recently entered into with France, the disgrace must have rested with herself, and not with Great Britain. On this it must be observed, that this is one of those cases, the decision of which will depend upon the preconceived opinions adopted by those who form a judgment upon it. To those who can justify the treacherous attack upon Copenhagen, the negotiation with Russia can require no apology; but to those who conceive that the character of a nation for honour and integrity is paramount to every other consideration, a disregard on the part of this country, of those principles upon which alone such a character can be supported, must occasion the most poignant regret. Is there then nothing criminal in endeavouring to prevail upon another person, or another state, to adopt a course of conduct confessedly treacherous, dishonourable, or criminal? Are treaties of peace only made for the moment? and can the party who has derived advantage and security from them have a right to discard them at pleasure? Is it allowable

to assert and to act upon such maxims? and can it be justifiable in the representative of a great and powerful nation, whilst he is ostensibly employed in laying the basis for pacific negotiations, to excite the power that offers its mediation to combine against that very state which has given an opening to such discussions? If such a course of conduct is to be justified, it can only be upon those new maxims which it has been the disgrace of the present day to have first openly avowed. To attempt to influence those who have the hardihood to assert them, by stating to them the obligations of society, or the laws of civilized states, is a hopeless task. To recall them to a sense of the over-ruling power of a Moral Providence moves only their derision. Let us then for once meet them upon their own ground. Let us discard all that has been obtained by the united wisdom of mankind through past ages; and let us see what the advocates of these new opinions would gain by demolishing all that has

been erected, and building their own superstructure in its stead. Let us take the instance before us, and suppose that Ministers had carried their object, and been able to combine Great Bri`tain and Russia in a new and successful war against France. Would there then have been an end of human affairs? Would nothing have remained to be done when the present government of France was overthrown? Will no future negotiations ever be necessary? and is it of no importance to have given to the world a decisive proof that a war with Great Britain is less dangerous than a negotiation for peace, in which the proposed mediator is to be seduced, and the opportunity ostensibly devoted to the work of reconciliation is perverted to purposes wholly the reverse? The question is not, whether we shall excel our adversaries in the arts of negotiation, but whether we shall relinquish our national character for openness and integrity. Not whether we shall be able to excite a new and uncertain conflict on the continent

of Europe, but whether we shall lose the power of allaying it, when an unexpected result may require our interference. Not whether a Bonaparte or a Bourbon shall reign in France, but whether those principles upon which alone the tranquillity and happiness of the human race are founded, shall be overthrown or preserved. Destroy these principles in private life, and every man will suspect his neighbour; the whole order of society will be deranged; law will lose its influence, and violence and force will alone prevail. Discard them in public affairs, and the horrors of war will be multiplied; the soldier will degenerate into the assassin, and nation must be opposed in arms to nation, till one of them be exterminated.

But whatever opinion may be enter tained of the conduct of the British Ministry in other respects, the result of this negotiation will indisputably shew how far the pacific sentiments so uniformly avowed by them were exemplified in their

conduct. The discussions were indeed entered upon with an apparent earnestness on their part, to be informed of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, as preparatory to a further negotiation; but no sooner was a confidential intercourse established between the British Ambassador and the Russian Ministry, than these objects were wholly disregarded, and every effort made to engage Russia once more to take a decided part against France. Even since the avowal of hostilities on the part of Russia against this country, the objects which the British Ministers had in view have been acknowledged, as if for the purpose of exasperating France and Russia still further, in the declaration of the British Court in answer to that of Russia; in which we are told, that " His Majesty had enter"tained the hope, that a review of the "transactions of that unfortunate nego-. "tiation (of Tilsit) and a just estimate "of its effects upon the glory of the "Russian name, and upon the interests "of the Russian Empire, would have