the United States: People v. C. P. R. R., 43 Cal. 499; Huntington v. C. P. R. R. Co., 2 Saw. 503; Thomson v. Pacific R. R., 9 Wall. 579; Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 18 Id. 5; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. City of Richmond, 26 Gratt. 1; and see State Bank Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 595.

Property of state, county, or municipal corporation. The state does not design to tax itself nor any subordinate portion of the government, as counties, towns, and cities: People v. Doe, 36 Cal. 220; Low v. Lewis, 46 Id. 549; Doyle v. Austin, 47 Id. 353.

The statement that all property must be taxed means all private property; the state will not be held to have intended to tax itself: People v. Doe, supra. Yet bonds of the state held by individuals are private property and are taxable: People v. Home Ins. Co., 29 Id. 533. As a general principle, the property of municipalities is exempted from taxation by clear implication: People v. Salomon, 51 Ill. 37; Directors of the Poor v. School Directors, 42 Pa. St. 21, 25; State v. Gaffney, 34 N. J. L. 133. It has been determined, however, that such property as a municipal corporation might own, not for carrying out its public functions, but which it uses and owns as a private corporation, would be subject to taxation under such general words of the statute as would embrace like property in a private corporation: Cooley on Taxation, 132, in note, citing Storrs v. Utica, 17 N. Y. 104; Lloyd v. New York, 5 Id. 369; Western Fund Savings Society v. Philadelphia, 31 Pa. St. 175; Commissioners v. Duckett, 20 Md. 468; Detroit v. Corey, 9 Mich. 165; and see post, sec. 3617, and note.

Double taxation is prohibited by this section, and by the constitution of the state: San Francisco v. Mackey, 3 West Coast Rep. 697 (C. Ct. Cal.); S. C., 4 Id. 407. The difficulty of escaping an unequal apportionment of the burden of taxation necessitates a common-sense construction of this prohibition. All the books discuss this question; and while political economists and legal text-writers delight to dwell

upon the injustice of duplicate taxation, and inveigh against the systems which result therein, it is a matter now too well recognized to admit of serious denial that a tax is not invalid simply for the reason that an individual who has directly contributed his proportion to the public revenue may be indirectly compelled to respond. Cooley, Taxation, p. 160, says that "the decisions are nearly if not quite unanimous in holding that taxation is not invalid because of any such unequal results." It is apparent that no one ought to be made to pay more than his proportion; an enactment which does this directly is to be censured. But in the very nature of human society, relations to possessions are so complex, the necessity for revenue so manifest, that statutes ought not to be set aside simply because the wisdom of man has been unable to devise means equally to distribute the burden of taxation. This spirit is everywhere prevalent, and appeals to the reason of all. Courts guard against the abuse of the taxing power as far as is possible. They refuse to believe that legislators intended to subject the same property twice to taxation, and they will adopt a construction most likely to guard against such an evil: Cooley on Taxation, 165; Burroughs on Taxation, sec. 87. It must not be overlooked, however, that the question of the justice of double taxation is very different from that of the power to impose it: See Cooley on Taxation, 161; Burroughs on Taxation, sec. 87. But a constitutional provision that "all property in the state not exempt under the laws of the United States shall be taxed in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as provided by law," is a limitation upon the power of double taxation. To tax a portion of a man's property more than once would not be taxing all of it in proportion to its value: Burke v. Badlam, 57 Cal. 594, where, in the counsel's argument, will be found an extensive collating of the au thorities on this general subject. The taxing the property of a corporation, as well as the shares of the stock, is expressly declared to be double taxation: Sec. 3608.

Shares of stock.-Section construed in connection with many other provisions of this code relating to corporations, in Spring Valley Water Works v. Schottler, 62 Cal. 68. See the note to section 3640. The rule as defined in the above section is the one independently thereof declared to be the law in San Francisco v. Mackey, 3 West Coast Rep. 697 (C. Ct. Cal.).

To assess all the corporate property to the

corporation and the shares of stock to the holders thereof is double taxation, and is prohibited: Burke v. Badlam, 57 Cal. 594. “Capital," eo nomine, was held taxable in San Francisco v. Spring Valley Water Works, 54 Id. 571, but a corporation cannot be taxed on capital stock which it does not hold: People v. National Gold Bank, 51 Id. 50S.

Double taxation: See note to sec. 3607.

conclusion, Judge Rhodes alone dissenting. They there decided that "credits" were not "property" subject to taxation within the meaning of the then existing constitution; and this determination was reaffirmed in a subsequent cause reported in the same volume of reports at page 369, viz., Bank of Mendocino v. Chalfant. In the new constitution, the view entertained by the earlier cases was adopted and made a portion of that instrument; and now "credits" are "property" liable to be taxed, the legislature being empowered to deduct from any man's credits the amount of indebtedness which he owes to a bona fide resident of the tate: Art. 13, sec. 1. For quite an interesting treatment of the taxation of credits, read Mr. Burroughs' forty-ninth section of Taxation. The author by no means accepts the views entertained in People v. Hibernia Savings Bank, 51 Cal. 243. For the purpose of taxing solvent credits, their situs is the residence of the creditor: San Francisco v. Mackey, 4 West Coast R. 407 (C. Ct. Cal.).

Stock: See sec. 3608.

Bonds: See the note to section 3607, as to national bank stock. Bonds of the state are taxable: People v. Home Ins. Co., 29 Cal. 533. Franchises are taxable: San José Gas Co. v. January, 57 Cal. 614; Burke v. Badlam, Id. 594; Spring Valley Water Works v. Schottler, 62 Id. 72, where the subject is considered at length; San Francisco Gas Co. v. Schottler, Id. 448; The Freight Case, 15 Wall. 282; Railway Gross Receipts Case, Id. 296; State R. R. Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 603; Porter v. R. R. I. & St. L. R. R. Co., 76 Ill. 573; Monroe Savings Bank v. Rochester, 37 N. Y. 367.

Real estate. Possessory interests taxable: State v. Moore, 12 Cal. 56; People v. Shearer, 30 Id. 645; People v. Frisbie, 31 Id. 146; People v. Cohen, Id. 210; People v. Crock ett, 33 Id. 150; Reily v. Lancaster, 39 Id. 354; People v. Black Diamond Co., 37 Id. 54; Barrett v. Amerein, 36 Id. 327; and this although it may be a possessory interest in public lands: Hall v. Dowling, 18 Id. 621; People v. Morrison, 22 Id. 73; High v. Shoemaker, Id. 363; People v. Shearer, 30 Id. 645. It is certainly so where this possessory interest has been derived from the state itself, with respect to her domain: People v. Donelly, 58 Id. 144, and has been so asserted with respect to possession of and improvements upon, the land of the United States. See note to sec. 3607, under "Property Belonging to the United States."

"Claim to lands," under the former revenue laws of the state, meant not merely an assertion of title, but an actual possession of the land claimed: People v. Crockett, 33 Cal. 150; so also Reily v. Lancaster, 39 Id. 354; People v. Black

Diamond Co., 37 Id. 54; Barrett v. Amerein, 36 Id. 327. But the wording of the present statute, differing from that of the former one, probably warrants a different construction.

Mines, minerals, and quarries on public lands, timber rights, and privileges appertaining thereto, are taxable. This is but an application of the principle which makes possessory rights the subject of taxation. The objects here described are, moreover, legimately within the meaning of the word "property." Therefore they are subject to state taxation: State v. Moore, 12 Cal. 56; People v. Frisbie, 31 Id. 146; People v. Cohen, Id. 210; People v. Black Diamond Co., 37 Id. 54.

Subd. 3. Mortgages.-Whether mortgages could be taxed was a much mooted question under the former constitution of California: People v. Eastman, 25 Cal. 601; People v. McCreery, 34 Id. 432; People v. Whartenby, 38 Id. 461; People v. Kohl, 40 Id. 127; Lick v. Austin, 43 Id. 590; People v. Eddy, Id. 331; S. & L. Society v. Austin, 46 Id. 415; and see supra, note under "Credits;" but the matter was set at rest by the new constitution. By its provisions, all property is taxable. Article 13, section 4, expressly provides for mortgages, and in the above section the legislature has included mortgages within that term. With respect to mortgages, the law operates upon those created prior to the new constitution. Say the court, in McCoppin v. McCartney, 60 Cal. 367: "But a mortgagee, prior to the adoption of the new constitution, did not have a vested right of exemption from taxation which extended beyond the life of the former constitution. Even if he had a contract with his mortgagor by which the latter agreed to pay all taxes, a change in the law which imposed upon him the duty to pay the tax on the mortgage interest in the first instance would not violate the obligation of the contract. Mortgagee might still enforce his contract against mortgagor. His relation to the debtor would not be changed, but only his relation to the state. The plain intent of the new constitution is to subject to taxation classes of property previously exempt. That one of the new classes consists of credits, secured or unsecured, no more violates any contract or vested right of the creditor than would a provision by which, for the first time, the owner of any tangible property should be taxed upon its value.' And so also Mumford v. Sewell, 3 West Coast Rep. 712 (Or.).

How mortgages are to be assessed: See sec. 3627.

Subd. 4. Improvements.-Fruit-trees are not growing crops within the exemption of article 13, section 1, of the constitution: Cottle v. Spitzer, 3 West Coast Rep. 416.

3627. Property, how assessed.

Assessing franchises: See note to sec. 3617, ante.

Railway property.-This provision of the code respecting the taxing of railroads conforms to article 13, section 10, of the constitution of California, which instrument in this particular is self-executing: People v. Sacramento Co., 59 Cal. 321; S. F. & N. P. R. R. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 60 Id. 12. As to the manner of assessing railroads, see post, secs. 3664, 3665. And see the note thereto for further consideration of this subject.

Place of assessment. The respective duties of the state board of equalization and of boards of supervisors with regard to the assessment of railroads operating in more than one county are discussed in People v. Supervisors of Sacramento County, 59 Cal. 321; and the design of the revenue laws, seemingly all apparent from the laws themselves, is there judicially declared to be that all other property than railroad property is to be assessed by the local assessors in the manner prescribed by law. The ateamers of the Central Pacific Railroad plying on the bay of San Francisco are to be assessed by the local assessors, not by the state board: San Francisco v. C. P. R. R. Co., 63 Id. 467. The code prescribes that the situs of personal property is to govern in determining the place of its assessment. And before the code the law was the same: People v. Iolladay, 25 Cal. 300; People v. Niles, 35 Id. 282; People v. Home Ins. Co., 29 Id. 533. For the purposes of taxation, personal property is to be considered like real estate, as having a situs of its own, independent of the domicile of the owner: People v. Niles, supra. But by thus assigning to personal property a situs for the purposes of taxation, it is not intended to authorize the listing or taxing out of the owner's county of such personal property as might casually, in the usual and ordinary course of business, be found therein: Id. Elsewhere, also, personalty is given a situs to enable taxation of it to be made: Huckins v. Boston, 4 Cush. 543; Leonard v. New Bedford, 16 Gray, 292; although the general rule is to make the personalty, as in other cases, follow the domicile of its owner: Burroughs on Taxation, sec. 97; a method of tax ing conceded by the California courts to be within the power of the legislature to adopt: People v. Townsend, 56 Cal. 633. Property of firms and of corporations has a situs of its own: Sec. 3641, post.

Money on deposit in bank is a loan, and is to be assessed on the depositor's death at his late place of residence, not in the county of deposit: San Francisco v. Lux, 1 West Coast Rep. 555.

Taxes are due and payable in the county where the property is first assessed; People v. Holladay, 25 Cal. 300.

Assessment to the owners by name is required, under the present revenue system, where the owner is known: Gowtefend v. Ultz, 53 Cal. 666; the full name is required: Crawford v. Schmidt, 47 Id. 618. The method to be pursued where the owner is unknown is prescribed by sections 3634 and 3635, post. For merly blocks of land in a city could be assessed by blocks: People v. Morse, 43 Id. 534; People v. Culve cell, 44 Id. 620; and this without placing A se rate valuation on the several lots into it was divided: Id. Land owned in common by two or more may be assessed to

which

them jointly: People v. McEwen, 23 Id. 54. But the better practice is to assess each particular person upon the interest which he claims in the land: People v. Shimmins, 42 Id. 123. And where interests therein are held in severalty, each particular parcel of the land should be assessed to its respective owner: Id.; People v. Hancock, 48 Id. 631; as where a portion has been sold and the entire tract is assessed without specifically describing the excepted portion: People v. Cane, 48 Id. 427; People v. Hyde, Id. 431. Where a man permits his land to be used and worked in the name of a mythical company, it will not do to assess the land under such company name; it must be assessed to the owner: Hearst v. Egglestone, 55 Id. 365. Several tracts belonging to the same owner ought to be separately valued: People v. Hollister, 47 Id. 617.

Corporation and firm names: See sec. 3641, post.

Description of land.-Subdivision 5 of the next section of this code provides for the description of land in the voluntary statement to be filed by the owner, and section 3634 prescribes the practice upon a refusal or omission of the owner to make the required statement. The description should be at least so definite as to inform the owner that it was his land to which the assessment attached. A description sufficiently certain to convey land between man and man, and which if contained in an agreement to convey would authorize a court of equity to decree a specific execution, has been declared, in California, insufficient in a proceeding to enforce the collection of a tax: People v. Mahoney, 55 Cal. 286; although Cooley, Taxation, pp. 282, 283, says that such a description would be generally sufficient. Describing land by a certain name, as "Clark's ranch," is insufficient: Lachman v. Clark, 14 Cal. 131; and omitting the metes and bounds, where the statute requires them, is fatal: Id.; Kelsey v. Abbott, 13 Id. 609. A mistake in a description so trivial as not to mislead the owner, and not prevent him from ascertaining that his is the land assessed, does not avoid the assessment: Bosworth v. Danzien, 25 Id. 296. The books are full of cases where assessments are sought to be set aside for insufficient descriptions; many turning on the language of the statute, others involving peculiar facts. Attempts have been made to state some general rule upon the subject, but no complete satisfactory statement of the principle has yet been made. Cooley seems to approve of the rule as stated by Judge Thompson in Woodside v. Wilson, 32 Pa. St. 52, 55: "The designation of the land will be sufficient if it afford the

means of identification, and do not positively mislead the owner:" Cooley on Taxation, 286. A vague, indefinite, and uncertain description will render the assessment void: People v. Flint, 39 Cal. 670.

Assessment is the basis of a tax, and essential to the validity of all subsequent proceedings: Ferris v. Coover, 10 Cal. 589; Reily v. Lancaster, 39 Id. 354; People v. Hastings,

29 Id. 449; People v. San Francisco Savings Union, 31 Id. 132; Miller v. Hale, 26 Pa. St. 432; Matter of Nichols, 54 N. Y. 62. It in itiates the lien of the tax: Reeve v. Kennedy, 43 Cal. 644; and if irregular, is beyond the power of the legislature to correct: McReynolds v. Longenberger, 57 Pa. St. 13. The as