Majesty to the government of France." This reply closed the discussion. Nothing further could indeed remain to be said. A few days afterwards the Prince. de Starhemberg demanded his passports; and England and Austria are now at

war.

The

Such have been the circumstances that have attended, and such the fate, of the three distinct offers made to Great Britain in the course of the year 1807, for opening negotiations for peace. first of them appears to have been frustrated by the British Ministry having undertaken to consult the wishes of their allies and to communicate the result to Austria; a promise, of the performance of which no evidence has yet been adduced, and the neglect of which cannotbe satisfactorily accounted for by those changes in the political state of Europe which did not take place till some

Note from Mr. Canning to the Prince de Star hemberg, January 8, 1808.

time afterwards. In the second negotiation, in which Russia offered herself as a mediator, the British Ministry, instead of availing themselves of the friendly disposition manifested by that Court, to promote pacific negotiations and obtain more honourable terms of peace, were intent only on improving that disposition to excite a new combination against France; until our attack upon Denmark roused the resentment of the Russian sovereign, and instead of a friend and mediator, rendered him our exasperated and determined enemy. With respect to the third proposition; whatever construction may be put upon the pacific asseverations and irrelevant objections with which the answer of the British Ministry abounds, the positive refusal. to authorize the Austrian Minister "to speak in the name of His Majesty to the government of France," operated as a decisive negative to all further proceedings, and mig at alone have been sufficient for that pu pose, without the observations by

which it is preceded, and which are so palpably open to fair and candid remark. Whether ministers are right in thus declining to enter upon negotiations for peace, when so many opportunities have occurred, is not the question. The object of the present inquiry is only to shew how far the conduct of ministers in these transactions has been consistent with the convictions they have expressed, and the professions they have so repeatedly made, “that it was not only their duty, "but their interest, to secure peace as soon "as possible, upon safe and honourable

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grounds, AND THAT THEY HAD MISSED NO

FAIR OPPORTUNITY TO EFFECT IT ;"* and how far their friends and supporters are justified, in recommending to the country a further reliance in those assurances, and in representing petitions for peace as not only "unnecessary but mischievous, and

* Such is reported as the language of Mr. Canning, in the House of Commons, on Colonel Stanley presenting the petition for peace of the inhabitants of Bolton, 22d February, 1808.

"in effect, AS PETITIONS FOR THE PROLONGATION OF THE WAR."+

But it may probably be asked, if the present policy of the British Cabinet has determined them to continue the war, what should prevent them from openly avowing such determination, and what occasion can there be to elude by so much circumlocution, and so many evasions, the pacific proposals made by the enemy? Would it not, it may be asked, be much more manly, much more honourable, much more consistent with the character of Great Britain, to reject these insufficient pretexts, and to avow the determination, that England will not negotiate for peace with France? Undoubtedly it would be more dignified, and more consistent with those professions of frankness and good faith so frequently made in the course

See the Address to the inhabitants of Manchester before referred to in p. 6,

of the correspondence by the British Ministry; but a little consideration will shew that this is a line of conduct which ministers cannot ostensibly adopt. What the consequences might be, if Great Britain were openly to avow sentiments of inextinguishable hostility against the states with which she is now at war, it is not easy to calculate. To the great tribunal of public opinion, some deference is due; and the manifestation of such a disposition, and the course of conduct to which it must lead, could only cause this Country to be considered as the common enemy of the rest of the world. But independent of foreign powers, there are formidable objections at home against such a bold and decisive measure. Were ministers explicitly to refuse all offers of negotiation, it would open the eyes of the people to their real situation. They would then clearly perceive, that the long unvaried track of hostility in which they are called upon to persevere, can only terminate in their ruin; and that if