first-class ticket, the evidence is all one way-that it was good till used; and, if it were not, it was good for that whole day, and any train going to Stanton that day, so that he could have taken another train. The ticket's statement could certainly not deceive." Daling v. Phila., Wilmington & Baltimore R. Co., 66 Md. 120; s. c., 27 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 84.

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For the use.-A deed conveying a tract of land containing beds of iron ore, and owned by an iron company, contained the following reservation: "And further referring to the said company the right of mining on the above granted premises, 'for the use' of said company, an amount of ore not exceeding," etc. It was claimed by the grantor that under this clause it had a perpetual right to mine and carry away ore from the land to the extent and upon the terms so provided, and that this right was assignable; while the grantee contended that the right was limited to the actual purposes of the iron company. The court, Wells, J., said "It is contended that the language, 'for the use of said company,' is a restriction upon the exercise of the rights reserved to the grantor, limiting the purposes for which alone mining could be done; that as the Stockbridge Iron Company at that time was authorized only to manufacture pig-iron at Stockbridge, and to mines only for its own use, these limits of its corporate powers are to be im ported into the deed, and thus furnish the measure of those purposes. Upon this construction the rights would not be assignable, and would have ceased or become suspended when the Stockbridge Iron Company ceased to carry on its business of manufacture at Stockbridge, and sold its furnaces. But we cannot give so restricted a construction, even against a grantor, to language which is commonly employed in conveyances and thereby has acquired a well-known significance. When so employed the phrase is expressive of the right of appropriation or enjoyment, rather than descriptive of the purposes or mode of the use. It does not call for any extrinsic aid for its inter pretation. The meaning contended for is not the natural and ordinary one. There is nothing in the context, or in the application of the language to the subjectmatter, which creates an ambiguity; and we think the facts in regard to the corporate powers of the grantor, and the entertained purpose of discontinuing its business, are so far extrinsic as not to be competent to raise an ambiguity for the purpose of setting it against the more obvious sense of the terms used." Stock

bridge Iron Co. v. Hudson Iron Co., 107 Mass. 290. 324.

For that. This is an expression used in declarations to set forth a positive allegation. It is thus discussed in Hammond's Nisi Prius: " 'A consequence resulted from the special terms in which these newly invented formulæ (i.e., writs on the case) were conceived, affecting the structure of the declaration which followed them. It is a maxim in law, regulating alike every form of action, that the plaintiff shall state his complaint in positive and direct terms. and not by way of recital. For that' is a positive allegation; for that whereas' (in Latin quid cum) is a recital. In a general writ nothing more than the point of the action, in other words, the very cause of complaint, was set forth; and as the declaration ought not to vary from the writ, it will follow that in all declarations founded upon the brevia formata, the allegation for that' must be used in describing the grievance. But in special writs a recital of those circumstances which lead to and serve to introduce the cause of action invariably precede it, and therefore the declaration properly enough commences with the words for that whereas,' to which alone the collateral introductory clauses have reference." Hammond's Nisi Prius, 9.

A curious illustration of this difference is to be found in an early Massachusetts case, in which it was held that a declaration for trespass for an assault and battery is sufficient, though it begins "For that whereas," etc., by way of recital. The judge, Parsons, C.J., in an opinion much too long to quote at length on a matter of law so antiquated, examines the question and the various cases supporting it from the earliest times. This opinion will be found in Coffin v. Coffin, 2 Mass. 358.

For and during.-Where in a deed creating a lease the habendum was in the following form: "to have and to hold said demised premises to said lessees for and during their pleasure, etc., the court held, upon an examination of the whole instrument, that these words did not create a strict tenancy at will, but a covenant for perpetual enjoyment by the lessees; Ladd, J., saying: "It is said, further, that this instrument creates simply a tenancy at will, because by its terms the lessees may terminate it at their pleasure. The words are, 'to have and to hold said demised premises to said lessees for and during their pleasure.' It is not contended but that a lessor may, by express covenant, grant an estate the duration of which shall depend upon the

pleasure of the grantee, and when that is done there can be no pretence that the estate so created is a tenancy at will in the ordinary legal signification of the term. The question here is, what are the meaning and intention of the parties in this respect as shown by the language of the habendum above quoted, read in the light thrown upon it by the rest of the instrument? One covenant is, 'And the said parties agree with each other that all the covenants and agreements herein contained shall extend to and bind their legal representatives.' The inquiry now is, not what estate is created by this clause, but what effect, if any, is to be given it upon the question whether the estate created is or is not a strict tenancy at will, as claimed by the defendants. On its face this clause appears to be important, and must have been so regarded by the parties. It could not have found its way into the instrument without some design. It must have been understood to have some meaning and effect. It certainly cannot be stricken out as senseless or repugnant, and there can be no doubt but that we must give it some effect, if possible. Putting this clause and the words in the habendum together, it reads, 'to have and to hold said demised premises to said lessees and their legal representatives for and during their pleasure.' Now, whatever else may be meant by the term 'legal representatives' of the lessees, it certainly does not mean the lessees themselves. It is equally certain that it must mean some person or persons to whom the demised premises may legally pass from the lessees, and this, to say the least, implies an assignment either by operation of law or by the act of the lessees themselves. The clear intention, then, was to create an assignable estate. That being so, the intention was not to create a strict tenancy at will, for that is not an interest or estate capable of assignment. The bearing of this covenant, therefore, upon the construction of the words in the habendum which we are considering would seem to be conclusive that they were intended as an express covenant for an estate greater than a tenancy at will. Whether that estate was understood by the parties to be a feesimple, or an estate for life, or a term the length of which was at the option of the lessees, is of no consequence so far as regards this point. It is sufficient that they intended to create an estate which might be conveyed by assignment, and not a mere tenancy at will. The words in the habendum are at least equally ca. pable of a construction to tally with the

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obvious intention of the parties as thus expressed; and without going further, we have no hesitation in holding that such is the construction they must receive, and therefore that the estate granted is not a simple tenancy at will." Cole v. Lake Co.. 54 N. H. 242, 276. That for" is sometimes equivalent to "for and during" has been held in two Kansas cases, under the following circumstances: On a judgment of foreclosure and sale, the sheriff advertised and charged fees for publishing the notice of sale in four consecutive issues of a weekly newspaper. The judgment creditor filed a notice to tax these costs except for one publication in the newspaper, the property not having sold for as much as his judgment, and the district court allowed the taxation on the ground that the statute only required one publication in a newspaper. The language of this statute (sec. 457 of the Civil Code) was, "public notice of the time and place of sale, for at least thirty days before the day of sale, by advertisement in some newspaper. The sheriff excepted, and the supreme court sustained the excep tion, Brewer, J., saying: "Is one insertion of the notice in the newspaper sufficient, or must it be continued through the successive issues of the paper up to the day of sale? The language is, public notice of the time and place of sale, for at least thirty days before the day of sale, by advertisement in some newspaper.' The preposition 'for' as used in the language quoted requires, as it seems to us, an insertion in each successive issue of the paper up to the day of sale, the first one being more than thirty days prior there

to.

In the authority cited by counsel the language was, at least sixty days,' the preposition for being omitted. The difference is obvious." McCurdy v. Baker, II Kan. III.

This case was subsequently followed where judgment of foreclosure and for sale of mortgaged premises was entered and the property was sold at the sheriff's sale and bid in. The district court set the sale aside because only one publication was inserted in a newspaper thirty days before the day of sale. The purchaser of the property appealed, and on the argument cited Craig v. Fox, 16 Ohio, 563. The supreme court sustained the order of the lower court, Brewer, J., saying: "This question was before the court in the case of McCurdy v. Baker, II Kan. 111, and we see no reason to change the views therein expressed. True, our attention was not then called to the case of Craig v. Fox, 16 Ohio, 563, in which a

different view of a precisely similar statute seems to have been entertained by two justices of the supreme court of Ohio. No decision was made, however, in that case upon the question, the other two justices apparently concurring with the views expressed by this court. The statute requires public notice for at least thirty days before the day of sale by advertisement, etc. The question turns upon the force of the word 'for' in the language quoted. It seems to us to be nearly equivalent to the word 'during.' Such is the common signification of the word, and unless it have that meaning here it is entirely superfluous. If the legislature intended that a single insertion in the paper should be sufficient, they would have expressed this intention much more clearly by omitting 'for' and saying only "at least thirty days.' Whitaker v. Beach, 12 Kan. 492.

In the Ohio case above cited, in which the court, on motion to confirm a sale, set the sale aside because the notice had been published in a paper not of general circulation in the county, only one publication was made, under a statute (Swan's Stat. 474) similar to the Kansas statute. The court, Birchard, C. J., used the following language: "It is urged that these words require consecutive insertions of the notice during the period of thirty days. This construction of the statute has been practised upon very generally in many parts of the State, and were it possible that private rights could be injuriously affected by not adopting and sustaining it, I might hesitate in expressing an opinion that consecutive insertions of the notice are not required. No such right can, however, be affected. I look then to the statute in order to gather the meaning and intention of the legislature. Its words will be answered by one publication inserted in a newspaper thirty days before the day of sale, and will not require an insertion in each paper that may be issued between the date of the first insertion and the sale. Insertions daily or weekly, when intended to be provided for, are always indicated in definite language, as in the advertisement for a tax sale, where this is the form of expression: shall cause notice to be advertised four weeks successively.' There is in my opinion, and in the opinion of another member of the court, no objection to the notice of sale on this ground which would induce us to refuse a confirmation of the sale." Craig v. Fox, 16 Ohio, 563.

In another Ohio case, the one cited by counsel in McCurdy v. Baker, II Kansas, III, supra, where the law required

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at

least sixty days' notice” to be given of the time and place of payment of the instalments of subscription to a company, it was held that a simple notice, given at least sixty days before the time of payment, is sufficient, and that it was not intended that notice should be given sixty consecutive days; the court, Birchard, J., saying: "The third ground for a new trial is that the notice was not published continuously for sixty days. This position stands upon the hypothesis that at least sixty days' notice' is equivalent to notice for and during sixty days.' The words are, however, not equivalent. A notice published once sixty days or more before the time of payment is all that the statute requires. Its letter is complied with by that. We are not left at liberty to imagine or suppose, in this case, that one thing is expressed and another intended, because whenever the legislature have designed that a continuous notice should be given, they have used explicit terms. Had a continuous notice been intended in this class of cases, we should have found words more appropriate to convey that meaning, such as, 'notice by publication, at least sixty days prior to the day of payment, which notice shall be published daily, tri-weekly, or weekly, to the day of payment;' or, which notice shall be continued for eight successive weeks prior to the day of payment.' Muskingum Valley Turnpike Co. v. Ward, 13 Ohio, 120.

For the purpose.-Under a Massachusetts statute (St. of 1866, c. 253, § 1), which provides a penalty for "whoever kills, or causes to be killed, for the purpose of sale, any calf less than four weeks old, or knowingly sells, or has in his possession with intent to sell, the meat of any calf killed," etc., an indictment was framed charging that the defendant "knowingly, wilfully, and maliciously did kill a certain calf, the said calf being then and there less than four weeks old, with intent then and there the meat of said calf to sell." The defendant moved to quash the indictment, on the ground inter alia that it did not appear by said indictment that said calf was killed for the purpose of sale." This motion was overruled, and the defendant found guilty, whereupon he excepted. The court overruled his objections and sustained the indictment, Foster, J., saying: The language used, with the intent to sell,' we regard as exactly equivalent to the language of the statute, 'for the purpose of sale.' 'With an in tent' and 'for a purpose' are expressions almost absolutely identical in meaning.

pose. He was a mere servant, having possession of the flour for the purpose of delivering it to the railway company, and nothing more. He had no power, nor semblance of power, by virtue of his employment, to direct the delivery of the flour by the railway company to Mr. Tilton or any one else. The agents and servants of the railway company were bound to know this, and to govern themselves accordingly. Special authority from the plaintiff to the teamster for that purpose was not shown, nor at tempted to be. In the second place, the statement of the teamster that the flour was 'for' Mr. Tilton did not justify the inference either that it then belonged to Mr. Tilton, or that he was entitled to the possession of it. It was no more than saying that it was intended for him, which was true, but which could not have been understood as implying that it was to be delivered by the railroad company to him without further and specific instructions to that effect from the plaintiff, who was the real owner. Sawyer v. Chicago & Northwestern R. Co., 22 Wis. 402; s. c., 99 Am. Dec. 49.

1. Bouvier's Law Dict. sub voce. In deciding that an arrangement between a bank and a trust company, both in the city of New York, whereby an exchange of notes was made between them, upon a premium greater than the legal rate of interest, was within the statute of usury, because the true object of the parties was a loan of money, and the form of an exchange was substituted only as a disguise, the court, Gardiner, J., said: "The statute against usury (1 R. Š. 722, 1, 2), prohibiting a greater rate of interest than seven per cent for the loan, or forbearance, of any money, goods, or things in action,' is applicable only to those loans which are in substance and effect loans of money. . . . The terms interest' and forbearance cannot be predicated of any other than a loan of money, actual or presumed. Interest is defined to be a certain profit for the use of the loan; and forbearance, the giving a further day. when the time originally limited for the return of the loan has passed. (Ord. 30, 24.) Both imply that the thing loaned has an established value, so that the lender on its return, with the compensation fixed by law for the use and risk, may receive a certain profit.' Now this is true only of money, which is

legally supposed to have a fixed, unchangable value in itself, and to be consequently the true measure of the value of all other property. A fixed rate per cent on money, therefore, in contemplation of law, is supposed to give to the lender a certain profit,' because the thing loaned is of the same value at the end of the term as at its commencement." Dry Dock Bank v. American Life Ins. & Trust Co., 3 N. Y. 344, 355.

In Alabama, prior to 1818, the statutes provided (An Act against Usury, 1805):

...

...

That if more than the rate of six dollars for the forbearance or giving day of payment of one hundred dollars for one year, etc., . . . shall be taken, etc., by way of any corrupt bargain, loan, etc., the same, together with the whole amount of interest taken, etc., may be recovered by any person paying the same," etc. In 1818 an act was passed as follows: "That any rate of interest, or premium for the loan or use of money, etc., . . . fairly and bona fide stipulated and agreed upon by the parties to such contract, expressed in writing, and signed by the party to be charged therewith, shall be legal and recoverable; and no bona fide contract shall be vacated or in any manner impaired by reason of any premium or rate of interest so stipuluted and expressed." In an action upon a bond or note to pay a certain sum at a future day, with interest from the date, at 5 per cent a month, if not punctually paid, it was held that the contract for interest from the date was a penalty; and further, to carry interest at a rate above the legal rate the statute of 1818 must be accurately followed, and the contract must be in writing, signed by the party to be charged, and express that it is for a loan of money, and that such interest is recoverable only for the stipulated time of forbearance; the court, Saffold, J., saying: "And if we attach to the term loan' its most comprehensive signification, it can only apply to a contract for the return or payment of money at a future day, or for the delivery of something for temporary use which is to be returned to the owner. Forbearance is the giving day for the return of a loan, or, more properly, signifies the giving a further day when the time originally agreed on is passed.' (Ord. 23.) Giving a further day for payment, to constitute forbearance, requires, I apprehend, not merely a passive indulgence, but an ex