the coal, though of the same name. People v. Peacock, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 72. So of making a fraudulent alteration or erasure in any material part of a true instrument, or any alteration which gives it a new effect-as by altering the date of a bill of exchange after acceptance, whereby the payment was accelerated." See Masters v. Miller, 4 T. R. 320; 3 Chit. Cr. L. 1038; 2 East P. C. 855.

1. Phillips v. State, 17 Ga. 461; Fox v. People, 95 Ill. 71; State v. Pierce, 8 Iowa, 231; Arnold v. Cost, 3 Gill & J. (Md.) 219; s. c., 22 Am. Dec. 302; Com. v. Foster, 114 Mass. 311; s. c., 19 Am. Rep. 353; Com. v. Ladd, 15 Mass. 526; State 7. Eades, 68 Mo. 150; s. c., 30 Am. Rep. 780; State v. Redstrake, 39 N. J. L. (10 Vr.) 365; People v. Stearns, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 409; People v. Fitch, 1 Wend. (N. Y.) 198; s. c., 19 Am. Dec. 477; Barnum v. State, 15 Ohio, 717; s. c., 45 Am. Dec. 601; Hess v. State, 5 Ohio, 5; s. c., 22 Am. Dec. 767; State v. Washington, 1 Bay (S. C.), 120; s. c., I Am. Dec 601; State v. Floyd, 5 Strobh. (S. C.) L. 58; s. c., 53 Am. Dec. 689; Snell v. State, 2 Humph. (Tenn.) 347; Montgomery v. State, 12 Tex. App. 323; State v. Shelters, 51 Vt. 105; s. c., 31 Am. Rep. 679; Kerr v. Force, 3 Cr. C. C. 43; United States v. Moses, 4 Wash. C. C. 726; United States v. Houghton, 14 Fed. Rep. 544; s. c., 4 Cr. L. Mag. 243; Reg. v. Dunlop, 15 Up. Can. Q. B. 118; Reg. v. Craig, 7 Up. Can. C. P. 239; Rex v. Powell, W. Bl. 787; Rex v. Martin, 7 Car. & P. 549; Rex v. Holden, 2 Taunt. 334; Briggs's Case, 3 P.Wms. 119; 2 Bish. Cr. L. (6th ed.) $ 506-601; I Whart. Cr. L. (8th ed.) § 653.

The Very Essence of the Offence is the Intent to Defraud.-But it is perfectly immaterial whether any person is actually defrauded or not. If the forgery appears to have been done with a view of gaining any advantages to the party himself, or prejudicing a third person, it is sufficient. And in Briggs's Case, 3 P. Wms. 119, it was held no objection that the forgery was found, by a special verdict, not to have been committed for the sake of lucre or to defraud the party. I Campb. 324; 2 Leach, 983; 1 New Rep. 92; Chitty C. L. vol. 1, p. 387; 2 Stra. 747; 2 Ld. Raym. 1461.

Forgery at Common Law was considered a species of fraud, and might have been

committed of any writing by which another might be defrauded. The fraudu lent intent was the essence of the offence, and must have been alleged and proved. Hess v. State, 5 Ohio, 5; s. c., 22 Am. Dec. 767.

Belief that he had the Right.-Where the evidence in support of an indictment for forgery fails to show criminal intent, and is consistent with the theory that defendant, in indorsing a check, did only what he believed he had a right to do, a verdict of conviction will not be sustained. Montgomery v. State, 12 Tex. App. 323.

Incapacity to Execute Instrument.—It is not essential to the crime of forgery that the person in whose name the instrument purports to be made shall have legal capacity to make it. It is sufficient, under Mo. Rev. Stat. (Wag. Stat. § 16, p. 470), if it is made with intent to defraud, and on its face would be likely to defraud. Thus, the making of a false municipal certificate of indebtedness, with intent to injure and defraud, is forgery, notwithstanding the municipality may have no power to issue such certificate. State v. Eades, 68 Mo. 150, s. c., 30 Am. Rep. 180.

Forgery of Pay-roll.-In order to a conviction under U. S. Rev. Stat. § 5418, the jury must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) That the time and payroll described in the indictment was a false, forged, and counterfeit writing; (2) that it was transmitted to the proper offi. cer of the government by the defendant; and (3) that the falsity of the writing was known by the defendant at the time of sending it, and that it was sent with the intent to defraud the United States. Where one intends to do what he knows is forbidden by law, no other evil intent need be shown. The law infers the intent to defraud from such an act; and knowledge of the false character of the pay-roll, when transmitted, raises the inference of a fraudulent intent. United States v. Houghton, 14 Fed. Rep. 544; s. c., 4 Cr. L. Mag. 243.

2. See Com. v. Whitney, Thach. C. C. (Mass.) 588; Parmelee v. People, 8 Hun (N. Y.), 623; Reg. v. Beard, Car. & P. 142; Reg. v. Parish, 8 Car. & P. 94; Rex v. Forbes, 7 Car. & P. 224.

Authority to Sign. It is said, in the case of Parmelee v. People, 8 Hun (N. Y.),

623, that the proof that one indicted for forgery had reasonable grounds for believing that he had authority to sign the name of another entitles him to acquittal; citing Reg. v. Beard, 8 Car. & P. 143; Reg. v. Parish, 8 Car. & P. 94; Rex v. Forbes, 7 Car. & P. 224.

1. Com. v. Henry, 118 Mass 460

2. Arnold v. Cost, 3 Gill & J. (Md.) 219; s. c., 22 Am. Dec. 302; Tatlock v. Harris, 3 T. R. 176; 2 Chitt. Cr. L. 796, 1036. Compare Williams v. State, 51 Ga. 535; s. c., I Am. Cr. Rep. 227; State v. Harrison, 69 N. C. 143; s. c., I Green Cr. Rep. 537.

Intention to Defraud Particular Person. -Some of the States, however, hold that there must be an intent to defraud some particular person, and that the indictment must specify such person.

In Barnum v. State, 15 Ohio, 717; s. c., 45 Am. Dec. 601, the court say that, "to constitute forgery, there must be the fraudulent making or alteration of the instrument, with the intent to defraud some one. That intent must be laid, and the person on whom it was designed to operate; and the indictment must charge both duly. And the instrument must be such that it may have the tendency precisely which is averred." See Williams v. State, 51 Ga. 535.

In England since the statute of 15 Vict. c. 100, 8, although there must be an intent to defraud a particular person, it need not be specifically alleged. Reg. v. Hodgson, 7 Cox C. C. 122; s. c., Dears. & B. C. C. 3. In the last case, the prisoner was indicted for forgery for counterfeiting a diploma of the College of Surgeons and hanging it up in his house, and exhibiting it to visitors as genuine. The court held that this was not forgery, because there was no intent to defraud any person in particular.

3. Williams v. State, 61 Ala. 33; Rembert z. State, 53 Ala. 467; s. c., 25 Am. Rep. 639; Jones v. State, 50 Ala. 161; Dunn v. People, 4 Colo, 126; State v. Pierce, 8 Iowa, 231; Arnold v. Cost, 2 Gill & J (Md.) 219; s. c., 22 Am. Dec.

5

307; Com. v. Ladd, 15 Mass. 526; State v. Jones, N. J. L. (4 Halst.) 357; s. c., 17 Am. Dec. 483; People v. Fitch, I Wend. (N. Y.) 198; s. c., 19 Am. Dec. 477: Hess v. State, 5 Ohio, 5; s. c., 22 Am. Dec. 767; State v. Lurch, 12 Oreg. 99; Pennsylvania v. Misner, Addis. (Pa.) 44; State v. Washington, 1 Bay (S. C.) 120; s. c, I Am. Dec. 601; Snell v. State, 2 Humph, (Tenn.) 347; Henderson v. State, 14 Tex. 503; Com. v. Goodenough, I Thach. C C. (Mass.) 132; Reg. v. Hathaway, 8 Low. Can. J. 285; 2 Arch. C. Pr. 803; Rex v. Ward, 2 East C. L. 861; s. c., 2 Ld. Raym. 461; 2 Str. 747; King v. Crocker, 2 Leach, 987; Rex v. Goate, I Ld. Raym. 737; Rex v. Crooke, 2 Str. 901.

Concurrence of Guilty Knowledge and Intent. The crime is complete when the act and guilty knowledge concur with the intent to defraud. So, where a forged check was passed in consideration of illicit intercourse, and of cigars and liquors sold without license at a house of prostitution, held, that the illegality of the consideration did not affect the criminal character of the act. Dunn v. People, 4

Colo. 126.

4. Williams v. State, 61 Ala. 33; Reg. v. Hoatson, 2 Car. & K. 777; Reg. v. Marcus, 2 Car. & K. 356; Rex v. Holden, Russ. & R. C. C. 154.

5. Billings v. State, 107 Ind. 54; s. c., 57 Am. Rep. 77; State v. Pierce, Iowa, 231; Henderson v. State. 14 Tex. 503; Reg. . Nash, 2 Den. C. C. 493; s. c., 12 Eng. L. & Eq. 578; 1 Whart. Cr. L. S 694; Rex v. Holden, Russ. & R. C. C. 154.

No Person to be Defrauded.-Mr. Bishop, however, maintains a contrary opinion. He says: "The English judges were divided upon the question whether, in the absence of evidence of some one existing on whom the fraud could operate, in the case of a forged will, a count charging an intent to defraud a person unknown could be supported. Reg. ". Tuffs, I Den. C. C. 319. And under Stat. 13 & 14 Vict. c. 100, § 8, which

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provided, that 'It shall be sufficient, in any indictment for forging, uttering, offering, disposing of, or putting off any instrument whatsoever, or for obtaining, or attempting to obtain, any property by false pretences, to allege that the defendant did the act with intent to defraud any particular person; and, on the trial of any of the offences in this section mentioned, it shall not be necessary to prove an intent on the part of the defendant to defraud any particular person, but it shall be sufficient to prove that the defendant did the act charged, with an intent to defraud.' (Re-enacted, slightly changed terms, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 98, § 44.) opinion of the judges seemed to be, that the offence might be committed, though there were no person in existence on whom the fraud could operate. Reg. v. Nash, 2 Den. C. C. 493; s. c., 12 Eng. L. & Eq. 629. But afterward, on full consideration, they decided that this statute concerns only the form of the indictment, not the law relating to the offence, which stands now as it stood before; there being, it seems, a necessity for some person to exist who can be defrauded." Reg. v. Hodgson, Dears. & B. C. C. 493: s. c., 36 Eng. L. & Eq 626. In another place, he says: "If there is in existence no being or corporation to be injured by the cheat -State v. Givens, 5 Ala. 747; People v. Peabody, 25 Wend. (N. Y.) 472; Reg. v. Tuffs, 1 Den. C. C. 319;— or, if the forged writing, were it genuine, would be neither apparently nor really valid in law,-People v. Harrison, 8 Barb. (N. Y.) 560; Rex v. Burke, Russ. & Ry. 496;-or if, for any other reason, it could not defraud any one,—Barnum v. State, 15 Ohio, 717; s. c.. 45 Am. Dec. 601; Reg. v. Marcus, 2 Car. & K. 356; Reg. v. Nash, 2 Den. C. C. 493; s. c., 12 Eng. L. & Eq. 578; Rex v. Knight, I Salk, 375; s. c., 1 Ld. Raym. 527-the transaction is not forgery.' 1 Bish. Cr. L. § 748.

1. Rex v. Nash, 2 Den. C. C. 433; Rex v. Sterling, I Leach, 99. Compare Rex v.

Hodgson, Dears. & B. C. C. 336; s. c., 7 Cox C. C. 122.

2. Barnum v. State, 15 Ohio, 717; s. c., 45 Am. Dec. 601. In this case the court held that evidence which tends to prove that the forged instrument could not under any state or circumstances prejudice the rights of any one, is competent to go to the jury.

3. People v. Tomlinson, 35 Cal. 507; Barnum v. State, 15 Ohio, 717; s. c., 45 Am. Dec. 601.

4. State v. Floyd, 5 Strobh. (S. C.) L. 58; s. c., 53 Am. Dec. 689.

5. Garmire v. State, 104 Ind. 444; Wilkinson v. State, 10 Ind. 372; State v. McKenzie, 42 Me. 392; Com. v. Stephenson, 65 Mass. (11 Cush.) 481; s. c., 59 Am. Dec. 154; Com. v. Smith, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) 137; State v. Carr, 5 N. H. 367; State v. Van Hart, 17 N. J. L. (2 Hair.) 327; People v. Peabody, 25 Wend. (N. Y.) 472; State v. Covington, 94 N. C. 913; s. c., 55 Am. Rep. 650; Dement v. State, 2 Head (Tenn.), 595; s. c., 75 Am. Dec. 747; Buckland v. Com., 8 Leigh (Va.), 732; United States v. Turner, 32 U. S. (7 Pet.) 132; bk. 8, L. ed. 633; United States v. Sprague, II Biss. C. C. 376; United States v. Morrow, 4 Wash. C. C. 733; Reg. v. Smith, Dears. & B. C. C. 566; Rex v. Collicott, 2 Leach C. C. 1048; s. c., 4 Taunt. 300; Russ. & R. C. C. 212; 2 East P. C. 858.

Resemblance of Instruments.-A charge of forgery may be based upon an instrument which bears such a resemblance to the genuine instrument it is intended to represent as is calculated to deceive; and the person forging an instrument cannot escape punishment where there is such a resemblance, upon the ground that the forgery was such as would have deceived only stupid and careless persons. Garmire v. State. 104 Ind. 444.

Unnecessary that Real Instrument Would Have Been Effectual.-In forgery, it is of no consequence whether the counterfeit be of such as, if real, would be effectual to the purpose it intends, so long as

there is sufficient resemblance to impose on persons of ordinary observation, though persons of experience could not be deceived by it. Hess v. State, 5 Ohio, 5 s. c., 22 Am. Dec. 767; People v. Krummer, 4 Park. Cr. Cas. (N. Y.) 217. Forgery of Bond.-To constitute the offence, it is not necessary that the fraudulent bond should purport to be an obligation of the United States, or that the similitude should be such as to deceive experts or cautious men; it is sufficient that it be calculated to deceive honest, sensible, and unsuspecting men of ordinary observation and care, dealing with a man supposed to be honest. United States v. Sprague, 11 Biss. C. C. 376.

Name Misspelled.-An indictment will lie for the forgery of an obligation for the payment of money although the signature is misspelled. State v. Covington, 94 N. C. 913; s. c., 55 Am. Rep. 650.

In Gooden v. State, 55 Ala. 178, the name attempted to be forged was Thweatt, but the forged instrument had it Threet. There was a conviction; and the appellate court approved the ruling of the lower court on that question. See also 3 Greenl. Ev. 103.

Forged Check-In those cases where the invalidity is to be made out by proof of some extrinsic fact, if the instrument is good on its face it may be capable of effecting fraud. See State v. Johnson, 26 Iowa, 207; State v. Pierce, 8 Iowa, 231. Thus, where a check is apparently a valid obligation, and would create a liability upon the party if genuine, it has a tendency to defraud, and is within the statute. State v. Coyle, 41 Wis. 267; s. c., 2 Am. Cr. Rep. 149. However, where a check is not made payable to the order of any one or to bearer, it is so imperfect that no one could be defrauded by it. Williams v. State, 51 Ga. 535; s. c., I Am. Cr. Rep. 237.

It is held, in the case of Com. v. Stephenson, 65 Mass. (11 Cush.) 481; s. c., 59 Am. Dec. 154, that a person may be guilty of forgery although the check drawn by him has so little resemblance to the genuine check of the person whose name was forged that it is not likely to deceive the officers of the bank on which it was drawn. The court say: "It is not necessary that there should be so perfect resemblance to the genuine handwriting of the party whose name is forged as would impose on persons having particular knowledge of the handwriting of such party; nor is it necessary that the officers of the bank upon which a check purported to be drawn would

probably have been mislead and deceived by it. The intent to defraud the bank may exist, and may be found by the jury, though the officers of the bank, from their better acquaintance with the genuine handwriting of the drawer, would readily have detected the check as a counterfeit one. The authorities to this point may be found in 2 Hale P. C. 950; Rex v. Mazagora, Russ. & R. C. C. 291; Rex v. Sheppard, Russ. & R. C. C. 169.

Awkward Forgery. In a case reported in the Vienna Juristische Blaetter, one Caroline J., a waiter in the service of Colonel P., took a blank check from his check book, and had her son fill it for an amount of 200 florins, date it, sign Colonel P.'s name to it, and present it to S. M. Rothschild for payment. The filling of the blank was so awkwardly done, the signature not resembling in the least that of Colonel P., that the forgery was discovered by the cashier, and payment refused. The lower court directed a verdict of acquittal, on the ground that the false check was not at all adapted to deceive. On appeal, the court of cassation reversed the judgment below, saying: "The punishment of an attempt is based upon this: that it manifests the intention to commit an offence in a manner endangering the order of law. Such danger, as is generally recognized in the Austrian decisions and doctrine, can only be denied where the attempt is made with means completely and unqualifiedly (in abstracto) unfit to attain the object. If the cause of failure was only in the manner of execution or in the concrete quality or operation of the object used (as in fraud of him whose deceit was planned), then a punishable attempt is to be assumed. The aquittal was erroneous. A forged instrument is adapted to deceive." This is the doctrine of Mazagora's Case, Russ. & R. C. C. 291. See Com. v. Stephenson, 65 Mass. (II Cush.) 481; s. c., 59 Am. Dec. 154; Reg. v. Coulson, I Den. C. C. 592; s. c., 24 Alb. L. J. 83.

Defective Instrument.-Where a forged instrument is so defectively executed as

not

to deceive anybody, it does not amount to the crime of forgery. See Rembert v. State, 53 Ala. 467; s. c., 25 Am. Rep. 639; Williams v. State, 51 Ga. 525; s. c., I Am. Cr. Rep. 237; People v. Galloway, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 540.

The Omission of Important Words renders an instrument fatally defective; and such an instrument is so imperfect as to be incapable of sustaining a charge of forgery. Thus an indictment charging one of the forgery of a bank check payable "to the order of," such instrument is

fatally defective and too imperfect to defraud any one. Williams v. State, 51 Ga. 535 s. c., I Am. Cr. Rep. 237, following People v. Galloway, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 549. The latter case was an indictment for obtaining the signature of a person to a written instrument by false pretences. The written instrument was a deed of lands by a wife, conveying real estate belonging to her in her own right, executed by her with her husband, at the solicitation of the husband, under the pretence that it was a deed of lands belonging to him. There not being an acknowledgment of the instrument by the wife in the mode prescribed by law for passing the estate of a feme covert, it was held not to be such an instrument as is contemplated by the statute; and the conviction was reversed.

the

Words Necessarily Implied.-In Booth v. Wallace, 2 Root (Conn.), 247, where a promissory note was for thirty-two, twelve shillings and five pence,' court said that the word "pounds" after the word "thirty-two" is necessarily implied, and that the omission, it is clear, was owing to the mistake of the scribe who drew the note, and that the implication is so clear and strong that it is not necessary it should be averred in the declaration more fully.

Omission of the Dollar-mark.-The dollar-mark ($) comes from the letters U and S, which, after the adoption of the Federal Constitution, were prefixed to the Federal currency, and afterwards were run into one another, the U being made first and the S over it. Gleanings for the Curious, 230. This mark being used simply as the emblem of the nationality of the currency, its omission will be supplied and will not affect the instrument. This question first arose in the case of Northrop v. Sanborn, 22 Vt. 433; s. c., 54 Am. Dec. 83, on an order requesting the drawee to pay the bearer 37.89," without anything else on the face of the order to denote that dollars and cents were intended. The court said, Judge Redfield delivering the opinion: "We think it not necessary to say that the order expressed for 37.89 is so far unintelligible that it is void. The law of the United States Congress establishing our national currency having declared that it shall consist of the dollar as a unit and the decimal parts as dimes and cents, it would seem the necessary intendment that a contract expressed in figures should be in the currency of the country. If prefixed by the usual sign ($), no one could entertain doubt; and that is nothing but a mark to signify that the national

currency is intended. Without that, we think the legal intendment is the same. Murrill v. Handy, 17 Mo. 406, was an action on a promissory note wherein the makers promised to pay the payee the sum of fifty-two 25-100, for value received.' The word dollars, as well as the dollarmark, were entirely omitted. It was held that the note, on its face, was for fiftytwo dollars and twenty-five cents. Some stress was laid upon the words 'the sum' in the instrument, but we think the word pay' is equally significant. Other cases to the same effect are cited by the attorney-general, although perhaps they are not so directly in point as those above referred to." Baysinger v. State, 77 Ala. 63; s. c., 54 Am. Rep. 46.

In the case of State v. Schwartz, 64 Wis. 432, an instrument in the form of a promissory note for the payment of **25.00, as per deed, 10 per cent till paid" was held to be a note for twenty-five dollars upon its face. The court said: "The controlling question is, therefore: Does the forged instrument purport to be, on its face, a promise by Braggs, the maker, to pay the defendant twenty-five dollars, although it contains neither the dollar-mark nor the word 'dollars'? If this question be answered in the affirmative, it is entirely clear that such forged instrument was properly admitted in evidence; that such alteration constituted the crime of forgery; and that the information is sufficient, without an averment therein that the figures 25.00 meant twenty-five dollars. On principle and authority, we think the question should be answered affirmatively.

In Rembert v. State, 53 Ala. 467; s. c., 25 Am. Rep. 639, the entire instrument charged to have been forged was in the following language: "Due 8.25 Askew Brothers." There was a conviction; and after an elaborate consideration of authorities, the judgment of conviction was affirmed. Speaking of the general rule, that if the instrument is void on its face it cannot be the subject of a forgery, the court said it must be taken with this limitation: "When the instrument does not appear to have any legal validity, nor show that another might be injured by it, but extrinsic facts exist by which the holder of the paper be enabled to defraud another, then the offence is complete, and an indictment averring the extrinsic facts, disclosing its capacity to deceive and defraud, will be supported. The fact that the paper is incomplete or imperfect in itself, and that without the knowledge of extrinsic facts it does not appear that it has the vicious capacity, only renders