. "I will own," he wrote, "that from the conduct which has hitherto been held by those with whom you have conversed I augur very little good from the further prosecution of this business, and nothing but the earnest desire I have to unite my subjects in the present moment of danger, and to form a strong Government out of the most able and respectable of all parties, would induce me to make any further attempt. Influenced, however, by this last motive, and in order to make the person with whom you last conversed (if possible) more open and explicit, I consent that you should acquaint him that Lord North's situation will not stand in the way of any arrangement, and that he does not desire to be a part of any new administration that is to be formed. This declaration ought to convince that