CHAP. XXXI.

and this last civilized quarter of the globe may exhibit those striking traits of grandeur and magnificence, which the Divine Economist may have reserved to crown the closing scene, when the angel of his prefence will stand upon the sea and upon the earth, lift up his hand to heaven, and swear by Him that liveth for ever and ever, that there shall be time no longer.

END OF VOL. III,

Earl CORNWALLIS to Sir HENRY CLINTON, K. B. dated York-Town, Virginia, October 21, 1781.

66 SIR,

"I HAVE the mortification to inform your excellency, " that I have been forced to give up the pofts of York and "Gloucester, and to furrender the troops under my com"mand, by capitulation, on the 19th inftant, as prifoners "of war, to the combined forces of America and France.

"I never faw this post in a very favorable light; but " when I found I was to be attacked in it, in fo unprepared "a ftate, by fo powerful an army and artillery, nothing "but the hopes of relief would have induced me to at66 tempt its defence; for I would either have endeavoured "to go to New York, by rapid marches from the Gloucef«ter fide, immediately on the arrival of general Washing"ton's troops at Williamsburgh, or I would, notwithstand"ing the disparity of numbers, have attacked them in the "open field, where it might have been juft poffible that "fortune would have favored the gallantry of the handful ❝of troops under my command; but being affured by 46 your excellency's letters, that every poffible means would be tried by the navy and army to relieve us, I could no

"think myself at liberty to venture upon either of those "defperate attempts; therefore, after remaining for two

days in a strong pofition, in front of the place, in hopes "of being attacked, upon obferving that the enemy were "taking measures which could not fail of turning my left "flank in a fhort time; and receiving, on the second even"ing, your letter of the 24th of September, informing that "the relief would fail about the 5th of October, I withdrew "within the works on the night of the 29th of September, "hoping by the labor and firmnefs of the foldiers, to pro"tract the defence until you could arrive. Every thing "was to be expected from the fpirit of the troops, but every "difadvantage attended their labor, as the works were to "be continued under the enemy's fire, and our stock of entrenching tools, which did not much exceed four hun"dred, when we began to work in the latter end of Au"guft, was now much diminished.

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"The enemy broke ground on the night of the 30th, "and conftructed on that night, and on the two following "days and nights, two redoubts, which, with fome works "that had belonged to our outward pofition, occupied a

gorge between two creeks or ravines, which come from "the river on each fide of the town. On the night of the "6th of October they made their firft parallel, extending "from its right on the river to a deep ravine on the left, "nearly oppofite to the centre of this place, and embracing "our whole left, at the distance of fix hundred yards. Hav"ing perfected this parallel, their batteries opened on the " evening of the 9th, against our left, and other batteries "fired at the fame time against a redoubt advanced over "the creek upon our right, and defended by about one "hundred and twenty men of the twenty third regiment "and marines, who maintained that poft with uncommon "gallantry. The fire continued inceffant from heavy can"non, and from mortars and howitzers, throwing fhells "from eight to fixteen inches, until all our guns on "the left were filenced, our work much damaged, and

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"our lofs of men confiderable. On the night of the 11th "they began their fecond parallel, about three hundred "yards nearer to us; the troops being much weakened by "fickness, as well as by the fire of the befiegers, and ob "ferving that the enemy had not only fecured their flanks, "but proceeded in every refpect with the utmost regularity "and caution, I could not venture fo large forties as to "hope from them any confiderable effect; but otherwise, "I did every thing in my power to interrupt this work, by opening new embrasures for guns, and keeping up a con"stant fire with all the howitzers, and small mortars that "we could man. On the evening of the 14th, they as"faulted and carried two redoubts that had been advanced "about three hundred yards, for the purpose of delaying "their approaches and covering our left flank, and during "the night inclofed them in their second parallel, on which "they continued to work with the utmost exertion. Being perfectly fenfible that our work could not stand many "hours after the opening of the batteries of that parallel, "we not only continued a constant fire with all our mortars, "and every gun that could be brought to bear upon it, "but a little before day-break, on the morning of the 16th, "I ordered a fortie of about three hundred and fifty men, "under the direction of lieutenant colonel Abercrombie, to "attack two batteries which appeared to be in the greatest "forwardness, and to fpike the guns. A detachment of "guards, with the eightieth company of grenadiers, under "the command of lieutenant colonel Lake, attacked the "one, and one of light infantry, under the command of "major Armstrong, attacked the other, and both fucceed"ed by forcing the redoubts that covered them, spiking "eleven guns, and killing or wounding about one hundred "of the French troops, who had the guard of that part of "the trenches, and with little lofs on our fide. This ac❝tion, though extremely honorable to the officers and "foldiers who executed it, proved of little public advantage; for the cannon, having been fpiked in a hurry, foon rendered fit for service again, and before dark

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❝ the whole parallel and batteries appeared to be nearly "complete. At this time we knew that there was no parť "of the whole front attacked, on which we could fhew a

fingle gun, and our shells were nearly expended; I there. "fore had only to choose between preparing to surrender "next day, or endeavouring to get off with the greatest part of the troops; and I determined to attempt the " latter, reflecting, that though it should prove unsuccessful "in its immediate object, it might at least delay the enemy "in the prosecution of farther enterprises: fixteen large "boats were prepared, and upon other pretexts were or"dered to be in readiness to receive troops precifely at ten "o'clock. With these I hoped to pafs the infantry during "the night, abandoning our baggage, and leaving a de"tachment to capitulate for the town's people, and the "fick and wounded; on which subject a letter was ready "to be delivered to general Washington. After making "my arrangements with the utmoft fecrecy, the light in“fantry, greatest part of the guards, and part of the twen

ty-third regiment, landed at Gloucester; but at this crit"ical moment, the weather, from being moderate and "calm, changed to a most violent ftorm of wind and rain, "and drove all the boats, fome of which had troops on "board, down the river. It was foon evident that the "intended paffage was impracticable, and the absence of "the boats rendered it equally impoffible to bring back "the troops that had paffed, which I had ordered about two "in the morning. In this fituation, with my little force "divided, the enemies batteries opened at day-break; the

paffage between this place and Gloucester was much "expofed, but the boats having now returned, they were "ordered to bring back the troops that had paffed during "the night; and they joined us in the forenoon, without "much lofs. Our works were in the mean time going to "ruin and not having been able to ftrengthen them by "abbatis, nor in any other manner but by a flight fraizing, "which the enemy's artillery were demolishing wherever they fired, my opinion entirely coincided with that of the