A.

ABORTION.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 314.

ACCEPTANCE.

See AGREEMENTS, 341, 347 note.

ACCIDENT.

1. A horse drawing a brougham under
the care of the defendant's coachman
in a public street, suddenly and with-
out any explainable cause bolted, and,
notwithstanding the utmost efforts of
the driver to control him, swerved on
to the footway and injured the plain-
tiff:

Held, no evidence of negligence to go
to a jury.

2. And held, that the fact that the horse
had cast a shoe shortly after he bolted,
and that the driver did not under the
circumstances in which he was placed
call out or give any warning, did not
alter the case. Manzoni v. Douglas, 530

See CRIMINAL LAW, 503, 506 note.
INSURANCE, LIFE, 488, 491 note.

ADMIRALTY.

1. A shipowner, where a general average
loss has occurred, may be liable to an
action for damages for delivering up
the cargo without taking the necessary
steps for procuring an adjustment of
the general average and securing its
payment.

The plaintiffs shipped goods at Liver-
pool on board a steamer belonging to
the defendants under a bill of lading,
by which the defendants undertook to
deliver the goods at the port of Mon-
treal unto the Grand Trunk Railway,
by them to be forwarded (upon the
conditions before and after expressed)
thence per railway to the station near-
est to Toronto, &c., and among the
conditions was the following: "The
shipowner or railway company are not
to be liable for any damage to any
goods which is capable of being cov-
ered by insurance," &c.

In the course of the voyage the plain-
tiffs' goods sustained damage which
came under the heading of general aver-
age. The ship returned to Liverpool,
and the cargo was discharged and
handed over by the defendants to a
company to be distributed and dis-
posed of for the benefit of the parties
concerned, without giving any assist
ance to the bailees, the underwriters,
or the persons whose goods were dam-
aged to get an average statement made
out, or taking any steps to enable the
plaintiffs to recover contribution :

Held, first, that the bill of lading did
not relieve the defendants from contri-
bution to general average, and, second-
ly, that they were liable to an action

2. By the terms of a charterparty the
ship was to take in a full cargo at
Bombay, and proceed therewith to a
safe port on the continent between
Havre and Hamburg as ordered, ** or
so near thereto as she might safely
get." The cargo was to be brought to
and taken from alongside at merchant's
risk and expense. The ship was or-
dered by the charterers to Kooger-
polder in Holland. Koogerpolder is
some distance up a canal, and the ves-
sel with her full cargo on board drew
too much water to proceed up the ca-
nal. No arrangements had been made
by the charterers or consignees for
taking delivery of any part of the cargo
at the mouth of the canal.
tion of the cargo that required to be
unloaded in order to enable the vessel
to enter the canal was at least a third.
The question arising under these cir-
cumstances between the shipowners
and the charterers which of them
ought to bear the expenses of lighter-
ing the cargo from the mouth of the
canal to Koogerpolder:

The por-

4. W. was the registered owner of cer-
tain shares in a ship, and had been
entered on the register as managing
owner. The defendant subsequently
became the registered owner of other
shares in the ship. The defendant was
not aware in fact that W. was so regis
tered as managing owner. W. sent the
ship on a voyage without the defend-
ant's knowledge, and contrary to the
terms of an agreement made between
them. The defendant did not partici-
pate in the adventure, and had previ-
ously informed W. that he did not in-
tend to navigate the ship or take any
part in her management. The plain-
tiffs supplied necessaries for the ship
previous to such voyage, upon the or-
der of W. without the knowledge or

5.

consent of the defendant. The plain-
tiffs, before supplying the goods, con-
sulted the register, and found the de-
fendant's name entered therein as part
owner of the ship:

Held, by Bowen, J., that the fact that
the defendant had allowed the entry on
the register describing W. as manag.
ing owner to remain unaltered did not
per se amount to a holding out of W. as
his agent, so as to render the defendant
liable for the necessaries supplied by
the plaintiffs, and that inasmuch as W.
had not in fact authority to bind the
defendant, the plaintiffs could not re-
cover against the defendant for such
necessaries. Frazer v. Cuthbertson, 508

A county court having admiralty ju-
risdiction has no greater jurisdiction
in respect of a claim for necessaries
than that possessed by the Admiralty
Division of the High Court, and conse-
quently cannot entertain an action for
necessaries supplied to a British ship,
the owners of which are domiciled in
Great Britain. Allen v. Garbutt. 542

See DEMURRAGE, 585.
FREIGHT, 200.
TRESPASS, 384.

AGENT.

See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

AGREEMENTS.

1. The plaintiffs, a wagon company, by
agreement in writing let the defend-
ants a number of railway wagons for a
term of years at an annual rent, the
agreement providing that the plain-
tiffs, their executors, or administrators,
should during the term keep the wagons
in repair. Pending the agreement an
order was made for the winding-up of
the plaintiff company under the super-
vision of the court, in pursuance of a
resolution previously passed by the
company, and liquidators were appoint-
ed, who joined the company in assign-
ing the benefit of the contract to an-
other company, upon the terms that
such company should perform the stip-

ulations by the assignors contained in
the original contract. The assignees
took over the repairing stations of the
plaintiffs and the staff of workmen em-
ployed by them, and were always ready
and willing to execute all necessary re-
pairs to the wagons:

Held, that the defendants had no de-
fence to an action for rent, upon the
ground that the plaintiffs had incapaci-
tated themselves from performing their
contract; for, first, the voluntary liqui
dation of the company was immate-
rial, the liquidators having power under
the Companies Act, 1862, ss. 95, 131, to
continue the letting of the wagons;
and, secondly, the repair of the wagons
by the company to whom the contract
was assigned was a sufficient perform.
ance by the plaintiffs of their agree-
ment to repair. British, etc., v. Lea. 236,

241 note.

2. The defendant, being possessed of war-
rants for iron, wrote from London to
the plaintiffs at Middlesborough asking
whether they could get him an offer for
the warrants. Further correspondence
ensued, and ultimately the defendant
wrote to the plaintiffs fixing 40s. per
ton, net cash, as the lowest price at
which he could sell, and stating that
he would hold the offer open till the
following Monday. The plaintiffs on
the Monday morning at 9.42 tele-
graphed to the defendant: "Please
wire whether you would accept forty
for delivery over two months, or if
not, longest limit you could give."
The defendant sent no answer to this
telegram, and after its receipt on the
same day he sold the warrants, and at
1.25 P.M. telegraphed to plaintiffs that
he had done so. Before the arrival of
his telegram to that effect, the plaintiffs
having at 1 P.M. found a purchaser for
the iron, sent a telegram at 1.34 P.M.
to the defendant stating that they had
secured his price. The defendant re-
fused to deliver the iron, and thereupon
the plaintiffs brought an action against
him for non-delivery thereof. The jury
found at the trial that the relation be-
tween the parties was that of buyer and
seller, not of principal and agent.

The state of the iron market was
very unsettled at the time of the trans-
action, and it was impossible to foresee
when the plaintiffs' telegram was sent
at 9.42 A.M. how prices would range
during the day:

Held, by Lush, J, that under the
circumstances the plaintiffs' telegram
at 9.42 ought not to be construed as
a rejection of the defendant's offer, but
merely as an inquiry whether he would
modify the terms of it, and that, al-
though the defendant was at liberty to
revoke his offer before the close of the
day on Monday, such revocation was not
effectual until it reached the plaintiffs;
consequently the defendant's offer was
still open when the plaintiffs accepted
it, and the action was, therefore, main-
tainable. Stevenson v. McLean. 341,
347 note.

See ADMIRALTY.

DAMAGES, 102, 109 note.
FREIGHT, 200.

ILLEGAL AGREEMENTS, 117, 128 note.
LANDLORD AND TENANT, 31, 34 note, 63.
PERFORMANCE, 40.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT, 111.
SALE.

AIR.

See EASEMENTS, 35.

ANIMALS.

See HEALTH, 331.

ANSWER.

See PLEADINGS, 310, 313 note.

ARMY.

See MILITARY, 463.

ARREST.

See WARRANT, 335, 340 note.