passed; and the indictment may lay the intent to defraud either of them. Proof of an intent to defraud either, and to pass the instrument as good, though there be shown no actual intent to defraud the particular person, will sustain the allegation. State v. Cleaveland, 6 Nev. 181.

In an indictment for forgery, the person intended to be defrauded was described in the designation of the offence as one J. L., and afterwards, in the body of the indictment, as J. B. L.; and the charge was that the indorsement of J. B. L. was forged by the defendant on a bill of exchange, with intent to defraud the said J. B. L., etc. Held, that the omission of the initial of the middle name of J. B. L., in the designation of the offence, was immaterial. People v. Ferris, 56 Cal. 442.

In an indictment for forgery by alteration of an instrument alleged to have been intended to defraud the Travelers Insurance Company, of Hartford, Conn.. held, that the designation of the company as resident of that place did not amount to a misnomer. People v. Graham, 6 Park. Cr. Cas. (N. Y.) 135.

On an indictment for forging a check drawn in the name of a copartnership firm, on a banking company, it is not necessary to set out the names of all the persons who compose the copartnership; it is enough that any one person intended to have been defrauded is designated. People v. Curling, 1 Johns. (N. Y.) 320. Compare Harris v. People, 9 Barb. (N. Y.) 664.

Where, in an indictment against A for forging an assignment of a promissory note made by B to C, or bearer, the second count charged that the assignment was forged with intent to defraud C, held, that this count was valid. State v. Crawford, 2 Ind. 23.

be actually defrauded, or that any person should be in a situation to be defrauded, by the act. State v. Pierce, 8 Iowa, 231; Henderson v. State, 14 Tex. 503; Reg. v. Nash, 21 L. J. M. C. 147. It has been said, the intent to defraud is an intent that the false instrument shall be taken as genuine. Hence, the criminal intent exists though he who utters a false note or bill intends himself to protect it or take it up at maturity,-Reg. v. Beard, 8 Car. & P. 143; Reg. v. Geach, 9 Car. & P. 499; Rex v. Forbes, 7 Car. & P. 224;—or although he agrees, while uttering the paper, to take it back if it proves not to be genuine,-Perdue v. State, 2 Humph. (Tenn.) 494;-or, in case of manufacturing a deposition, he believes the statements therein to be substantially true, and he believes he should obtain the judgment sought, -State v. Kimball, 50 Me. 409.

Same-English Doctrine.-By 24 & 25 Vict. c. 98, § 44, it is provided that "It shall be sufficient, on any indictment for forging, altering, uttering, offering, dispos ing of, or putting off any instrument whatsoever, where it shall be necessary to allege any intent to defraud, to allege that the party accused did the act with intent to defraud, without alleging an intent to defraud any particular person. And on the trial of any such offence, it shall not be necessary to prove an intent to defraud any particular person; but it shall be sufficient to prove that the party accused did the act charged, with an intent to defraud." Under this statute, it is no longer necessary to specify in the indictment the particular person whom the prisoner intended to defraud, or even to prove an intent to defraud any particular person; yet the general intent to defraud, which it is necessary to prove, cannot exist unless the circumstances of the case are such that the natural consequence of the prisoner's act would be to defraud some one or other. Thus, in Reg. v. Hodgson, Dears. & B. C. C. 3; s. c., 25 L. J. M. C. 78, where the prisoner forged a diploma of the College of Surgeons with intent to induce people to believe that he was a member of the college, the conviction was quashed, because it appeared that he had no intent, in forging, to commit any fraud or specific wrong to any person. This was held on the 14 & 15 Vict. c. 100, § 6, which is in similar terms to the 24 & 25

1. Setting Out Name of Instrument. Thus it has been held that one indicted for forging an instrument cannot be convicted of forging an acceptance. Morrill v. State, 47 Ga. 17. And where the indictment described the forged instrument as a certain bond “placed as a prosecution bond in the suit in the court," etc., the indictment is not sustained by proof that the bond was placed (meaning written) on the paper containing the affidavit instituting the suit, no process having been prepared." State v. Lytle, 64 N. C. 255. But it has been held that an averment in the indictment that an instrument was forged with intent to defraud an incorporate bank is not rendered defective by the fact that the instrument, as set out in words and figures in the indictment, appears to be a check drawn upon the "cashier" of such bank. State v. Jones, 1 McMull. (S. C.) L. 236; s. c., 36 Am. Dec. 257.

Averment of Description in Indictment. -An indictment charging the forging of "a certain bond," instead of a certain paper writing purporting to be a bond, is proper. State v. McGardiner, 1 Ired. (N. C.) L. 27.

While, at the common law, an indictment for forgery, which described the spurious instrument as being a note executed and signed by," etc., would be bad for repugnancy, such an indictment is cured by the Missouri statute (§ 1821, revision 1879). State v. Chamberlain, 89 Mo. 129.

Certainty Required.-The degree of certainty required in an indictment for forgery is certainty to a common and general intent only, and not certainty in every particular and they need not aver that which is apparent to the court and appears from a necessary implication. State v. Brown, I Dev. (N. C.) L. 137; S. C., 17 Am. Dec. 562; Sherban v. Com., 8 Watts (Pa.), 212; s. c., 34 Am. Dec. 460; State v. Crank, 2 Bail. (S. C.) L. 66; s. c., 23 Am. Dec. 117.

At Common Law, forgery is the false making of any written instrument for the purpose of fraud or deceit; and the offence is sufficiently alleged in the indictment when the forgery and the allegation of fraudulent intent fully appear, although no person is set forth as intended to be defrauded. Hill v. State, 1 Yerg. (Tenn.) 76; s. c., 24 Am. Dec. 441; State v. Phelps, 11 Vt. 116; s. c., 34 Am. Dec. 672. See Arnold v. Cost, 3 Gill & J.

(Md.) 219; s. c., 22 Am. Dec. 202; Hess v. State, 5 Ohio, 5; s. c., 22 Am. Dec. 767.

Mistake in Naming.-But it has been held in some States that where an instrument is set forth, a mere mistake in naming it will not vitiate the indictment. Garmire v. State, 104 Ind. 444; s. c., 5 Am. Cr. Rep. 238; Powers v. State, 87 Ind. 97.

The Term "Receipt," when used in an indictment for forgery, imports a written instrument. State v. Bibb, 68 Mo. 286.

Averring Under Seal. -Averring in an indictment the forgery of a "deed" sutficiently imports that the false instrument made was under seal. Paige v. People, 3 Abb. App. Dec. (N. Y.) 439.

"Indorsed" held to be Tantamount to "Written Upon "in an indictment for forgery. Com. v. Butterick, 100 Mass. 12.

Mortgage. An indictment charging the forgery of "a certain instrument in writing, commonly called a mortgage, for payment of money," sufficiently imports the forgery of a sealed instrument. ple v. Dewey, 35 Hun (N. Y.), 308.

Peo

An Information for Uttering a Forged Power of Attorney, alleging the forgery only of the certificate of acknowledgment, and the annexed clerk's certificate of authentication, but sets out the uttering as of a forged power of attorney, is good; the appended certificates so far constituting a part of the completed power as to be included in the term used to designate the instrument as a whole. People v. Marion, 29 Mich. 31.

Forging and Uttering Bank Bills.-In an indictment for forging bank bills, it may be charged that, at a specified time and place, the defendant falsely and feloniously did forge and counterfeit a bank note of a designated bank, setting out a forged paper in hæc verba, and alleging that the act was done with intent to defraud a particular person or the specified bank. See State v. McLeran, 1 Aik. (Vt.) 311.

Though these offences differ from each other and vary in punishment, they may be included in the same indictment. Peo ple v. Rynders, 12 Wend. (N. Y.) 425.

A Bank Check may be Described as an order for money or as a subject of exchange in an indictment for forgery. State v. Morton, 27 Vt. 310; s. c., 65 Am. Dec. 201.

An indictment charged a prisoner with falsely making, forging, and counterfeit ing; of causing and procuring to be falsely made, forged, and counterfeited; and of willingly acting and assisting in the said false making, forging, and counterfeiting. Held, that as the indictment followed the words of the statute, it was good, though all these charges were contained in a single count. Rasnick v. Com., 2 Va. Cas. 356.

An indictment charging defendant with having in his possession a forged check, with intent to pass it as true and genuine, knowing it to be false, need not allege that he indorsed the check, which is described as payable to his order. State v. Vincent, 91 Mo. 662.

A Certified Check on a bank is an instrument which, as entirety, comes within the statute of forgery; and where evidence, received without objection, shows that any material part of it-e.g., the certificate-was forged, it is immaterial that the indictment does not specify that the forgery was of the certification, and not of the signature of the check itself. (Distinguishing 6 Car. & P. 148.) People v. Clements, 26 N. Y. 193, reviewing Clements v. People, 5 Park. Cr. Cas. (N. Y.) 337.

Forging Bond.—An indictment for forging a bond against one of the obligors therein may allege the forgery of the whole instrument by him. State v. McGardiner, 1 Ired. (N. C.) L. 27.

Forging Deed. -An indictment for forging a deed need not set forth the interest of the person alleged to be defrauded in the lands conveyed; it is sufficient that by possibility the party may be defrauded. West v. State, 22 N. J. L. (2 Zab.) 212.

indictment

Same Alteration. - An which charges a forgery to have been the alteration of an order given by the defendant, without charging that the alteration was made after it was circulated and had been taken up by him, is defective. State v. Greenlee, 1 Dev. (N. C.) L. 523.

Forgery of Receipt.-In an indictment for forgery in altering a receipt for money, paid as part of the purchasemoney of a farm, allegations of transactions of dealings between the parties, and that the original receipt was delivered to the defendant as acquittance or discharge, are unnecessary. State v. Shelters, 51 Vt. 102; s. c., 31 Am. Rep. 679.

1. 2 Bish. Cr. Proc. (3d ed.) 439.

A count in an indictment, charging that the defendant did forge and counterfeit a certain forged and counterfeited paper writing, instead of alleging the forging and counterfeiting of a certain paper writ ing merely, is sufficient according to the precedents, and is good. Duffin v. People, 107 Ill. 113; s. c., 47 Am. Rep. 431. 2. See Stone v. State, 20 N. J. L. (1 Spen.) 404; State v. Holly, 1 Brev. (S. C.) L. 35; State v. Jones, 1 McMull. (S. C.) L. 236: s. c., 36 Am. Dec. 257.

3. An indictment which describes the forged instrument as a "school voucher or check," is not uncertain. It is apparent that both are the same thing. Thomas v. State, 18 Tex. App. 213.

An indictment charging that the defendant did feloniously forge a certain check

or bill of exchange is not vicious for duplicity. A check may be described in an indictment for forgery as a check or bill of exchange. The object of the statute in permitting the forged instrument to be described by its ordinary designation was to exclude the need of designating it by its exact legal name. State v. Maas, 37 La. An. 292.

1. People v. Tomlinson, 35 Cal. 503; Moore v. State, 33 Ga. 225; Garmire v. State, 104 Ind. 444; s. c., 5 Am. Cr. Rep. 238; State v. Dufour, 63 Ind. 567; State v. Cook, 52 Ind. 574; Reed v. State, 28 Ind. 398; Com. v. Spilman, 124 Mass. 327; s. c., 26 Am. Rep. 668; Com. v. Ray, 69 Mass. (3 Gray) 441; State v. Riebe, 27 Minn. 315; State v. Fisher, 65 Mo. 437; State v. Horan (N. H.), 15 Atl. Rep. 20; Vincent . People, 15 Abb. (N. Y.) Pr. 234; s. c., 5 Park. Cr. Cas. (N. Y.) 88; People v. Shall, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 778; People v. Stearns, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 409; State v. Covington, 94 N. C. 913; s. C., 55 Am. Rep. 650; Morris v. State, 17 Tex. App. 660; Snow v. State, 14 Wis. 479; Rex v. Wilcox, Russ. & R. C. C. 50.

Alleging Instrument calculated to do Harm.—Thus if an indictment for forgery sets out in hæc verba the instrument alleged to have been forged, and it is of such a character that, if genuine, it would have created, increased, diminished, discharged, or defeated any pecuniary obligation, it need not be alleged that such would have been its effect had it been genuine. Morris v. State, 17 Tex.App.660.

Where the tendency to prejudice the rights of persons appears upon the face of the instrument, it is only necessary to aver its fraudulent nature, and set forth a copy of it. State v. Covington, 94 N. C. 913; s. c., 55 Am. Rep. 650.

Capacity to be Used as Proof. It is Not Requisite to the Validity of the Indictment that the forged instrument should appear to be one which can be used as legal proof at once, because if it is capable of being used at any time in the future it will expose the party on whom the forgery is executed to apparent risk. See Rembert v. State, 53 Ala. 467; s. c., 25 Am. Rep. 639; Langdale v. State, 100 Ill. 263; Lemasters v. State, 95 Ind. 367; Harding v. State, 54 Ind. 359; State v. Ferguson, 35 La. An. 1043; Bishop v. State, 55 Md. 138; Com. v. Costello, 120 Mass. 358; State v. Fisher, 65 Mo. 437; Fadner v. People, 33 Hun (N. Y.), 240;

Peete v. State, 5 Lea (Tenn.), 513; Reg. v. Pike, 2 Moo. C. C. 70.

Manner of Use.-It need not appear from the indictment that the instrument was capable of being used in an ordinary suit at common law against the party whose name is forged, it being sufficient that it may be used either in equity or as a defence. See Biles v. Com., 32 Pa. St. 529.

Forgery of Affidavit.-An indictment for forgery of an affidavit in detinue must set out enough of the proceedings to show that the oath was administered by proper authority and lawfully taken. Jacobs v. State, 61 Ala. 448.

An Indictment for Forgery of a Bank Bill need not allege that the bill was for the payment of money. Townsend v. People, 4 Ill. (3 Scam.) 326.

Forgery of Deed-Averments.-An indictment for forging a deed need not state that the instrument, if genuine, would have conveyed the land; it is sufficient to say that it purported to convey it. need it charge that the deed was executed or acknowledged. The word "deed" of itself imports a complete instrument. State v. Fisher, 65 Mo. 437.

Nor

An indictment for forgery of a certificate of acknowledgment to a deed, but setting forth a certificate without venue, and not averring that the commissioner of deeds, whose name was forged, had authority to take such an acknowledgment, is fatally defective. The objection may be raised after verdict. Vincent v People, 15 Abb. (N. Y.) Pr. 234; s. c., 5 Park. Cr. Cas. (N. Y.) 88.

Same Acknowledgment.-An indictment predicated upon the forging and uttering of a certificate of acknowledgment of the execution of a deed of land with intent to defraud the owner or his heirs, held to assume the validity of the conveyance itself, as between the grantor and grantee, and to be sufficient. State v. Dufour, 63 Ind. 567.

Draft or Order-Forging Indorsement.— Where a party is charged with forging an indorsement on the back of an order or draft, purporting to have been drawn by one bank upon another, proof of the existence is not required, nor is it necessary to aver the genuineness or validity of the instrument forged. State v. Pierce, 8 Iowa, 231.

Forging School Order - Averments.-— An indictment charged the uttering of a