whom we are at peace." Charge to the Grand Jury, 5 McLean (U. S.), 306.

1. By the terms of a contract of insurance upon the body, tackle, apparel, etc., of a propeller, the insurers were not to be liable for the bursting of the boilers." While the vessel was proceeding on the voyage the boilers burst, whereby the body, tackle, etc., and the boilers were blown to pieces, and sank and became destroyed. In an action upon the policy of insurance, it was held that the insurers were not liable for the damage resulting to the vessel, the court, Denio, C. J., saying: “The complaint was apparently drawn with a view to prevent the question of construction arising upon the exception contained in the policy. As the solution of that question depends upon the particular language used, we must assume that the averments contain verbally accurate extracts from the contract. The position of the defendant, upon that language, is that the insurers were not to be liable for the consequences to the vessel, and its equipments and furniture, resulting from the bursting of the boilers; while the plaintiffs claim that the exemption from liability is limited to damage from the boiler alone. Upon questions of this kind the first resort is to the terms used. It is not said in express language that the defendant is not to be liable for any loss occasioned by the explosion of the boiler, but the expression is more deep, and perhaps more indefinite. The company is not to be liable for bursting of the boilers.' It is unquestionably loss or damage of some kind and to some subject, to which the liability is declared not to extend. The kind of damage was that which would naturally or probably result from such an accident. Such an occurrence would

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necessarily injure and would probably destroy the boiler itself, but it would also be likely to injure the vessel, and might, as it did in this case, sink and destroy it. The meaning of the sentence depends much on the force of the word 'for.' The defendant was not to be liable for bursting the boilers. In my opinion, it is to be understood in the sense of on account of,' by reason of,' or because of.' The word is familiarly used in such a sense; and these are among its established definitions. A man is said to be liable to pay damages for the commission of a trespass, or to be imprisoned for stealing another's property. What the defendant was not to be liable for by this clause were the consequences of the bursting of the boilers. The plaintiffs took the risk of these consequences upon themselves. The nature and extent of the consequences which were embraced in the scope of the provision is another question. They were something which the insurers would be liable for, or which it was supposed they would be liable for, but for the special provision. The breaking to pieces and sinking of a vessel which was seaworthy at the commencement of the voyage, by a peril insured against, is a thing for which an insurer is of course liable, and the explosion of the boilers of a steam-vessel, without the fault of the assured, is, upon the conces sion of the counsel on both sides, a peril embraced in this policy. The plaintiff's claim to recover is based wholly upon that position. It has been so held in several cases in this country, and I am not aware that it has ever been contradicted. Strong v. Sun Mutua lIns. Co., 31 N. Y. 163.

For or on account of.-In an action of assumpsit the plaintiff gave in evidence

the following receipt: "Received of Captain E. Smith, 50 barrels of provisions, for account of David M'Kinstry. "ROBERT PEARSALL.

'5th December, 1803."

It appeared that Pearsall gave this receipt to the master of a vessel, the provisions having been sent to him, as he offered evidence to show, to sell upon commission. He further offered evidence to show that this was his uniform custom, and that he never sold otherwise; that the provisions in question were sold by him at a credit of 60 days, to persons at that time in good credit, and their note taken for the amount; that the purchasers failed before the note fell due, and that the defendant was obliged to take it up. Of all of which he had informed the defendant. Upon this evidence the judge charged the jury that the plaintiff was entitled to recover, and the jury found accordingly. Upon a motion to set aside the verdict, it was held that the receipt was not evidence of a sale of the provisions, and that parol evidence was admissible to show that the provisions were in fact received to sell on commission, and so far to explain the written receipt, the court, Spencer, J., saying: "If the receipt had been in terms more explicit than it is, it would be open to explanation: I mean that kind of explanation not directly contradictory to, but consistent with it. With respect to papers of this kind, the courts have permitted the party to show mistake, fraud, and imposition in obtaining them. It is not necessary in this case to go so far, as the receipt itself is perfectly equivocal, and from the mere reading of it no one could say whether the provisions were received to go on an account held by the defendant against the plaintiff, or whether the defendant meant only to acknowledge that though the provisions were received from Captain Smith they were received by the defendant for or on account of David M'Kinstry. I should understand the receipt to import the latter, for several reasons: because there is no sum mentioned at which they were received, and because for account' denotes with more propriety the ownership of the property, rather than that they were received on an account against him." M'Kinstry v. Pearsall, 3 Johns. (N. Y.) 319.

Where a declaration stated that one J. was indebted to the plaintiff in £17 115.. and thereupon, in consideration that the plaintiff would, for and on account of the said sum, accept the joint and several promissory of J. and one E. for payment thereof six months after date, and would

thereby give time to J. for the payment of said debt, the defendant promised to pay the said sum, if the said promissory note were not duly honored and paid; and then averred that the plaintiff, confiding in the said promise, did then accept and receive the said promissory note, for and on account of the said sum so due to him from Johnson as aforesaid, and did give time to Johnson for payment thereof, from thence until hitherto,-it was objected by the defendant that the plaintiff was only to give time "thereby" (that is, by taking the note), until the note became due, and that there was no averment that he gave time by taking the note. The court held that the giving a bill for and on account of " is prima facie an agreement to forbear enforcing payment of the debt until the bill be due, Pollock, C. B., saying: "I am of opinion that the plaintiff is entitled to the judgment of the court. With respect to the last objection, the declaration expressly shows not only that the plaintiff did give time by receiving the note, but that he received it under circumstances which compelled him to give time; the case of Kearslake v. Morgan (5 Term Reports, 513), having decided that a creditor who receives a negotiable instrument for and on account' of a debt is presumed to have received it in present satisfaction, and the receipt operates as a suspension of the remedy on the debt." Walton v. Maskell, 2 Dowl. & L. 410.

But the receipt of such negotiable instrument, is a suspension only of the debt, not an extinguishment, unless the instrument be paid. Thus in an action of debt containing two counts, one account by the drawer against the acceptor of a bill of exchange, the other a count upon an account stated, a plea was entered that the acceptance of the bill of exchange was the account stated, and that the debt was the same. To this a replication was filed by way of new assignment, to which the rejoinder was, that after the accruing of the said debt, so newly assigned, the plaintiff drew a bill of exchange upon the defendant for that amount, which the defendant accepted and delivered to the plaintiff, who then took and received the same of and from the defendant "for and on account of." and in payment and discharge of, the said debt. The verdict was for the defendant, whereupon the plaintiff took a rule to show cause why judgment should not be entered non obstante veredicto, which rule the court made absolute, Whiteman. J., saying: "It has been very properly admitted in this case that if the

words in the plea had been only for and and on account of,' the subsequent part of the plea would have rendered the plea bad; for it would appear that the bill was given as a collateral security, which would suspend the cause of action whilst running, but could have no effect when the collateral security failed and the original liability revived. The defendants' counsel, however, contends that the words here used are equivalent to 'satisfaction,' and that therefore the plea in effect states an extinguishment of the plaintiff's cause of action. It is a pity, if it was so meant, that the word 'satisfaction,' which the law knows, was not used. I am always inclined to distrust supposed equivalents. It is plain that if the words 'in payment and discharge of' do not amount to 'satis faction,' these words are not rendered stronger by the insertion of the words for and on account of." McDowall v. Boyd, 6 Dowl. & D. 149.

A captain of a barge, in the exclusive service of its owner, who was remunerated with half the earnings of the vessel, and had no authority to take any other cargoes but those appointed for him, on one occasion, although ordered to bring the barge back empty from a certain place, and forbidden to take a particular cargo, nevertheless loaded such cargo in the barge, returned therewith, and received £4 in payment. He did not profess to carry the cargo or receive the freight for his master, and the person paying the money did not know for whom he paid it. The captain declared that the barge came back empty, and never accounted for the freight. On indictment found, the jury rendered a verdict of guilty against the prisoner, as a servant of the owner of the barge, of embezzling £2; but the court held that he was not guilty of embezzlement, as the money was not received or taken into possession by him "for, or in the name of, or on the account of, his master or employer," within 24 & 25 Vict. C. 96, §68; Borill, C. J., saying: "In the former act relating to this offence were the words 'by virtue of his employment." The phrase led to some difficulty, for example, such as arose in Reg. v. Snowley (4 C. & P. 390) and Reg. v. I arris (Dears. Cr. C. 344). Therefore in the present statute those words are left out; and section 68 requires instead that in order to constitute the crime of embezzlement by a clerk or servant the 'chattel, money, or valuable security. . . shall be delivered to, or received, or taken into possession by 8 C. of L.-6

him "for, or in the name, or on account" of his master or employer.' These words are essential to the definition of the crime of embezzlement under that section. The prisoner here, contrary to his master's orders, used the barge for his, the servant's, own purposes, and so earned money which was paid to him, not for his master, but for himself; and it is expressly stated that there was no proof that he professed to carry for the master, and that the hirer at the time of paying the money did not know for whom he paid it. The facts before us would seem more consistent with the notion that the prisoner was misusing his master's property, and so earning money for himself, and not for his master. Under those circumstances, the money would not be received for,' or in the name of,' or 'on account of,' his master, but for himself, in his own name, and for his own account. His act, therefore, does not come within the terms of the statute, and the conviction must be quashed." The Queen v. Callum, L. R. 2 C. C. R. 28.

For or in behalf of.-In discussing the question whether a principal or his agent is the party liable upon a negotiable instrument, and in what way this question is to be determined, Gray, J., says: "Upon the question what words in a simple contract, made by the hand of an agent of an individual or private corporation, will bind the principal, the line of distinction between the cases, even in the same court, is very narrow. Thus it is well settled that a promissory note made by an agent, without naming his principal in the body of it, but signed

For C. D., A. B.,' or 'A. B., agent for C. D.,' or A. B.,' for C. D.' is the note of C. D., the principal. See Long v. Colburn, 11 Mass. 97; Emerson v. Providence Hat Mfg. Co., 12 Mass. 237; Ballow v. Talbot, 16 Mass. 461; Rice v. Gove, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 158; Paige v. Stone, 10 Metc. (Mass.) 160; Ex parte Buckley, 14 M. & W. 469. But it seems to be equally well settled in this court, and supported by English authority, that the mere insertion of 'for' or 'for and in behalf of' the principal, in the body of the note, does not make it the contract of the principal, if signed by the mere name of the agent, without addition.' Barlow v. The Congregational Society in Lee, 8 Allen (Mass.), 460.

Thus where one covenanted "for himself, his heirs." etc., and under his own "hand and seal," for the act of another, he was held personally bound by his covenant, although in the deed he de

scribed himself as covenanting "for and on the part and behalf" of said other person, the court saying:

"It is impossible to contend that where one covenants for another he is not to be bound by it; the covenant being in his own name for himself, his heirs,' etc. There was nothing unusual or inconsistent in the nature of the thing, that one should covenant to another that a third person should do a certain thing, as that he should go to Rome. The party to whom the covenant is made may prefer the security of the covenantor to that of his principal. Here the defendant covenants 'for himself,' not in the name of his principal, and puts his own seal to it. There is nothing against law in it, if he will bind himself for his principal. He probably consented to it upon an indemnity.'

Appleton v. Binks, 5 East, 148. For Cash.-See CASH. For Cause.-See CAUSE. For Collection.-See AGENCV; BANKS AND BANKING; COLLECTION.

Collection Agencies.-Where a collection agency received acceptances at their office, and gave a receipt for them "for collection," it was held that by giving such receipt they undertook themselves to "collect, not merely to remit for collection," to some responsible attorney; and having sent the acceptances to one of their agents, who collected the money and failed to pay it over, they were liable therefor, the court, Agnew, J., saying: "It is argued, notwithstanding the express receipt for collection,' that the defendants did not undertake for themselves to collect, but only to remit to a proper and responsible attorney, and made themselves liable for diligence in correspondence, and giving the necessary information to the plaintiffs; or in briefer terms, that the attorney in Memphis was not their agent for the collection, but that of the plaintiffs only. The current of decision, however, is otherwise as to attorneys at law sending claims to correspondents for collection, and the reasons for applying the same rule to collection agencies are even stronger. They have their selected agents in every part of the country. From the nature of such ramified institutions we must conclude that the public impression is correct that the agency invited customers on the very ground of its facilities for making distinct collections. It must be presumed, from its business connections at remote points, and its knowledge of the agents chosen, the agency intends to undertake the performance of the service which the individual customer is unable to perform for

himself. There is good reason therefore to hold that such an agency is liable for collections made by its own agents, when it undertakes the collection by the express terms of the receipt. If it does not so intend, it has it in its power to limit responsibility by the terms of the receipt. An example of this limited liability is found in the case of Bullitt v. Baird, decided at Philadelphia in 1870-the only case in this State upon the subject of such agencies. There the receipt read for collection according to our direction,' and proceeds: When received by us, to be paid over to King & Baird.' Across the face of the receipt were printed these words: 'N. B. The owner of the within mentioned taking all the risks of the mail, of losses by failure of agents to remit, and also of losses by reason of insurrection or war.' The limitation of the liability of Bullitt and Fairthorn by Mr. Bullitt, himself a good lawyer, is evidence of his belief that a greater liability would arise without the restriction. Recurring to the analogy of attorneys at law, the first point to be considered is the interpretation given by the courts to the terms of a receipt for collection.' In our own State we have several decisions in point.

In Riddle v. Hoffman's Ex'r, 3 Penrose & Watts (Penn.), 224, Riddle, an attorney in Franklin county gave a receipt in these words: Lodged in my hands a judgment bill, granted by Henry H. Morwitz to Henry Hoffman, for the sum of $1200, due with interest since the 15th of May, 1811, which is entered up in Bedford county, which I am to have recovered if it can be accomplished.' Riddle sent this bill to his brother, a practising lawyer in Bedford. The money was made by the sheriff, but by the neglect of the Bedford Riddle was not received from the sheriff, who became insolvent, and the money was thus lost. Hoffman sued the Franklin county Riddle on his receipt and recovered. On a writ of error it was contended that the words of the receipt which I am to have recovered if it can be accomplished,' imported only a limited undertaking to have it collected by another, and not to collect it himself. But this court held that the receipt contained an express and positive undertaking for the collection of the money, if practicable, and not merely for the employment of another to that end; and that the defendant was bound by every principle of moral and legal obligation to make good the collec tion of the judgment by the application of reasonable diligence, skill, and attention.

"The next case is Cox v. Livingston, 2 W. & S. (Pa.) 103. This was the receipt: Received of Mr. Thos. Cox, of Lancaster, Pa., for collection," a note drawn in his favor by Mr. Dubbs, calling for $497.65, payable three months after date.' The note was left with an instruction to bring suit. The receipt was dated August 30th. 1837. and Livingston died in January following without having brought suit. Dubbs became insolvent. It was held that Livingston was liable for the collection,' though only two terms intervened between the receipt and his death.

"Krause v. Dorrance, 10 Barr (Pa.), 462, was assumpsit against two attorneys for money collected and not paid by another attorney to whom they sent the note, for collection.' The liability of the original attorneys 'for the collection' was admitted, but the point was made and succeeded, that a demand before suit was necessary. Rogers, J., says expressly they were liable for the acts of the agent whom they employed, but being without fault themselves, a demand was necessary before a resort to an action.

"In Rhines v. Evans, 16 P. F. Smith (Pa.), 192, the receipt was: 'Received "for collection" of A. Rhines, one note on Lukens & Beeson, of Rochester, dated October 30, 1857. for $365.' The liability of Evans, the attorney. was conceded, and the question was on the Statute of Limitations, and it was held the action was barred by the lapse of seven years and five months from the date of the receipt. These cases show the understand ing of the bench and bar of this State upon a receipt of claims for collection.' It imports an undertaking by the attorney himself to collect,' and not merely that he receives it for transmission to another 'for collection,' for whose negligence he is not responsible. He is therefore liable by the very terms of his receipt for the negligence of the distant attorney, who is his agent, and he cannot shift responsibility from himself upon his client. There is no hardship in this, for it is in his power to limit his responsibility by the terms of his receipt when he knows he must employ another to make the collection. Bullitt v. Baird, supra. We find cases in other States holding the same doctrine.

"In Lewis & Wallace v. Peck & Clark, 10 Ala. 142, both firms were attorneys. The defendants gave their receipt to the plaintiffs for certain notes for collection,' and after collecting the money transmitted it to the payees in the notes

instead of the attorneys who had employed them, the payees having, however, indorsed the notes. Held, that Peck & Clark were liable to their immediate principals, the plaintiffs, there being no evidence that the payees had given them notice not to pay over to Lewes & Wallace, the original attorneys. This is a direct recognition of the liability of the collecting attorney to the transmitting attorney.

"The case of Pollard v. Rowland, 2 Blackf. (Ind.) 22, is more directly in point. Rowland received from Pollard claims 'for collection,' and sent them to Stephen, an attorney in another county. Stephen obtained judgment, and collected the money. Held, that Rowland was accountable to Pollard for the acts of Stephen to the same extent that Stephen was, and could make no defence that Stephen could not; and that Rowland was liable to Pollard for the money.

Cummins v. McLain et al., 2 Pike (Ark.), 402, was a case nearly similar to the Pennsylvania case of Krause v. Dorrance, 10 Pa. St. 452. The attorney sent the claim to another attorney at a distance, and was held liable, but for the omission of the plaintiff to make a demand he failed to recover. The court say the attorney is liable for the acts of the attorney he employs.

"In a Mississippi case two attorneys, Wilkison & Willison, received of the plaintiff a claim for collection,' and brought suit and obtained judgment. They dissolved partnership. Wilkison retiring from the practice; and Willison took another partner, Jennings, who received the money from the sheriff. In a suit against Wilkison, as surviving partner of Willison, he was held liable for the receipt of the money by Jennings. Wilkison v. Griswold. 12 Smedes & Mar. (Miss.) 669. In view of these reasons and authorities, we hold that a collection agency, such as the defendants have been found to be, receiving and remitting a claim to their own attorney, who collects the money and fails to pay it over, is liable for his neglect." Bradstreet v. Everson, 72 Pa. St. Rep. 124. 133.

Where a note was indorsed "Pay to Rock County National Bank, Janesville, Wisconsin, for collection," and the indorsement signed by the payee or owner of the note, it was held that it merely made the indorsee agent for the indorser to collect the note, and did not vest in him such title as to make him a proper party plaintiff in a suit on it; the court, Gilfillan, C. J., saying. Two witnesses swear that the plaintiff is the