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Insurable interest, 96, 225.
Insurance of mortgaged property,
405.

Insurance policy, 218, 221.
Insurance of specific property, 86,

537.

Fire insurance on specific property, to secure a particular interest, covers a loss happening by destruction of such property only, as was held in that particular right, and to the extent only of the injury to that interest. Smith v. Columbian Insurance Co.

Hence where the interest to be secured by the policy was described as a mortgage including land, it is a material fact, that the land was subject to prior mortgages held by the assured at the date of the policy, which, if concealed, vitiates the policy. Ib. A. insured certain real and personal property, for $4000, to secure a mortgage which was said to cover land, and in the answers to the interrogatories he apportioned the sum insured among the different species of property. He then held three mortgages on the land, the last of which was for $4000, and one on the personalty. The property mentioned in the policy was destroyed to an amount greater than $4000. The insurers offered to pay the loss on receiving an assignment of all the mortgages of which they had no notice until after the loss. Held, 1st. He could recover only for the value of the property included in one mort 2d. That the existence of the gage. prior incumbrances on the mortgaged property was a material fact, which should have been communicated to the insurers without injury by them. Ib.

Representations, 86, 96, 218, 405, 521. Insurance, life, 107. Representations, 107. Interrogatories, to parties, 111, 638.

J.

Jeffrey, Lord, Life and Letters of, 61. Judgment, 39, 42, 45, 331, 629.

The extension of admiralty jurisdiction to the lakes, by the act of Feb. 26, 1845, (5 U. S. Stat. at Large, 726,) did not take away the concurrent remedy which existed at

common law, and which is to be sought in the jurisprudence of the states, and usually in the state courts. The Globe, 421.

As a general, if not universal rule, in order to bind a defendant, or to confer any rights upon a plaintiff, by force of judgment, in a personal action, the former must be served with notice of the institution of the suit, so that he may have an opportunity to appear and defend. Ib.

But a proceeding in rem forms an exception to the general rule, and binds the res in the absence of any personal notice to the party interested. Ib.

A foreign vessel was attached by a proceeding in rem under a law of Ohio in a court of that state, for repairs made and supplies furnished, and sold upon a judgment duly recovered in pursuance to such attachment. Held, that the judgment was conclusive upon the transfer and disposition of the vessel in whatever place she might be found, and upon the title to her, by whomsoever it might be questioned, and whether involved directly or collaterally. 1b.

Held also, that this was especially so, where the owner of the vessel at the time appeared in the suit in the Ohio court, and contested the proceedings throughout. Ib.

The case of The Barque Chusan, (2 Story, 455,) commented on and explained. Ib.

Judgment and satisfaction, 102. Juries, have they a right to decide

the law in criminal cases, 1, 116. Juries in criminal cases on the continent, 351.

Jurisdiction, 99, 102, 277, 306, 404,

517.

Concurrent of State and Federal

court, 421. Jurisdiction of U. S. Courts, 137.

The 11th section of the Judiciary Act (1789) applies to the courts of the United States sitting in admiralty, as well as when sitting in equity and common law. Wilson v. Pierce,

137.

The libellant brought his libel in personam against the respondent and joined other parties as trustees. Process of foreign attachment issued, according to the prayer of the libel, against the respondent aud supposed trustees. The marshal returned, as

to the defendant, non est inventus, and that he had attached his goods, effects and credits, in the hands of the trustees. The respondent, by his proctor, pleaded specially to the jurisdiction of the court, that the defendant was a citizen of another State, and then domiciliated therein; and was not found within that district at the time of serving the writ; Held, that it was a civil suit, against an inhabitant of the United States, commenced by original process, and, as such, within the prohibition of the 11th section of the Judiciary Act. Ib.

The case of Clark v. New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. (1 Story, 531,) considered. Ib.

Jurors, 110, 172, 421.

Jury and court, province of, 94. Justification. (See LIBEL AND SLANDER.)

K.

Kaine's Case, 232, 288.

L.

Landlord and Tenant, 42, 43, 169,

222, 268, 518, 682.

In a complaint brought under the statute of 1847, ch. 267, §§ 1 & 2, to recover possession of premises occupied by the defendant as tenant of the complainants under a written lease, on the ground that the lease had been determined by a notice to quit, the tenant objected that the complainants could not jointly maintain the complaint, because they owned different portions of the de. mised premises in severalty and not in common; but it was held, that the tenant was estopped by the lease from taking the objection; and that the complainants, as lessors, by the express terms of the statute, were authorized to maintain the complaint in their joint names. Oakes v. Munroe, 268.

The right to maintain this summa ry process for the recovery of premises, held under a written lease for the non-payment of rent, depends entirely upon the statute, and whoever would enforce it, must strictly follow the provisions of the statute. Ib.

The provision of the statute, that,

for the non-payment of rent, a lease may be determined by giving in writ ing "fourteen days' notice to quit," is not satisfied by a notice to quit, &c. "forthwith; and no complaint under the statute can be maintained upon such notice. lb.

In a tenancy at will, where the rent is payable monthly, in order to determine the tenancy, a month's notice must be given to quit at the expiration of a month from the day when the rent is payable. Prescott v. Elms, 497.

Unless a month's notice is given to quit at the expiration of a month from the day when the rent is payable, the notice is insufficient. Ib. Larceny, 42, 404.

Law books published in U. S. in 1852, 657.

Law reform in England, 284, 594.
Law reform in Maine, 49.

Leading cases, notes on, 264, 361, 510.

Lease, 42, 43, 169, 405, 518. Lease of real estate, no implied warranty therein, 155.

There is no implied covenant that premises leased for a dwelling-house

are

in a habitable condition. A clause in a lease, stating that the lessor shall not be called on for repairs, "the house now being in perfect order," is not a special warranty against a stench, which renders the house uninhabitable. Foster v. Peyser.

Leases, restrictions upon in N. Y.
Constitution, 281.
Legislature, authority of, 331.
Lex loci contractus, 642.
Libel, 40, 94, 108.

Publication, 108.
License law, 104, 410.
License affecting real estate, 219, 328.
Lien, 336, 404, 408, 409, 578.
Liens, maritime, 421, 555, 578.

Order of satisfaction, 421.

The rule in respect to maritime liens against a vessel for supplies and materials furnished to her master at a foreign port, is, that the party first instituting legal proceedings for the purpose of enforcing his claim against the vessel, is entitled to satisfaction out of the proceeds of her sale. The Globe, 421.

The true meaning of maritime lien is, that it renders the property liable to the claim without a previous

judgment or decree of the court sequestering or condemning it, or establishing the demand, as at common law, and the action in rem carries it into effect. Ib.

The appropriation of the property to that end becomes absolute and exclusive on suit brought, unless superseded by some pledge or lien of paramount order. lb.

The first action by which the property is seized is entitled to hold it as against all other claims of no higher character. Ib.

The lien, so termed, is, in reality, only a privilege to arrest the vessel for the demand, which, of itself, constitutes no incumbrance on the vessel and becomes such only by virtue of an actual attachment of the same. Ib.

G. filed a libel in rem in the admiralty of New York, under the act of February 26, 1845, (5 U. S. Stat. at Large, 726,) against a vessel, to recover for supplies and materials furnished to her in New York, as a foreign vessel, owned in Michigan. Before the filing of the libel, she had been sold in Ohio upon a judgment recovered in a state court, in Ohio, for supplies and materials furnished to her by C. subsequently to the time when G. furnished his supplies and materials. The Ohio judg. ment was recovered in a proceeding in rem against the vessel by attachment under a law of Ohio, she being then also a foreign vessel, owned in Michigan. Held, that the priority of time in the furnishing of the supplies and materials by G. gave him no paramount lien on the vessel over the lien of C. Ib.

Limitations, statute of, 43, 173, 222, 283, 333.

Liquor law, the New Hampshire,

481.

Liquor law, complaints under, 501. Liquor law, the Maine, 189, 193.

It is competent for the State, by legislative enactment, operating prospectively, to determine that articles, injurious to public health or morals, shall not constitute property. Preston, et al. v. Drew.

The act of 1851, "for the suppression of drinking-houses and tipplingshops," though it provides for the seizure and forfeiture of such liquors when designed for sale, does not en

act that no property can be acquired in them, when not designed for unlawful sale; but on the contrary, recognises them as subjects of property, when kept for certain purposes. Ib

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The prohibition to sell such liquors does not prevent the acquisition of property on them, or the transport of them through the State, when not designed for unlawful sale. lb.

To obtain a forfeiture of intoxicating or spirituous liquors under the act for the suppression of drinkinghouses and tippling-shops," it is necessary to be distinctly averred in the complaint, and proved on the trial, that the liquors were intended for sale in the city or town, in which they were kept or deposited, and by some person not authorized to sell the same in such city or town, under the provision of the act. The State v. Certain spirituous and intoxicating Liquors; Robinson, claimant, 193.

It is not, however, necessary to aver or prove that they were intended for sale in the shop or other building wherein they were kept or deposited Ib.

The requirement of the Constitution in reference to search-warrants, that "A special designation of the place to be searched "shall be made, is not answered by words, which, if used in a conveyance, would not convey it, and which would not confine the search to one building or place. Ib.

Under that constitutional provision, an article to be searched for may in the warrant be described simply by its generic name, if it be destitute of any peculiar and known marks or qualities, by which, in the description, it can be distinguished from other articles of the same general name. Ib.

Thus, a warrant for the search of "spirituous or intoxicating liquors," will not be considered unauthorized, for the want of sufficient designation of the thing searched for. Ib.

The officer's return, which omits to state how long the liquors had been advertised, or that the notice posted contained the number or any description of the packages, is too defective to authorize a decree or forfeiture based upon it. Ib.

Legal proof that the liquors were

kept for sale by the owner or keeper of them, is an essential prerequisite to a decree of forfeiture, (where a criminal appears.) and to the imposition of a fine. Neither the affidavit contained in the complaint, nor the recitals in the warrant, nor the officer's return, can be taken as evidence upon that point. lb.

When the complaint names no person as the owner, keeper or claimant of the liquors, the swearing of the jury in the form as of a criminal trial, is irregular. The finding that the defendant is guilty, would be merely void, there being no issue upon which it could rest. Ib.

A complaint alleging that spirituous, &c. liquors are kept and intended for sale, and which does not allege where they were intended to be sold, was held insufficient. Commonwealth v. Certain intoxicating Liquors; Dean, Claimant.

List of law books published in 1852. Long Island, an arm of the sea, 404. Lotteries, 160.

Lowell, construction of ordnances of, 173.

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Married women, 99, 171, 333, 521. Master and servant, 39, 198.

New promise, 171. New trial, 110.

New York aldermen, discharge of
offenders by, 349.
Contempt by, 643.
NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

Rawle on Covenants for Title, 51; Blatchford's Statutes of New York, 52; Washburn's Digest, Vol. II. 53; Synoptical Index to United States Laws and Treaties, 53; United States Digest, Vol. IV. 53; Digest_of Massachusetts Militia Laws, 55; Roelker's, Cushing's Manual, (in German,) 55; Kent's Commentaries, (7th ed) 116; Waterman's Eden on Injunctions, 118; Barbour's Criminal Law, (2d ed.) 118; Gordon's Digest, (4th ed) 119; Eaton's Chipman on Contracts, 176; Blatchford's Reports, Vol. I. 237; Wharton's Criminal Law, (2d ed.) 238; Massachusetts General Laws for 1852, Dutton & Wentworth's edition, 239; Supplement to Minot's Digest, 239; Letter of E. Bellinger, J., 295; Cushing's Reports, Vol. VI. 297; Desor v. Davis, 298; English Law and Equity Reports, 298; Sedgwick on Damages, (2d ed.) 352; Mittermaier's Criminal Procedure, 353; English Chancery Reports, Vol. XXXI.; Walker's Theory of the Common Law, 417; Greenleaf's Reports, (by Bennett,) 419; Cooper's Justinian, 419; Robinson's Reports, 538; Revised Statutes of New York, 538; Bishop on Divorce, 539; Harrison's Digest, Vol. III. (Am. edition,) 594; Flanders on Maritime Law, 596; Greenleaf on Evidence, (6th ed.) 597;

Memoranda, when witness may use, Taylor's Law of Landlord and Ten

95, 337.

Merger, 101.
Mill-owners, 104.

Mistakes, mutual, not corrected, 405.
Mistakes, when corrected, 406.
Mortgage, 95, 104, 164, 284, 514,
517, 520, 641, 642.
Foreclosure, 164, 169, 406, 515.
Redemption, 104.
Murder, 115, 405.

N.

Naas v. Scott, 235.
Negligence, 277, 407.
New publications received, 55, 119,
240, 298, 354, 419.

New Practice Act. Construction, 515. (See DECISIONS UNDER NEW PRACTICE ACT.)

ant, 597; Spooner on Trial by Jury, 597; United States Digest, (annual,) Vol. V. 650; Curwen's Statutes of Ohio, 703; Law's United States Courts, 702.

Notice, 43, 327, 335.

Notice, poor debtors' oath, 43.
Notice to quit, 222, 268, 497.
Nuisance, 169, 223.

0.

OBITUARY NOTICES.

Benjamin Rand, 56; George Crabb, 177; David Graham, 178; Lewis H. Sandford, 299; Henry Holton Fuller, 354; William Porter, 658; Horace Binney Wallace, 659.

The evasion of duty or delay in a public officer to discharge his duty,

when the reason for delay is an
illegal one, is equivalent to refusal
of duty. People v. Whittemore, 213.
If an officer in the execution of a
duty commits an error of judgment,
and the act done be not against law,
and within the authority and power
conferred, it is on general principles
valid and binding until reversed by
some competent reversing tribunal.
Hancock v. McKinney, 68.

The construction of their powers
and of the laws which conferred
them, adopted and acted upon by the
authorities of the former government
of the country, must be respected
until it be shown that they have
clearly transcended their powers, or
have acted manifestly in contraven-
tion of law. Ib.
Officer, 68.

Official records and signatures, 172.

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Pauper, 108, 222.
Payment, 283, 513.

Application of, 278, 331, 578.
In specific articles, 403.
Under mistake, 520.
Patteson, retirement of Mr. Justice, 46.
Pleading, 94, 97, 103, 159, 166, 331,
397, 409, 520, 642.
Plundering, 35.

Poor debtor's oath, 43.
Power of attorney.
Practice, 97, 104, 108, 110, 164, 170,
172, 174, 333, 337, 403, 519.
Practice Acts of Massachusetts, of
1851 and 1852, 112. (See DE-
CISIONS, &c.)

Presumption, 220, 277, 282, 519.
Principal and agent, 108, 169, 278,

281.

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Courts of admiralty deal with
claims by seamen for compensation
for marine services in the nature
of wages, in a manner different
from that in which courts of com-
mon law treat ordinary transactions.
Bark Rajah, 208.

Receipts or releases given by sea-
men, even with all the solemnity of
sealed instruments, will have no ef
fect beyond the actual consideration
fairly paid. Ib.
Receipt, 330.

Receiptor, liability of, 103.
Receiver, 165, 330.

Records, admissibility of, 172.
Referees, 334.
Release, 203.

Removal of action from State Court,
what is entry of appearance to
U. S., 97.

Replevin, 336, 519, 642.
Representations, 155.
ANCE)
Retrospective, statute, 39.
Revenue law, 149.

(See INSUR-

The Tariff Act of 30th August,
1842, explained by the Act of 3d of
March, 1851, provides, that the value
of the article upon which the duty is
to be charged shall be ascertained in
a certain manner, and that "to such
value or price shall be added all costs
and charges except insurance, and
including in every case a charge for

commissions at the usual rates."
Held,

(1st.) That by the proper construc-
tion of this clause of the act, a com-
mission should, in all cases, be added
to the invoice value, although in fact
no commission is paid, and although
it is not customary for the importers
of the article in question to pay
any commission. Norcross v. Greely,
149.

(2d.) That where the rate of the
commission charged and added by
the collector, is that prescribed by
the Secretary of the Treasury as the
usual one, that it is incumbent upon
the merchant to show that it is higher
than the rate usually paid, when any
commission is paid. Ib.

The act of 26th of February, 1845,
requires, that no action shall "be

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