which constitutes a default by the terms of the mortgage.1 396; Huxton v. Bishop, 3 Wend. (N. Y.) 13; Watkins v. Crouch, 5 Leigh (Va.), 522; Rumboil v. Ball, 10 Mod. 38. And it is not necessary to make a demand before suit, even where the note is payable on demand in a particular place; in such case, however, it may be shown in defence that the party was ready at the appointed place to make payment, in which case, if he brings the money into court he will be relieved from interest and costs. Carley v. Vance, 17 Mass. 389; Green v. Goings, 7 Barb. (N. Y.) 652, 655; Caldwell v. Cassidy, 8 Cow. (N. Y.) 271; Place v. Union Express Co., 2 Hilt. (N. Y.) 19, 31; Gay v. Paine, 5 How. (N. Y.) Pr. 108; Walcott v. Van Santvoord, 17 Johns. (N. Y.) 248; s. c., 8 Am. Dec. 396; Foden v. Sharp, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 183; Locklin v. Moore, 5 Lans. (N. Y.) 308; Nazro v. Fuller, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 376; Hurton v. Bishop, 3 Wend. (N. Y.) 13; Fullerton v. Bank of United States, 26 U. S. (1 Pet.) 604: bk., 7 L. ed. 28; Bank of United States v. Smith, 24 U. S. (11 Wheat.) 171, bk. 6, L. Ed. 443: Fenton v. Goundry, 13 East. 459. When No Time of Payment is Specified, the debt is due immediately. Gillett v. Balcom. 6 Barb. (N. Y.) 170. See also Selleck v. French, 1 Conn. 32; Broth v. Brown, 103 Ind. 23; s. c., 1 West. Rep. 128; Green v. Brebilbis, I G. Greene (Iowa), 552; Francis v. Castleman, 4 Bibb (Ky.), 282; Taylor v. Knox, 1 Dana (Ky.), 391; s. c., 5 Dana (Ky.), 463; Goodloe v. Clay, 6 B. Mon. (Ky.) 236; Swett v. Hooper, 62 Me. 54; Jillson v. Hill, 70 Mass. (4 Gray) 316; Dodge v. Perkins, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 369; Weeks v. Hasty, 13 Mass. 218; Eaton v. Truesdeil, 40 Mich. 1, 6; Phill v. Phillips. 11 N. Y. 406, affirming 1 Duer (N. Y.), 369; People v. County of New York,5 Cow. (N. Y.) 331; Rensselaer Glass -factory v. Reid, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 587; Clark v. Barlow, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 183; Rhoads v. Reed, 89 Pa. St. 436; Heath v. Page, 63 Pa. St. 108; s. c., 3 Am. Rep. 533; Northern Pa. R. Co. v. Adams, 54 Pa. St. 94; Hummel v. Brown, 24 Pa. St. 313; Lessee Dilworth v. Sinderling, I Binn. (Pa.) 488; s. c., 2 Am. Dec. 469; Cheesborough v. Hunter, 1 Hill (S. C.), 400; Smetz v. Kennedy, Riley (S. C.), 218; Aikin v. Peay, 5 Strobh. (S. C.) 15; s. c., 53 Am. Dec. 684; Roberts v. Cocke, 28 Gratt. (Va.) 207; Young v. Godbe, 82 U. S. (15 Wall.) 562; bk. 21, L. ed. 250; Brewster v. Wakefield, 63 U. S. (22 How.) 118, 127: bk. 16, L. ed. 301; Sheehy v. Mendeville, 11 U. S. (7 Cr.) 208, 217; bk. 3, L. ed. 317; United States v. Gurney, 8 If U. S. (4 Cr.) 333; bk. 2, L. ed. 638; Rapelie v. Emory, U. S. (1 Dall.) 349; bk. 1, L. ed. 170; Farquhar 7. Morris, 7 T. R. 124; Bayley on Bills (5th Ed.), § 14, p. 59; Thompson on Bills, § 1, p. 32. 1. The insolvency of the mortgagor having put it out of his power to perform an agreement to secure the performance of which the mortgage had been given, a foreclosure was allowed before the expiration of the time for performance. Harding v. Mill, 34 Conn. 458. On the other hand, the non-payment of the debt will not authorize the foreclosure of a mortgage given as a security "in case any of the notes prove to be insolvent or worthless" when it was not shown that any of the notes were worthless or that the maker was insolvent. Fetrow v. Merrewether, 53 Ill. 275. A mortgage of personal property provided that the mortgagor should not suffer the property to be attached on mesne process. The property was attached, however, by the mortgagor's consent and procurement, but the attachment was held to be void, and that the mortgagor had no attachable interest in the property. It was nevertheless held to be a breach of this condition in the mortgage. Crocker v. Atwood, 144 Mass. 588. See the recent case of Trustee sof the Canandaigua Academy v. McKechnie et al., 90 N. Y. 618, as to what will constitute the happening of the event provided for in the mortgage for the maturing of the debt. A stipulation in the mortgage that the mortgagee would “not assign or dispose of the mortgage until his future advance, amounting to $4000, had actually been made," does not prevent the foreclosure for the sum actually advanced and due thereon, although not amounting to $4000. Baldwin v. Flag. 36 N. J. Eq. 48. Where the mortgage contained no provision for foreclosure upon non-payment of interest, although given for the security of the payment of the note with interest, a foreclosure cannot be had until the principal sum becomes due. Brodribb v. Tibbets, 58 Cal. 6. The failure of mortgagor to pay taxes, held, such default as to justify the advertisement of the property for sale. Building Asso. No. 1 of Baltimore City v. Kratz, 55 Md. 394. Where a mortgage had been given to secure a bond for support of husband and wife during their lives, the breach necessary to be shown in the foreclosure proceeding need not be shown to have occurred during the lifetime of the husband, the time for the payment of the mortgage be extended,1 of course who died first; nor is it necessary to the suit to show that the widow had made any claim for her support on the administrator of deceased mortgagor before the suit was commenced. Plummer, Adm'r, v. Doughty, 78 Me. 341. 1. See Reed v. Home Saving Bank, 127 Mass. 295; Burt v. Saxton, 1 Hun (N. Y.), 551; Sharpe v. Arnott, 51 Cal. 188; Pendleton v. Rowe, 34 Cal. 149; Maher v. Lanfrom, 86 Ill. 513: Flynn v. Mudd, 27 Ill. 323; Redman v. Deputy, 26 Ind. 338; Lee 7. West Jersey Land Co., 29 N. J. Eq. (2 Stew.) 377; Tompkins v. Tompkins, 21 N. J. Eq. (6 C. E. Gr.) 338; Massaker v. Mackerley, 9 N. J. Eq. (1 Stockt.) 440; Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Bonnell, 35 Ohio St. 365; Albert v. Grosvenor Investment Co., L. R. 3 Q. B. 122. Consideration for Extension.-An agreement for an extension of time, based upon a valid consideration, suspends the right to foreclose until the expiration of such time. Maher v. Lanfrom, 86 Ill. 513; Flynn v. Mudd, 27 Il 332; Warner v. Campbell, 26 Ill. 282; Trayser v. Trustees of Asbury University, 39 Ind. 556, 567; Carlton v. Tardy, 28 Ind. 452; Calbin v. Wiggam, 27 Ind. 489; Redman v. Deputy, 26 Ind. 338; Loomis v. Donnolan, 17 Ind. 198; Dickerson v. Board, etc., 6 Ind. 128; s. c., 63 Am. Dec. 373; Harbert v. Dumont, 3 Ind. 346; Reed v. Home Sav. Bank, 127 Mass. 295; Fowler v. Brooks, 13 N. H. 240 Bailey v. Adams, 10 N. H. 162; Tompkins v. Tompkins, 21 N. J. Eq. (6 C. E. Gr.) 338; Massaker v. Mackerley, 9 N. J. Eq. (1 Stockt.) 440; Newsam v. Finch, 25 Barb. (N. Y.) 175; Prentice v. Fellows, 3 Den. (N. Y.) 512; Burt v. Saxton, 1 Hun (N. Y.). 551; Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Bonnell, 35 Ohio St. 365; McComb v. Kittridge, 14 Ohio, 348; Austin v. Dorwin, 20 Vt. 38; Creath's Admr. v. Sims, 46 U. S. (5 How.) 192; bk. 12, L. ed. III. In re Betts, 4 Dill. C.C. 93: Albert v. Grosvenor Investment Co., L. R. 3 Q. B. 123. An agreement for extension without consideration is void. See Sharpe v. Arnott, 51 Cal. 188; Pendleton v. Rowe, 34 Cal. 149; Massaker v. Mackerley, 9 N. J. Eq. (1 Stock.) 440; Trayser v. Trustees of Asbury University, 39 Ind. 556, 567. Payment of Interest in Advance is a sufficient consideration. Maher . Lanfrom, 86 I. 513, 517; Flynn 7. Mudd, 27 Ill. 323; Narner v. Campbell, 26 Ill. 282; Redman 7. Deputy, 26 Ind. 338. But prompt payment of interest of demand is not. Pendleton v. Rowe, 34 Cal. 149. Giving of Additional Security is sufficient consideration. Trayser v. Trustees of Asbury University, 38 Ind. 556, 567. Payment on Note Before Due is a sufficient consideration. Newsan v. Finch, 25 Barb. (N. Y.) 175. Agreement with Third Person respecting the equity of redemption is a sufficient consideration where such third person acts upon that agreement. See Loomis v. Donovan, 17 Ind. 198; Fellows v. Prentiss, 3 Den. (N. Y.) 512; s. c., 45 Am. Dec. 484: Charlton v. Tardy, 28 Ind. 452; Galvin v. Wiggin, 27 Ind. 489: Redman v. Deputy, 26 Ind. 338; Dickerson v. Board of Commissioners of Ripley Co., 6 Ind. 128; s. c., 63 Am., Dec. 373: Harbert v. Dumont, 3 Ind. 346; Fowler v. Brooks, 13 N. H. 240; Bailey v. Adams, 10 N. H. 162; McComb v. Kittridge, 14 Ohio, 348; Austin v. Dorwin, 21 Vt. 38; Creath's Admr. v. Sims, 46 U. S. (5 How.) 192; bk. 12, L. ed. 111; Reed v. Home Sav. Bank, 127 Mass. 295. Extension of Time by Parol is valid when founded on sufficient consideration. See Dodge v. Crandall, 30 N. Y. 295; Dearborn v. Cross, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 48; Townsend v. Empire Stone-dressing Co.. 6 Duer (N.Y.), 208; Fish v. Hayward, 28 Hun (N. Y.), 456; Lattimore v. Harsen, 14 Johns. (N. Y.) 430; Flemming v. Gilbert, 3 Johns. (N.Y.) 528; Keating v. Price, 2 Johns. Cas. (N. Y.) 22; De la Croix v. Bulkley, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 71; Tomp. kins v. Tompkins, 21 N. J. Eq. (6 C. È. Gr.) 338; Flynn v. Mudd, 27 Ill. 323; Stevens v. Cooper, I Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 429; s. c., 7 Am. Dec. 652; Van Houten v. McCarty, 4 N. J. Eq. (3 H. W. Gr.) 141, King v. Morford, 1 N. J. Eq. (í Saxt.) 274, 280; Cox v. Bennett, 13 N. J. L. (1 J. S. Gr.) 165, 171. In re Betts, 4 Dill. C. C. 93; s. c., 7 Rep. 225. This is true notwithstanding the general rule that it is not permissible to vary, supply, or contradict the terms of a written instrument by parol evidence, particularly where it is under seal. Stevens v. Cooper, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 425: S. c., 7 Am. Dec. 499; Hill v. Syracuse, B. & N. Y. R. Co, 73 N. Y. 35; Van Bokkelen v. Taylor, 62 N. Y. 185; Baker 7. Higgins, 21 N. Y. 379: Brewster v. Silence, 8 N. Y. 207, 213; Cork v. Eaton, 16 Barb. (N. Y.) 439; Taylor v. Baldwin, 10 Barb. (N. Y.) 586; Egleston v. Kinckerbacker, 6 Barb. (N. the mortgage cannot be foreclosed until the expiration of the extended time,1 unless made without consideration; in which case the agreement for extension may be disregarded and the foreclosure at once enforced.? Y.) 464; Sayre v. Peck, 1 Barb. (N. Y.) 464, Patterson v. Hull, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 747, 754; Austin v Sawyer, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 41; Wright v. Taylor, I Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 226; Webb v. Rice, 6 Hill (N. Y.), 219; Hull. Adams, 1 Hill (N. Y.), 601; Meads v. Lansingh, 1 Hopk. Ch. (N. Y.) 124, 134; Bayard 7. Malcom, 1 Johns. (N. Y.) 453. 467; Mann v. Mann, 1 Johns. (N.Y.) 231; Parkhurst v. Van Portland, I Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 274; Crosier v. Aser, 7 Paige Ch. (N. Y.) 187; Jarvis v. Palmer, II Paige Ch. (N. Y.) 650; Loober v. Le Roy, 2 Sandf. (N. Y.) 202; Russell v. Kinney, I Sandf. Ch. (N. Y.) 38; Evans v. Wells, 22 Wend. (N. Y.) 323, 337; Lee Evans, 8 Cal 432; Beckley v. Munson, 22 Conn. 299; Mann v. Smyser, 76 Ill. 365; Harlow v. Boswell, 15 Ill. 56; Cincinnati, U. & F. W. R. R. Co. v. Pearce, 28 Ind. 502; Pilmer 7. State Bank, 16 Iowa. 321; Jack v. Naber, 15 Iowa, 450; Peters v. Davis, 29 Mo. 184; Reed v. Jones, 8 Wis. 272; Stevens v. Cooper, I Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 425: Webb & Rice, 6 Hill (N. Y.), 219; Evans v. Wells. 22 Wend. (N. Y.) 324, 339; Powell v. Monson & B. Mfg. Co., 3 Mason C. C. 358. 1. Looms v. Donavan, 17 Ind. 198; Frayser v. Trustees of Indiana University, 39 Ind. 556; Tompkins v. Tompkins, 21 N. J. Eq. 338. 2. Massaker v. Mackerley, I Stock. Eq. (N. J.) 440. The mortgagee may pursue all his remedies concurrently. He may sue at law and obtain judgment upon the debt secured by the mortgage, while at the same time he proceeds by bill in equity to foreclose the mortgage. Pettibone 7'. Stevens, 15 Conn. 29; Juchter v. Boehm, 63 Ga. 71; Andrews 7. Scotton, 2 Bland (Md.), 629; McCall v. Lenox, 9 S. & R. (Pa) 302; Ayres v. Wattson, 57 Pa. St. 360; Longworth v. Flagg, 10 Ohio, 300; Knetzer v. Bradstreet, i Greene (Iowa), 382; Downing 2. Palmateer, 1 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 64; Burtis v. Bradford, 122 Mass. 129; Thuber . Jewitt, 3 Mich. 295; Satterwhite v. Kennedy, 3 Strobh. (S. Car.) 457; Chapman v. Clough, 6 Vt. 123. The cost of the suit at law will become a part of the mortgage debt in the foreclosure proceeding. Pettibone v. Stevens, 15 Conn. 19. And, where the mortgagor is unsuccessful in a suit to restrain the mortgagee from foreclosing, and judg ment is rendered in favor of the defendant upon his answer, the amount of the debt will be ascertained, and the suit treated as one to foreclose, and the costs of the restraining suit made a lien upon the mortgaged property. Reimer v. Schlitz, 49 Wis. 273. Where the mortgage contained a covenant that mortgagor should "pay all expenses of collecting said debt, including attorneys' fees, and that said money shall be secured by this mortgage," the mortgagees having recovered judgment at law upon the mortgage debt, and had paid their attorneys for prosecuting the suit, it was held, on a bill filed by them to foreclose the mortgage, to reimburse them the amounts so paid their attorney, that the suit would be sustained for a reasonable amount, to be determined by the proofs adduced. L'Engle & Hartridge. Adm'rs 7. L'Engle. 22 Fla. 131. Where the mortgage provided that the mortgagee should not “institute any proceeding to foreclose" until the maker and indorser had been sued to insolvency, the right to take possession is postponed until the happening of this contingency, and the mortgagee cannot maintain ejectment before that time. Grandin v. Hurt, 80 Ala. 116. A mortgagee has the right to pay taxes on the land, or redeem the same from tax sale; and the amounts so paid are a valid claim against the mortgagor, and enforceable as a part of the mortgage debt; and whatever amount is due, including taxes, at time of foreclosure, constitutes an indivisible demand, and cannot be separated and enforced by separate suits. Johnson v. Payne, 11 Neb. 269. D. had mortgaged land in which W. owned the equity of redemption. W. deeded the land to S., and as a part of the trade agreed to pay a certain portion of the amount due on D.'s mortgage, and gave S. a mortgage on the land taken from S. in the trade, to secure this agreement. Subsequently S. quitclaimed the land, subject to D.'s mortgage, the grantee assuming the mortgage debt as a part of the purchase price. W. failed to pay D. what he had agreed to pay on D.'s mortgage, and it was held that S. was, in consequence of this failure, entitled to foreclose the mortgage given to him by W. Stuart 7. Warden, 42 Mich. 154. Where a mortgage is given to secure Where the entire debt may be treated as due upon any default in payment of interest,1 or other instalment at the election of the several debts falling due at different times, or a single debt due in instalments, the mortgage may be foreclosed when the first becomes due, and the court will control the surplus so as to protect the portions not due. Hatcher v. Chancery, 71 Ga. 689. A note, secured by mortgage, contained the following clause: Any interest remaining due and unpaid shall be added monthly to the principal, and bear interest at the same rate;" and the mortgage provided that, in case of default in payment of the principal sum, or interest thereon, or any part thereof, according to the terms of the note, the mortgagee might sell the premises in the manner prescribed by law, and out of proceeds of sale retain principal sum, with interest, costs, charges, and attorneys' fees; and a subsequent mortgage between the same parties provided that all arrearages of monthly interest then existing, or thereafter to accrue upon the prior note, shall bear interest from the date respectively at which they have accrued or shall accrue, at a higher rate than that expressed in the note. It was held that, construing the note and mortgage together, that on default of the monthly payment of interest the mortgagee might foreclose; and that an action of foreclosure was compliance with terms of mortgage as to sale; and that the clause giving right to sell in case of default refers to default in payment of interest, and not to a default in adding it, when unpaid, to the principal debt; this was the privilege of the mortgagee, not the right of the mortgagor. Brickell v. Batchelder, 62 Cal. 623. 1. Failure to Pay Interest. The parties may make the whole mortgage debt due upon the failure to perform a single condition; as, on failure to pay interest,-see McLean v. Pressley, 56 Ala. 211; Pope v. Durant, 26 Iowa, 133; Holden v. Gilbert, 7 Paige Ch. (N. Y.) 208; Hosie v. Gray, 71 Pa. St. 398;-and such condition will be enforced by the courts,-Richards v. Holmes, 59 U. S. (18 How.) 143; bk. 15, L. ed. 304. See Pope v. Durant, 26 Iowa, 233; Holden v. Gilbert, 7 Paige Ch. (N.Y.) 208. Effect of Such a Condition is not a penalty, but a provision for the earlier maturing of a debt on the happening of the contingency specified. Stillwell v. Adams, 29 Ark 340; Grattan v. Wiggins, 23 Cal. 16; Jones v. Lawrence, 18 Ga. 277; Morgenstern v. Klees, 30 Ill. 422; Taber 7. Cincinnati L. & C. R. Co., 15 Ind. 459; Hunt . Harding, II Ind. 245; Smart v. McKay, 16 Ind. 45. See Cecil v. Dynes, 2 Ind. 166; Hough v. Doyle, 3 Blackf. (Ind.) 300; Greenman v. Pattison, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 465: Andrews v. Jones, 3 Blackf. (Ind.) 440; Mobray v. Leckie, 42 Md. 474; Schooley v. Romain, 31 Md. 575; Salmon v. Clagett, 3 Bland Ch. (Md.) 125; Magruder v. Eggleston, 41 Miss. 284; Goodman v. Cincinnati & C. R. Co., 2 Disney (Ohio), 176; Baker v. Lehman, Wright (Ohio), 522; Richards v. Holmes, 59 U. S. (16 How.) 143; bk. 15, L. ed. 304. In the absence of a clause making the whole debt due on breach of a condition, the mortgage cannot be foreclosed for the whole amount, nor the entire mortgaged premises sold to satisfy the partial default. Mussina v. Bartlett, 8 Port. (Ala.) 284; Greenman v. Pattison, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 465; Adams v. Essex, I Bibb (Ky.), 149; s. c., 4 Am. Dec. 623; Caufman v. Sayre, 2 B. Mon. (Ky.) 202; Magruder v. Eggleston, 41 Miss. 284; James v. Fisk, 17 Miss. (9 Smed. & M.) 144, 153; s. c., 47 Am. Dec. 111; Suffern 2. Johnson, 1 Paige Ch. (N. Y.) 450; s.c., 19 Am. Dec. 440. 2. See Grattan v. Wiggins, 23 Cal. 16, 28; Jones v. Lawrence, 18 Ga. 277; Adams ข. Essex, 1 Bibb (Ky.), 149; s c.. 4 Am. Dec. 623; Caufman v. Sayre, 2 B. Mon. (Ky.) 202: West Branch Bank v. Chester, II Pa. St. 282; Richards v. Holmes, 59 U. S. (18 How.) 143; bk. 15, L. ed. 304; Stanhope v. Manners, 2 Eden, 197; Gladwyn v. Hitchman, 2 Vern. 135. Failure to Pay Instalment may be made a condition for the maturing of the whole debt, in which case a failure to pay an instalment works a forfeiture of the mortgage. Whitcher v. Webb, 44 Cal. 127; Ottawa Northern Plank Road Co. v. Murray, 15 Ill. 336; Noell v. Gaines, 68 Mo. 649; Beisel v. Artman, 10 Neb. 181; Ackerson v. Lodi Branch R. R. Co., 31 N. J. Eq. (4 Stew.) 42; Voorhis v. Murphy, 26 N. J. Eq. (11 C. E. Gr.) 434; McLean v. Pressley, 56 Ala. 211; Andrews v. Jones, 3 Blackf. (Ind.) 440; Indiana & I. C. R. Co. v. Sprague, 103 U. S. (13 Otto) 756; bk. 26. L. ed. 554. And in such case an action for foreclosure and sale of the premises may be commenced at once. See Rubens v. Prindle, 44 Barb. (N. Y.) 336; Dwight v. Webster, 32 Barb. (N. Y.) 47; s. c., 19 How. (N. Y.) Pr. 349: 10 Abb. (N. Y.) Pr. 128; Ferris v. Ferris, 28 Barb. (N. Y.) 29; s. c., 16 How. (N. Y.) Pr. 102; Grattan v. Wiggins, 23 Cal. 16; Morgenstern mortgagee or trustee, the whole debt is nevertheless not due until the election has been exercised;1 and a sale before such election could not be authorized, even by an act of the legislature.2 v. Klees, 30 Ill. 422; Ottawa Northern 1. See Macloon v. Allen 49 N. Y. 448; Rubens v. Prindle, 44 Barb. (N. Y.) 336; Ferris v. Ferris, 28 Barb. (N. Y.) 29. The Mortgagee is not Estopped to Exercise His Right of Election by the commencement of an action to foreclose prior to the expiration of the time limited for the payment of the money; or by the acceptance of an instalment of principal falling due before filing an amended supplemental complaint. See Odell v. Hoyt, 73 N. Y. 343; Malcolm v. Allen, 49 N. Y. 448; Lawson v. Barron, 18 Hun (N. Y.), 414 Waiver of Right of Election, respecting: Wilson v. Bird, 28 N. J. Eq. (1 Stew.) 153. Election that mortgage debt become due. See Harper v. Ely, 56 Ill. 179, 189; Randall v. Middleton, 26 N. J. Eq. (10 C. E. Gr.) 543; Malcolm v. Allen, 49 N. Y. 448. Notice of Election, it seems, need not be given. See Randall v. Middleton, 26 N. J. Eq. (10 C. E. Gr.) 543; Harper v. Ely, 56 Ill. 179, 189; Malcolm v. Allen, 49 N. Y. 448. Notice of elections, it seems, need not be given. See Hoodless v. Reid, 112 Ill. 105; Marston v. Brittenham, 76 Ill. 611; Princeton Loan & Trust Co. v. Munson, 60 Ill. 371, 375; Heath v. Hall, 60 Ill. 334; Harper v. Ely, 56 Ill. 179. Buchanan v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 96 Ind. 510, 520; English v. Carney, 25 Mich. 178, 184; Young v. McLean, 63 N. C. 576; Hunt v. Keech, 3 Abb. (N. Y.) Pr. 204; Howard v. Farley, 3 Robt. (N. Y.) 599, 602. Compare Dean v. Applegarth, 65 Cal. 391; Malcolm v. Smith, 49 Wis. 200, 215, 217; Marine Bank v. International Bank, 9 Wis. 57, 68; Basse v. Gallegger, 7 Wis. 442, 446; s. c., 76 Am. Dec. 225; Hall v. Delaplaine, 5 Wis. 206; s. c., 68 Am. Dec. 57. Such notice, given by a duly authorized agent or attorney, is sufficient. Rosseel v. Jarvis, 15 Wis. 571. Who May Exercise Option.-Such option may be exercised by the mortgagee,-See Heath v. Hall, 60 Ill. 344; Princeton Loan & Trust Co. v. Munson, 60 Ill. 171; Harper v. Ely, 58 Ill. 179;-his assignee, -Heath v. Hall, 60 Ill. 344, 349), or any person for whose benefit the provision is inserted, Mallory v. West Shore & H. R. R. Co., 35 N. Y. Super.Ct. (3 J. & S.)174; Fellows v. Gilman, 4 Wend. (N. Y.) 414. 8 C. of L-13 But the right to exercise such option is an indivisible condition, and cannot be exercised by an assignee in part only of the debt. See Marine Bank of Buffalo v. International Bank, 9 Wis. 57. Relieving from Forfeiture.-The court has no power to relieve from forfeiture,see Savannah & M. R. Co. v. Lancaster, 62 Ala. 555; Mowbry v. Leckie, 42 Md. 474; Schooley v. Romain, 31 Md. 557. 574; Magruder v. Eggleston, 41 Miss. 284; Bennett 7. Stevenson, 53 N. Y. 508; Ferris v. Ferris, 28 Barb. (N. Y.) 29, 33; Hale v. Gouverneur, 4 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 207; O'Connor v. Shipman, 48 How. (N. Y.) Pr. 126; Noyes v. Clark, 7 Paige Ch. (N. Y.) 179; s. c., 32 Am. Dec. 620; Gowlett v. Hanforth, 2 W. Bl. 958; Steel v. Bradfield, 4 Taunt. 227;— except possibly in cases of fraud,-see Noyes v. Clark, 7 Paige Ch. (N. Y.) 179; s. c., 32 Am. Dec. 720;-or a denial in good faith and upon reasonable grounds,. though the party is liable to pay the interest in arear, or claim that he has paid it even though in error as to such liability, see Wilcox v. Allen, 36 Mich. 160. However, where the only questions are as to a proper tender at the prescribed time, though it must be determined upon the trial, see Bennett v. Stevenson, 53 N. Y. 508, 510; Asendorf v. Meyer, 2 Daly (N. Y.), 278; Lynch v. Cunningham, 6 Abb. (N. Y.)94; Thurston v. Marsh, 5 Abb. (N. Y.) Pr. 389; s. c., 14 How. (N. Y.) Pr. 572; Spring v. Fisk, 21 N. J. Eq. (6 C. E. Gr.) 175. 2. Randolph v. Middleton, 26 N. J. Eq. 543. The clause in this mortgage was as follows: "In case default shall be made in the payment of any halfyear's interest on any of said bonds at the time and in the manner in the coupon issued therewith provided, the said coupon having been presented for payment, and the payment of the interest specified therein having been demanded, and such default shall continue for the space or period of three months after the interest expressed in said coupon shall have become due, and from and after the coupon shall have been presented, and the payment thereof demanded as aforesaid; then and thereupon, the principal of all of the said bonds shall, at the election of the trustees, became immediately due and payable." Beasley, C. J., in the course of his opinion says: The principal moneys secured by the mortgage were not to fall due until the first day of 193 |