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Williams v. The Mechanics' Bank of New Haven.

defendants, and demanded a transfer of the ten shares of stock therein named, and the issue of a certificate for the same to him, and, on being refused, demanded from the defendants the value of the stock, which was also refused. The grounds upon which the defendants refused to comply with the demands of the plaintiff, to transfer the stock in question to him, or pay the value thereof, rested upon the following facts: In September, 1857, two years before the demand for a transfer was made by the plaintiff, Ebenezer D. Brockway, a resident of Connecticut, and a creditor of George W. Corlies, attached the stock, in a suit brought in Connecticut, and, in January, 1858, judgment was rendered in his favor against Corlies. On an execution duly issued upon this judgment, and levied upon the stock, it was sold by the sheriff, Brockway becoming the purchaser. The sale on the execution was in February, 1858. The sheriff gave Brockway a certificate of sale, as required by the laws of Connecticut. He presented that certificate to the defendants and demanded a transfer, which was made, and a certificate was issued to him. The defendants had no notice that the plaintiff had any claim to the stock, either as collateral security or otherwise, until long after the sale on execution and the transfer to Brockway, and not until the time, or about the time, when the demands before referred to were made by the plaintiff.

William Fullerton, for the plaintiff.

George C. Goddard, for the defendants.

SHIPMAN, J. No question arises, in this case, touching the validity of the proceedings on the attachment, and sale on execution, of this stock. They were all regular, and in conformity to the laws of the State of Connecticut, and the transfer of the shares to Brockway, on his presentation of the certificate, was required by law, in the absence of any other consideration. It is, however, insisted by the plaintiff, that, inasmuch as the charter of the defendants provides that the stock "shall be transferable according to such rules as may be estab

Williams v. The Mechanics' Bank of New Haven.

lished by the directors," and it does not appear that the directors have established any such rules, except what may be implied from the certificate, therefore the transfer of the certificate operates as a transfer of the stock. The application of the argument is, that when Corlies delivered this certificate, with the power of attorney attached, to the plaintiff, the latter became vested with the legal title to the stock, and that the defendants are bound by such transfer, whether they had any notice or not. We think this view of the matter entirely overlooks the true construction of the certificate and the importance to be given to the words "transferable at the bank." The counsel for the plaintiff, in his criticism of the language of the instrument, suggests, that if the expression had been "transferable only on the books of the bank," the legal purport and significance of the paper would have been very different. But, while we concede that the form of expression suggested would be more full and exact, its legal import would, in our judgment, have been substantially the same. By the words "transferable at the bank," the defendants have indicated the place where the transfer must be made, as they had the right and power to do. To have inserted the word "only," would have added no force to the meaning. When a note or sum of money is made payable in terms at a specified place, or bank, it is payable there and nowhere else, and no words of exclusion are necessary to limit the construction of the instrument to the place named; and, in the eye of the law, this certificate reads the same as if the expression was, "transferable only at the bank."

As to the omission in the certificate to state that the transfer was to be made on the " books" of the bank, we do not regard this as material. The words "transferable at the bank" do not refer merely to the place-within the walls of the bank building but to an act to be there done, and to assume a formal and authentic shape, under the official cognizance of the officers of the institution. All meaning in these words dissolves and evaporates under any other construction.

It follows, from these views, that we must hold that the

Ex parte Field.

plaintiff, in order to have obtained a valid title to this stock, (except as between him and Corlies,) should have applied to the defendants to have it transferred, or, at least, have given them notice of a claim upon it, before it was attached and sold on execution; and that, having failed to do so, he has no claim against them.


The two orders issued by the War Department of the United States, August 8th, 1862, one being an order "to prevent the evasion of military duty, and for the puppression of disloyal practices," and the other being an order "authorizing the arrest of persons discouraging enlistments," were issued in violation of section 9 of Article 1 of the Constitution, and of Articles 4 and 5 of the Amendments to the Constitution.

Those orders cannot be regarded as having emanated from the President of the United States, although the one first above named purports on its face to be issued "by direction of the President of the United States," nor can they be regarded as suspending the writ of habeas corpus, in the cases embraced in them.

An order from a subordinate in the War Department to a Marshal of the United States, who holds in custody a person arrested by him under said orders, not to produce such person before a Court of the United States, under a writ of habeas corpus issued by it to such Marshal, requiring him to produce before it the body of such person, is no justification to such Marshal for disobeying such writ.

The President of the United States had authority to issue his Proclamation of September 24th, 1862, (13 U. S. Stat. at Large, 730,) proclaiming martial law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in the case of military arrests.

Such writ having been issued and so disobeyed by such Marshal before the issuing of such Proclamation, the fact that such Proclamation had been issued was taken into consideration by the Court, in punishing the Marshal for his contempt, and a fine of $100 was imposed upon him, and he was not permitted to act as an officer of the Court until he had paid the fine.

A jailor who acted as the mere servant of the Marshal, in disobeying the writ, was discharged without punishment.

(Before SMALLEY, J., Vermont, October 7th, 1862.)

This was a hearing on a writ of habeas corpus, issued on

Ex parte Field.

the petition of Anson Field, directed to C. C. P. Baldwin, Marshal of the United States for the District of Vermont, and Noble B. Flanagan, Jailor of Chittenden County, Vermont, commanding them to produce the body of said Field. The petition for the writ set forth, that the petitioner resided in Jericho, in Chittenden County; that he was illegally imprisoned in the common jail of the county, by the Marshal; that the jailor of said county held him by the order of the Marshal; that the Marshal held him by some pretended order of the President of the United States; and that he was not held by force of any process of any Court of the State, or of the United States. On the return day of the writ, the jailor produced the body of the petitioner and made a verbal return to the writ, to the effect, that the petitioner and two other persons were brought to the jail by the said Marshal, who directed the jailor to commit and hold them until further orders; and that the Marshal presented no process or warrant, but said that he had arrested them under some general order from the War Department. It not appearing that the said Marshal had received notice of the issuing of the writ, the Court adjourned the hearing, and directed that in the meantime the jailor should hold the petitioner in custody. On the adjourned day, the Marshal and the jailor appeared, with their counsel, but without the petitioner, and made the following return to the writ: "United States of America, District of Vermont, September 1st, 1862. Now, in pursuance of the mandate of the within writ, the said C. C. P. Baldwin, Marshal of the said District, and the said Noble B. Flanagan, say, that the said Field having been brought into Court on the 28th day of August, 1862, and the matter continued until this day, and the body of said Field having been ordered to remain in custody, they now say that the said Anson Field is in their custody, and they say he was arrested and is held and detained, by virtue of orders issued by the authority of the President of the United States, signed by Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War, copies of which are annexed hereto; and they further state, that said Field is held in custody, to be dealt with under

Ex parte Field.

said orders, report having been made to Major L. C. Turner, Judge Advocate, as in said orders directed; and said Flanagan acts solely under the directions of said Baldwin, being jailor in the County of Chittenden; and said Baldwin says that he has informed the War Department of the United States of the issuing of the writ, and he is instructed by said Department to pay no regard to it, and not bring the body of said Field into Court; and the said Baldwin says that, as Marshal of said District, having made said arrest, and now holding said Field in custody, by order of said Department, he deems it his duty, in obedience to such instructions, not to bring said Field into Court, intending thereby no disrespect to this Court. C. C. P. Baldwin, Marshal. N. B. Flanagan, Jailor. Sworn to before me, September 1st, 1862, D. A. Smalley, Judge." The following were the orders referred to in the return: "Official War Bulletins. Persons liable to draft not allowed to leave their county. Washington, Friday, August 8th, 1862. The following order has just been issued by the War Department: War Department, Washington, D. C., August 8th, 1862. An order to prevent the evasion of military duty, and for the pression of disloyal practices. First: By direction of the President of the United States, it is hereby ordered that, until further orders, no citizen liable to be drafted into the militia shall be allowed to go to a foreign country; and all marshals, deputy marshals, and military officers of the United States, are directed, and all police authorities, especially at the ports of the United States on the sea-board, and on the frontier, are requested, to see that this order is faithfully carried into effect; and they are hereby authorized and directed to arrest and detain any person or persons about to depart from the United States in violation of this order, and report to Major L. C. Turner, Judge Advocate, at Washington City, for further instructions respecting the person or persons so arrested and detained. Second: Any person liable to draft, who shall absent himself from his county or State before such draft is made, will be arrested by any provost marshal, or other United States or State officer, wherever he may be found within the jurisdic

VOL. V.-5


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