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March 23, 1821, overthrew the constitutional government that had been inaugurated, and restored Ferdinand II to absolute power. The revolution which had broken out in Piedmont was also suppressed by a detachment of the Austrian army.

England held aloof from all participation in the proceedings at Troppau and Laybach—though Sir Charles Stuart was present to watch the proceedings. In a circular dispatch of January 21, 1821, the British government expressed its dissent from the principles set forth in the Troppau circular.

The next meeting of the allied powers was arranged for October, 1822, at Verona.

Here the affairs of Greece, Italy, and, in particular, Spain came up for consideration. At this Congress all five powers of the alliance were represented. France was uneasy about the condition of Spain, and England had to send a delegate out of self-defense, as her interests were largely involved. Castlereagh was preparing to depart for the congress, when his mind gave way under the stress of work and more remotely of dissipation, and he committed suicide. Canning then became secretary for foreign affairs, and Wellington was sent to Verona.

The congress which now assembled at Verona was devoted largely to a discussion of Spanish affairs. Wellington had been instructed to use all his influence against the adoption of measures of intervention in Spain. When he found that the other powers were bent upon this step and that his protest would be unheeded, he withdrew from the congress. The four remaining powers signed the secret treaty of Verona. November 22, 1822, as a revision, so they declared in

the preamble, of the "Treaty of the Holy Alliance." This treaty of the Holy Alliance, signed at Paris, September 26, 1815, by Austria, Russia, and Prussia, is one of the most remarkable political documents extant. It sprang from the erratic brain of the Czar Alexander under the influence of Madame Crudner, who was both an adventuress and a religious enthusiast. Its object was to uphold the divine right of kings and to counteract the spirit of French revolutionary ideas by introducing "the precepts of justice, of charity, and of peace" into the internal affairs of states and into their relations with one another. No one had taken it seriously except the Czar himself and it had been without influence upon the politics of Europe. The agreement reached at Verona gave retrospective importance to the Holy Alliance, and revived the name, so that it became the usual designation of the combined powers. The following alleged text of the secret treaty of Verona soon became current in the press of Europe and America. Although it has never been officially acknowledged and its authenticity has been called in question, it states pretty accurately the motives and aims of the powers. The first four articles are as follows:

The undersigned, specially authorized to make some additions to the Treaty of the Holy Alliance, after having exchanged their respective credentials, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I. The high contracting parties being convinced that the system of representative government is equally incompatible with the monarchical principles as the maxim of the sovereignty of the people with the divine right, engage mutually, and in the most solemn manner, to use all their efforts to put an end to the system of representative

governments, in whatever country it may exist in Europe, and to prevent its being introduced in those countries where it is not yet known.

ART. II. As it cannot be doubted that the liberty of the press is the most powerful means used by the pretended supporters of the rights of nations, to the detriment of those of Princes, the high contracting parties promise reciprocally to adopt all proper measures to suppress it not only in their own states, but also, in the rest of Europe.

ART. III. Convinced that the principles of religion contribute most powerfully to keep nations in the state of passive obedience which they owe to their Princes, the high contracting parties declare it to be their intention to sustain, in their respective states, those measures which the clergy may adopt, with the aim of ameliorating their own interests, so intimately connected with the preservation of the authority of Princes; and the contracting powers join in offering their thanks to the Pope, for what he has already done for them, and solicit his constant coöperation in their views of submitting the nations.

ART. IV. The situation of Spain and Portugal unites unhappily all the circumstances to which this treaty has particular reference. The high contracting parties, in confiding to France the care of putting an end to them, engage to assist her in the manner which may the least compromise them with their own people and the people of France, by means of a subsidy on the part of the two empires, of twenty millions of francs every year, from the date of the signature of this treaty to the end of the war.

Signed by Metternich for Austria, Chateaubriand for France, Bernstet for Prussia, and Nesselrode for Russia.14

Such was the code of absolutism against which England protested and against which President Monroe delivered his declaration.

14 For the Congresses of Aix-la-Chapelle, Troppau, Laybach, and Verona, вее "Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh," Vol. XII; "Life of Lord Liverpool," Vol. III: Political Life and Official Correspondence of Canning Chateaubriand's "Congrès de Verone," and W. A. Phillips, The Confederation of Europe, 1813-1823." The text of the treaty of Verona is published in Niles' Register, August 2, 1823, Vol. 24, p. 347. and in Elliot's American Diplomatic Code," Vol. II, p. 179.

The Congress broke up about the middle of December, and the following April, the Duc d'Angoulême led a French army across the Pyrenees. By October the constitutional party had been overthrown and absolutism reigned supreme once more in western Europe. In England alone was there still any semblance of constitutional government.

The Congress of Verona was the last of the jointmeetings of the powers for the discussion of the internal affairs of states. It marked the final withdrawal of England from the European alliance. Henceforth she took up a position distinctly hostile to the principles advocated by her former allies and her policy in relation to Spanish America, practically coincided with that of the United States.

The great majority of the English people sympathized deeply with the constitutional movement in Spain and were ready to take up arms in support of the Spanish people. The protest of England having been disregarded by the powers at Verona, it became necessary for the cabinet, in view of the preparations going on in France for the invasion of the Peninsula, to say what they contemplated doing. In February, 1823, Lord Liverpool circulated among his colleagues a minute prepared by Canning, which gave at length the reasons, military and other, why it would be unwise for England to undertake the defense of Spain. In the first place, the war against Spain was unpopular in France, and if Great Britain should take part in the war, the French government would avail itself of the fact to convert it into an English war and thus render it popular. Second, England would have to undertake the defense of Spain against

invasion by land, and her naval superiority would not materially aid the Spaniards or baffle the French. Third, the continental powers were committed to the support of France. Fourth, there was a possibility that the invasion of Spain would be unsuccessful. Fifth, on the other hand, it might meet with success, in which event France might assist Spain to recover her American colonies. Here, he says, England's naval superiority would tell, "and I should have no difficulty in deciding that we ought to prevent, by every means in our power, perhaps Spain from sending a single Spanish regiment to South America, after the supposed termination of the war in Spain, but certainly France from affording to Spain any aid or assistance for that purpose." Sixth, in case of the invasion of Portugal by France and Spain, he thought England would be in honor bound to defend her, in case she asked for aid. The military defense of Portugal would not be so difficult as a land war in Spain.15

In accordance with this determination Canning dispatched a letter to Sir Charles Stuart, British ambassador at Paris, March 31, 1823, in which he spoke of recognition of the colonies as a matter to be determined by time and circumstances, and, disclaiming all designs on the part of the British government on the late Spanish provinces, intimated that England, although abstaining from interference in Spain, would not allow France to acquire any of the colonies by conquest or cession. To this note the French government made no reply and England took this silence as a tacit agreement not to interfere with the colonies.

18" Life of Lord Liverpool," Vol. III, p. 231. "Official Correspond. ence of Canning," Vol. I, p. 85.

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