under masters interested to disturb the peace of the world, "it might be impossible to admit them to the partnership of nations which must henceforth guarantee the world's peace," or "to admit Germany to the free economic intercourse which must inevitably spring out of the other partnerships of a real peace." Finally, he recommended as a military necessity an immediate declaration that the United States was in a state of war with Austria-Hungary, now "simply the vassal of the German Government," and "not acting upon its own initiative or in response to the wishes and feelings of its own peoples, but as the instrument of another nation."

He then reverted to the reasons for which the United States had entered into war. It had "been forced into it" to save its political institutions "from corruption and destruction." "The purposes of the Central Powers," he added, "strike straight at the very heart of everything we believe in; their methods of warfare outrage every principle of humanity and of knightly honor; their intrigue has corrupted the very thought and spirit of many of our people; their sinister and secret diplomacy has sought to take our very territory away from us and disrupt the union of the States. Our safety would be at an end, and our honor forever sullied and brought into contempt, were we to permit their triumph. They are striking at the very existence of democracy and liberty. It is because it is for us a war of high, disinterested purpose, in which all the free people of the world are banded together for the vindication of right, a war for the preservation of our nation and of all that it has held dear of principle and of purpose, that we feel ourselves doubly constrained to propose for its outcome only that which is righteous and of irreproachable intention, for our foes as well as for our friends. The cause being just and holy, the settlement must be of like motive and quality. For this we can fight, but for nothing less noble or less worthy of our traditions. For this cause we entered the war and for this cause will we battle until the last gun is fired."

The House Committee of Foreign Affairs, on the day (December 5th) when this address was delivered, agreed unanimously to report a declaration of war with this preamble:

Whereas, the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government has severed diplomatic relations with the Government of the United

States of America, and has committed acts of war against the Government and the people of the United States of America, among which are its adherence to the policy of ruthless submarine warfare adopted by its ally, the Imperial German Government, with which the United States of America is at war, and by giving to its ally active support and aid on both land and sea in the prosecution of war against the Government and people of the United States of America; therefore, be it, etc.

On further consideration and consultation with the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the Act of December 7, 1917, was passed, in which for the preamble in the original draft was substituted the following:

Whereas, the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government has committed repeated acts of war against the Government and the people of the United States of America; therefore be it, etc.

The final draft of the declaration of war against Austria-Hungary, therefore, unlike the earlier draft of the House committee, hardly seems to comply with the spirit of the Hague Convention of 1907, if read without reference to the previous address of the President on the subject of such a war. If, on the other hand, passed as it was with substantial unanimity, it may properly be read as approving and supplementing that address, and as incorporating the gist of that into itself, any such ground for criticism would be removed. In that all-important state paper, the President, it will be remembered, used the word we to signify himself and Congress. In other words, he spoke for both. To hold that he could properly do this would be to advance little, if at all, the prerogatives of the Executive. There is no people in the world today whose chief ruler has an extent of war power equal to that of the President of the United States. He is independent of cabinet control. He can call the ministers of the different departments of executive power into council with him or not, as he sees fit. He can indicate governmental policy in unofficial correspondence or public addresses, without reserve. He has for any such address what Lord Bryce has described. as "an unrivaled platform."

In 1908 the Kaiser gave permission to publish the report of an interview between him and a foreigner upon an important matter of foreign policy. At once, he was called to account before the Reichstag. The Imperial Chancellor, as president of the Bundesrath, has a right to be

present at the deliberations of the Reichstag. The Chancellor at that time appeared before it and substantially repudiated what the Emperor had said at the interview in question, practically pledging himself that in the future nothing of such a nature would be said by the Crown that had not the previous approval of the constituted authorities.

The President of the United States is subject to no such restraints. He holds an office which makes him in all other matters affecting international intercourse the spokesman of the whole country. Is he any the less such with respect to a declaration of war? He holds, not a part, but the whole, of the executive power of the United States. Its scope is not circumscribed by many limitations. Of such as there are, two are of particular importance, namely, the provision that while he alone can negotiate treaties, they are of no force until ratified by a two-thirds. vote of the Senate; and that by which, while he alone can nominate to the higher public offices, the appointments can only be made with the consent of a majority vote of the Senate.

Four powers, though in their nature and history primarily of an executive character, are expressly conferred: namely, that of receiving ambassadors and other public ministers; that of commissioning all officers of the United States; that of granting reprieves and pardons; and that of a conditional veto. These four lines of authority are not strictly a part of the executive power of the United States, though, regarded as a matter of general political government, they belong in their nature to the executive power.

Two things are certain, when the functions of the President are considered with respect to their relation to a declaration of war. He has the right, and is under the duty, to communicate to Congress, before such a declaration is made, the facts and circumstances that in his opinion may call for it. It is also of no force, unless he approve it. It is certain, further, that he cannot approve it in part and disapprove it in part. He must, as in the case of any other measures of legislation, approve the whole or disapprove the whole.

There are then three stages in proceedings for declaring war by the United States. The first comes with the doings of the President in * American Political Science Review, XI, 660.

informing Congress of the state of our relations with the Power against which war may be declared. The second is the doings of Congress in making the declaration, and the third is the approval of the declaration by the President.

The second stage has become much more important since the Hague Convention of 1907, ratified by us and by Germany and Austria-Hungary in 1909, which requires the declaration, if not connected with an ultimatum, to state the reasons (motifs) for its adoption. The President, it may be assumed, if he recommends a declaration of war, will always state what seem to him the reasonable grounds for it. Congress may coincide with him in his views and give the same reasons for its action which the President has given. It may, however, coincide with him in his conclusion, but prefer to rest the declaration on a part only of the grounds specified by him, or even on grounds not stated by him at all. He has had his say, and Congress is now to speak and to speak decisively, subject always to the conditional veto.

Whenever a declaration of war has been enacted and approved, it unquestionably becomes the right and duty of the President to give public notice of it to all neutral Powers. To the Power against which war is declared no formal notice is absolutely necessary before the opening of hostilities, nor indeed ever. It will hear of it soon enough through channels of information open to all.

The most important thing here is to give notice of the fact of the declaration, and the time of its going into effect. It is less necessary to specify immediately the grounds on which it rests. As to what these are, is the declaration itself now the sole evidence? Or can the President, in making his announcements to foreign nations, add to or subtract from those declared by Congress to support its action?

"Results, not processes," Samuel Warren once wrote, "are for the eye of the world." It must be remembered that in announcing a declaration of war, the chief end in view is to state the fact of the existence of war, as evidenced by such a declaration. The grounds for it, or the want of grounds for it, have become, for the time being, comparatively unimportant.

John Bassett Moore begins his consideration of the title "War" in his Digest of International Law, by this remark:

Much confusion may be avoided by bearing in mind the fact that by the term "War" is meant not the mere employment of force, but the existence of the legal condition of things in which rights are or may be prosecuted by force."

A declaration of war announces, or creates and announces, such a legal condition of things. It may or may not go into further particulars, according to the position of the government making it, in regard to the Hague Convention of 1907. If it states what constitutes this legal condition, and purports to describe the controlling facts leading up to the declaration, its validity and effect will not depend on the truth or falsity or relevancy of what may be set forth in its assignment of causes. They are mentioned merely to give public notice of the grievances which the nation making it claims to have suffered from the nation against which it is directed.

A declaration of war at once charges the President with a double responsibility. In addition to his holding the civil executive power, he must now assume the supreme direction and command of military and naval activities. This, however, he takes subject to limitations not ordinarily existing in other countries.

As the Supreme Court of the United States has held in a leading case, the duty and power of the President under a declaration of war are "purely military," and if he makes conquests they cannot

extend the operation of our institutions and laws beyond the limits before assigned to them by the legislative power. . . . The genesis and character of our institutions are peaceful, and the power to declare war was not conferred upon Congress for the purpose of aggression or aggrandizement, but to enable the general government to vindicate by arms, if it should become necessary, its own rights and the rights of its citizens. .. A war, therefore, declared by Congress, can never be presumed to be waged for the purpose of conquest or the acquisition of territory; nor does the law declaring the war imply an authority to the President to enlarge the limits of the United States, by subjugating the enemy's country. 10

The war power, however, as shared between the President and Congress, is not limited to achieving military successes. "It carries with it inherently the power to guard against the immediate renewal of the

9

• VII, 153.

10 Fleming v. Page, 9 How., 603, 614.