"existence of secret articles in the treaty "of Tilsit. There were some," he said, "which in no way concerned the interests of England. That he could assure

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him, and, as an honest man, he would "not say it if it were not truth, there ex"isted no secret article whatever, which "stipulated the shutting the Russian "ports against the British commerce. "That the proposed projet of a com"mercial treaty must be considered by "the Minister of Commerce, before he "could confer with the British Envoy "upon it. That it by no means followed,

because Bonaparte had communicated "to the Emperor of Russia the basis 66 upon which he was ready to conclude with England, that his Imperial

1

peace

* This expression it will be perceived is equivocal, and may mean, either that there were secret articles, some of which in no way concerned the interests of England; or, that there were some secret articles, none of which in any way concerned the interests of England. As Lord G. L. Gower did not require an explanation, it is probable that he took them in the latter sense.

་

Majesty had made any communications

at Tilsit, of the future views and sys"tem of the Court of Petersburgh."*

From this interview it appears, that Bonaparte had not only requested or assented to the mediation of the Emperor of Russia, for effecting a peace with Great Britain, but had actually communicated to him the basis upon which he was ready to conclude it. The British Ambassador did not, however, press for the communication of this basis; conceiving perhaps that such a request would be premature, till he was acquainted with the secret articles; but only required again, to be informed of those articles, and expressed his hopes that the negotiations for the conclusion of the treaty of commerce between the two countries might still be continued.

"

It appears however, that at this criti

*Dispatch from Lord G. L. Gower to Mr. Canning, 2d Sep. 1807.

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cal juncture, "a considerable change took

place in the tone and temper of Gene

"ral Budberg's conversation. Instead of "that coldness and reserve which cha"racterized the replies of the Russian "Minister to the questions which the “British Ambassador had thought it his

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duty to put to him in previous con"ferences, he found a very mild and con"ciliating manner, and an apparent anxiety to remove every difficulty in the

66

way of a perfectly good understanding "between the two countries." To what circumstance this extraordinary change in the sentiments of the Russian Government is to be attributed, we are not informed. If, however, the British Ambassador had been disposed to forward the negotiation for peace, this appears to have been the proper time for it. He might now, with every prospect of success, have pressed again for the communication of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit; and if those had appeared to be as irrelevant to the interests of Great Britain, as had been represented by the Russian Minis

ter, he might then have proceeded to require to be informed of the basis on which the French Ruler had proposed to treat. Such, and such alone, was the plain simple path that must have presented itself to any person who had a direct object in view. But with this apparent change of disposition in the Russian Ministry, other prospects opened to the enlarged vision of the British Ambassador, who appears at this important moment to have been actuated by an almost prophetic knowledge of the sentiments of his own cabinet. The secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, the basis of the proposed negotiation, and even the commercial treaty, were forgotten. He instantly recurred in imagination to those happier days, full of hope and con

fidence, when upon the very spot where

he then stood, he was combining with Russia and Austria, for a secret attack upon France. The lessons of experience were for a moment disregarded. The deception, though once defeated, might now be more deeply concealed. From

arose,

his silent chamber the shade of Pitt and hovered over his friend. His spirit alone could have dictated the answer of the British Ambassador, when he replied, "That they could not better serve the cause of Bonaparte than by indulging "in mutual recrimination on the past "conduct of each government. That he "wished their whole attention should be "turned to the future; and that he was

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persuaded, if the Emperor of Russia "still entertained his former opinions of "the danger to be apprehended from the preponderance of France, the cause of "the independance of Europe was by no means desperate."*

Sentiments so enlightened, and which evidently pointed to the renewal of the war on the continent of Europe, seem to have been too much in unison with those of the British Cabinet not to have met with their most unqualified approbation.

*2d Dispatch of Lord G. L. Gower, dated 2d Sep. 1807.