erts, the landlord, waived his lien on the 'patch cotton' of one Venie Dixon." Held, insufficient to sustain a prosecution, because it failed to indicate that Roberts, whose name was alleged to have been forged, had any interest whatever in the "patch cotton mentioned, the words "meaning thereby that W. W. Roberts, the landlord, waived his lien on the 'patch cotton'" being only an innuendo whose office is not to supply omitted words, but to give point and direction to ambiguous language. Dixon v. State, 81

Ala. 61.

Indorsements. In an indictment for forging an indorsement, such indorsement must be averred to have been put on a document in such a way as to have a prima facie binding effect. Com. v. Spilman, 124 Mass. 327; s. c., 26 Am. Rep. 668.

Forgery by Officer Not Acting in Line of Duty-Extrinsic Averments. An indict ment for forgery by the alteration of an instrument issued by an officer acting not in the line of his proper office, but in that of another office the duties of which he had been designated to perform during a vacancy, should aver the facts necessary to show that such officer had been duly designated to act in the vacancy, and was competent to make the instrument alleged to have been altered. Averring that he issued it ex officio is not enough. United States v. Schoyer, 2 Blatchf. C. C. 59. Mortgage Indictment for forging a mortgage in the name of S., with intent to defraud S. & M., held, insufficient because it did not aver that there was any such land as the alleged mortgage described, or that S. had any title to it. People v. Wright, 9 Wend. 193; explained in Fenton v. People, 4 Hill (N. Y.), 128; and questioned in People v. Stearns, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 409.

Order for Goods.--An indictment for forgery set forth the alleged forged order as follows: "Mr. T. Hemphill-Please let Charles Shannon have one dress pattern, and oblige Theodore Points." Held, that the instrument was so uncertain that, there being no extrinsic facts averred to show its fraudulent tendency or to explain or remove the apparent uncertainties therein, a motion to quash the indictment should be granted. Shannon 7. State, 109 Ind. 407.

the named signed meant G. W. McGowen. Baysinger v. State, 77 Ala. 63; s. c.. 54 Am. Rep. 46.

Railroad Pass.-A description of the forged instrument as a railroad pass," merely, is insufficient. The circumstances showing authority of the officer whose name is forged, and the obligation of the company to honor it, must be set out in the indictment. State v. Weaver, 94 N. C. 836; s. c.. 55 Am. Rep. 647. See Com. . Ray, 69 Mass. (3 Gray) 441; Clark v. State, 8 Ohio St. 630.

Forging Receipt-Pleading-Extrinsic Facts.-Where, in an indictment for uttering a forged receipt, the instrument set out is not prima facie a receipt, such extrinsic facts must be averred as are necessary to show that the instrument would, if genuine, have the operation and effect of a receipt. An averment that the instrument set out was a receipt does not have the effect to change its prima facie character. Nor will the character of the instrument be changed by an averment that, by the rules of the bank where the instrument was used, it was upon its face a receipt. It should be shown how or in what way the instrument, if genuine, would, under the rules of the bank, have, the operation and effect of a receipt. Henry v. State, 35 Ohio St. 128; s. c., 20 Alb. L. J. 377.

An Indictment for the Forgery of an "accountable receipt for personal property, viz., an elevator ticket for wheat," alleged that the defendant "did falsely make, forge, alter, and counterfeit a certain false, forged, altered, and counterfeited accountable receipt for personal property, viz.: an elevator ticket for wheat, is of the tenor following, that is to say: 'St. Paul & Sioux City Elevator Co., St. Peter, Received of J. S., load No. 20, ticket No. 2402, account of W. B. N. or bearer, No. I Wheat, 84 5-60 bushels. M. Good, Inspector,' with intent thereby then and there to injure and defraud, contrary to the form of the statute," etc., etc. Held, that, inasmuch as no connection between the subscriber of the instrument and said elevator company appeared on the face thereof; as it cannot be contended in support of the indictment that "M. Good, Inspector," was an agent of the company;-the indictment presents the case of an accountable receipt not purporting to be signed by any authorized agent of the company and not on its face of any apparent legal effect; and, there being no averment in the indictment of any connection between said subscriber and said company which would give it such effect, the indictment was insufficient. State v.

Wheeler, 19 Minn. 98; s. c., I Green Cr. L Rep. 541.

1. Bell v. State, 48 Ark. 94; s. c., 17 Am. Rep. 40; Com. v. White, 145 Mass. 392; Com. v. Ladd, 15 Mass. 526; State 7. Shaw, 92 N. C. 768; Hess v. State, 5 Ohio 5; s. c., 22 Am. Dec. 767; Cocke v. Com., 13 Gratt. (Va.) 750; Brown v. Com., 2 Leigh, (Va.), 769: Snell v. State, 2 Humph. (Tenn.) 347, State v. Schwartz, 64 Wis. 432; United States v. Trout, 4 Biss. C. C. 105.

Thus, in an indictment under the United States Revised Statute (14 Stat. at L.; Rev. Stat. § 5418) for forging papers to be used in making entry of goods at a customhouse, need not in terms allege the existence of such goods. United States v. Lawrence, 13 Blatchf. C. C. 211. In an indictment for forging an indorsement, it is not necessary to set out the original quality of the note or the maker's name. Cocke v. Com., 13 Gratt. (Va.) 750. Compare Com. v. Spilman, 124 Mass. 327; s. c., 25 Am. Rep. 668.

Forged Bank Note.-An indictment for the felonious possession of a forged national bank note need not aver that the forged instrument purported to be a note of any designated national bank if the instrument be copied into the indictment, and, if by the terms of such copy, it purports to be such a note. United States v. Williams, 4 Biss C. C. 302.

An Instrument in the Form of a Promissory Note for the payment of "25.00 as per deed, 10 per cent, till paid" is a note for twenty-five dollars; and, in an information for the forgery thereof, no averment of extrinsic facts is necessary to show that such is its character. State v. Schwartz, 64 Wis. 432.

Forged Receipt-Averments.--In an indictment for forging a receipt, it is not

necessary to aver a liability on the part of the person charged with the offence, to the individual against whom the receipt is forged, in order to show that the latter stands in a situation to be defrauded by the former. Snell v. State, 2 Humph. (Tenn.) 347

Receipted Bill for Goods.--On indictment for forging and uttering a receipted bill for goods, held, that the instrument being set out, and purporting on its face to be the thing prohibited by statute to be forged, there was no need of further allegations to show how it was that thing, or how it could be used as an instrument of fraud, or that it was so used in fact. Com. v. White, 145 Mass. 392.

Treasury Note.-In an indictment for forging a treasury note, it is not necessary to aver that it was made in the resembance of the genuine notes. United States v. Trout, Biss. C. C. 105.

2. State v. Shaw, 97 N. C. 678.

3. Bell v. State, 48 Ark. 94; s. c., 17 Am. Rep. 40.

4. Com. v. Cary, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 47; Com. v. Houghton, 8 Mass. 107; Com. v. Whitmarsh, 4 Mass. 233: Brown v. Com., 8 Mass. 59: Com. v. Ross, 2 Mass. 373; Com. v. Cone, 2 Mass. 132; State v. Van Hart, 17 N. J. L. (2 Harr.) 327; People v. Stearns, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 409; s. c., 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 634; State v. McKiernan, 17 Nev. 224; State v. Ward, 2 Hawks (N. C.) L. 443; State v. Jones, 1 McMull. (S. C.) L. 236; s. c., 36 Am. Dec. 257; Murry's Case, 5 Leigh (Va.), 720; United States v. Williams, 4 Biss. C. C. 302.

The National Courts will judicially take notice of the existence of all national banks. United States v. Williams, 4 Biss. C. C. 302.

When the indictment charges the for

gery to have been committed by forging the signature of a person on the back of a draft with intent to defraud such person, it is unnecessary to allege that the bank upon which the draft was drawn was incorporated. State v. McKiernan, 17 Nev. 224.

In an indictment for forging, etc., to the injury of a foreign bank, it is not necessary to aver that such bank was a corporation duly created; it is enough to allege that the instrument set forth was falsely made with the intent to injure and defraud the bank. Under such an allegation, an exemplification of the act of incorporation is admissible. People v. Stearns, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 409; s. c., 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 634.

Indictment need not set forth that the bank was incorporated under the laws of the state or of the United States by a specific allegation; but if it be averred that a forgery was committed with intent to defraud a certain bank, describing it by its corporate name, and it appears that there is such a corporation incorporated by a public statute, the court will take judicial notice of such act of incorporation, and the indictment is sufficient without any further designation of the bank by its name. State v. Jones, 1 McMull. (S. C.) L. 236; s. c.. 36 Am. Dec. 257.

1. See Com. v. Simonds, 77 Mass. (11 Gray.) 306; State v. Van Hart, 17 N. J. L. (2 Harr.)327; People v. Stearns, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 409; State v. Ward, 2 Hawks (N. C.) L. 443; Owen v. State, 5 Sneed (Tenn.), 493; Jones v. State, 5 Sneed (Tenn.), 346; State v. Wilkins, 17 Vt. 151; Cady v. Com., 10 Gratt. (Va.) 776; Murry's Case. 5 Leigh (Va.), 720.

2. See State v. Van Hart, 17 N. J. L. (2 Harr.) 327; Owen v. State, 5 Sneed (Tenn.), 493; Jones v. State, 5 Sneed (Tenn.), 346.

3. Bell v. State, 48 Ark. 94; s. c., 17 Am. Rep. 40; State v. Henry, 59 Iowa, 391; State McCormack, 56 Iowa, 585, overruling State v. Nichols, 38 Iowa, 110; People v. Van Alstine, 57 Mich. 69; People v. McMillan, 52 Mich. 627; People v. Parham (Mich.), 34 N. W. Rep. 720; State v. Wood, 13 Minn. 121.

A charge of forging a document in an indictment or information does not include a charge of uttering it. State v. Snow, 30 La. An. pt. 1, 401.

An indictment for forgery which charges the defendant with forging an indorsement on a draft, and then uttering it after it had in the meanwhile been accepted by the drawee and indorsed by other parties, does not charge two offences. People v. Frank, 28 Cal. 507.

Where the first count of an indictment charged defendant with forging a certain instrument, the second count charged another person with uttering the instrument, and the indictment then proceeded to charge the defendant with being an accessory before the fact to such uttering, held, that the indictment contained but two counts. Pettes v.Com., 126 Mass. 242. Also that the offence charged against the defendant in the first count is a different offence from that charged against him in the second count; and a verdict of acquittal on the first count and of conviction on the second count is not repugnant. Pettes v. Com., 126 Mass. 242.

Where an indictment for forgery contained a count for forging and counterfeiting a note and a count for feloniously using and employing as true a counterfeit note, the verdict found the prisoner guilty of "forgery," as alleged in the indictment. Held, that an acquittal n.ust be entered on the second count. Page's Case, 9 Leigh (Va.), 683.

The Forgery and Uttering of a Bond or Note, and of the Mortgage which secures it, are connected transactions, and can be joined in the same information. People v. Sharp, 53 Mich. 523.

But it has been held that a count charging the prisoner with the forging of two distinct instruments, e. g., a mortgage and a receipt,-requiring different degrees of punishment.-is bad. People v. Wright, 9 Wend. (N. Y.) 193.

Charging Forging and Uttering Deeds.— A count in an indictment or information that charges the forgery of a deed, and also the utterance of a forged deed, is bad for duplicity. People v. Parker (Mich.), 34 N. W. Rep. 720.

There is duplicity in charging forgery, and the utterance thereof, in the same count, but not in charging joint respondents with forging a deed, and one of them with causing it to be recorded; the act of recording bears upon the intent, and is not of itself an utterance. People v. Van Alstine, 57 Mich. 69.

Election Between Counts.-An indictment contains two counts-one for forgery and one for uttering a forged instrument. Held, that the state should not have been forced to elect upon which count it would prosecute. Williams v. State, 24 (Tex. App.) 342, 6 S. W. Rep. 531.

After the evidence was concluded, the state elected to claim a conviction under the second count, and abandoned the first ouly so far as to disclaim a conviction under it, and it was not stricken out. Objection is made that thereby the second count was rendered insufficient of itself, and did not charge any offence, and could be made sufficient only by reference to and supplying its defects from the allega tions in the abandoned first count. Held, that, not having been stricken out or abandoned for any other purpose than that stated, the first count was still for all other purposes a part of the indictment, and was competent, if it could, to supply the deficiencies if any in the second count. Boles v. State, 13 Tex. App. 650.

But where an indictment charged defendants in one count with forgery, and in another count charged them with uttering the forged instrument as genuine, knowing it to be false and forged, held, that it charged two distinct and separate offences; and the State would be required, on motion, to elect on which count it would proceed. Bell v. State, 48 Ark. 94; s. c., 17 Am. Rep. 40.

Same-Discretion.-On the trial of an indictment containing two counts, one of which alleges the forging of a draft and the other the uttering and publishing of the forged draft as true, it is not error for the court to refuse to require the prosecutor to elect on which count he will proceed on trial. This is a matter in the discretion of the trial court. Miller v. State, 51 Ind. 405; s. c., I Am. Cr. Rep. 230.

1. Chester v. State, 23 Tex. App. 577. See Parker v. People, 97 Ill. 32; Boles v. State, 13 Tex. App. 650; Sprouse v. Com., 81 Va. 374; s. c., 21 Rep. 702. Duplicity. An indictment which in separate counts charges forgery, and the utterance of a forged instrument knowing it to be forged, is not vulnerable to a motion to quash upon the ground that it is duplicitous and charges two offences; nor is it obnoxious to the objection that two distinct and separate felonies are charged in the same indictment. Boles v. State, 13 Tex. App. 650. Charging Forgery of Check and Indorsement. An indictment which charges the forgery of a check and the indorsement in one count, and the uttering of both in a second count, is not obnoxious to the objection of duplicity. Sprouse v. Com., 81

Va. 374; s. c., 21 Rep. 702.

2. The person whose name is forged is a competent witness for the state in the prosecution of forgery. Hess v. State, 5 Ohio, 5; s. c., 22 Am. Dec. 767; State v. Bateman, 3 Ired. (N. C.) L. 474; Pope v. Nance, I Stew. (Ala.) 354; s. c., 18 Am. Dec. 60; People v. Sharp, 53 Mich. 523; State v. Phelps, 11 Vt. 116; s. c., 34 Am. Dec. 762.

A judgment was obtained against A and his surety, B. B paid a part of the judgment, and took the constable's receipt, which he fraudulently altered so as to make the sum larger. Afterwards A settled with B, and repaid him what appeared by the receipt to have been paid by B. Held, on an indictment against B for forgery, that A was a competent witness. State v. Bateman, 3 Ired. (N. C.) L. 474.

English Rule.-According to the rule in England, a person whose name appeared on forged paper, who was interested in setting the instrument aside, was not permitted to give evidence to prove the forgery, although he was competent to prove all collateral matters; and this rule was adopted, and at one time prevailed, in several of the states of the Union, notably in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and Connecticut. This rule, however, was never extended to those cases where the witness had no real interest in the conviction; as where he is cashier or other agent of a bank, the note

of which had been forged. Com. v. Hutchinson. I Mass. 7; s. c., 2 Am. Dec. 1; State v. Hamilton, 2 Hayw. (N. C.) L. 288; Hess v. State, 5 Ohio, 5; s. c., 22 Am. Dec. 667; Resp. v. Ross, 2 Yeates (Pa.), 8; Resp. v. Ross, 2 U. S. (2 Dall.) 239; bk. 1, L. ed. 364; State v. A. W., I Tyler (Vt.), 260; Rex v. Crocker, 2 Bos. & Pul. 88.

The English rule was adopted in New York in 1794; but in 1809, in the case of People v. Howell, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 296, Kent, C.J., says that since that time the question of English interest of witness has been investigated and defined with more precision both in England and New York, though the resolution of the party in case of forgery has become an anomaly in the line of evidence; and it would seem to be, if proper, that the rule should be no longer applied. See Hess v. State, 5 Ohio, 5, 8; s. c., 22 Am. Dec. 767, 770.

The English rule excluding persons having an interest in the forged instrument was abolished in England by express statute, 9 Geo. IV. c. 32; and in this country it was considered by Mr. Greenleaf as having been changed by more recent decisions. He says (1 Greenl. on Ev. § 414) that "In America, though in some of the earlier cases the English rule of exclusion was followed, yet the weight of authority excluding the latter decision is quite the other way, and the witness is now almost universally held admissible," citing Com. v. Waite, 5 Mass. 261; Com. v. Frost, 5 Mass. 58; People v. Dean, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 27; People v. Howell, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 296, 302; State v. Stanton, 1 Ired. (N. C.) L. 424; Simmons v. State, 7 Ohio, 116; Pennsylvania v. Farrell, Addis. (Pa.) 246; Resp. v. Keating, 1 U. S. (1 Dall.) 110; bk. 1, L. ed. 59.

Admissibility of Confessions. In the prosecution for forgery, as in other cases, the confession should never be admitted in evidence when the defendant was influenced thereto by any threats or promises. State v. Walker, 34 Vt. 301; State v. Phelps, 11 Vt. 116; s. c., 34 Am. Dec. 672. See State v. Guild, 10 N. J. L. (5 Halst.)

163; s. c., 18 Am. Dec. 404: Com. v. Knapp, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 496; s. c., 20 Am. Dec. 491; Hector v. State, 2 Mo. 166; s. c., 22 Am. Dec. 454; State v. Crank, 2 Bail. (S. C.) L. 66; s. c., 23 Am. Dec. 117.

Confession of Accomplice.-But in Com. v. Knapp, supra, it was decided that the confession of an accomplice may be in writing, on the promise of exclusion from punishment if he would turn state's evidence, are admissible against himself should he refuse to testify on behalf of the government on the trial of his principal.

1. People v. Sharp, 53 Mich. 523.

2. Rounds v. State, 78 Me. 42; 6 Am. Cr. Rep. 266; State v. Henderson, 29 W. Va. 147.

In the case of Rounds v. State, 78 Me. 42; s. c., 6 Am. Cr. Rep. 266, the question by defendant's counsel, whether witnesses were indebted to the person whose name was alleged to be forged, was held to be properly excluded.

3. Allen v. State, 79 Ala. 34; People v. Marion, 29 Mich. 31; Montgomery v. State, 12 Tex. App. 323.

Criminal Intent is a necessary and essential constituent of the crime of forgery, and, like every other issue in the case, must be conclusively established by the evidence. Montgomery v. State, 12 Tex. App. 323.

Parol proofs as to the manner in which the prisoner read the note to the witness, to whom he offered it, is admissible, to show the quo animo with which it was made and uttered,-Butler v. State, 22 Ala. 43; and evidence of transactions had between the defendant and the person alleged to have been defrauded, after the delivery of the note, is admissible, if it it tends to show that the note was used with a fraudulent intent, and to secure a valuable benefit from the person to whom it was delivered. People v. Phillips, 70 Cal 61.

The Law Presumes the Intent to be to Defraud any person who may suffer a loss by receiving such paper as genuine.