(c) Intervention by General Sanction. Some authorities have maintained that intervention when sanctioned by a group of states is justifiable. It is probable that a group of states would be less liable to pursue an unjust course than a single state, and that intervention under such sanction would be more liable to be morally justifiable. It is, however, no more legal than the same act by a single state; and if general consent is the only sanction, while the act may be expedient, advantageous, and morally just, it cannot be regarded as upheld by international law, nor can a single act of this kind establish a principle. The several cases of such intervention under general sanction can hardly be regarded as sufficiently similar to establish a principle even upon the Eastern Question in Europe.1 It may be concluded that while general sanction of a considerable group of states may, for a given interference, free a state from moral blame and warrant the act as a matter of policy, yet it does not give any international law sanction for intervention by general consent. (d) Other Grounds of Intervention. Many reasons have been advanced as justifying such measures as intervention. (1) Intervention to carry out provisions of treaties of guaranty was formerly common, e.g. intervention by one state to preserve the same form of government in the other or to maintain the ruling family. It is now held that no treaty can justify interference in the internal affairs of a state not party to the treaty. In general, intervention, because of treaty stipulations, 1 See Rolin-Jaequemyns, R. D. I., XVIII., 591. even when the state subject to the intervention is a party to the treaty, is a violation of independence unless the treaty provides for such measures, in which case the state has become a protected state or entered into relations by which it has not full state powers. Such treaties must be clearly state acts and not acts of individuals who from their position have the opportunity of giving to their personal agreements the form of a state act." While there is still difference of opinion as to the question of intervention under treaty sanction, the weight of opinion seems to be decidedly to the effect that such intervention has no ground of justification in international law. (2) Intervention to preserve the balance of power, which was regarded as a necessary means for the preservation of European peace, has been considered as justifiable till recent times. Since the middle of the nineteenth century the position has received less and less support, though advanced in behalf of the preservation of the Turkish Empire and the adjustment of the Balkan states. In 1854 Great Britain and France, on the appeal of the Sultan for assistance against the Russian aggressions, determined to aid him, "their said Majesties being fully persuaded that the existence of the Ottoman Empire in its present Limits is essential to the maintenance of the Balance of Power among the States of Europe." 2 The attitude at the present time is stated by Lawrence. "The independence of states is not to be violated on the ground of possible danger to some imaginary equilibrium of political forces."8 1 Hall, § 91, p. 301. 2 Hertslet, 1181, 1193. 8 § 85, p. 129. See also 1 Halleck, 507. (3) Interventions upon the broad and indefinite ground of humanity have been common and were generally upheld by the writers to the time of Vattel. Since his day opposition to intervention of this kind has gradually obtained favor. What the grounds of humanity are, and which nation's ideas of humanity shall be accepted as standard, have been questions difficult to settle to the general satisfaction of states. For a state to set itself up as judge of the actions of another state and to assume that it has the right to extend its powers to settling and regulating affairs of morals, religion, and the relations of public authority to the subjects in another state, on the ground of maintaining the rights of mankind as a whole, is to take a ground which the conduct of any modern state, even the most civilized, would hardly warrant. While it is admitted that a state or states may sometimes interfere to prevent one state from unduly oppressing another, as in the intervention of the powers in Greece in 1827, yet it is generally held that to interfere because the internal affairs of a given state are not conducted in a manner pleasing to the foreign state is to give a sanction to an act that would result in far more evil than good. Such intervention has often taken place. The “Holy Alliance," in attempting to guard Europe from “the curse of Revolution," advocated in practice a most dangerous form of intervention.1 Indeed, much of the European history of the nineteenth century is but a history of successive interventions. In spite of all this, as Walker says, "the rule regularly progresses towards more general recognition, that non-interven 11 Hertslet, 317. Ibid., 658. tion in the internal affairs of a state is a law which admits of no exception to foreign powers, so long as the operations of that state are confined in their effect to the limits of the national territory.”1 Nevertheless, the United States interfered in the affairs of Cuba on the ground of humanity. The President, in his message of April 11, 1898, says, after a long statement of the facts: "I have exhausted every effort to relieve the intolerable condition of affairs which is at our doors. Prepared to execute every obligation imposed upon me by the Constitution and the law, I await your action."2 By joint resolution of Congress of April 20, 1898, demand was made upon Spain to relinquish its authority in Cuba, and the President was authorized to use land and naval forces to carry the resolution into effect.3 (4) In time of civil war, on invitation of both parties, a foreign state may act as mediator, but unless the revolting party has been recognized, this is mediation in a domestic sense rather than intervention in the sense of international law. Under other conditions there is a diversity of view as to the proper course of action. Some deny with Vattel, G. F. de Martens, Heffter, Fiore, Bluntschli, Woolsey, and others maintain or permit intervention in civil war at the request of one of the parties, though some of the authorities do not permit intervention except on the invitation of the parent state and not on that of the rebelling party. Bluntschli (§ 476) and Wool 1 Walker, p. 151. 2 Ann. Cycl. 1898, p. 159; U. S. For. Rel., 1898, p. 760. sey (§ 42) admit intervention only in behalf of the party representing the state; Vattel and some others permit intervention in behalf of the party which the intervening state considers to have the right of the contest, thus opening the arbitration of the contest to a foreign state. Both of these positions are receiving less and less of sanction. Intervention in behalf of the established state implies a doubt as to which power within the state is the de facto power, and as Hall says: "the fact that it has been necessary to call in foreign help is enough to show that the issue of the conflict would without it be uncertain, and consequently that there is a doubt as to which side would ultimately establish itself as the legal representative of the state." It is plain to see that intervention in behalf of the rebelling party is a violation of the independence of the existing state. It is equally clear that international law does not give a foreign state a right to judge upon the justice or merits of domestic questions in another state. The principle may now be regarded as established by both theory and practice that the invitation of neither party to a domestic strife gives a right to a foreign state to intervene, and that no state has a right to judge as to the merits of the contest and to interfere in behalf of the party it thinks in the right. Indeed, intervention because of civil war only is in no case justifiable, though the consequences of such a disturbance may warrant intervention upon other grounds.2 (5) Intervention on the ground of financial transactions is not now sanctioned. A state may make any injustice done its subjects by a foreign state a matter 1 § 94, p. 307. 21 Hertslet, 664 ff. |