and took possession of " premises then in the plaintiff's possession, “and has since unlawfully kept and detained the possession thereof from him." This remedy only lies against a tenant who holds over after the expiration of his term, or against one who obtains or holds possession by, from, under, or by collusion with such tenant. Russell v. Desplous, 25 Ala. 514. See also Russell v. Desplous, 29 Ala. 308.

When a tenant holds over after the expiration of his lease, although it was for more than a year, and by parol, a warrant for a forcible detainer will lie against him and a previous notice to quit is not necessary. Harrison v. Marshall, 4 (Ky.) Bibb, 524.

Forfeiture of Lease.-A tenant disclaiming to hold under his landlord, and refusing to pay rent, is not entitled to notice to quit, but is instantly liable to a warrant of forcible detainer. Bates v. Austin, 2 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 270.

Where a tenant claims to hold adversely to his landlord it is evidence of refusal to give up the premises, sufficient to justify an ejectment. Hoskins v. Helm, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 309.

Tenant at Will after Notice to Quit.— Rent, payable quarterly by A, a tenant at will, was in arrear, and the landlord, for that reason, gave him written notice to quit, and leased the premises to B for years. Held, that B might maintain an action, on the Rev. Stat. ch. 104, against A for possession of the premises, with out first making an entry or giving further notice to quit; although A had no notice that the landlord had leased the premises to B. Hildreth v. Conant, 10 Metc. (Mass.) 298.

1. Reed v. Hawley, 45 Ill. 40; Fogle v. Chaney, 12 B. Mon. (Ky.) 138; Bird v. Fannon, 3 Head (Tenn.), 12.

A held land as tenant of B, B assigned his interest to C, and C to D. A rented from D after he bought, and, by an arrangement with A, E entered on the land as tenant, and died there. E's son disclaimed D's title, Held, that he was liable to the process for forcible entry and detainer without notice to quit Goodlet v. Cleaveland, 12 B. Mon. (Ky.) 430. The Execution of a Bond for a Deed, by the owner of a tenement, to one who oc

cupies it under an oral lease, does not change the nature of the tenancy. And a deed by the owner to a third person will terminate such a tenancy, and entitle the purchaser to maintain a process for the recovery of the tenement, under the statutes respecting forcible entry and detainer, against the tenant or one holding under him, although in the bond the owner agreed that when a certain sum should have been paid thereon he would stop charging rent, but instead thereof charge interest upon the sum remaining unpaid; and although before the delivery of the deed that sum had been paid or tendered. Rooney v. Gillespie 6 Allen, (Mass.), 74.

An action of unlawful detainer of demised premises will lie against a city. Rains . Oshkosh, 14 Wis. 372.

Sub-tenant Not Made a Party.—A subtenant who is not a party to a judgment of forcible entry and detainer against the tenant cannot, under the Illinois statute, making him expressly liable to the action, be put out of his possession under the writ, unless he entered pendente lite." Leindecker v. Waldron, 52 Ill. 283.

Executor of Deceased Person.-The executor of a deceased person, who succeeds to the possession of leased premises held by the deceased at the time of his death but makes default in the payment of rent, is not within the provisions of § 1661 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and a summary action for an unlawful detainer as defined by that section cannot be brought against him. Martel v. Meehan, 63 Cal. 47.

One Who Withholds Possession after Delivery of Master's Deed.—When a remedy by an action of forcible entry and detainer is sought under the second clause of the act of 1861, it is not restricted to the nominal party against whom the decree was rendered, but may be employed against any one who, even after the expiration of the time of redemption from the sale under the decree, and after the execution and delivery of the master's deed to the purchaser, by collusion with the defendant in the decree, obtains and holds the possession of the premises without the knowledge or consent of the purchaser. Jackson v. Warren, 32 Ill.

331.

1. Mallory . Hananer Oil Works, 81 S. W. Rep. (Tenn ) 396; Petty v. Malier, 15 B. Mon. (Ky.) 591; Crane v. Dod, 2 N. J. L. (1 Pen.) 340; Kilburn 7. Ritchie, 2 Cal. 145; Gladwin v. Stebbins, 2 Cal. 103. But see Warren v. Kelly, 17 Tex. 544; Thorn 7. Reed, I Ark. 480.

2. A Tenancy from Month to Month can only be determined by a month's notice; and forcible detainer does not lie until the end of the month. Seem v. McTees, 24 Ill. 192; Prickett v. Ritter, 16 Ill. 96. Stipulation in Lease for Continuance of Possession after Expiration of Term.When a written lease contains a stipulation, that the lessee may, after the expiration of the term, continue to occupy by month," but does not bind him to do so, each party has an equal right, after the expiration of the term, to put an end to the tenancy by the month, by giving reasonable notice, and in the absence of statutory regulations, if a lease contains no provision as to the notice necessary to put an end to the tenancy, reasonable and sufficient notice is "the interval between the times of payment of rent, or the length of time by which the letting was first measured;" and when the tenancy is by the month, a month's notice must be given. McDevitt v. Lambert, 80 Ala. 536.

Party Holding under a Grantor.-An action of forcible detainer lies against a party in possession of land under the grantor in a deed of trust, by the purchaser at the trustee's sale, and a demand of possession upon such occupant will be sufficient. Rice v. Brown, 77 Ill. 549.

3. Martin v. Splivalo, 56 Cal. 128; King v. Connolly, 51 Cal. 181; Wheeler v. Wood, 25 Me. 287.

In an action under the "forcible entry and detainer act," to recover possession of land against the defendant who has originally entered under an executory contract of purchase, and who failed to pay the purchase money, it having been stipulated that on such failure defendant should consider himself as a tenant at will, a previous notice to quit is necessary in order to sustain the action. nor v. Haggard, 18 Mich. 72.

Ray

Sale of Leased Premises.-A landlord

terminates a lease at will by selling and conveying the leased premises, and the tenant is thenceforth a tenant at sufferance, and liable to the grantee, without notice to quit, in the process provided by Rev. Stat. ch. 104, § 4. Benedict v. Morse, 10 Metc. (Mass.) 223.

Waiver of Right to Notice.-A tenant at will waives his right to a notice to quit by acts constituting a declaimer of the relationship of landlord and tenant. Simpson v. Applegate (Cal.), 17 Pac. Rep. 237.

Holding Over after Forfeiture of Contract of Sale.-The summary proceedings under Mich. Comp. Laws, chap. 211,-to dispossess one who holds contrary to the covenants of an executory contract,-is not vailable where there are no covenants regulating possession. So held where a contract of sale provided that in case of default in payment, the vendor should be discharged from all obligations, and all payments made be forfeited as stipulated damages, without further notice. In such case the purchaser was a tenant at will, and entitled to three months' notice to quit. Ranson v. Babcock, 40 Mich. 330.

A Tenant at Sufferance is not by Rev. Stat. ch. 60, § 26, entitled to notice to quit; and if he hold possession unlawfully by force, is immediately liable to the process prescribed by Rev. Stat. ch. 104, § 4. Kinsley v. Ames, 2 Metc. (Mass.) 29; Hollis v. Pool, 3 Metc. (Mass.) 350.

4. Johnson v. Hargrove, 81 Va. 218.

To create a forfeiture so as to support, under the Act of 1865, an action of forcible detainer, for non-payment of rent, four things must occur there must be a default in paying the rent, a demand of the same, and ten days' notice to quit, and a failure to pay the rent before the expiration of the ten days' notice. Cone v. Woodward, 65 Ill. 477.

A tenant disclaiming to hold under his landlord forfeits his term, and in such case a notice to quit is not a condition precedent to bringing an action of unlawful detainer. Ladd v. Riggle, 6 Heisk. (Tenn.) 620.

Where the occupant of land had held the same under a written lease from the owner for the term of one year, and has

Demand. A notice to remove from and deliver up possession of a building on certain premises is not a sufficient demand under Code Civ. Proc. Cal., § 1160, subd. 2, providing every person is guilty of a forcible detainer who in the night-time unlawfully enters on real property, and who, after demand made for the surrender thereof, for the period of five days, refuses to surrender the same to such former occupant;" and until such demand, no right of action accrues. Tivnen v. Monahan (Cal.), 18 Pac. Rep. 144.

3. Time of Service.—In Alabama, the statutory notice, or demand in writing, which is necessary to the maintenance of an action of unlawful detainer (Code, § 3697). is distinct from the notice which, in case of a tenancy by the month, is necessary to put an end to the tenancy and terminate the defendant's rightful possession; and this statutory notice cannot be given while the defendant is in rightful possession. McDevitt v. Lambert, 80 Ala. 536.

In California, by the terms of an award between a landlord and his tenant, the tenant was to quit the premises on the 9th. The notice to quit necessary to sustain the action was given on the 3d, and the action was commenced on the roth. Held, that under the award the plaintiff had no right to give notice to quit until thr 10th, and then by the forcible entry act the defendant had six days in which to remove; so the suit was premature. Ray v. Armstrong, 4 Cal. 208.

An action for unlawful detainer cannot be maintained against a tenant at will without first terminating the tenancy by giving at least thirty days' notice in writing to quit, and afterwards giving three days' notice in writing to surrender the possession. Martin v. Splivalo, 56 Cal. 128; King v. Connolly, 51 Cal. 181.

In Illinois, the demand in writing for possession required to be made upon a tenant to authorize an action of forcible detainer against him, under the act of 1845, should be made after the determination of the time for which the premises were let. A demand made before that time will not avail. Doran v. Gillespie, 53 Ill. 366.

In Iowa, an action for forcible entry and detainer is maintainable only after a three days' notice. Held, that an unnecessary thirty days' notice should be deemed to satisfy the statute. Shuver v. Klinkenberg, 67 Iowa, 544.

In Kansas, when a tenant repudiated his lease, held, that he could not claim a right to a new notice to quit, because the landlord did not bring forcible detainer for a year after his first notice. Douglas v. Anderson, 32 Kan. 350.

Where, prior to a notice to terminate a tenancy for non-payment of rent, defendant had claimed that he was not plaintiff's tenant, held, that the fact that the statutory ten days given defendant in which to leave had not expired when another notice was served, as the foundation for forcible detainer, did not invalidate the second notice. Douglas v. Parker, 32 Kan. 593.

In Maine, before the process of forcible entry and detainer is instituted, thirty days' notice to quit should be given after the termination of a tenancy at will. Dutton v. Colby, 35 Me. 505.

In Michigan, the statute requires that a landlord should demand possession of premises in writing from his tenant at least twenty days before summary proceedings under its provision to recover the possession. Held, that a demand requiring the tenant to quit the premises in ten days, but which was served twenty days before proceedings instituted, was sufficient. Chamberlain v. Brown, 2 Dougl. (Mich.) 120, note.

In Missouri, a person in possession of land under a contract to purchase, who received notice to quit on the same day, but before, the summons was served on him, is not guilty of an unlawful detainer in holding over. Young v. Ingle, 14 Mo.. 426.