self to be concerned,' may institute proceedings, each in his own name. Parsons on Marine Ins. 44 et seq.

"In Pennsylvania, one decision doubts the right of a person not named in the policy to bring covenant upon it, but does not dispute his right, when interested and intended to be embraced by the terms thereof, to maintain assumpsit De Bolle v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 4 Whart. (Pa.) 68.

"In a recent Maine case this question was directly presented, and Appleton, C. J., said: A suit in a case of loss may be maintained upon such policy in the name of the party effecting the policy or in the name or names for whose benefit it was made, and who are and are intended to be insured under the clause **on account of whom it may concern,' or some similar form of expression, although they are not named in the policy.' Sleeper v. Union Ins. Co., 65 Me. 385. Here the part owner of a vessel effected a policy for the benefit of whom it may concern, and upon his death his administratrix was allowed to maintain an action on the policy. In Barnes v. Union M. F. Ins. Co., 45 N. H. 21, 28, the adjudications are collected which hold that the agent obtaining the policy for whom it may concern may bring an action in his own name. It is noticeable that in each of these cases last referred to the action was assumpsit." Note to 16 Am. Dec. 317, 323.

Contracting for.-In Minnesota, in the year 1876, a law was passed entitled "An Act providing for a lien for labor upon logs and timber," which declared in section 14 that this act is intended only for the protection of laborers for hire, and shall not inure to thebenefit of any person interested in contracting, cutting, hauling, banking, or driving logs by the thousand." In the same year one D. made a contract with one S. for cutting, hauling, and banking a lot of pine logs for S. D. made a sub-contract with E. for hauling and banking these logs, or a portion of them. E. performed labor on this sub-contract to the value of $219. only $5 of which was paid him. S. sold and assigned his logs to K. In the meanwhile E. filed his affidavit of his services for the purpose of having a lien on the logs for the amount due him, and brought suit against D. and his assignee K. therefor. The court below entered judgment in favor of the defendant K., on the ground that E. was not entitled to a lien on the logs under the above statute. Laws 1876, c. 89; Gen. Stats. 1878, c. 32. §§ 63-77. But on appeal the Supreme Court held

It is

that this was error, Berry, J., saying: "We are of opinion that the design and effect of these provisions of statute are to give the lien mentioned to every person performing the specified kinds of manual labor (that is to say, labor with his own hands, upon logs or timber. It is apparent that section one, standing alone, would have this effect, at least. But that section is explained and possibly limited by section 14, which declares that the act is intended for the protection of laborers for hire, that is to say, for the protection of those who do labor or work in person. This is an explicit declaration that all such laborers are within the act, and entitled to the lien for which it provides. It is not reasonable to suppose that it could have been the intention of the legislature to impair this explicit declaration (made by way of explanation and construction) by the latter provision of the section in which it occurs. This latter provision should therefore, if possible, be so read as to be consistent with the explicit declaration mentioned. obviously inserted for the purpose of distinguishing the contractor (that is to say, the person who takes contracts for the performance of work, which he employs others to do) from a laborer who works himself. We think that the latter provision of section 14 is to be read by omitting the comma found in the printed statute after the word 'contracting.' This is equivalent, in sense, to inserting the word 'for' after the word 'contracting,' so that the provision would read that the act shall not inure to the benefit of any person interested in contracting for cutting, hauling, banking, etc. The punctuation of a statute is of little or no consequence, being ordinarily the work of clerks and printers; and the reading which we suggest not only makes sense, but is consistent with the preceding provisions and the general spirit of the act. We think it sufficiently appears, from the admission of plaintiff and the findings of the court, that the work in this case was performed by the plaintiff as a laborer, not as a contractor." King, Admr. of Emery, v. Kelly, 25 Minn. 522.

For the future.-Where a decree had been made in relation to certain leaseholds held in tenancy under a charity, namely, Hemsworth Hospital, to the effect that, the court being fully satisfied by the original constitutions of the hospital, as likewise by certain former de crees, that the tenants had a tenant-right of renewal of said leases from the hospital, and ought therefore to have beneficial leases thereof made to them, the

court declared and ordered that the plaintiff should pay "for the future" for the whole but 150 pounds per annum reserved rent to the hospital. On a question of further renewal of the leases, the court, Sir William Grant, M. R.. said: "Some stress was laid in the argument on the words for the future,' as imply. ing that in all time to come the plaintiff should have leases made to him at the rent then directed to be paid. The court declared that the said complainant should pay for the future' but 150 pounds per annum reserved rent to the said hospital. It is quite clear that the words for the future,' as here used, could have no such meaning as is ascribed to them, for Lord Cowper had declared that the rent should not be a fixed rent; and it was reduced so low in that instance as 150 pounds, only with reference to the amount of the fine, which was estimated as equal to 60 pounds per annum of rent, and on account of the sum expended in improvements, which was considered as equiva lent to 121 pounds per annum of rent. Upon these data the rent was fixed at 150 pounds, which was not to be the rent payable in all time to come, and there fore the words for the future' cannot here have that meaning.' Watson v. Hemsworth Hospital, 14 Vesey, Jr., 324, 339.

""

For giving. The statute 2 G. II. c. 24, s. 7, for bribery at an election, provides; "If any person who hath or claimeth to have a vote, etc., shall ask, receive, or take any reward by way of gift, loan, or other device, or agree or contract for any money gift, office, employment, or other reward, whatsoever, 'to give his vote, or to refuse or forbear 'to give his vote, in such election, "etc., he shall be liable to a certain penalty. A voter received money after an election for having voted for a particular candidate, but no agreement for any such payment was made before the election. An action for debt for penalties under the statute was brought against him; and the first series of counts in the declaration stated that the defendant, having a right to vote at the said election, did receive of and from one W. S. a large sum of money "for giving his vote, etc. A second series charged that the defendant, before the election took place, did agree with the said W. S. to receive a sum of money "to give" his vote, etc. At the trial the above facts were proved, and it was objected that the evidence did not support any count in the declaration, as the charge in the first series did not constitute an offence within the statute, unless

the words "for giving" in those counts were read " to give." The judge reserved the point, and left the case to the jury, who found for the defendant upon the counts charging the previous agreement, and for the plaintiff upon the others. A rule was then obtained to enter a nonsuit, which the court made absolute. It was argued against the rule that the words "to give," used in the seventh section of the statute, were to be construed "for having given," or the mischief would be very imperfectly rem edied, as it is equally criminal to receive money for having voted as for promising to vote, and the commission of bribery would be very much facilitated if it were necessary to show a pre-existing agreement; for the very practice of giving money after an election may raise an expectation of similar payments in future, which will produce quite as much effect upon the minds of the voters as any express promise would do. But Bayley, J., said: "The offence, in the terms of the act, is receiving or agreeing to receive a reward to give' or to forbear to give' a vote; the plain meaning of which is

in order that' he may give or forbear to give his vote. The words used are clearly prospective, not retrespective; and such an operation it probably was the intention of the legislature to give them when the act passed. Other parts of the statute may assist us in forming a judgment as to that intention. The first section prescribes an oath to be taken by each elector that he has not received any sum of money, etc., or any promise or security for any money, etc., in order to give his vote. It has been argued that the mischief is as great if money be received for having voted as if it be taken in pursuance of an agreement to vote. Admitting that it be so, still it is plain that the oath only applies to that which passes before the election. The legislature might very easily have introduced into that clause the words, that the voter would not receive money, etc., for having voted, had it been intended to make that an offence." It was further objected that the words "for giving" meant "for having given," and if that be not within the statute, the motion should have been in arrest of judgment, so that the opinion of a court of error might be obtained. But to this the court said, by Bayley, J.: "As to the second question, whether this motion to enter a nonsuit be a proper one, it seems to me that the objection was properly taken at the trial. and does not arise upon the record. If the declaration had stated that the money

was received 'for having given' and not ⚫ for giving' his vote, it would have been otherwise. The expression for giving' does not necessarily mean 'for having given.' but is clearly equivocal. Now if an ambiguous expression be used in the declaration, that is cured by verdict, and must afterwards be construed in that sense which would sustain the verdict. Avory 7. Hoole, 2 Cowp. 825. If, then, it be no offence to receive money for having voted, but it is an offence to receive it in order to give a vote, we should be obliged to presume after verdict that the ambiguous words for giving' were used in the latter sense; and as there was no evidence given at the trial sufficient to support such an allegation, I am of opinion that a nonsuit must be entered." Huntingtower v. Gardiner, 1 B. & C. 297.

For hire or gain.-Section 37 of stat. 7 & 8 G. IV. c. 75, enacts that if (with certain exceptions), "any person not a freeman of the company of watermen and lightermen of the Thames, or apprentice to a freeman or freeman's widow, shall act as a waterman or lighterman, or ply, or work, or navigate any wherry, lighter, or other craft, from or to any place or places, or ship or vessel, within the limits of the act, for hire or gain,' he shall forfeit not exceeding £10." Henry Tibble was convicted under this act, and appealed against the said conviction. At the time of the commission of the alleged offence the appellant was not a freeman of the company of watermen, etc., nor entitled to act thereas, nor to work or navigate "for hire" on the river, within the limits of the act. He was the servant of the Great Western Railway Company, and employed, at a fixed weekly salary, for the purpose of assisting in the working and navigating of the company's barges. He did so navigate a barge over a portion of the course within the limits of the act, the barge being rowed by two persons other than the appellant, also servants of the railway company, and not freemen of the watermen, etc. The appellant had the command of the barge, and directed it and steered it. At a certain point in the course a freeman of the company of watermen and lightermen, by arrangement with the railway company, met the barge with his wherry, took it in tow, and towed and worked it for the remainder of the course. Whilst he was so engaged in working the barge with his wherry, the barge was being steered by the appellant. Upon these facts it was argued that the appellant did not “ply, or work, or navigate 'for hire or gain;'

that these words were not intended to designate what is ordinarily called plying on the river; they were not applicable to a person who works in the boat merely in his character of servant of the owner of that boat, employed on the boat. But the court affirmed the conviction, Whightman, J., saying: "It is contended that the appellant did not do this 'for hire or gain,' because he was employed as servant on board the vessel. But that clearly is acting 'for hire or gain.' Reg. v. Tibble, 4 El. & Bl. 888. For her own use.-Where the rights of husband and wife have not been altered by statute, the meaning of these words is sometimes important, thus: "If a gift or legacy, whether specific or otherwise, be given to a married woman, 'for her own use, and at her own disposal,' or direct that the wife's receipt should be a sufficient discharge, notwithstanding any present or future coverture, without other words, this vests the beneficial interest separately in her; and in these cases, if no other trustee be appointed, a court of equity will treat the husband merely as a trustee, and compel him to act accordingly. But if the bequest be to a married woman for her own use and benefit' without adding the words and at her own disposal,' especially if there be bequests to men by the same words, the wife does not take a separate interest, but her husband is entitled." I Chitty Gen. Prac. 61.

An illustration of this may be found in the will of Thomas Marvin, as follows: "I give and bequeath unto my daughter Charlotte, wife of James Abbott of, etc.. the sum of £200 to and for her own use and benefit.'' A commission of bankruptcy issued against James Abbott, and his assignees claimed the £200 legacy. It was held by the Vice-Chancellor, Sir John Leach, that this could not be considered as a gift to the separate use of the wife; following Wills v. Sayers (see infra); Roberts v. Spicer, 5 Maddock, 491.

The case cited above was as follows: J. Kilwick by his will bequeathed to Sayers certain moneys in trust, to apply them and the dividends arising therefrom for the sole and separate use and benefit of his daughter, Mary Wills. And he bequeathed all his household and other goods, plate. linen, etc., unto the same daughter, for her own use and benefit," and appointed Sayers sole executor of his will. The question was, whether the words for her own use and benefit,” used in the residuary bequest. gave the daughter, who was a married

woman, a separate estate. And the court held that it did not, Sir John Leach, V. C., saying: A court of cquity will excute a trust for the sole and separate use of the wife, when the intention of the donor to that effect is unequivocally declared. A gift to the wife for her own use' is no declaration of such an intention; and it is difficult to find any substantial distinction between a gift to a wife 'for her use,' and a gift to a wife 'for her own use,' But if such a distinction could prevail in another case, it could not govern this case. Here the testator, as to the same person with respect to another gift, has appointed a trustee, and expressly directed the application of it to her sole and separate use; he knew, therefore, the technical form of excluding the right of the husband; and I cannot infer that as to this legacy he intended what he has not expressed." Wills v. Sayers, 4 Maddock, 409.

For said firm.-A recent case on this phrase, decided in Kentucky in 1887, and not yet reported in the State Reports, appears in the form of an abstract in one of the journals, as follows: "Attorney and Client-Contract.-S. and others having formed a partnership for the purpose of managing and operating a lottery, entered into a written contract with two attorneys, who were not partners, employ. ing them as special counsel 'for said firm,' and agreeing to pay them $500 per month during the existence or operation of said lottery,' the contract reciting that it was in consideration of the services of said attorneys in bringing about and consummating the arrange ment of business interests between said parties, and the services to be performed by them in the protection of said business.' After thirteen months the firm was dissolved, and appellant, one of the attorneys, having been paid at the rate agreed for the thirteen months, was notified that his services were dispensed with. S. then formed a partnership with others, and continued the operation of the lottery until his death. Appellant now brings this action against appellee, the wife of S., who, as executrix and devisee of S., has been running the lottery since his death, to recover $500 per month from the time of the dissolution of the first firm up to the commencement of this action." And the court, Pryor, C. J., held that under appellant's contract the relation of attorney and client existed as long as the firm with which the contract was made continued to exist, but no longer; and was not perpetual, binding all who might by succession

or contract assume control of the lottery to employ its attorney, under the contract. Lochrane v. Stewart, 8 Kentucky Law Reporter, 25; s. c., 2 Southwest. Rep. 903.

For his services.-Jane D. Poineer, by her will, after providing for the payment of her debts, etc., bequeathed several legacies, and among them one to Henry B. Duncan, in the following language:

Eighth.-I give and bequeath to Henry Benson Duncan, 'for his services' in assisting me at different times, the sum of two thousand dollars." Henry B. Duncan was one of her executors. The will was duly probated, and when the executors' account was filed it appeared that the estate was insufficient to pay all the legacies in full, and also that the executors asked allowance for the payment of the legacy to Duncan, by an item of discharge. To this item an exception was filed. The executors did not offer any proof that services had been in fact rendered by Mr. Duncan to the testatrix, for which an obligation to pay existed at her death, but relied entirely upon the will to justify their payment. The court sustained the exception, McGill, Ordinary, saying: The burden of proving that a general legacy is entitled to priority is upon him who asserts it, and the proof must be clear, conclusive, and unequivocal. Titus v. Titus, 11 C. E. Gr. (N. J.) III, 117; Shepherd v. Guernsey, 9 Paige (N. Y.), 357. There is nothing in this bequest to Mr. Duncan or in the will to indicate that the testatrix intended that this bequest should be paid before the other legacies. The expression for his services in assisting me at different times' does not, standing alone, import an indebtedness from her to the legatee for which payment may be exacted by process of law. For aught that appears to the contrary, the services may have been rendered gratuitously, and the legacy may have been given in grateful recognition of them. That the legacy was given because of a sense of moral obligation, or as compensation for services or other favors rendered as a mere voluntary courtesy, will not, if no legal obligation to pay exist at the death of the testatrix, constitute such a valuable consideration as to entitle the legacy of priority in payment. Coppin v. Coppin, 2 P. Wms. 291; Turner v. Martin, 7 De G. M. & G. 429; Towle v. Swasey, 106 Mass. 100. More than six years elapsed between the making of the will and the death of the testatrix, yet no evidence was offered to show that if a legal indebtedness to Mr. Duncan existed at the

making of the will, its payment was enforceable when the testatrix died. The burden of proof, which was upon the executors, was not discharged by the simple production of the will.' Duncan v. Franklin Township, 43 N. J. Eq. 143; s. c., 10 Atl. Rep. 546.

For the time being.-Where the charter of the borough and town of Weymouth and Melcombe Regis provided that the election of mayor was to be made by a majority of an assembly, composed of certain several definite parts of the corporation and other burgesses and inhabitants" for the time being," and on a quo warranto filed against one M., charging that he exercised the office of mayor of said borough without any legal warrant, it appeared that at the time of M.'s election to the mayoralty one of the several parts of the corporation, namely the "principal burgesses," of whom the original number was twenty-four, was reduced to eight, by the neglect of those authorized to fill the number up, it was contended that the words "for the time being or the major part of them" must refer to the then existing body, assembled at the time of election, inasmuch as this phrase is applied to other burgesses and inhabitants of the borough, as well as the "principal burgesses." the former of which being an indefinite body, the phrase must have been necessarily intended to apply to the major part of the then existing body. But the court held that, one of the integral parts being reduced below a majority of its proper number, the election was void; Lord Ellenborough, C.J., saying: No grammatical construction will admit that the words 'for the time being' should refer merely to the word inhabitants' as the antecedent last named; they must certainly refer to all the constituent parts of the corporation before named. The only doubt which can be or has been raised in this and other cases is, whether those words do not confine the description to the actually existing state of the corporation at the time of the election? But for this there is no foundation. It is clear that 'for the time being' means no more than hodierne diurne. A corporation is a fluctuating body, changing its members from day to day. Certain persons are first named in the charter, on whom the powers are in the first instance conferred nominatim, as they die, the same powers are to be continued to others who succeed them. To such the words for the time being' refer in succession. The king grants to A, B, etc., who are named as mayor and

aldermen in the charter, certain powers; and then he continues the same powers to all other persons who 'for the time being' shall be mayor and aldermen. This is the plain meaning of the words, which obviate all kind of difficulty in the misconstruction of them as applied only to the existing majority at the time. The same words occur in the case of The King v. Bellringer, 4 Term Rep. 810, and received the same construction." The King v. Morris, 4 East, 17, 26.

In the case cited in the paragraph above, the charter required that the mayor and common clerk for the time being," and the common council "for the time being," or the major part of them, should all the officers and ministers of a borough. The common council was a definite body consisting of thirty-six members. On a quo warranto it appeared that at an election this common council had been reduced to eighteen in number, and that the election was made by a majority of that number; and it was held that a majority of the whole number must meet to form an elective assembly; and that if the corporation be so reduced as that so many do not remain, no election can be had at all. The King v. Bellringer, 4 Term Rep. 810.

For this day and train only.-A passenger purchased a ticket at a station for a certain point, just as a train was approaching, and going towards that point. After he had boarded the train, he found that it did not stop at the station for which he had taken his ticket, and he was obliged to get off some distance short of his destination and to continue his journey on foot. The ticket was marked, "For this day and train only." He sued the railroad company for selling him a ticket for a train which, as he claimed, was represented to him as about to proceed to his destination and deliver passengers there. He did not claim that this was expressly told him by any representative of the company, but he alleged a custom of the railroad only to sell tickets for approaching trains; and that the marking of the ticket was a representation, when so sold, that the train then coming would stop at the place for which the ticket was sold. The court, Irving, J., held the fact of the alleged custom was not sustained by the evidence, and on the other point said: "Finally, it was contended that, the ticket being marked, 'For this day and train only,' this was of itself a representation. Clearly it was not. Had it been marked 'Good for train No. 26 only,' which train he took, the contention would be plausible; but it was not so marked. Being a