have maintained, and some still maintain, that allegiance is inalienable.1 England formally maintained this principle till 1870, and her attempts to enforce the principle brought on the War of 1812 with the United States. In certain countries, as in the United States and Switzerland, minor children are held to follow the allegiance of their father in case of naturalization. The French law claims that the minor child's nationality is that of his birthplace. The subject has been determined in some instances by treaty stipulation, yet must be considered, like many questions of naturalization, as unsettled. Many states distinguish in law and more in practice between that naturalization which carries with it protection of the state and allegiance of the subject (naturalisation ordinaire) and that naturalization which carries full political privileges (grande naturalisation). (e) Incomplete naturalization. The fact that a person has taken the preliminary steps toward acquiring the nationality of a foreign state, by making a declaration of his intention or otherwise, may give the state to which the person has assumed an inchoate allegiance the right of protection of the declarant against third states, though not necessarily against the native state of the declarant.3 Of the privileges to be accorded to one who has declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States, Secretary Marcy said, "The declaration, indeed, is prima facie evidence that the person who made it was, at its date, 1 Hall, § 71, p. 240 ff. 22 Whart., § 175, Frelinghuysen to Wallace, March 25, 1887. domiciled in the United States, and entitled thereby, though not to all, to certain rights of a citizen, and to much more consideration when abroad than is due to one who has never been in our country; but the declarant, not being a citizen under our laws, even while domiciled here, cannot enjoy all the rights of citizenship either here or abroad;"1 and Mr. Marcy also says of the papers proving domicile, "And to this simple certificate... the European authorities are at liberty to pay such respect as they think proper." 2 In 1853 a case arose in which the United States affirmed: "It is a maxim of international law that domicile confers national character; . . . international law looks only to the national character in determining what country has the right to protect. If a person goes from this country abroad, with the nationality of the United States, this law enjoins upon other nations to respect him, in regard to protection, as an American citizen." "3 This statement was made in support of the position assumed by the United States in the case of one Martin Koszta. Koszta, a Hungarian refugee of 18481849, went to Turkey, was imprisoned, later was released on condition of leaving the country, went to the United States, declared his intention to become a citizen, and in 1853 returned to Turkey. He went into business at Smyrna, obtained there a traveling pass certifying that he was under protection of the United States, was seized, thrown into the sea by persons employed by the Austrian consulate, and was picked up by an Austrian 12 Whart., § 193, Marcy to Seibels, May 27, 1854. 8 2 Whart., § 198, Marcy to Hüselmann, Sept. 26, 1853. man-of-war, Hussar. The consul of the United States remonstrated, but the captain of the Hussar held Koszta. The chargé d'affaires requested the aid of a United States man-of-war, whose captain demanded Koszta's release. To avoid conflict in the port the mediation of the French consul was accepted, and Koszta was intrusted, pending settlement of claims, to the French consul. Finally Koszta was allowed to return to the United States, though Austria maintained her right to proceed against him if he returned to Turkey. The United States in this case undoubtedly took an extreme position in its claim of jurisdiction. By an act of March 3, 1863, the United States declared that those who had taken the preliminary oath of intention to become citizens were liable to military service. Upon protest by foreign nations against this act of Congress, the President, by proclamation, announced that, as it had been claimed that "such persons, under treaties or the law of nations, retain a right to renounce that purpose, and to forego the privileges of citizenship and residence within the United States, under the obligations imposed by the aforesaid act of Congress," 1 to avoid all misapprehension, the plea of alienage would be accepted for sixty-five days, during which time such persons as had only declared their intention to become citizens might depart. The position in the Koszta case, where the claim to the protection of the United States was made when the inchoate citizen was in trouble, and the claim of the inchoate citizens to renounce their allegiance when the state was in difficulties, show some of the problems to K 16 Messages and Papers of President, 168. which the diverse laws and practices in regard to naturalization have given rise. The municipal laws of some of the local states of the United States admit to all political privileges of the local state those who have taken the first steps toward naturalization. It is generally conceded that such as have exercised the privileges of full citizens can properly be held to the obligations of full citizens, as was declared in the above proclamation. The inconsistencies in regard to jurisdiction over those naturalized or incompletely naturalized are gradually yielding to treaty provisions which distinctly determine the position of such persons. § 60. Jurisdiction over Aliens Citizens of one state, when sojourning in a foreign state, have a dual relationship by which they may claim certain privileges, both from their native state and from the foreign state. (a) The native state naturally has jurisdiction of a qualified sort over its subjects even when they are in a foreign state. (1) The right to make emigration laws may lead to restrictions binding in a foreign state. A state may banish its subjects. No other state is obliged to receive them, however. (2) A state may recall its citizens for special reasons, as in the case of Greece in 1897, when Greek citizens were recalled for military service. (3) There is much difference of opinion upon the question of penal jurisdiction of the native state over its subjects who have committed crimes in a foreign state. In general American and English authorities agree that penal law is territorial. Some of the continental authorities take the view that a citizen on his return may be punished for crimes committed in a foreign state. The English law takes this position in certain crimes, as treason, bigamy, and premeditated murder. Usually a crime committed upon a vessel in a foreign harbor is held as within the jurisdiction of the state of the vessel's registry. (4) A state may interfere to protect its subjects in a foreign state, thus extending its authority in their behalf. This has been frequently done to protect Western sojourners in Eastern states, e.g. the demands of Germany, in 1898, for concessions from China on account of injuries to missionaries. These demands, accompanied by a naval demonstration, resulted in the cession of Kaio-Chau. (b) The jurisdiction of a state over aliens within its territory is very extensive. (1) The absolute right of exclusion of all foreigners would hardly be maintained by any civilized state, though it could be deduced from the doctrine of sovereignty. Whether justly or not, Japan and China have been compelled by force to cede certain rights to states demanding admission for their citizens. (2) The right of expulsion is, however, generally maintained. This right should, however, be |