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11. A legislative grant cannot be impaired by a subsequent act of the legislature: Jennison v. Planters' Bank, 23 Ala. 168; Tenn. & C. R. R. Co. v. Moore, 36 Id. 371; Montgomery v. Kas son, 16 Cal. 189; Grogan v. San Francisco, 18 Id. 590; Trustees v. Bradbury, 26 Am. Dec. 515; and this is so whether the grant be to an individual or to a corporation. But the fact that subsequent legislation has diminished the value of a franchise does not make the act liable to the objection being discussed: Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 429; Curtis v. Whitney, 13 Wall. 68.

The legislature cannot revive a claim barred by the statute of limitations: Wright v. Oakley, 5 Met. 400; Battles v. Forbes, 18 Pick. 532; Kinsman v. Cambridge, 121 Mass. 558; Rockport v. Walden, 54 N. H. 167; Atkinson v. Dunlap, 50 Me. 111; Davis v. Minor, 1 How. (Miss.) 183; Hicks v. Steigleman, 49 Miss. 377; Chandler v. Chandler, 21 Ark. 95; Bradford v. Strine, 13 Fla. 393; Coady v. Reins, 1 Mont. T. 424; Baldro v. Tomlie, 1 Or. 176; Rogers v. Handy, 24 Vt. 620; Wires v. Farr, 25 Id. 41. A statute allowing a creditor to redeem at any time within two years after the sale under a mortgage made prior to the passing of the statute is void: Grantly v. Ewing, 3 How. 707; Howard v. Bugbee, 24 Id. 461; Malony v. Fortune, 14 Iowa, 417; Robinson v. Howe, 13 Wis. 341; yet different views are entertained in Iverson v. Shorter, 9 Ala. 713; Freeborn v. Pettibone, 5 Minn. 277. And in Tuolumne Co. v. Sedgwick, 15 Cal. 515, it was said that the right to redeem property sold under execution pertains solely to the remedy, and is under legislative control.

Remedial rights, when vested.-The legislature is not bound to continue the same

9. Limitations shall continue to run.

forms and the same system of courts and proceedings for the accommodation of debtors or creditors; it has the power to regulate legal proceedings: Rathbone v. Bradford, 1 Ala. 312; Stoddart v. Smith, 5 Binn. 355; Vanzant v. Waddel, 2 Yerg. 260; Livingston v. Moore, 7 Pet. 469; Maynes v. Moore, 16 Ind. 116; Hopkins v. Jones, 22 Id. 310; Webb v. Moore, 25 Id. 4; Smith v. Brayn, 34 Ill. 364; Templeton v. Horne, 82 Id. 491; Frost v. Ilsley, 54 Me. 345; Martin v. Hewitt, 44 Ala. 418; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 134. It may change the remedy: Smith v. Judge, 17 Cal. 547; Templeton v. Horne, 82 Ill. 49; Carnes v. Red River Parish, 29 La. Ann. 608; Hardeman v. Downer, 39 Ga. 425; Fearing_v. Irwin, 55 N. Y. 486; Penniman's Case, 11 R. I. 333; Mills v. Charleton, 29 Wis. 400; Tennessee v. Sneed, 96 U. S. 69. Nor is it material that the new remedy is less expeditious or simple than the old: Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311; Guild v. Rogers, 8 Barb. 502; Jones v. Crittenden, 6 Am. Dec. 531; Wood v. Wood, 14 Rich. 148; Ex parte Pollard, 40 Ala. 77; Starkweather v. Hawes, 10 Wis. 125. The right to alter the means whereby a right may be enforced is thus qualified: An act which so alters the previous remedial legislation as to wholly deprive a person of recovering on his claim, undoubtedly impairs vested rights: Curran v. State, 15 How. 304; Western Savings v. Philadelphia, 31 Pa. St. 175; Oatman v. Bond, 15 Wis. 20; Rigg v. Martin, 5 Ark. 506; or if it leaves any essential part practically unavailing, it is not constitutional: Musgrove v. Vicksburg R. R. Co., 50 Miss. 677; Morton v. Vallentine, 15 La. Ann. 150.

Legislative power over statutes of lim. itation: See the note to the next section.

SEC. 9. When a limitation or period of time prescribed in any existing statute for acquiring a right or barring a remedy, or for any other purpose, has begun to run before this code goes into effect, and the same or any limitation is prescribed in this code, the time which has already run shall be deemed part of the time prescribed as such limitation by this code. [Amendment, approved March 24, 1874; Amendments 1873-4, 279; took effect July 1, 1874.]

Amendments of codes, how affected. This section applies to subsequent amendments of the codes as well as to the code as originally adopted: See C. P. R. R. v. Shackelford, 63 Cal.


The statute, having commenced to run under the law as existing prior to the adoption of the codes, continued to run notwithstanding them; and where the limitation prescribed in the codes is the same as that of the prior statute, the time runs as though no new legislation had been enacted: Benjamin v. Eldridge, 50 Cal. 612; and see Guillotel v. Mayor of N. Y., 8 N. Y. 441, discussing the effect of the code of that state upon the statute of limitations, and reviewing the earlier decisions of Ely v. Holton, 15 Id. 595; Matter of Peugnet, 67 Id. 444; and Acker v. Acker, 80 Id. 143. A statute prescribing additional acts as requisite to ac quire a right by the lapse of time refers only to the future, and requires the compliance with its provisions only during the remaining period of the time: C. P. R. R. v. Shackelford, 63 Cal. 261. As to the effect of a legislative alteration

of the statute of limitations, see the interesting decision of Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 603.

Legislative control over statute of limitation.-In the previous note it was stated that remedial rights were within the control of the legislative body; that they are not vested within the sense that they cannot be altered: Curry v. Sanders, 35 Ala. 280; Cutts v. Hardee, 38 Ga. 350; Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 628, and other cases there cited. It is now recognized that the legislature may alter or repeal a statute of limitations: Dyer v. Gill, 32 Ark. 410; Hyman v. Bayne, 83 Ili. 256; Sampson v. Sampson, 63 Me. 328; Krone v. Krone, 37 Id. 308; Bigelow v. Bemis, 2 Allen, 496; People v. Wayne Co. Judge, 37 Mich. 287; 11orbach v. Miller, 4 Neb. 31; Johnson v. Railroad Co., 54 N. Y. 416; Pearsall v. Kenan, 79 N. C. 472. But there is this qualification of the rule with regard to rights already accrued, the new stat utory provision must give a reasonable time for their enforcement: Horbach v. Miller, 4 Neb. 31; Lockhart v. Yeiser, 2 Bush, 231; Bea? v. Nason, 14 Me. 344; Halcombe v. Tracy, 2 Minn.

241; W. S. R. R. Co. v. Stockett, 21 Miss. 395; and in the absence of some reasonable time expressly given therein, the law will presume that it was intended: Dale v. Frisbie, 59 Ind. 520; Bratton v. Guy, 12 S. C. 42. When the

10. Holidays.

statute has once completely run, there exists no power in the legislature by a new act to revive the claim. See the preceding note. Limitation of actions: See secs. 312 et seq., Code Civ. Proc.

SEC. 10. Holidays, within the meaning of this code, are: Every Sunday, the first day of January, the twenty-second day of February, the thirtieth day of May, the fourth day of July, the twenty-fifth day of December, every day on which an election is held throughout the state, and every day appointed by the president of the United States, or by the governor of this state, for a public fast, thanksgiving, or holiday. If the first day of January, the twenty-second day of February, the thirtieth day of May, the fourth day of July, or the twentyfifth day of December, fall upon a Sunday, the Monday following is a holiday. [Amendment, approved April 9, 1880; Amendments 1880, 49 (Ban. ed. 189); took effect immediately.]

Holidays.—Cited as to first of January falling on Sunday: Estate of Rose, 63 Cal. 346. Here a notice of appeal was given on Tuesday, the third of January, the sixtieth day being the second, but the first coming on Sunday.

11. Holidays.

Declaring the thirtieth day of May to be a holiday, and the addition of the last clause, are the particulars in which this section is amended.

SEC. 11. If the first day of January, the twenty-second day of February, the fourth of July, or the twenty-fifth day of December, fall upon a Sunday, the Monday following is a holiday. [Amendment, adopted March 30, 1874; Amendments 1873-4, 2; took effect July 6, 1874.]

It will be observed that the thirtieth day of May is omitted from this section. The entire section, however, is included in section 10 as amended in 1880, in the last clause of which

12. Computation of time.

the thirtieth day of May is enumerated with the other holidays falling on Sunday.

Holidays, when counted: See note to following section; and see sec. 13, and note.

SEC. 12. The time in which any act provided by law is to be done is computed by excluding the first day, and including the last, unless the last day is a holiday, and then it is also excluded.

Computation of time. It is now the received law in most of the states that time is to be computed as prescribed by the above section. Chief Justice Gray reviews the cases in Bemis v. Leonard, 118 Mass. 502, and concludes that "in computing time from the date or from the day of the date, or from a certain act or event, the day of the date is to be excluded, unless a different intention is manifested." The same rule is adopted in Mish v. Mayhew, 51 Cal. 514; Sheets v. Selden, 2 Wall. 190; O'Connorv. Towns, 1 Tex. 107; Goode v. Webb, 52 Ala. 452; Handley v. Cunningham, 12 Bush, 402.

"Month" is meant to be a calendar and not a lunar month: Savings and Loan Society 7. Thompson, 32 Cal. 347; Sprague v. Norway, 31 Id. 173; but see section 17, infra, subdivision 4, defining the word "month." Where a statute directs the publication of notices a certain number of times a week for a specified number of months, it is requisite, not only that the number of weekly publications be observed, lated according to the calendar month, be folbut that the prescribed length of time, calcu: lowed: Savings and Loan Society v. Thompson,


Excluding holidays.-As to the perform. ance of secular acts falling on a holiday, see

note to next section. Intervening holidays are counted as part of the computed time. Should the law require the publication of a notice daily for ten days, Sundays excepted, the exception in favor of the Sunday relates to the daily publishing of the notice, and not to the period of time during which publication is to be counted: Taylor v. Palmer, 31 Cal. 241; Miles v. McDermott, Id. 271. And if published on Sunday, the fact that the day is a dies non does not vitiate the service, that publication being but one of a series of acts required to make the service complete: Savings and Loan Society v. Thompson, 32 Id. 347. In excluding the last prescribed day in estimating the length of time for the performance of a duty required by law, it is necessary to include the following Monday. A publication of a resolution of intention was pronounced insufficient, it appearing that the statute required the publication to be made for five days, "Sundays and non-judicial days excepted," and that the publication was for four days only, exclusive of the last day, which was a Sunday: San Francisco v. McCain, 50 Id.

210. Again, in estimating the period for which a judge may grant an extension of time, under section 1054 of the Code of Civil Procedure, if

the last of the thirty days falls on Sunday it is

to be excluded: Muir v. Galloway, 61 Id. 498. See also application of section to redemption from sheriff's sale under section 702, post; Perham v. Kuper, Id. 331.

Time, how computed, and year, week, and day defined: See post, secs. 3255 et seq. The supreme court is always open for the transaction of business: Sec. 134; although the thirtieth day in which to make an order to hear a cause in bank falls on Sunday, yet the court cannot make the order on the next day: Adams v. Dohrmann, 63 Cal. 417.

Fractions of a day will be considered by the courts where time is important, and the rights of parties are concerned: Craig v. Godfrey, 1 Cal. 415; People v. Beatty, 14 Id. 566. 13. Certain acts not to be done on holidays.

SEC. 13. Whenever any act of a secular nature, other than a work of necessity or mercy, is appointed by law or contract to be performed upon a particular day, which day falls upon a holiday, such act may be performed upon the next business day with the same effect as if it had been performed upon the day appointed.

Day of performance a holiday.-Under this section, a note falling due on Sunday is payable the following Monday, in the absence of usage to the contrary; the language of the section being permissive. In Hibernia Bank v. O'Grady, 47 Cal. 579, the note in question was held payable on Saturday, the day of maturity being Sunday; but this was under a former statute prescribing that such should be the case with negotiable instruments. The rule of the code is that which most generally is observed:

14. Seal defined.

Barrett v. Allen, 10 Ohio, 426; Kuntzv. Temple, 48 Mo. 75; Thayer v. Felt, 4 Pick. 354; Sands v. Lyon, 18 Conn. 17; Commonwealth Bank v. Varnum, 49 N. Y. 279. In Patrick v. Faulke, 45 Mo. 314, the principle was not applied to a mechanic's lien expiring on Sunday, the court thinking that such a lien should be strictly construed against the lien-holder. Under the New Jersey act, a note maturing on Sunday, May 30th, is due and payable on the following Tuesday: Hagerty v. Engle, 43 N. J. L. 299.

does not vitiate the record of the writing: Smith v. Dall, supra. A corporation may adopt the seal of a private individual: Gashwiler v. Willis, 33 Id. 11; but when adopted must be used as the seal of the corporation: Richardson v. Scott R. W. & M. Co., 22 Id. 156.

SEC. 14. When the seal of a court, public officer, or person is required by law to be affixed to any paper, the word "seal" includes an impression of such seal upon the paper alone as well as upon wax or a wafer affixed thereto. An impression of a seal on paper without wax is sufficient: Connolly v. Goodwin, 5 Cal. 220; and such impression may be made with a pen: Hastings v. Vaughn, Id. 315. The appellate court will assume from the letters "L. S.," after a certificate of a notary printed in a transcript, that the original was properly executed: Touchard v. Crow, 20 Id. 150. In copying a sealed instrument, it is not necessary to transcribe the seal: Jones v. Martin, 16 Id. 165; Smith v. Dall, 13 Id. 510. An omission of a county recorder to make any mark for the seal 15. Joint authority.

Seals other than official are abolished by the Civil Code, sec. 1629.

Court seals: See secs. 147 et seq., Code Civ. Proc.

Seals for private writings: See sec. 1929, Code Civ. Proc.

SEC. 15. Words giving a joint authority to three or more public officers or other persons are construed as giving such authority to a majority of them, unless it is otherwise expressed in the act giving the authority.

Executing joint authority.-If from the delegation of authority it appear that all must not only meet but all must agree, the authority must be pursued: People v. Coghill, 47 Cal. 361. Before the code there were many authorities to the effect that, as a general rule, where the legislature had created a board of commissioners and conferred discretionary powers to decide upon matters of public interest, but had made no provision that a majority shall constitute a quorum, all must be present and consult, though a majority might decide: People v. Coghill, supra, citing Grindley v. Barker, 1 Bos. & Pul. 229; Crocker v. Crane, 21 Wend. 218;

16. Words and phrases.

Babcock v. Lamb, 1 Cow. 239; Ex parte Rogers, 7 Id. 526; so also Talcott v. Blanding, 54 Cal. 289, where all met and a majority decided; Smith v. Smith, 28 Ill. 56; Tuscarora Bridge Co. v. Jemison, 33 Ala. 476; McCrary v. Harrison, 36 Id. 577: Blodgett v. Prince, 109 Mass. 4; Henderson v. Bulkley, 14 B. Mon. 236. Not only does section 15 remove the distinction between the exercise of a joint authority between public and private bodies, but also gives to the majority power not only to decide, but to meet and decide; where a majority, a quorum of the board, have met, a majority of the quorum may decide: Flint v. Harrington, 63 Cal. 257.

SEC. 16. Words and phrases are construed according to the context and the approved usage of the language; but technical words and phrases, and such others as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law, or are de

fined in the succeeding section, are to be construed according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition. Words and phrases, how construed.The above is the general rule with regard to the construction of words, whether in contracts, statutes, or constitutions. The meaning to be given to words in contracts is provided for in the Civil Code, sections 1644, 1645, and Code of Civil Procedure, section 1861. The following decisions follow the rule of the codes: Houghton's Appeal, 42 Cal. 35; People v. Eddy, 43 Id. 332; Weill v. Kenfield, 54 Id. 111; Waller 7. Harris, 20 Wend. 555; United States v. Jones, 3 Wash. 209; Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 17. Words, what they include.

Wheat. 326; Mayor v. Winter, 29 Ala. 651; Philadelphia R. R. v. Catawissa R. R. Co., 53 Pa. St. 20; Green v. Weller, 32 Miss. 650. But if a technical word is manifestly used in an untechnical sense, the court will give it the meaning intended by the party using it: C. P. R. R. v. Beal, 47 Cal. 151; Clark v. City of Utica, 18 Barb. 151; Robinson v. Varnell, 16 Tex. 382. And see Rosenberg v. Frank, 58 Cal. 387, for a construction of the words “pro rata” in a will.

SEC. 17. Words used in this code in the present tense include the future as well as the present; words used in the masculine gender include the feminine and neuter; the singular number includes the plural, and the plural the singular; the word "person" includes a corporation as well as a natural person; "writing" includes printing; "oath" includes affirmation or declaration; every mode of oral statement under oath or affirmation is embraced by the term " testify," and every written one in the term "depose;""signature" or "subscription" includes mark, when the person cannot write, his name being written near it, and witnessed by a person who writes his own name as a witness. The following words, also, have in the code the signification attached to them in this section, unless otherwise apparent in the context:

1. The word "property" includes both real and personal property;

[2] The words "real property" are coextensive with lands, tenements, and hereditaments;

3. The words "personal property" include money, goods, chattels, things in action, and evidences of debt;

4. The word "month" means a calendar month, unless otherwise expressed; 5. The word "will" includes codicils;

6. The word "writ" signifies an order or precept in writing, issued in the name of the people, or of a court or judicial officer; and the word "process," a writ or summons issued in the course of judicial proceedings;

7. The word "vessel," when used in reference to shipping, includes ships of all kinds, steamboats and steamships, canal-boats, and every structure adapted to be navigated from place to place;

8. The term "peace-officer" signifies any of the officers mentioned in section eight hundred and seventeen of the Penal Code.

9. The term "magistrate" signifies any one of the officers mentioned in section eight hundred and eight of the Penal Code;

10. The word "state," when applied to the different parts of the United States, includes the District of Columbia and the territories; and the words. "United States" may include the district and territories. [Amendment, approved March 30, 1874; Amendments 1873-4, 2; took effect July 6, 1874.]

"Person," in its legal signification, is a generic term, and includes artificial as well as natural persons: S. V. W. W. v. Schottler, 62 Cal. 69, 116; Douglass v. Pac. M. S. S. Co., 4 Id. 306. The word "person," in the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States, was thought not to include corporations, in C. P. R. R. v. Board of Equalization, 60 Id. 35; but the opposite view was entertained in Railroad Tax Cases, 8 Saw. 235.


"Signature."-Fac-simile of an autograph printed and used as a signature is a signature: Pennington v. Baehr, 48 Cal. 565. And an attorney's name printed to a complaint is a sufficient signing: Hancock v. Bowman, 49 Id. 413; Barnard v. Heydrick, 49 Barb. 62. But to cut a written signature and affix to another instrument is not a signing of that instrument: Fox

v. Board of Supervisors, Id. 563. The clerk of a board of supervisors may adopt a printed 81

signature: Williams v. McDonald, 58 Cal. 527.

"Masculine" includes "feminine." There is no variance where the indictment charges the larceny of a "horse" and the proof shows it to have been a "mare:" People v. Pico, 62 Cal. 50. Masculine words in statute extend to the feminine gender of that class: Foltz v. Hoge, 54 Id. 28.

"Property" includes evidences of debt, as a general rule: People v. Eddy, 43 Cal. 331; but People v. Hibernia Bank, 51 Id. 243, and

Miller v. Heilborn, 8 Id. 133, illustrate how this meaning may be qualified by the context. The right to an appeal is property within the meaning of the Penal Code, section 519. It will be an injury to property under this section to write threatening letters preventing one from prosecuting his appeal: People v. Cadman, 57 Id. 562.

"Month:" See note to section 12, ante. Words used in boundaries are defined in sections 3903 to 3907 of this code.

18. Statutes, laws, or rules inconsistent with code repealed.

SEC. 18. No statute, law, or rule is continued in force because it is consistent with the provisions of this code on the same subject, but in all cases provided for by this code all statutes, laws, and rules heretofore in force in this state, whether consistent or not with the provisions of this code, unless expressly continued in force by it, are repealed and abrogated. This repeal or abrogation does not revive any former law heretofore repealed, nor does it affect any right already existing or accrued, or any action or proceeding already taken, except as in this code provided; nor does it affect any private statute not expressly repealed.

Code operating as a repeal of prior statutes. See application of this section to power to give other punishment for contempt than as prescribed in this code: Johnson v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. 578; and to sec. 1881, Code Civ. Proc., in regard to a wife's testifying against her husband: People v. Langtree, G1 Id. 256. The code commissioners quote the general principle of repeal by implication, as laid down in Perry v. Ames, 26 Id. 382, and stated hereinafter, and then say: "In view of this decision, the language of the text was necessary, repealing all former laws on the same subject, whether consistent or not."

Statutes continued in force: See sec. 19. Repeals by implication.-It being the design of the codifiers to frame a new system of law, as appears from the note to section 4, ante, the effect of the code upon existing laws must be determined accordingly; yet previous sections of these preliminary provisions disclose an intention not to disturb existing rights, and section 18 must be construed with reference to these sections; the last clause of section 18 declares the same thing. The whole provision is but a formal statement of a well-settled rule in the construction of statutes, though the repeal of statutes by implication is not favored by the courts: Gordon v. People, 44 Mich. 485; People v. Webster, 3 Neb. 323; People v. Quigg, 59 N. Y. 83, SS; People v. Palmer, 52 Id. 82; Hogan v. Guigon, 29 Gratt. 709; State v. Severance, 55 Mo. 378; W. W. Co. v. Burkhart, 41 Ind. 364; Merrill v. Gorham, 6 Cal. 42; Scofield v. White, 7 Id. 401; People v. S. F. & S. J. R. R. Co., 28 Id. 256; Buckingham v. Steubenville R. R. Co. 10 Ohio St. 25; Goodrich v. Milwaukee, 24 Wis. 422; Horton v. Mobile, 43 Ala. 598; Gill v. State, 30 Tex. 514; Kerlinger v. Barnes, 14 Minn. 526; and, generally, such a construction will be given the two provisions of the law as will enable them both to have effect: Fowler v. Perkins, 77 Ill. 271; Iverson v. State, 52 Ala. 170; Crosby v. Patch, 18 Cal. 438; Pond v. Maddox, 38 Id. 574; Walton v. Walton, Deady, 605; yet where there is a plain and unavoidable repugnance between the

new act and the former statute a repeal by implication will take place: Forqueron v. Donally, 7 W. Va. 114; Golding v. College of Chambersburg, 8 Vroom, 258; Covington v. City of East St. Louis, 78 Ill. 518; Pacific R. R. Co. v. Cass County, 33 Mo. 17; W. W. Co. v. Burk hart, 41 Ind. 364; Grant Co. v. Sels, 5 Or. 243; Hurst v. Hawn, Id. 275; People v. Burt, 43 Cal. 561; Ex parte Smith, 40 Id. 419; Estate of Wixom, 35 Id. 320; People v. Sargent, 44 Id. 430, and cases above cited. There must be such a positive repugnancy between the new and the old provisions that they cannot stand together or be consistently reconciled: McCool v. Smith, 1 Black, 459; Wood v. United States, 16 Pet. 342; Clay Co. v. Society for Savings, 104 U. S. 579.

The general design undertaken by the codes, to revise the laws, gives room for the application of another principle in respect to construing legislative enactments, which is, in effect, embodied in the above section. It is recognized that a new statute, revising the whole subject-matter of an old one, and evidently intended as a substitute for it, will operate as a repeal of the former law, although it is not so expressly stated: Treadwell v. Yolo County, 62 Cal. 563; Stirman v. State, 21 Tex. 734; Cullen v. State, 42 Conn. 55; Campbell v. Case, 1 Dakota, 17; Swann v. Buck, 40 Miss. 268; Strauss v. Ileiss, 48 Md. 292; Erwin v. Moore, 15 Ga. 361; Conley v. Calhoun, 2 W. Va. 416; State v. Rogers, 10 Nev. 319; Norris v. Crocker, 13 How. 429; United States v. Barr, 4 Saw. 256; United States v. Tynen, 11 Wall. 95; Leighton v. Walker, N. II. 59; Commonwealth v. Kimball, 21 Pick. 376; Dowdell v. State, 58 Ind. 333; Hayes v. State, 55 Id. 99; Longlois v. Longlois, 48 Id. 60. Judge Field, in Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 590, commenting upon the effect of the second section of the act of February 5, 1867, upon the twenty-fifth section of the judiciary act of 1789, after stating that it was manifest that congress intended "by the latter statute to revise the entire matter to which they both had reference," said: "We are of opinion that the

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