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sential that a fraud shall have been expressly perpetrated by it, the intent being sufficient; for although intent to defraud is essential to the completion of the offence, yet it is not necessary to show either that the prosecutor was actually defrauded 3 or that there was an intent to defraud any particular person, a general intent to defraud being sufficient.

The intent to defraud may be inferred from the circumstances,5 as where there is an apparent possibility of fraud. Thus if a person passes a note as genuine, knowing it to be forged, the law infers that the intent was to defraud, because it is the natural consequence of the act."

There must be a capacity to injure, however, to constitute an uttering within the meaning of the statute, because it is not an indictable offence to utter a paper which could in no case be the subject of a suit.8

this offence, and this is indeed particularly expressed in the statute, 5 Eliza. ch. 14, and in most if not all the other acts. See also I Hawk. P. C. 335: 2 Arch. Cr. Pl 546; Blake v. Allen, Morris' Rep. 619; Bacon's Abridgment, Forgery," A. Whether, if the indorser had not known of the forged character of the paper, the causing of a notice of presentment and protest to be sent to him would have been such an assertion or declaration that the paper was good as would amount to an uttering, is not a matter of express authority, though the reasoning, in some cases, goes far toward supporting such a doctrine. See Com. v. Searle, 2 Binn. (Pa.) 332; s. c., 4 Am. Dec. 446; United States v. Mitchell, Bald. C. C. 366; The Queen v. Green, Jebb's Cr. Cas. 281. In the last case the paper was not exhibited, but its contents stated, and the court held it an uttering. 16 Alb. L. J. 214.

California Doctrine. It was held by the supreme court of California in Ex parte Finley, 66 Cal. 262; s. c., 19 Rep. 236, that the offence of uttering a forged indorsement includes the case of one who shall utter, with intent to defraud, a writing such as can be the subject of forgery, although not genuine but purporting to be so, even though there is no intent to defraud, when the writing is fabricated.

1. State v. Hahn, 38 La. An. 169; People v. Caton, 25 Mich. 388.

2. Stephens v. State, 56 Ga. 604; Couch v. State, 28 Ga. 367; State v. Redstrake, 39 N. J. L. (10 Vr.) 365; McClure v. Com., 86 Pa. St. 353; Reg. v. Hodgson, 7 Cox C. C. 122; s. c., 36 Eng. L. & Eq. 626; Rex v. Holden, 2 Taunt. 334; Rex v. Powell, 2 W. Bl. 787.

3. See Rembert v. State; 53 Ala. 467; s. c., 25 Am. Rep. 639; Langdale v. State,

100 Ill. 263; Lemasters v. State, 95 Ind. 367; Harding v. State, 54 Ind. 359: State 7. Ferguson, 35 La. An. 1042; Bishop v. State, 55 Md. 138; Com. z. Costello, 120 Mass. 358; Com. v. Ladd, 15 Mass. 526; Com. v. Goodenough, Thach. C. C. (Mass.) 132; State v. Fisher, 65 Mo. 437; Fadner v. People, 40 Hun (N. Y.), 695; Hess v. State, 5 Ohio, 12; s. c., 22 Am. Dec. 767: Pennsylvania v. Misner, Addis. (Pa.) 44; Snell v. State, 2 Humph. (Tenn.) 347; Peete v. State, 2 Lea (Tenn.), 513; Rex v. Goate, 1 Ld. Raym. 737; Reg. v. Pike, 2 Moo. C. C. 70; Rex v. Crook, 2 Str. 191.

4. McClure v. Com., 86 Pa. St. 353.

5. State v. Kenestor, 59 N. H. 36; Rex 7. Crowther, 5 Car. & P. 316; Reg. v. Hodgson, 7 Cox C. C. 714; s. c., Dears. & B. C. C. 3; Reg. v. Nash, 2 Den. C. C. 493: Reg. v. Tylney, 1 Den. C. C. 319; Reg. v. Todd, 18 L. T. N. S. 89.

6. Schroeder v. Harvey, 75 Ill. 638; Miller v. State, 51 Ind. 405; United States v. Moses, 4 Wash. C. C. 726; Reg. v. Geach, 9 Car. & P. 499; Reg. v. Cooke, 8 Car. & P. 582; Reg. v. Vaughan, 8 Car. & P. 276; Reg. v. Hill, 8 Car. & P. 274; Rex v. Jones, 12 East P. C. 991.

7. Com. v. Whitney, Thach. (Mass.) C. C. 588.

8. State v. Snow, 30 La. An. pt. 1, 401. See People v. Tomlinson, 35 Cal. 503: Downing v. Brown, 3 Colo. 571; People v. Head, I Idaho, 531; Brown v. People, 86 Ill. 259; s. c., 29 Am. Rep. 25: Waterman 7. People, 67 Ill. 91; Abbott v. State, 59 Ind. 70; State v. Davis, 53 Iowa, 252; Abbott v. Rose, 62 Me. 194: S. c., 16 Am. Rep. 427; Com. 7. Dallinger, 118 Mass. 439; State v. Wheeler, 19 Minn. 98; Roode v. State, 5 Neb. 174; s. c., 25 Am. Rep. 475; People v. Harri

3. Possession with Intent to Utter. It seems that at common law the mere possession of bank notes with intent to utter them as true is not indictable, although in most if not all of the States in this country it is by statute made an offence to have counterfeit money in possession with intent to pass the same; and some courts hold it an offence at common law.

son, 8 Barb. (N. Y.) 560; People v. Shall, Cow. (N. Y.) 778; Henry v. State, 35 Ohio St. 128; State v. Humphreys, 10 Humph. (Tenn.) 462; Howell v. State, 37 Tex. 591; Henderson v. State, 14 Tex. 503; Keeler v. State, 15 Tex. App. 112; Reg. v. Harper, L. R. 7 C. B. 78; s. c., 44 L. T. N. S. 615; Rex v. Burke, Russ. & Ry. C. C. 496; Rex v. Pateman, Russ. & Ry. C. C. 455; Rex v. Randall, Russ. & Ry. C. C. 195; Rex v. Richards, Russ. & Ry. C. C. 193.

1. Com. v. Morse, 2 Mass. 138; United States v. Wright, 2 Cr. C. C. 68; United States v. Williams, 14 Fed. Rep. 550; Dugdale v. Reg., 1 El. & Bl. 435; s. c., Dears C. C. 64; Rex v. Stewart, Russ. & Ry. C. C. 288.

Possession of Forged Coupon with Intent to Utter. In a case where the appellant was indicted for having in his possession, with intent to utter, a forged coupon annexed to an unsigned bond, and the court was asked to charge that if he was merely keeping the bond for another person, with knowledge of its character, intending to return it when requested, would not be guilty, which was refused,-held, error; for the imperfection of the bond gave notice of the invalidity of the annexed coupon and non constat the bond would not be signed. People v. Martin, 36 Hun (N. Y.), 462.

2. People v. Ah Sam, 41 Cal. 654; State v. Benham, 7 Conn. 414; Com. v. Price, 76 Mass. (10 Gray) 472; s. c., 71 Am. Dec. 668; Stone v. State, 20 N. J. L. (1 Spen.) 404; Sasser v. State, 13 Ohio, 453; Reg. v. Willis, Jeb. 48, note; Rex v. Sutton, 2 Str. 1074; s. c., I East P. C. 170.

To Constitute the Offence, it is not usually necessary that the prosecution should prove that the intention in keeping the counterfeit notes or coin was to pass them as genuine, it being sufficient if it is made to appear that the ultimate object is iraud, although the immediate object be to supply a co-conspirator. See People v. Ah Sam. 41 Cal. 645; Hopkins v. Com., 44 Mass. (3 Metc.) 410; State v. Harris, 5 Ired. (N. C.) L. 287; Bevington 7. State, 2 Ohio St. 160. See also tit. Counterfeiting," 4 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of L. 333. As true."-When the statute provides that it shall be an offence to have counter

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feit coins with the intention of passing them "as true," the intent to utter and pass as true must be averred in the indictment and proven on the trial. People v. Stewart. 4 Mich. 655.

The Federal Statute, which requires that counterfeit money shall be after the "similitude" of an obligation of the United States, extends to the signature. United States v. Williams, 14 Fed. Rep. 550. See United States v. Bicksler, I Mackey (U. S. D. C.) 341.

In United States v. Williams, supra, the defendant was convicted, under § 534 of the United States Rev. Stat., of the offence of having in his possession an instrument, engraved or printed after the similitude of an obligation, issued under the authority of the United States, with the intent to sell or otherwise use the same, the alleged fraudulent instrument, although in the similitude of the United States bond was not nor did it purport to be signed. The court held, in granting a new trial, that the words of the statute, "any obligation or other security," must be construed to mean an executed instrument, or one which on its face purports to be executed, and that, it appearing that the alleged fraudulent obligation or security is not an obligation or security at all within the meaning of the statute, a conviction cannot be sustained though the paper in its body and general form be made after the similitude of a United States bond. It was further held that it was for the court to determine whether the case made was within the statute. See United States v. Morrow, 4 Wash. C. C. 733.

The Similitude required by the federal statute need not be perfect, it is sufficient if the deception of persons who are nonexperts is probable. United States v Sprague, II Biss. C. C. 376. See Rem bert v. State, 53 Ala. 467; s. c., 25 Am. Rep. 639; Longdale v. State, 100 Ill. 263; Harding v. State, 54 Ind. 359; Lemasters v. State, 95 Ind. 367; State v. Ferguson, 35 La. An. 1042; Bishop v. State, 55 Md. 138; Com. v. Costello, 120 Mass. 358; State v. Fisher, 65 Mo. 437; Fadner v. People, 40 Hun (N. Y.), 695; Peete v. State, 2 Lea (Tenn.), 513; Reg. v. Pike, 2 Moo. C. C. 70.

In such cases knowledge of the character of the instrument is material, and, independently of the statute, should be alleged in the indictment and proved on the trial; for it is always a good defence that the money was received innocently, in the usual course of business.2

4. Distinction between Uttering and Forging.-Under the statute the crime of uttering forged paper is not included in the crime of forging it, each being distinct and substantive offences.3

VII. MATTERS OF DEFENCE --It is no defence to an indictment for forging or uttering and publishing forged paper, that there is no person, at the time, legally in a situation to be defrauded by the act,4 it being sufficient if there is a possibility of such fraud; the intent to defraud persons unknown, or any person on whom the forged paper may be passed, or the public generally, being sufficient to warrant a conviction. Neither is it a valid defence that the object for which the forged instrument was passed was in violation of law; or the fact that the drawer of a forged check is a fictitious person; or that he had no funds in the bank at the time the check was drawn ; or the belief of the accused in the truth of the statement in a forged paper; or a mistake in wrongly dating the forged instrument so that from the face of the instrument an indictment would appear to be barred by the statute of limitations;9 or the belief of the defendant that the amount was coming to him from the party attempted to be injured;1o or that the instrument was usurious, even though usurious on its face;11 or that the forg

For Unexecuted Bonds which do not fall within the statute, see United States v. Sprague, 11 Biss. C. C. 376.

1. Powers v. State, 87 Ind. 97; Owen v. State, 5 Sneed (Tenn.), 494.

2. United States v. Kenneally, 5 Biss. C. C. 122.

Mere Possession of a counterfeit coin or a forged instrument as a curiosity without any intention of using or passing the same is not an offence either at common law or under the statute, and will not sustain a conviction. Fox v. People, 95 Ill. 71; Rex v. Haines, 7 Car. & P. 429.

The Intent.-Fraudulent Selling is evidence of fraudulent possession. United States v. Biebusch, 1 McCr. C. C. 42. An intent generally may be inferred and proved in the same way as the intent in cases of uttering generally. See Miller v. State, 51 Ind. 405; Hopkins v. Com.. 44 Mass. (3 Metc.) 460; Hutchins v. State, 13 Ohio, 198; Perdue v. State, 2 Humph. (Tenn.) 494.

3 Ex parte Finley, 66 Cal. 262; Barfield v. State, 29 Ga. 127; s c., 74 Am. Dec. 49; State v. Boasso, 38 La An. 202; State v. Hahn, 38 La. An. 169; State v. Anderson, 30 La. An. pt. 1, 557; Buren 7. State, 16 Lea (Tenn.), 61; Hatch v. State, 8 Tex. App. 416, s c., 34 Am. Rep.

751; Cal. Pen. Code, sec. 470; Ga. Pen. Code, div. 7, sec. 14; Tex. Crim. Code art. 439.

4. Rex v. Crowther, 5 Car. & P. 337; Reg. v. Nash, 2 Den. C. C. 493; Reg. v. Dodd, 18 L. T. N. S. 89. See Reg. v. Tylney, I Den. C. C. 319.

5. State v. Keneston, 59 N. H. 36.

6. Thus it has been held that the fact that the law was violated by the sale of liquors without a license, for which the forged instrument was passed will not affect the criminal character of the act. Dunn v. People, 4 Colo. 196.

7. Thompson v. State, 49 Ala. 16.

8. Forged Deposition to Secure Divorce. -As in a forged deposition made by the defendant to secure a divorce, his object in forging such deposition being to procure a divorce to which he pleaded himself legally entitled. State v. Kimball, 50 Me. 409.

9. Garmire v. State, 104 Ind. 444.

10. Raising on Order. -Thus under an indictment for forgery in raising an order it is held immaterial that the drawer owed defendant more than the amount to which the order was raised. Bush v. State, 77 Ala. 83.

11. People v. Fadner, 10 Abb. (N. Y.) N. C. 462.

ery was discovered and no injury resulted; or that the forged instrument was obtained from the defendant by a trap.2

An acquittal of forging and uttering a particular forged paper will not preclude the State from proving the fact of the possession or the uttering of such forged paper in another prosecution against the same person for a crime of the same character.3

VIII. VENUE AND JURISDICTION.-The venue must be laid in the jurisdiction where the offence is committed. The crime of uttering and publishing is not complete until the paper is transferred and comes to the hands of some person other than the felon, his agent or servant.4 Thus where a note with forged indorsements is sent by the accused per mail from one county to an individual in another county, for the purpose of obtaining money or credit upon it, the crime is not committed until received by the person to whom it is sent, and the proper place of trial is the county to which the note was sent.5

1. Where an Insurance Agent Forged an Application for Insurance and notes for the premium, and sent them to his company for the purpose of fraudulently securing his commission, it was held that he could not escape conviction on the ground that the forgery was discovered and no policy issued, and the notes never became valid obligation for the payment of money. State v. McMackin, 70 Iowa, 281.

2. See Thompson v. State, 18 Ind. 386; s. c., 81 Am. Dec. 364; State v. Covington, 2 Bail. (S. C.) L. 569; Rex v. Adey, 7 Car. & P. 140; Rex v. Holden, Russ. & R. C. C. 154. As where a detective appealed to the defendant to purchase forged notes. Rex v. Holden, Russ. & R. C. C. 154.

3. Bell v. State, 57 Md. 108.

Former Acquittal-Proof of Uttering.Thus an indictment, trial, and acquittal for forging a certificate of deposit on one bank cannot be set up as a defence to a subsequent indictment for obtaining money from another bank by means of a forged letter inclosing the same certificate. People v. Ward, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 231. In this case the court say: "The two defences were distinct; the counterfeit letter and use made of it did not constitute a material ingredient in the crime of forgery. That depended upon the alteration of the certificate with the intent to defraud some person, which of itself constituted a crime. The offence alleged in this indictment was committed to carry into effect more successfully the other defence; but has no more necessary connection with it than the setting fire to a dwelling-house for the purpose of the more effectually concealing the perpetration of a larceny has to the larceny itself."

8 C. of L.-32

4. Com. v. Searle, 2 Binn. (Pa.) 332; s. c., 4 Am. Dec. 446; Perkin's Case, 2 Lew. C. C. 150.

Mailing as evidence of uttering. Perkins' Case, 2 Lew. C. C. 150. In the case of the United States v. Bickford, 4 Blatchf. C. C. 337; s. c., 12 Law Rep. N. S. 273, it was held that the transmitting of false papers to the pension office at Washington in support of applications for bounty lands is an offence committed at the place from which such papers were sent, and not at Washington, where received. But it is held that the inclosing of a false instrument directed to a person at W., and depositing it in a post-office box at B. to be forwarded, is not an uttering at W. United States v. Plympton, 4 Cr. C. C. 309; United States v. Wright, 2 Cr. C. C. 296.

5. People v. Rathbun, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 509,

Uttering in a Particular County, it has been held, does not justify a conviction of forgery in such county. Com. v. Parmenter, 22 Mass. (5 Pick.) 279; Rex 7. Parks, 2 East P. C. 993. In Com. v. Parmenter, the court say: "It was not sufficiently proved that the offence was committed in the county of Worcester: the evidence was only that the note was here uttered. It is clear from authority that the offence of forging in the county cannot be inferred from the fact of uttering and publishing in the county." See Spencer v. Com., 2 Leigh (Va.), 751; United States v. Britton, 2 Mason C. C. 464; 1 Chitt. Cr. L. (3d Am. ed.) 190; 3 Id. 1039 and notes.


Naked Utterance in a County.-While the mere naked utterance in a particular county is not per se proof of forgery in such county, yet it has been said that where "there are inculpatory incidents, which so

Under the laws of the United States forgeries must be tried in the district where the crime is committed. The courts of the States and territories have jurisdiction to punish the forgery of bank notes of the United States, although Congress has passed an act for the punishment of such offences; because in this act strongly intensify in such case the pre- jurisdiction of the United States at the sumption of guilt as to compel a conviction time of its enactment, does not embrace of forgery, and when so the conviction may uttering a false paper within the precincts be had for forgery, as committed in the of a custom-house. United States v. venue of the uttering." See Cohen 7. Barney, 5 Blatchf. C. C. 294; s. c., 3 Int. People, 7 Colo. 274; Lindsey v. State, 38 Rev. Rec. 46. Ohio St. 369; State v. Poindexter, 23 W. Va. 815.

The Possession of a Forged Instrument, or the Uttering of it by one in the county where the indictment is found, is strong evidence to show that the forgery of the instrument was committed by him in the same county. State v. Yerger, 86 Mo. 33. Thus it has been held that the fact that forged notes are found in possession of one in a certain county tends to show that he committed the forgery in that county. State v. Poindexter, 23 W. Va. 805. And proof that the defendant forged a note and attempted to pass it in S. county is evidence that he forged it in that county in the absence of proof where it was forged. Bland v. People, 4 Ill. (3 Scam.) 364.

Date of Forged Checks is Sufficient Evidence of the Place where it was made, if it be shown that the defendant was in that place at the date of the check and had it in his possession. State v. Jones, 1 McMull. (S. C.) L. 276; s. c., 36 Am. Dec. 257.

A check drawn in Philadelphia on Boston, in favor of the prisoner, who was then in Philadelphia, and who produces the check altered in Boston, if there be no evidence that it was altered elsewhere, it is prima facie evidence that it was altered in Massachusetts, that being the first State where it is known to be altered. United States v. Britton, 2 Mason C. C. 464.

The Forgery in Another State of Titles to Lands in Texas, or of any instrument affecting the titles to lands in this State, is an offence against the laws of the latter State, and subject to the jurisdiction conferred by article 454 of its penal code. Hanks v. State, 13 Tex. App. 289.

1. United States v. Barney, 5 Blatchf. C. C. 294; s. c., 3 Int. Rev. Rec. 46; United States v. Bickford, 4 Blatchf. C. C. 337; s. c, 12 Law Rep. N. S. 273; United States v. Britton, 2 Mason C. C. 464.

The act of March 3, 1825, sec. 3 (4 Stat. 115), being confined to offences committed in places the sites whereof had been ceded to and were under the

Transmitting False Papers to the pension office at Washington in support of an application for bounty lands is held to be an offence committed at the place from which such papers were sent, and not at Washington, where they were received. United States v. Bickford, 4 Blatchf. C. C. 337; s. c., 12 Law Rep. N. S. 273.

2. Hoke v. People (Ill.), 10 Cr. L. Mag. 274; Territory v. Ross, I Mart. (La.) 79; s. c., 5 Am. Dec. 705; Com. v. Luberg, 94 Pa. St. 85; State v. Pitman, I Brev. (S. C.) L. 32; s. c., 2 Am. Dec. 645. See People v. Kelly, 28 Cal. 423; Rouse v. State, 4 Ga. 136; Chess v. State, I Blackf. (Ind.) 198; State v. McPherson, 9 Iowa, 53; Com. v. Fuller, 25 Mass. (8 Metc.) 313; s. c., 41 Am. Dec. 509; Harlan v. People, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 207; Manley v. People, 7 N. Y. 295, 302, 303; Sutton v. State, 9 Ohio, 133; State v. Brown, 2 Oreg. 221; State v. Tutt, 2 Bail. (S. C.) L. 44; s. c., 21 Am. Dec. 508; State v. Antonio, Brev. (S. C.) L. 562; s. c., 2 Tread. (S. C.) L. 776; State v. Pitman, I Brev. (S. C.) L. 32, s. c., 2 Am. Dec. 645; Sizemore . State, 3 Head (Tenn.), 26; Jett v. Com., 18 Gratt. (Va.) 933; Hendrick v. Com., 5 Leigh (Va.), 707; Moore v. Illinois, 55 U. S. (14 How.) 13; bk. 14 L. ed. 306; Fox v. Ohio, 46 U. S. (5 How.) 410; bk. 12 L. ed. 213.

Jurisdiction of State Court.-A State court has jurisdiction to try an indictment against the cashier of a national bank for fraudulently making false entries in its books with intention to injure the bank, such acts being forgery at common law. Luberg v. Com., 94 Pa. St. 85; s. c., I Cr. L. Mag. 779.

Upon trial of defendant for forgery, it appeared that a draft was drawn by one national bank upon another; that defendant was bookkeeper in the bank, and without authority filled a draft signed in blank by the assistant cashier, issued it, and fraudulently changed his book entries to cover the crime. Held, that the punishment of the crime was within the jurisdiction of the State courts, notwithstanding the provision of U. S. Rev. Stat. sec.

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