FENUS. That which produced interest on money. 1 A Latin word used in the expression fanus nauticum, of agreements made when money is lent on the hazard of a voyage.* FOLIO. A certain number of words in legal documents; in conveyances, deeds, etc., the folio is seventy-two words; in Parliamentary proceedings, ninety words.3 By statute in Michigan the folio is one hundred words.4 threshed barley which had grown on land in the occupation of the owner, to a mill to be ground into meal for feeding the owner's pigs. They repassed on the same day, laden with barley-meal obtained from the mill, the produce of another parcel of barley grown by the same owner on the same land, and previously sent to be ground into meal for the same purpose. It was held that the horse and cart were exempt from toll under the above General Turnpike Act; for that both the barley and the barleymeal came within the description of "fodder for cattle," Cockburn, C. J., saying: In this case I think that the justices were right in holding that the exemption, from liability to toll did exist. It is true that the application of barley or barley-meal as food for cattle may be a modern practice. But the words of the act of Parliament are wide enough to include them within the exemption and the principle of exemption applies. It has been held that clauses of this nature are to be construed liberally in favor of agriculture. No doubt there is some difficulty at first sight in saying that barley in the course of transit to a mill for the purpose of being ground into meal, to be afterwards eaten by cattle, is already fodder for cattle; but giving a fair and liberal construction to the words of the statute, I think that everything which is ultimately destined to be used as food for cattle is fodder for them, although it may not have gone through the final process which will make it such. Otherwise, this absurd and inconvenient consequence would follow, that if a man passed through a toll-gate with barley intended, in its natural state, as food for cattle, he would be within the exemption; but if he had a crushing machine on his own premises, to reach which with the barley he had to pass through the gate, he would be liable to toll, because of his intention to crush the barley before giving it to his cattle. So, again, it would be strange if a man who was taking turnips to be boiled before giving them to his cattle, as is done in parts of Scotland, was not exempt from toll in respect of them. A variety of similar instances might be adduced. The safer course is to construe the act liberally, in accordance with the spirit in which such enactments ought to be construed, and to hold that the exemption extends to corn destined for the consumption of cattle, although at the time that the exemption is claimed it is in an intermediate stage towards being made into fodder for them." Clements v. Smith, 3 El. & El. 238. 1. The Encyclopædic Dictionary. 2. The terms are also applied to contracts for the repayment of money borrowed, not on the ship and goods only, but on the mere hazard of the voyage itself: when a man lends a merchant £1000, to be employed in a beneficial trade, with condition to be repaid with extraordinary interest in case such a voyage be safely performed; which kind of agreement is sometimes called fanus nauticum, and sometimes usura maritima, 2 Blackst. Com. 458; 2 Stephen's Com.93. 3. The Encyclopædic Dictionary, sub voce. 4. The term "folio," when used as a measure for computing fees or compensation, shall be construed to mean one hundred words, counting every figure necessarily used as a word; and any portion of a folio, when in the whole draft or paper there shall not be a complete folio, and when there shall be any excess over the last folio, shall be computed as a folio. Compiled Laws of Michigan (1871), § 7459. Compare Howell's Annotated Statutes (Mich. 1883), § 9034. This law has been followed in a Michigan case, in which the plaintiffs, publishers of a newspaper in the village of Sturgis. St. Joseph's county, Michigan, brought suit against the village for the amount of a printing bill. The claim was disallowed on the ground that the publication had been made without any order of the village board, although it was in evidence that some of the village officers took notices to the plaintiffs for publica tion. The court, Cooley, J., confirmed, however, the instruction to the jury, that a legal folio was one hundred words. Thornton v. Sturgis, 38 Mich. 639. applicable to this matter, preserves the provisions of the County Courts Act, 1867, as to costs only in cases where relief is sought which can be given in the county court. The present action being an action of libel, which could not be brought in the county court, that section does not apply. It is contended that, because before the act the costs would not have followed the event,' inasmuch as the damages obtained by the plaintiff did not amount to a certain sum, therefore the plaintiff does not come within the words of the proviso. In other words, that the true construction of the proviso is that the words 'shall follow the event' mean shall follow the event according as before the act they would or would not have done so. This would require a very considerable interpolation of words into the order, and such as we ought not to make unless some overwhelming necessity for it could be shown to exist either with reference to the intention of the act or the authority of previ ous judicial decisions. . . The manifest object of the act was to assimilate the practice of law and equity, and to make one rule for all divisions of the one court... Here, according to the ordinary meaning of the words, the event was entirely in favor of the plaintiff, and the enactment is that the costs shall follow that event.' The reason of the thing is all in favor of giving the words of the order their plain, natural meaning. Whereas before the act the question of costs was often a very difficult one, depending on a multiplicity of statutes, and the rule differed in different courts, now this one short order is to govern them in all cases in a manner intelligible to everybody." Parsons v. Tingling, L. R. 2 C. P. Div. 119. FOLLOW.-To go or come after, hence to succeed or come after, go with, accompany, as in the phrase follow the event.1 To pursue ;2 1. Follow the event.-In an action for libel the plaintiff upon the trial recovered one farthing damages. His counsel asked the trial judge to certify for costs, but the judge refused to do so, or to interfere one way or the other. The plaintiff claimed that he was entitled to costs under the Judicature Act, 1875, Order LV., as follows: " Subject to the provision of the act, the costs of and incident to all proceedings in the high court shall be in the discretion of the court; provided that where any action or issue is tried by a jury, the costs shall follow the event,' unless upon application made at the trial for good cause shown, the judge before whom such action or issue is tried, or the court, shall otherwise order." The master, however, refused to tax the costs, on the ground that the plaintiff having recovered less than forty shillings was not entitled thereto. The plaintiff contended that the above order operated as a repeal of all the previous statutes as to costs; the defendant argued that there was no express repeal of the previous enactments with regard to costs in the Judicature Act or Rules; that a reasonable construction might be given to the proviso to Order LV. without interfering with the special provisions of the previous statutes as to costs in particular cases; and that by following the event the order meant that the result as to costs was to follow on the finding of the jury in the same manner as it would have done before the act. The court held the plaintiff entitled to costs, Lord Coleridge, C. J.. saying: We are called upon to construe the words of Order LV. There is no doubt that, according to the law that existed previous to the Judicature Act, the plaintiff would not get his costs in this case, inasmuch as the plaintiff only got a farthing damages, and the judge declined to certify or to interfere one way or the other. No question arises in this case of any application to the discretion of the court with regard to costs. The whole matter turns therefore upon the meaning of the words in the proviso to the order, the costs shall follow the event.' It must be observed that the order is made subject to the provisions of the Act,' and we do not intend to express any doubt that those words govern the proviso as well as the previous part of the order but they do not appear to affect the present case, inasmuch as sec. 67 of the Judicature Act, 1873, which appears to be the only section This ruling was followed in Field v. Great Northern Railway Co., L. R. 3 Exc. Div. 261; Myers v. Defries, L. R. 5 Exc. Div. 15; s. c., L. R. 5 Exc. Div. 180. See EVENT. See also Garnett v. Bradley, L. R. 3 App. Cas. 944. 2. Follow up.-Where a statute (Gen. Stat. tit. 12, § 123) made it a crime "to disturb or break the peace, or stir up and provoke contention and strife, by following or mocking any person with scur rilous or abusive or indecent language, or gestures, or noise;" and where it appeared that there had been a controversy between one charged with such a crime and another person, in which the accused had become greatly excited, and on the To walk in, to practice, as a profession or business.1 FOOD. (See also ADULTERATION.)—Any substance which, taken into the body, is capable of sustaining or nourishing the living." FOOT. The extremity, bottom, or end of anything. An ex next day he assailed the other party with scurrilous and abusive language,-the court held that whether it was a "following up" within the meaning of the statute, or not, it was clearly a mocking, McCurdy, J., saying: "As to the following up.' It seems that on the 28th of May a controversy had arisen between the parties, and that the accused had become very much enraged against Kerley, and so continued until the next day, when he went to the place where Kerley was, and abused and insulted him in the manner recited in the information. It would not be a strained interpretation to call this conduct a following up.' But however that may be, the outrageous acts of the accused clearly amount to a mocking, within the purview of the statute.' State v. Warner, 34 Conn. 276. 1. Follow his business.-A policy of insurance against accident contained a proviso that in case such accident shall not cause the death of the insured immediately, but shall cause any bodily injury to the insured of so serious a nature as wholly to disable him from following his usual business, occupation, or pursuits, the company will pay to the insured a compensation in money at the rate of £5 per week during the continuance of such disability." The insured, a solicitor, and registrar of a county court, sprained his ankle severely, and was con fined to his bedroom for some weeks, being unable to get down stairs. He was prevented from passing his accounts as registrar, and from attending at various places at which he was required to complete purchases for his clients. In an action brought on the policy of insurance, it was held that inasmuch as the plaintiff was so disabled as to be incapable of following his usual occupation, business, or pursuits, he was "wholly disabled from following his usual occupation, business, or pursuits within the meaning of the policy.' Hooper v. Accidental Death Ins. Co., 5 Hurl. & N. 546. 2 But in statutes the use of the word is generally limited to certain kinds or quantities of food. Thus, where a by-law of the District of Columbia provided that no person shall buy any provision or articles of food in the market, and during the market hours aforesaid, for the purpose of selling the same again in the said market, or in any part of the city; nor shall any person out of the market buy up any provision or article of food coming to said market,— under the penalty of six dollars for every offence." The court decided that ryechop (which was food for horses) was not provision," nor an "article of food," within the meaning of the by-law. (Burch's Dig. p. 119. art. 9.) Botelor v. Corporation of Washington. 2 Cranch C. C. (U. S.), 676. And statutes which provide that the necessary food for exempt stock shall be free from execution have been held not to exempt food for animals which the debtor does not possess, and has no present purpose of obtaining. Cowan v. Main, 24 Wisconsin, 569; King v. Moore, 10 Mich. 538; Farrel v. Highley, Denio & Hill (N. Y.), 87. But under a New York statute which enacts that "all sheep, to the number of ten, with their fleeces, and yarn or cloth manufactured from the same," shall be exempt from execution (2 R. S. 255. § 169, sub. 4), it was held that the fleeces, or the yarn or cloth manufactured from the fleeces, of ten sheep are exempted from execution while in the hands of a householder, whether he be or be not the owner of sheep. Hall v. Penny, II Wend. (N. Y.) 44. 3. Thus, where a woman died, leaving a will written on the first, second, and third pages of a sheet of foolscap paper, and the last clause appointing executors ended in the middle of the third page, the remainder of the page being left blank, while the attestation clause and the signatures were written at the top of the fourth page, a caveat was entered by one of the next of kin, on the ground that the deceased had signed her name at the bottom of the first and second pages, but not on the third page. The court, however, granted probate, as the case was clearly within Lord St. Leonard's Act, 15 & 16 Vic. c. 24, § 1, passed June 17, 1852, which provides as follows: Where, by an act passed in the first year of the reign of her Majesty Queen Victoria, intituled An Act for the amendment of the laws in respect to wills.' it is enacted that no will shall be valid unless it shall be signed at the foot or end thereof, by the testator, or by some other person in his presence, and pression of linear measurement.1 Sometimes used figuratively, by his direction. Every will shall, so far only as regards the position of the signature of the testator, or of the person signing for him as aforesaid, be deemed to be valid within the said enactment as explained by this act, if the signature shall be so placed at, or after, or following, or under, or beside, or opposite to the end of the will, that it shall be apparent on the face of the will that the testator intended to give effect by such his signature to the writing signed as his will; and that no such will shall be affected by the circumstance that the signature shall not follow or be immediately after the foot or end of the will, or by the circumstance that a blank space shall intervene between the concluding word of the will and the signature, or by the circumstance that the signature shall be placed among the words of the testimonium clause, or of the clause of attestation, or shall follow or be after or under the clause of attestation, either with or without a blank space intervening, or shall follow or be after or under or beside the names or one of the names of the subscribing witnesses, or by the circumstance that the signature shall be on a side or page or other portion of the paper or papers containiag the will, whereon no clause or paragraph or disposing part of the will shall be written above the signature, or by the circumstance that there shall appear to be sufficient space on or at the bottom of the preceding side or page or other portion of the same paper on which the will is written, to contain the signature, etc." Hunt v. Hunt, L. R. 1 P. & D. 209. Foot of the Mountain.-Where, in a deed, land was described as bounding on the mountain," and "by the mountain," and "at the foot of the mountain," it was held that these words were too indefinite and uncertain to control the courses, distances, and other references in the deed descriptive of the land, the court, Wilde, J., saying: "In the description of the lands in the deeds and locations in question they are bounded partly by the mountain,' or 'on the mountain,' or 'the foot of the mountain.' These references we consider as too indefinite and uncertain to control the courses and distances, and other references by which these lots are described. The foot of the mountain is the most definite reference. But the foot of the mountain may in many cases be uncertain, the rise being so gradual and inconsiderable. The other references are still more loose and indefinite. A mountain lot may be described as bounding on all sides by the mountain. So, if a lot is described as beginning at known monuments, and extending, according to the courses and distances named, far up the side of a mountain, or to its summit, and is there bounded by the mountain,' or 'on the mountain,' there would be no necessary inconsistency in the description, so as to render the construction doubtful." The question was therefore held to be one both of law and fact as to whether these words excluded or included a certain part of the mountain, and as such must be submitted to the jury. Williston v. Morse, 10 Metc. (Mass.) 17, 26. 1. Where a contract was made for the delivery of a certain number of trees, not less than one foot high, it was held that it was competent for the defendant in an action of covenant for the value of the trees delivered to show what, in the usage of the trade, was meant by trees "one foot high," such evidence tending to explain a doubtful contract, not to contradict an explicit one, the court, Nevins, J., saying: "But it is further objected, that the court below overruled legal and material evidence offered by the defendant on the trial. To get at the point of this objection, it is necessary to refer again to the written contract, which provides in terms that the trees to be delivered were not to be less than one foot high. The plaintiff proved that the trees delivered were one foot high, measuring from the top of the root to the top of the stem. The defendant then proved that, after his return home, he caused these trees to be counted and measured, and that, according to such measurement, there were only 9000 of a foot high and upwards, and that the rest were rejected, as falling short of that measurement. The mode of measurement adopted by the defendant (according to the evidence) was from the top of the root to the extent of the ripe or hard wood, and not to the top of the stem. It became apparent, then, that the discrepancy in the count and measurement of the trees by the different witnesses arose from the different modes of measuring adopted by them. The defendant then offered to prove by witnesses that the mode adopted by him was the lawful and proper rule; that it was the rule well known and practised by all dealers in that article from the commencement of the trade until the time when this contract was made; that this custom as in the phrase, "to set on foot," that is, to set in action, to start, put in motion. 1 or usage of measuring mulberry-trees, from the top of the root, or bottom of the stem, to the extremity of the matured or hard wood, was uniform and universal in the execution of all contracts for the sale and delivery of the article, made by dealers therein; that the plaintiff himself and those from whom he had acquired his title to the trees in question were dealers in the article, residing in the neighborhood where that usage prevailed, and were well acquainted with it. All this evidence was offered with the avowed purpose of explaining the true intent and meaning of the parties to this contract touching the phrase 'one foot high,' and not to alter, contradict, or even modify the terms of the contract. This evidence was overruled on the trial, and, I think, erroneously. It is no answer to say that 'tree is a word of precise and definite signification, or that a tree' is a 'tree,' and can be nothing else, and that everybody knows what a tree is. It is the qualification contained in the contract that we are to consider in this case. The trees were to be at least a foot high. This involves the question of measurement, and how were they to be measured -while standing and growing in the ground, or after they had been dug from it? Were they to be measured from the extreme root to the extreme branch (both of which are parts of the tree), or in what other mode were they to be measured, in order to determine their height? It seems to me that the inquiry proposed by the defendant was legitimate and proper, and tended to settle an ambiguity in one part of the contract. It is a well-settled rule of law, that contracting parties are always presumed to make their contracts with reference to the general custom and usage that appertains to the subject-matter of their contract, if any such general custom prevails; and all ambiguous terms or phrases used in expressing such contract may be explained by resorting to such general usage. . . . But, apart from the reasonable and well-settled principle of the law of evidence, the nature of the thing contracted for and the object of the parties rendered the evidence lawful. The defendant was the purchaser of these trees, and in his contract he provided that they should be one foot high. For what purpose? Why a foot high rather than six inches high? The plain and obvious answer is, that he might have a tree which, when divided into parts, would produce, when planted, a tree from every part, that is, that each part would vegetate. But all the witnesses proved that the part of the tree which did not consist of ripe or hard wood was entirely worthless, had not in itself a power of vegetation, but, as soon as the tree was removed from the ground, wilted and died. How, then, could the parties have contemplated that worthless part of the stem of the tree as a portion to be paid for by the terms of the contract?" Barton v. McKelway, 2 Zabriskie (N. J.), 165, 173. 1. In this sense it is used in the 6th section of the act of Congress of the 20th of April, 1818, entitled "An Act for the punishment of certain crimes," which reads as follows: "That if any person shall, within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States, begin, or set on foot, or provide, or prepare the means for any military expedition or enterprise, to be carried on from thence against the territory or dominion of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district or people, with whom the United States are at peace, every person so offending shall be deemed guilty of a high misde meanor," etc. In charging the grand jury upon this section, McLean, J., said: "To this section your attention is specially solicited. You will observe that the enumerated acts which constitute the offence are all in the disjunctive. To 'begin' the military expedition spoken of is an offence within the statute. To begin it, is to do the first act which may lead to the enterprise. The offence is consummated by any overt act which shall be a commencement of the expedition, though it should not be prosecuted. Or if an individual shall set the expedition on foot,' which is scarcely distinguishable from beginning it. To set it on foot may imply some progress beyond that of beginning it. Any combination of individuals to carry on the expedition is 'setting on foot,' and the contribution of money or anything else, which shall induce such combination, may be a beginning of the enterprise. To provide the means for such an enterprise' is within the statute. To constitute this offence, the individual need not engage personally in the expedition. If he furnish the munitions of war, provisions, transportations, clothing, or any other necessaries, to men engaged in the expedition, he is guilty, for he provides the means to carry on the expedition. It must be against a nation or people with |