doctrine, which has induced certain writers to deny it altogether; but incorrectly, for, whatever the necessary lapse of time may be, there unquestionably is a lapse of time after which one State is entitled to exclude every other from the property of which it is in actual possession. In other words, there is an International Prescription, whether it be called Immemorial Possession, or by any other name. The peace of the world, *the highest and best interests of humanity, the fulfilment of the ends for which States exist, require that this doctrine be [276] firmly incorporated in the Code of International Law. It is with great force of reason and language that Grotius, repelling the contrary proposition, observes: "Atque id si admittimus, sequi videtur maximum incommodum, ut controversiæ de regnis regnorumque finibus nullo unquam tempore extinguantur: quod non tantum ad perturbandos multorum animos et bella serenda pertinet, sed et communi gentium sensui repugnat."(a)

CCLVIII. It is impossible to speak with greater accuracy upon this very delicate subject; as the application of the general rule must of necessity be greatly modified by the special circumstances of each particular case. Vattel's remarks upon this subject are clear and sensible :"La Prescription ne pouvant être fondée que sur une présomption absolue, ou sur une présomption légitime, elle n'a point lieu si le propriétaire n'a pas véritablement négligé son droit. Cette condition importe trois choses: 1°. que le propriétaire n'ait point à alléguer une ignorance invincible, soit de sa part, soit de celle de ses auteurs; 2°. qu'il ne puisse justifier son silence par des raisons légitimes et solides; 3°. qu'on ait négligé son droit, ou gardé le silence pendant un nombre considérable d'années; car une négligence de peu d'années, incapable de produire la confusion et de mettre dans l'incertitude les droits respectifs des parties, ne suffit pas pour fonder ou autoriser une présomption d'abandonnement. Il est impossible de déterminer en droit *naturel le nombre d'années requis pour fonder la Prescription. Cela [*277] dépend de la nature de la chose dont la propriété, est disputée, et des circonstances.(b)

(a) L. ii. c. iv. s. 1.

See, too, Wolff.

And so Vattel: "Le droit de succession n'est pas toujours primitivement établi par la nation; il peut avoir été introduit par la concession d'un autre souverain, par l'usurpation même. Mais lorsqu'il est appuyé d'une longue possession, le peuple est censé y consentir, et ce consentement tacite le légitime, quoique sa source soit vicieuse. Il pose alors sur le méme fondement seul légitime et inébranlable, auquel il faut toujours revenir."-Vattel, t. i. 1. i. c. v. s. 59.

(b)" De ce qui est requis pour fonder la Prescription ordinaire." Vattel, Le Droit des Gens, t. i. 1. ii. c. xi. s. 142. And again: "Mais si la nation protégée ou soumis à certaines conditions ne résiste point aux entreprises de celle dont elle a recherché l'appui, si elle n'y fait aucune opposition, si elle garde un profond silence quand elle devrait et pourrait parler, sa patience, après un temps considérable, forme un consentement tacite qui légitime le droit de l'usurpateur. Il n'y aurait rien de stable parmi les hommes, et surtout entre les nations, si une longue possession, accompagnée du silence des intéressés, ne produisait un certain droit. Mais il faut bien observer que le silence, pour marquer un consentement tacite, doit être volontaire. Si la nation inférieure prouve que la violence et la crainte ont étouffé les

But that Prescription is the main pillar upon which the security of national property and peace depends, is as incontrovertible a proposition as that the property and peace of individuals rests upon the same doctrine.(c)

To these remarks should be added the observation of a living jurist :-(d)

"The general consent of mankind has established the principle, that long and uninterrupted possession by one nation excludes the claim of every other. Whether this general consent be considered as an implied contract or as positive law, all nations are equally bound by it, since all are parties to it; since none can safely disregard it without impugning its own title to its possessions; and since it is founded upon mutual utility, and tends to promote the general welfare of mankind."

*In one of those treatises(e) which show how deeply the mind [*278] of the writer was imbued with the principles of general jurisprudence, Mr. Burke uses the following admirable expressions :—

"If it were permitted to argue with power, might one not ask one of these gentlemen, whether it would not be more natural, instead of wantonly mooting these questions concerning their property, as if it were an exercise in law, to found it on the solid rock of prescription; the soundest, the most general, the most recognised title between man and man that is known in municipal or in public jurisprudence; a title in which not arbitrary institutions but the eternal order of things gives judgment; a title which is not the creature, but the master of positive law; a title which, though not fixed in its term, is rooted in its principles in the Law of Nature itself, and is indeed the original ground of all known property; for all property in soil will always be traced back to that source, and will rest there"-"these gentlemen, for they have lawyers amongst them, know as well as I, that in England we have had always a prescription or limitation, as all nations have against each other"-"all titles terminate in Prescription; in which (differently from Time, in the fabulous instances) the son devours the father, and the last Prescription eats up all the former."(ƒ)

témoignages de son opposition, on ne peut rien conclure de son silence, et il ne donne aucun droit à l'usurpateur."-Vattel, t. i. c. xvi. s. 199.

See list of authorities on the doctrine of International Prescription given by Ompteda, 512. s. 213, Lit. des Völkerrechts.

(c) Vattel, 1. ii. c. xi. s. 142.

(d) Wheaton, vol. i. c. iv. s. 5. p. 207. "Es liessen sich viele Beispiele, unter andern in Deutschland nachweisen, wo das Recht der Staatgewalt nur auf langen Besitzstand gegründet ist ohne erweislichen Rechtstitel."-Heffters, s. 69. 1.

(e) Vol. ix. p. 449. Letter to R. Burke, Esq.

See, too, vol. ix. p. 97. Reform of Representation in the House of Commons. "Prescription is the most solid of all titles, not only to property, but which is to secure that property, to Government." And vol. v. p. 274: "With the National Assembly of France possession is nothing, law and usage are nothing. I see the National Assembly openly reprobate the doctrine of Prescription, which one of the greatest of their own lawyers (Domat) tells us, with great truth, is part of the Law of Nature. He tells us that the positive ascertainment of its limits and its security from invasion were among the causes for which civil society itself was instituted."-Reflections on the Revolution in France.

(ƒ) The Abbé de Mably, speaking of the Treaty of the Pyrenees which followed

*CCLIX. In the foregoing observations, the foundation of International Prescription has not been necessarily laid upon [*279]

the abandonment or dereliction of the State, to whom the possession formerly belonged. It has been placed upon the length of time during which the possession has been held by the State which prescribes for it. It is important to establish clearly that dereliction does not, in the case of nations, necessarily precede prescriptive acquisition. Much of the uncertainty and confusion in the writings of International Jurists upon this subject may be ascribed to the want of firm discrimination and clear statement upon this point.

Dereliction or voluntary abandonment by the original possessor may be often incapable of proof between nations after the lapse of centuries of adverse possession; whereas the proofs of prescriptive possession are simple and few. They are, principally, publicity, continued occupation, absence of interruption (usurpatio), aided no doubt generally, both morally and legally speaking, by the employment of labour and capital upon the possession by the new possessor during the period of the silence, or the passiveness (inertia), or the absence of any attempt to exercise proprietary rights, by the former possessor. The period of time, as has been repeatedly *said, cannot be fixed by International Law between nations as it may be by Private Law between indi- [*280] viduals: it must depend upon variable and varying circumstances; but in all cases these proofs would be required.

Now it has been well observed by a recent writer,(g) that in cases where the dereliction is capable of proof, the new possessor may found his claim upon original Occupation alone, without calling in the aid of Prescription. The loss of the former, and the gain of the later possessor, are distinct and separate facts. Whereas, in cases of Prescriptive Acquisition, the facts are necessarily connected; the former possessor loses, because the new one gains.

CCLXI.There was a dispute of long standing between France and England respecting Santa Lucia, one of the Antilles Islands. After the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748), the matter was referred to the decision of certain Commissioners, and it was the subject of various State Papers(h) in 1751 and 1754. The French negotiators maintained, that though

the Treaty of Westphalia (1659), observes:-"Le Roi de France proteste contre toute prescription et laps de temps, au sujet du Royaume de Navarre, et se réserve la faculté d'en faire la poursuite par voie amiable, de même que tous les autres droits qu'il prétend lui appartenir, et auxquels lui ou ses prédécesseurs n'ont pas renoncé. (Traité de Vervin, rappellé par le Traité des Pyrénées, art. 23. Traité des Pyrénées, art. 89.) Tous les auteurs qui ont écrit sur le Droit des Gens, conviennent que la prescription rend légitimes les droits les plus équivoques dans leur origine; et ce qui prouve la sagesse de ce principe, c'est qu'il est de l'intérêt de chaque nation en particulier de l'adopter. La difficulté consiste à savoir, comment la prescription s'acquiert; pour moi je croirois qu'elle ne peut être établie que par le silence de la partie lésée, quand elle traite avec le Prince qui possède son bien, ou que celuici le vend, le cède et l'aliène en quelque autre manière. Le silence dans ces occasions équivaut à un consentement."-Droit Public, t. i. p. 31.

(g) Monsieur Eugène Ortolan. See his chapter on Prescription Acquisitive, in his work Du Domaine International (Paris, 1851).

(h) Ib. p. 111.

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the English had established themselves in 1639, they had been driven
out or massacred by the Caribbees in 1640, and they had, animo et facto
and sine spe redeundi, abandoned the island; that Santa Lucia being
vacant, the French had seized it again in 1650, when it became imme-
diately, and without the necessity of any prescriptive aid, their property.
The English negotiators contended that their dereliction had been the
result of violence, that they had not abandoned the island sine
spe rede-
undi, and that it was not competent to France to profit by this act of
violence, and surreptitiously obtain the territory of another State; and
that by such a proceeding no dominium could accrue to them. The
principal discussion turned, not upon the nature of the conditions of
Prescriptive Acquisition, but *upon the nature of the conditions
[*281] of Voluntary Dereliction, by which the rights of property were
lost, and the possession returned to the class of vacant and unowned
(adionora) territories.(i)

[*282]

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CCLXIIWe now enter upon the second kind of Acquisition, viz., that which in the system of Private Law is called Derivative.

Derivative Acquisition (a) is said to be that which takes place by the act of another, or by the act of the law (acquisitio derivativa, vel facto hominis, vel facto legis). In this system, not only Individuals, but Corporations or legal persons, are enabled to acquire and to alienate rights of property, through the medium of a representative, as minors and lunatics are in all systems of jurisprudence enabled to act through their guardian or tutor.

Who the representative of the corporation may be, depends upon the constitution of this legal person. But, as a general rule, the will of a corporation is expressed not only by the unanimous assent, but by the assent of the major part of its members. The rule that the will of the corporation may be collected from the agreement of a part of its members seems to be founded in Natural Law, as otherwise the body might be prevented from acting at all. (b) *The constructive whole, [*283] therefore, is held, for certain purposes, to reside in a part only. Turning from the system of Private to the system of International" Law, we find that it is competent to one State possessed of property to

(i) Vide post, Extinction of Acquisition.

(a) Eugène Ortolan, p. 23.

Heffters, s. 71.

(b) quod à majore parte ordinis salubriter fuit constitutum."-Cod. x. t. xxii. 46. De Decur.

"Quod major pars curiæ effecit, pro eo habetur, ac si omnes egerint."-Eig. 1. 1. 19. Savigny, R. R. s. 97.

But see Burke, vol. vi. p. 212; Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs.

alienate it, and to another to receive the alienated portion. So far the
analogy is sound between the State and the Individual or the Corpora-
tion;
the rights incident to a proprietor attach in both cases. But, in
the case of the State, it may be a matter of theoretical and practical
difficulty to ascertain where and in whom the power of acquiring and
alienating is lodged? In whom what has been happily called "the con-
tracting capacity" (c) of the nation is vested. (d) Whether the general
procuration of the State(e) be placed in the hands of one man, or of a
few, or of a majority of representatives? The solution of this grave
question belongs rather to the province of Public and Constitutional,
than to that of International Law. (f) It has, indeed, been discussed
by writers on International Law, especially by Grotius(g) and Vattel:(h)
but both those writers dealt, on this as on other occasions, with subjects
which belonged to the sphere of the Publicist rather than of the Interna-
tional Jurists.(2)

*CCLXI.Grotius divides all kingdoms into Patrimonial and

Usufructuary; and he reckons among the latter all kingdoms [*284]

over which the people elected a Governor, and all that are acquired by treaty or marriage. Patrimonial kingdoms, he seems to think, may be alienated by their rulers without the sanction of the people; but Usufructuary, not without their consent. Whatever countenance this doctrine might have derived from the practice and principles of the time in which Grotius lived, it can hardly be predicated of any Christian, and certainly of no European State (k) at present existing in the world. Puffendorf, indeed, lays it down as law, that the general presumption is against the power of the sovereign to alienate, without the consent of his subjects, any portion of the public property or domain; and the doctrine is distinctly and indignantly repudiated by Vattel;() neverthe

(c) Burke, vol. ix. p. 384: Tracts on Popery Laws, c. 3. in fine.

(d) See below, the Act of Renunciation of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany by Leopold II., on his accession to the throne of Austria, in favour of his second son.Martens, Rec. de Traités, vol. iv. p. 476. (a. D. 1790.)

Eugène Ortolan, pp. 14, 35.

Rutherforth, Institutes of Natural Law, c. viii.

Savigny, R. R. s. 140. b. iii. p. 310.

(e) Burke, vol. vi. p. 212: Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs.

(f) Grotius, 1. ii. c. vi.

Wheaton's Elements, pp. 102-3.

Günther, pp. 11-77. 2 Buch, II. Kap.

(g) Grotius, 1. ii. c. vi.: De acquisitione derivativâ facto hominis, ubi de alienatione imperii, et rerum imperii.

(h) Vattel, l. i. c. xxi.: De l'Alienation des biens publics, et de celle d'une partie de V'Etat. (i) De Jure Belli, 1. i. c. iii.-Heinec. Prælec. (k) "Die Eigenschaft eines Patrimonial-Staates (das heist, dass der Regent noch Eigenthumsrecht über der Staat verfügen könne) ist in Europa durch Staatsgrundgesetze nirgend festgesetz."-Klüber, s. 31.

"He will discover that when Grotius examines the subject in detail, he excludes every case of patrimonial governments. The fair conclusion to be drawn from it is therefore this, that there is no such thing as a patrimonial government."-Lord Grenville, Debate on Blockade of Norway, May 10, 1814. Harnsard's Parl Deb. (2) "J'ai osé cependant m'écarter quelquefois de mon guide, et m'opposer à ses sentiments; j'en donnerai ici quelques exemples. M. Wolf, entraîné peut-être par la foule des écrivains, consacre plusieurs propositions à traiter de la nature des royaumès patrimoniaux, sans rejeter ou corriger cette indée injurieuse à l'humanité.

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