States in 1778 could justly be regarded by England as premature and as a hostile act. (e) The recognition of a new state is the recognition of the existence of certain political conditions. This recognition of the state carries with it the acknowledgment of sovereignty, independence, equality, etc. It is an essential condition to just recognition that the new aspirant possess these qualifications absolutely or potentially to a reasonable extent. (f) From its nature, recognition is irrevocable and absolute, unless distinctly conditional. Even when conditional, if the recognition is prior to the fulfillment of the condition by the recognized state, the recognition cannot be withdrawn because of non-fulfillment of the condition, but the recognizing state may resort to any other means which would be admitted in international law as justifiable against any other state failing to fulfill its obligations, e.g. suspension of diplomatic relations, retorsion, reprisals, or even war. In the case of Belgium, the definition of its boundaries and establishing of permanent neutralization was an act subsequent to the recognition of its international statehood, and in case of violation of the treaty stipulations, Belgium would not lose its position as a state, but would be liable to such measures of reparation as the other parties to the treaty might employ.2 If recognition could be withdrawn, it would work injustice to the recognized state, and to other states who, as third parties, will not permit their rights to be subject to the will of the recognizing state or states. 1 I. Rivier, Droit des gens, §§ 3, 11. 2 Hall, § 26*, note 1, p. 93. (g) The consequences of recognition immediately touch the relations of (1) the recognizing state, (2) the recognized, (3) the parent state if the new state is formed from an existing state, and (4) in a minor degree other states. (1) The recognizing state is bound to treat the new state in all respects as entitled to the rights and as under duties accepted in international law. (2) The recognized state is, as related to the recognizing state, entitled to the rights, and under the obligations prescribed in international law. As it is a new person in international law, it is entitled to full personal freedom in entering into relations with other states. So far, however, as the territory within the new state was under local obligations, these obligations are transferred to the new state. The general obligations resting on the parent state, by reason of treaties and responsibilities of all kinds which have been assumed by the parent state in the capacity of a legal unity, are not transferred, because the identity of the parent state remains intact.1 (3) The parent state, in cases where the new state is formed by separation from one already existing, is, as regards the recognizing state, on the same international footing as the new state. Both states are entitled to equal privileges, and under like obligations. The relations to other states are not necessarily much changed. (4) The relations of the states other than the recognizing, recognized, and parent states are changed to the extent that they must respect the de facto relations set 1 Hall, § 27, p. 100. forth in (1), (2), and (3) above, i.e. while not recognizing the new state, they must accept the fact that the recognition exists for the states who are parties to it, and they are not entitled to pass judgment as to the justice of the recognition. A CHAPTER VI LEGAL PERSONS HAVING QUALIFIED STATUS 22. MEMBERS OF CONFEDERATIONS AND OTHER UNIONS. 23. NEUTRALIZED STATES. 24. PROTECTORATES, SUZERAINTIES. 25. CORPORATIONS. (a) Private. (b) Exercising political powers. 26. INDIVIDUALS. 27. INSURGENTS. (a) Definition. (b) Effect of admission of insurgency. 28. BELLIGERENTS. (a) Definition. (b) Conditions prior to recognition. (c) Grounds of recognition. (d) Who may recognize. (e) Consequences. (1) Recognition by a foreign state. 29. COMMUNITIES NOT FULLY CIVILIZED. § 22. Members of Confederations and other Unions A state in the sense of public law is not sovereign in the sense of international law, if there are any limitations upon its power to enter into relations with other states. Such a state may be a member of a confedera tion and exercise certain powers giving it a qualified international status. These loose unions may, as in the German Confederation from 1815 to 1866, leave to the local states a certain degree of autonomy in regulating international affairs while granting to the central government certain specified powers. This division of international competence is usually a temporary compromise ending in new states or in a close union. "Inasmuch as both the central and the separate states carry on diplomatic intercourse with foreign powers, they must each and all be regarded as Subjects of International Law; and inasmuch as they carry on such intercourse only in a limited degree, they cannot be regarded as fully and absolutely sovereign.' 1 In the examples of personal and real unions and the like, the nature of the state is a matter of public law and little concerns international law. As related to international law, the question is how far are such states restricted in their dealings with other states. A union, such as that existing in the case of the ruler of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and Empire of India, is of importance to international law only in its united capacity, while for public law the nature of the union is of much significance. The same might be said of the unions of Austria-Hungary, and Sweden-Norway. § 23. Neutralized States Neutralized states are sovereign only in a qualified degree. While such states have a certain formal equal 1 Lawrence, § 51, p. 75. |