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making or materially altering1 or uttering, with intent to defraud,3 a note or other instrument in writing, which, if genuine, might be

had no authority to take the indorsement. The court said: "It is the essence of forgery that one signs the name of another to pass it off as the signature of that other. This cannot be when the party openly and on the face of the paper declares that he signs it for another.'

In Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 77 Mass. (11 Gray) 187, the prisoner made and delivered a note signed "Schouler, Baldwin & Co.," stating at the same time that he and Schouler composed the firm. There was no such partnership. It was held not to be forgery. The court say:

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As a general rule, to constitute forgery the writing must purport to be the writing of another party than the person making it. The mere false statement or implication of a fact, not having reference to the person by whom the instrument is executed, will not constitute the crime." This case is referred to approvingly in Commonwealth v. Foster, 114 Mass. 311; and the court there say: "The distinction is plainly drawn between one who assumes to bind another, either jointly with himself or by procuration, however groundless and false may be the pretence of authority so to do, and one who signs in such a manner that the instrument may purport to be the actual signature of another party having the same name. To the same effect is Mann v. People, 15 Hun (N. Y.), 155; State v. Wilson, 28 Minn. 52; s. c., 24 Alb. L. J. 57.

1. United States v. Cameron, 3 Dak. 132; State v. Wooderd, 20 Iowa, 541; State v. Maas, 37 La. An. 292; State v. Robinson, 16 N. J. L. (1 Harr.) 507; Mann v. People, 15 Hun (N. Y.), 155; People . Fitch, 1 Wend. (N. Y.) 198; s. c., 19 Am. Dec. 477; State v. Greenlee, I Dev. (N. C.) L. 523; State v. Gherkin, 7 Ired. (N. C.) L. 206; State v. Thornburg, 6 Ired. (N. C.) L. 79; s. c., 44 Am. Dec. 67; Com. v. Sankey, 22 Pa. St. 390; s. c., 60 Am. Dec. 91; State v. Rowe, 8 Rich. (S. C.) L. 20; State v. Floyd, 5 Strob. (S. C.) L. 58; s. c., 53 Am. Dec. 689; State v. Waters, 2 Tread. (S. C.) 669; Hill v. State, 1 Yerg. (Tenn.) 76; s. c., 24 Am. Dec. 441; State v. Phelps, II Vt. 116; s. c., 34 Am. Dec. 673; State v. McLeran, 1 Aik. (Vt.) 311; Reg. v. Blenkinsop, I Den. C. C. 276; Car. & K. 531: Rex V. Kinder, 2 East P. C. 855; Rex v. Treble, 2 Leach (4th ed.), 1040; s. c., 2 Taunt. 328; Russ. & Ry. 164; Rex v. Dawson, I Str. 19; s. c., 2 East P. C. 978; Rex v. Post, Russ. & Ry. 101.

2. United States v. Cameron, 3 Dak. 132; State v. Phelps, 11 Vt. 116; s. c., 34 Am. Dec. 672.

Where Several Drafts are Uttered as One Individual Act, the forgery of each is a separate offence. Barton v. State, 23 Wis. 587.

3. State v. Givens, 5 Ala. 747; Cohen v. People, 7 Colo. 274; s. c., 2 Denv. L. J. 136; Jackson v. Weisiger, 2 B. Mon. (Ky.) 214; State v. Maas, 37 La. An. 29; Gratton Bank v. Flanders, 4 N. H. 239, 242; People v. Peabody, 25 Wend. (N. Y.) 472; Com. v. Sankey, 22 Pa. St. 390; s. c., 60 Am. Dec. 91; Hill v. State, I Yerg. (Tenn.) 76; s. c., 24 Am. Dec. 441; State v. Odel, 3 Brev. (S. C.) 552; State v. Floyd, Strobh. (S. C.) L. 58; s. c., 53 Am. Dec. 689; Reg. v. Beard, 8 Car. & P. 143; Reg. v. Page, 8 Car. & P. 122; Reg. v. Parish, 8 Car. & P. 94; Rex v. Forbes, 7 Car. & P. 224; Reg. v. Wilson, 2 Car. & K. 527; I Den. C. C. 284; Blake v. Allen, Sir F. Moore, 619; Rex v. Whiley, Russ & Ry. 90.

4. Forgery of Artist's Signature to Picture. If a person knowingly sells, as an original, a copy of a picture, with the painter's name imitated upon it, and by means of the imitated name knowingly and fraudulently induces another to buy and pay for the picture as a genuine work of the artist, he may be indicted for a cheat at common law, by means of a false token; but he cannot be indicted for forging, or uttering the forged name of the painter, for the crime of forgery must be committed with some document in writing, and does not extend to the fraudulent imitation of a name put on a picture merely as a mark to identify it as a painter's work. Reg. v. Closs, Dears. & B. C. C. 460; s. c., 7 Cox C. C. 494; 27 L. J. M. C. 54: Jur. N. S. 1309.

5. Sufficiency to Effect Purpose Intended. -It is perfectly immaterial whether the counterfeited instrument be such as, if real, would be effectual to the purpose it intends. If there is only a resemblance sufficient to impose upon those to whom it is uttered or to the public generally, it is sufficient. Whether the fraud be effected on the party to whom an instrument is addressed, or whose writing is counterfeited, or upon some third person who takes it upon the credit it assumes, is perfectiy immaterial. 3 Chit. Cr. L. 462. But notwithstanding the validity of the instrument, if real, is immaterial, it must not appear on its face, so that no one of

of legal efficacy,1 or might be the foundation of a legal liability.2

common understanding would give it credit. Thus, it will not be a forgery to fabricate a will of land, as attested by only two witnesses. 2 East P. C. 953.

1. People v. Galloway, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 540, 542; People v. Fitch, 1 Wend. (N. Y.) 198; DeBow v. People, I Den. (N. Y.) 9; Com. v. Linton, 2 Va. Cas. 476; Rex v. McIntosh, 2 East P. C. 942; s. c. sub nom. Rex v. Teague, Russ. & Ry. 33, 2 East P. C. 969; Rex v. Mackintosh, 2 Leach (4th ed.), 883; Reg. v. Pike, 2 Moo. 70; Rex v. Deakins, 1 Sid. 142.

2. Van Horne v. State, 5 Pike (Ark.), 349: Ames's Case, 2 Me. (2 Greenl.) 365; Com. v. Chandler, Thatch. Cr. Cas. (Mass.) 187; Com. z. Ayer, 57 Mass. (3 Cush.) 150; Com. v. Mycall, 2 Mass. 136; State v. Van Hart, 17 N. J. L. (3 Harr.) 327; Harris v. People, 9 Barb. (N. Y.) 664; People v. Harrison, 8 Barb. (N. Y.) 560; People v. Shall, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 778; People v. Cady, 6 Hill (N. Y.), 490; Barnum v. State, 15 Ohio, 717; s. c., 45 Am. Dec. 601; State v. Jones, 1 Bay (S. C.), 207; State v. Gutridge, i Bay (S. C.), 285; State v. Smith, 8 Yerg. (Tenn.) 150; Foulkes v. Com., 2 Rob. (Va.) 836; Rex v. Harris, 6 Car. & P. 129; Reg. v. Boult, 2 Car. & K. 604; Reg. v. Toshack, I Den. C. C. 492; Rex v. Wall, 2 East P. C. 953: Rex v. Jones, 2 East P. C. 991; Upfold v. Leit, 5 Esp. 100; Rex v. Gade, 2 Leach (4th ed.), 732; s. c., 2 East P. C. 874; Rex v. Ward, 2 Ld. Raym. 1461; s. c.. 2 Str. 747; Rex v. O'Brian, 7 Mod. 378; Reg. v. King, 7 Mod. 150; Rex v. Harris, 1 Moo. C. C. 393; Rex v. Burke, Russ. & Ry. 496; Rex v. Knight, 1 Salk, 375; s. c., I Ld. Raym. 530; 1 Bish. Cr. L. $572; 1 Horton Cr. L. § 563; 2 Russ. on Cr. (5th Eng. ed.) 618.

Attempt to Imitate-New York Doctrine. -Forgery is the attempted imitation of another's personal act, and by means of such imitation to cheat and defraud, and not the doing of something in the name of another, which does not profess to be the other's personal act, but that of the doer thereof; who claims and insists by and in the act itself, that he is authorized to obligate the individual whom he is assuming to obligate precisely as he undertakes to do. Mann v. People, 15 Hun (N. Y.), 155.

Forgery is the Signing by One, Without Authority, and falsely and with intent to defraud, the name of another to an instrument which, if genuine, might apparently be of legal efficacy or the foundation of a legal liability. State v. Thomp

son, 19 Iowa, 299; State v. Kimball, 50 Me. 409; Ames's Case, 2 Me. (2 Greenl.) 365; Com. v. Chandler, Thach. Cr. Cas. (Mass.) 187; Com. v. Ayer, 57 Mass. (3 Cush.) 150; People v. Krummer, 4 Park. Cr. Cas. (N. Y.) 217; Barnum v. State, 15 Ohio, 717; s. c., 45 Am. Dec. 601; Com. v. Searle, 2 Binn. (Pa.) 332; s. c., 4 Am. Dec. 446; State v. Holly, 2 Bay (S. C.) L. 252; State v. Smith, 8 Yerg. (Tenn.) 151.

The Making or Alteration of an Instrument, with a fraudulent intent, and without authority, completes the offence before any injury is sustained by any person. Nor is it necessary the whole instrument should be made fictitious; making an alteration or erasure in any material part of a true instrument, whereby another may be defrauded, is a forgery. A false signature to a true instrument, or a real signature to a false one, are forgeries. The alteration of the date of a bill of exchange after acceptance, by which payment may be accelerated, is a forgery. 4 T. R. 320. But the instrument must be false in itself; for if a man pass for another who is the maker or indorser of a true instrument, it is not a forgery, although he may be punished under the statute of false pretences. 3 Chitty Cr. L. 465. The instrument must bear a resemblance to that which it is intended to represent; but it is not necessary that it should be perfect, or even a correct copy.

It is sufficient if it bears such a resemblance as to impose upon mankind, although an individual skilled in that kind of writing would detect its fallacy. 2 East P. C. 950; 1 Leach, 229.

Intent to Damage or Defraud-Colorado Doctrine. The statute makes the offence of forgery to consist in forging or counterfeiting the handwriting of another, with intent to damage or defraud such person. Cohen v. People, 7 Colo. 274; s. c., 2 Denv. L. J: 156.

Must be Without Legal Authority-Texas Doctrine. To sustain an indictment for forgery, within the meaning of Paschal Dig. 1093, the instrument charged to be forged must be alleged and proved to have been made without legal authority. A charge to the jury that the mere making of the forged instrument is sufficient, is erroneous; the gist of the offence is that it was made without lawful authority. Shanks v. State, 25 Tex. 326.

Purporting to Be the Act of Another.Forgery is the false and fraudulent making, or uttering, or alteration of a written instrument, purporting to be the act of some other person, which it is not.

That any person should be actually injured1 by the making of any instrument with intent to defraud, without any uttering, amounts

United States v. Cameron, 3 Dak. 132; State v. Phelps, 11 Vt. 116; s. c.,34 Am. Dec. 672.

Forgery of Order for Goods.-It is not necessary, to constitute a forgery of an order for the delivery of goods, within the first section of the seventh division of the penal code of Georgia, that the person whose name is forged have goods in the hands of the drawee. Hoskins v. State, II Ga. 92.

H., without authority, drew an order upon A. for goods to a certain amount, and signed K.'s name to it with the fraudulent purpose of obtaining goods on K.'s credit. Held, that no acceptance of the order was necessary to constitute forgery. Hale v. State, I Coldw. (Tenn.) 167; s. c., 78 Am. Dec. 488.

Forgery of a Seal.-To constitute forgery of a seal, the instrument to which the seal is appended must be regular in form and apparently legal. Fadner v. People, 33 Hun (N. Y.), 240.

A Species of Fraud.-Forgery at common law was only a species of fraud, and punishable as a misdemeanor. It was often intermingled with false personating, to which it seems very closely allied. It was at one time doubted whether forgery could be of any other writings but those of a public kind. In Ward's Case, 2 Ld. Raym. 1461, it was decided that forgery at common law might be committed of any writing whatever by which another might be defrauded; and this case has been decided to be good law in this country.

In England, a great number of very penal statutes have been enacted by Parliament defining the crime and declaring the punishment; and prosecutions in that country are always brought under one of those statutes.. In New York there is a statute declaring what will be forgery, and also fixing the punishment. Rev. L. vol. I, p. 404.

In the case of People v. Fitch, 1 Wend. (N. Y.) 198; s. c., 19 Am. Dec. 477, the court say that forgery has often been defined by learned jurists. By Mr. Justice Blackstone, "Forgery is the fraudulent making or alteration of a writing, to the prejudice of another's right;" by Buller, J., "the making of a false instrument with intent to deceive;" by Baron Eyre, "a false signature with intent to deceive." Again, "the false making an instrument which purports on the face of it to be good and valid for the purposes for which it was created,

3 Chit.

with a design to defraud;" by Grose, J., "the false making of a note or other instrument with intent to defraud;" by Mr. East, "the false making of any written instrument for the purpose of fraud and deceit" (2 East P. C. 852, 853); by Mr. Chitty, "the false making or alteration of such writings as either at common law or by statute are subject of forgery, with intent to defraud another. Cr. L. 1022. This writer notices a distinction between forgery and fraud: that the latter must actually take effect, while the former is complete, though no one is actually injured if the tendency and intent to defraud be manifest. As to what false making is necessary to constitute the offence, it has been held that a party may make a false deed in his own name— by antedating, for instance, so as to prejudice a prior grantee. So by indorsing a bill of exchange in his own name, when he is not the real payee. East P. C. 855; 4 T. R. 28, "On this principle, we held Peacock guilty of forgery for indorsing the permit for the delivery of a quantity of coal with his own name, knowing that he was not the real consignee of the coal, though of the same name." People v. Peacock, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 72. So making a fraudulent alteration or erasure in any material part of a true instrument, or any alteration which gives it a new operation, -as by altering the date of a bill of exchange after acceptance, whereby the payment was accelerated." 4 T. R. 320; 3 Chit. Cr. L. 1038; 2 East P. C. 855.

1. Williams v. State, 61 Ala. 33; Rembert v. State, 53 Ala. 467; s: c., 25 Am. Rep. 639; Jones v. State, 50 Ala. 161; State v. Wooderd, 20 Iowa, 541; Arnold v. Cost, 3 Gill & J. (Md.) 219; s. c., 22 Am. Dec. 302; Com. v. Ladd, 15 Mass. 526; State v. Jones, 9 N. J. L. (4 Halst.) 357; s. c.. 17 Am. Dec. 453; People v. Fitch, 1 Wend. (N. Y.) 198; s. c., 19 Am. Dec. 477; State v. Washington, 1 Bay (S.C.), 120; s. c., I Am. Dec. 601; Reg. v. Nash, 2 Den. C. C. 493; Rex v. Ward, 2 East C. L. 851; s. c., 2 Ld. Raym. 1461; s. c., 2 Str. 747; King v. Crocker, 2 Leach, 987; Rex v. Goate, 1 Ld. Raym. 737.

If the person intended to be defrauded could not have been imposed upon, the crime could nevertheless have been com. plete. Williams v. State, 61 Ala. 33.

2. State v. Givens, 5 Ala. 747; People v. Peabody, 25 Wend. (N. Y.) 472; Com. v. Chandler, Thach. Cr. Cas. (Mass.) 187;

to the crime of forgery. It is not necessary, to constitute the offence of forgery, that the person whose name is signed, and who purports to become liable under the writing, should be in existence at the time: it is sufficient where the name is a mere fictitious name; 2 for the act may be equally an attempt to defraud.

II. ESSENTIALS OF THE CRIME.-The essential ingredients of forgery are: (1) The false making of some instrument in writing; (2) a fraudulent intent; (3) the instrument must be apparently capable of effecting a fraud.

Rex v. Sheppard, 1 Leach (4th ed.), 226; Reg. v. Avery, Car. & P. 596; Rex v. Sheppard, 2 East P. C. 967; s. c. sub nom. Rex v. Wilks, 2 East P. C. 957; Rex v. Lewis, 2 East P. C. 957; Fost. 116; Rex v. Parkes, 2 Leach (4th ed.), 775: 2 East P. C. 963, 992; Rex v. Bolland, 1 Leach (4th ed.), 83; East P. C. 958; Rex v. Dunn, I Leach (4th ed.), 57; Rex z. Taft, I Leach (4th ed.), 172; 2 East P. C. 959; Reg. v. Hill, 2 Moo. 30; Rex v. Peacock, Russ. & Ry. 278; Rex v. Bontien, Russ. & Ry. 260; Rex Francis. Russ. & Ry. 209; Rex v. Whiley, Russ. & Ry. 90; Rex v. Marshall, Russ. & Ry. 75.

υ.

1. Com. v. Stephens, 10 Mass. 526. Necessity of Uttering.-The forged instrument need not have passed, and goods or money obtained on it, to warrant a conviction. Keeler v. State, 15 Tex. Ap. III. In 2 Russell on Crimes (5th Eng. ed.), 618, it is said: "It should be observed that the offence of forgery, though there be no publication or uttering of the forged instrument. For the very making with a fraudulent intention, and without lawful authority, of any instrument which, at common law or by statute is the subject of forgery, is of itself a sufficient completion of the offence, before publication; and though the publication be the medium by which the intention is usually made manifest, yet it may be proved as plainly by other evidence. 2 East P. C. ch. 19, § 4, p. 855. Thus, in the case where a note, which the person was charged with having forged, was not published, but was found in his possession at the time he was apprehended, no objection was taken to the conviction, on the ground of the note not having been published, there being in the case circumstances sufficient to warrant the jury in finding a fraudulent intention. Elliott's Case, I Leach C. C. 175; 2 East P. C. ch. 19, § 44, p. 951; 2 New Rep. 93, note a: Crocker's Case, R. & R. 97; s. c., 2 Leach C C. 987.

Acceptance of Forged Order for Goods. In Hale v. State, 1 Coldw. (Tenn.) 167; s. c., 78 Am. Dec. 488, it is said that where

the statute declares that " forgery is the fraudulent making or alteration of any writing to the prejudice of another's name," it is forgery to sign another's name to an order for goods without authority, and for the fraudulent purpose of obtaining goods on credit of the party whose name is forged. Acceptance of the forged order for the goods is unnecessary to make out the offence of forgery, the court say: "It is sufficient that the fraudulent intention existed, and that the forgery might have resulted if his object had been accomplished." Com. v. Ladd, 15 Mass. 526; State v. Humphreys, 10 Humph. (Tenn.)

442.

2. Reg. v. Nash, 2 Den. C. C. 493; I Whart. Cr. L. § 694. Compare 2 Bish. Cr. L. (6th ed.) $ 599.

Signing Fictitious Name.-And it was decided, upon solemn argument, that a forgery in the name of a person who has no existence is a criminal, and as much a forgery within the statutes as if there was an intent to defraud the individual whose handwriting is counterfeited: Rex v. Bolland, I Leach C. C. 83. The cases are explicit and satisfactory upon this point. To put a false and fictitious name on a bill indorsed in blank, in order to circulate it with secrecy, is a forgery. I Leach C. C. 215. To counterfeit a power of attorney purporting to be by the administratrix and daughter of a seaman, who had no child at his death, is a capital forgery. The forgery of an instrument purporting to be the last will is taken as within the statutes, although the supposed testator is living. I Leach, 449. The fabrication of an order for payment of a sailor's prize-money is forgery, though it is invalid as wanting the requisites required by statute. 2 Leach C. C. 883. Forgery of a protection in the name of a member of Parliament, who was not so, is indictable. Sid. 142. So it has been adjudged a felony, within 5 Eliz. c. 14, to counterfeit a conveyance with a wrong name, although the conveyance would have been void if it were genuine. I Keb. 803; 3 Keb. 51.

3. 2 Russ.on Cr. (5th Eng. ed.), 618.

1. False Making.--It is of the essence of the crime of forgery that there should be a false making of an instrument apparently genuine; but the mere false making, without the intent to defraud some one, does not constitute the crime of forgery. The act done must be performed with the intent that it shall appear to be the act of another, or that it is other than that which it really is. Consequently, it is not forgery to sign one's own name, though with false pretence of authority to bind another person. Thus, it has been held that the mere indorsement of a bill with the party's own name, assuming to act for the owner of the bill, is not forgery; 3 because in such case there is no false making. The falsehood precedes the making, and the indorsement itself is precisely what it purports to be.4 And it is not forgery for a person to make a false charge in his own books or fraudulently to alter the date of a satisfied order.6

It has been said that every instrument which purports to be what it is not, whether executed by a person who is not the person purporting to execute it, or bearing a date which is not the true date, makes the instrument a false one, and is therefore forgery. But this proposition is too broad a statement of the doctrine as recognized by the American courts; yet it is undoubtedly true that there may be a false making of an instrument in a person's own name, as where one signs his own name to an instrument with the intention to have it received as having been executed by another person of the same name.s

1. Barnum v. State, 15 Ohio, 717, 721; fraudulent purpose of using it in evidence s. c., 45 Am. Dec. 601.

2. Fox v. People, 95 Ill. 71. 3. Reg. v. White, I Den. C. C. 208. 4. It is said by Lord Coke that, "To forge is metaphorically taken from the smith, who beateth upon his anvil and forgeth what fashion or shape he will." 3 Co. Inst. 168, 169.

5. State 7. Young, 46 N. H. 266; s. c., 78 Am. Dec. 212.

False Charge in Books.-In State v. Young, supra, it is said that the rule seems to be that the " writing or instrument which may be the subject of forgery must generally be, or purport to be, the act of another, or it must at the time be the property of another, or it must be some writing or instrument under which others have acquired some rights or have become liable in a certain way, and where these rights or liabilities are sought to be affected or changed by the alteration without their consent."

6. People v. Fitch, 1 Wend. (N. Y.) 198; s. c., 19 Am. Dec. 477.

Changing Date of Order.-In the case of People v. Fitch, supra, an alteration of the date of an order for the delivery of goods, made by the defendant with the

as a defence to a note made by him, was held not to be forgery, because there was no false making. The court say: "There was no false making. The order purported to be drawn by the defendant, and it was so drawn; it purported to be dated the 14th of November, and was so dated."

7. Reg. v. Ritson, L. R. 1 C. C. 200; s. c., 39 L. J. M. C. 10.

8. See Mead v. Young, 4 T. R. 28. This was a case where a person, who came into possession of a bill payable to another person by the same name, fraudulently indorsed and passed it as his own.

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Making a False Deed in Own Name. -In People v. Fitch, 1 Wend. (N. Y.) 198; s. c., 19 Am. Dec. 477, it is said that, as to what false making is necessary to constitute the offence, it has been held that a party may make a false deed in his own name, so as to prejudice the prior grantee. So by indorsing a bill of exchange in his own name, when he is not the real payee. Mead . Young, 4 T. R. 28; 2 East P. C. 855. On this principle,

we held Peacock guilty of forgery for indorsing the permit for the delivery of a quantity of coal with his own name, knowing that he was not the real consignee of

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