BOOK CHAPTER XII. AN INTERIM MINISTRY. LEFT once more without a Ministry, unable to find one in the undisciplined and excited crowd to which M. Thiers's tactics had reduced the Parliamentary majority by the vote of the 18th, and deserted by M. Odilon Barrot and his friends, to whose patriotism he appealed to form a Constitutional Ministry, the President was compelled to look for the elements of a Council outside the Assembly. The men he selected were remarkable for their administrative capacity, and included M. Schneider, who now first appeared on the political scene. Of the old Ministry M. Magne alone remained. This interim Administration was appointed to carry on the affairs of the country until the subsidence of party passion should enable the President to form a definite Government. Still patient, and resolved to hold on the way he had traced for himself, and keeping his enemies well in sight, the President appeared undisturbed by the wanton vote which had driven a thoroughly efficient working Ministry from office. When he had arranged his interim Council, he addressed a message to the President of the Assembly.' It preached the old sermon-moderation and conciliation in the interests of France. 'Public opinion,' said the Prince, relying on the wisdom of the Assembly and the Government, has not January 24, 1851. XII. been unsettled by recent events; nevertheless France is CHAP. beginning to suffer through discords which she deplores. It is my duty to do all that depends on me to prevent the grave results which may flow from them. The union of the two powers is indispensable to the peace of the country. But, since the Constitution has made them independent one of the other, the only condition under which they can act together is reciprocal confidence. This being my conviction, I shall always respect the rights of the Assembly, keeping intact, at the same time, the prerogatives of the power which I hold from the people. In order to close a painful disagreement, I accepted, after the recent vote of the Assembly, the resignation of a Ministry which had given to the country and to the cause of order striking tokens of its devotion. While desiring to reconstitute a durable Cabinet I saw that I could not find the elements of it in a fortuitous majority, and I discovered with regret that it was impossible to frame a combination through the minority, important as it was. 'In this conjuncture, and after vain efforts, I resolved to form a transition Ministry, composed of men of special qualifications, belonging to no faction of the Assembly, and ready to give themselves up to their administrative duties without thought of party. The honourable men who have accepted this patriotic task will deserve the gratitude of the country. 'Public affairs will therefore be carried on as in the past. Prejudices will dissolve before the solemn declarations of the message of November 12. A real majority will reconstitute itself, and harmony will be reestablished, without any sacrifice of the dignity which constitutes their strength, on the part of the two powers. France wishes for rest before all things, and she expects from those whom she has invested with her confidence BOOK VII. conciliation without weakness, calm resolution, and confidence in the maintenance of the law.'1 This was the language of moderation and of candour; but the combined factions in the Assembly pretended to see in it an attempt to humiliate them. They knew that it would be popular with the country, that it would add strength to the President, and that it was calculated to increase the growing anger with which the public had been watching the obstruction and dishonest policy of the Assembly for the last two months. The various sections of the majority, therefore, discussed impatiently the means of convicting the President of having betrayed the spirit of the Constitution by forming an entirely extra-Parliamentary Executive. The most ardent of his enemies talked about impeachment; the discreetest bore in mind, through their anger, that he was strictly within the limits of his prerogative. It was at this moment that M. Thiers's hopes rose once more, and that he saw his way to power as Minister, with M. Molé for colleague. The interim Ministry received no quarter. An obscure member of the majority was put up to ask the Executive whither they pretended to lead the country. To a definitive Ministry,' was the reply of the Keeper of the Seals. But this answer only adjourned the general onslaught on which the enemies of the Élysée had resolved, and which was to leave the President no alternative save an Administration composed of the leaders who were bent on his destruction. The opportunity occurred on February 3, when the Minister of Finance demanded a supplementary credit of 1,800,000 francs for the State expenses of the Presidency of the Republic. The Assembly at once appointed a Commission-composed of Reds, Orleanists, and Legitimists-to report on the credit de 1 L'impassibilité dans le droit.' XII. manded, and the leaders prepared to reject it unless their CHAP. conditions were accepted. These conditions were the immediate formation of a Ministry out of their ranks. The transaction was disdainfully rejected, and the debate began. It was conducted with great acrimony, General Changarnier distinguishing himself for the last time by the violence of his invective against the Government which had deprived him of the power of assisting the Bourbons back to Paris. The debate drew forth, however, a defender of the policy of the Prince to whom M. Berryer must listen with respect, and M. Thiers must, at any rate, appear attentive and deferential. M. de Montalembert was a Frenchman of the noblest type. He combined the chivalry and the social graces of the old régime with a liberal appreciation of the intellectual movements of his own time. His idea of honour must have had a Quixotic aspect in the sight of the shrewd political servants of the Monarchy of July. When he appeared in the tribune to endeavour to prevent the majority from committing an act of cowardice towards the President, he spoke not as the advocate of the Élysée, but as the doughty servant of the Truth according to his light. He was no Bonapartist; he was a patriot who would not stand by and see his country torn to pieces by selfish factions, even when some of these wore the colours to which his race had always been true. 'I am,' he said, 'neither the surety, nor the friend, nor the counsellor, nor the advocate of the President; I am his witness, and I wish to bear my testimony that he has failed in nought in the great cause of order which we have all wished to serve. I come to declare from this tribune that the President, in my opinion, has remained faithful to the mission which has been confided to him before being confided to us-to the mission of restoring society, of re-establishing order, and of repress VII. BOOK ing demagogism. When was it said to the wave of anarchy which menaced Europe as well as France : "Thou shalt come thus far, and no farther "? I do not hesitate to affirm that it was at the election of December 10. Yes, it was when men saw, in the freest and sincerest election that ever took place, five millions and a half of Frenchmen return, by an unanimous and irresistible impulse, to ideas of order, of tradition, and of authority, and personify them in the son of a king and the nephew of an emperor; they felt that anarchy had been thrown back, at least for a time, and by moral means, which is more useful and fruitful than when it is suppressed by the force of arms.' M. de Montalembert then touched on the efforts which the President had made to unite the leaders of the different parties, and to create a national party. He showed how the Prince had endeavoured to create such a party even in his first Ministry, which comprehended all shades. of men of order from M. Bixio to M. de Falloux, and how, through all the difficulties which had been wilfully cast in his way, he had remained faithful to his original programme-loyal to the various parties even after they had duped him. Then he described the manner in which the Prince had been deserted, and said that he traced the unfortunate division in the majority, by which France was suffering to-day, to the Law of May 31. For when the Monarchical parties saw that this law had been passed without creating public riots, and that peace and prosperity appeared to be settling upon their country under the Prince President, they said to themselves: Perhaps the country will attribute these blessings to the actual Government, and will prolong the powers of the Prince.' From that day they began to act against him. M. de Montalembert remarked he knew that he defended the President at the risk of being called a courtier of the |