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CHAPTER VII

THE STRATEGIC VALUE OF HAWAII

R. PRESIDENT, I believe that under the provisions of this treaty, which we can abrogate by

giving twelve months' notice, we are still the owners of Pearl Harbor. For my part, I should give back this piece of doubtful property to the Hawaiian people. I do not believe we want it. It seems to me it is an element of perpetual weakness, and I do not see how it can be otherwise regarded. It is 2,000 miles from our coast. It is in the very centre of the Pacific Ocean. It does not intercept any line of commerce between the United States and any portion of the globe. For us it does not command a rod of land on earth. The straightest and shortest line from San Francisco to Japan and China runs 2,000 miles north of the Hawaiian Islands.

The shortest line from San Francisco to New Zealand runs 1,000 miles south of them, and even the shortest line to Australia runs 500 miles south. The ship that goes from San Francisco to Honolulu goes for the purpose of visiting that point, and not for the purpose of pausing incidentally on a voyage to any other portion of the planet. There is no coal on the Hawaiian Islands; so, in order to coal there, we first have to transport the fuel from our own shores. After getting it there, it is in one of the most out-of-the-way places on earth. It would be vastly more expedient and profitable to establish a coaling station on one of our own Aleutian Islands south of Bering Sea, for they are within 100 miles of the shortest lines that can be drawn on the surface of the sea between the United States and Hongkong. Not only would the western extremity of our own Republic be the best possible 1. Speech in the Senate July 2, 1894.

place to establish a coaling station, if we had to carry the coal from Portland and pile it up there, but coal has already been found upon those islands and it could be mined and kept ready very near where it is most needed.

I hold in my hand a map which shows the facts in this case. It is constructed on the lines of Mercator's projection, but the distances are shown as they actually exist upon the surface of the sphere. It shows that our Aleutian Islands are just half way on our road to Japan and China; that they are very near the shortest route that vessels can take, and that they would constitute the best possible stopping place for all commercial purposes whatever. The map further shows (and I shall print an outline of it with my speech in the RECORD) that the Hawaiian Islands are entirely aside and out of the way of the path of our vessels bound for any other land. Not only are the Aleutian Islands nearer to the United States than the Hawaiian Islands are, but they are seven or eight hundred miles nearer to Japan and China. Indeed, if we were to transport our coal to the farthest westward of our Aleutian peninsula we should be within 500 miles of the coast of Asia and 1,500 miles nearer to Yokohama than Honolulu is.

Our steam vessels of every sort now crossing the Pacific do not go to Honolulu, for if they did they would go hundreds or thousands of miles out of their way. This coal is carried to Honolulu from British America, but bituminous coal, probably superior to it, is now being mined in Washington and will probably soon supersede it. But why should we have a coaling station at all at Honolulu? There is already an excellent coaling station at Unalaska, on one of our Aleutian Islands, over 1,000 miles nearer the coast of Asia than Honolulu, and that station is approached through one of the most spacious and finest harbors in the world. Already coal is being mined at various points in Alaska-at Unga Island, at Cape Sabine, at Cape Lisburne, at Herondine Bay, and other places -but that mighty chain of islands extends through 40 degrees of longitude-as far as from New York to San Franciscoand the exploration of their wealth has only just begun.

A reference to the map will show that this purpose will

make Unalaska the legitimate and foreordained coaling station for our Navy in the Pacific.

As to our own western coast, what protection would a coaling station at Pearl Harbor offer us? If England should ever attack our Pacific States she will attack them from Vancouver Island and from her harbors in British America. Could we resist these attacks from Pearl Harbor, 2,000 miles away in the center of the Pacific Ocean? Who would go to the Hawaiian Islands for the purpose of engaging us there? No, Mr. President, in case of war with any naval power on earth Pearl Harbor would immediately become an element of weakness, and the adoption of a strong defensive policy would compel us to abandon it at once, bring our munitions of war and vessels home, and make a defense from our own coast. In case of war, from what point could we attack British commerce in the Pacific? The Canadian Pacific is its natural outlet, and we should attack it from Puget Sound. What element of strength, then, would this paltry island in the Pacific give us? It would be absolutely worthless, and worse than worthless, from every point of view.

Now what are the arguments which are presented why we should annex these islands, with their peculiar and undesirable population? The arguments presented in debate before were that we should annex these islands because of a wonderful commercial interest; that we should annex these islands because their commerce was carried in American ships and under the American flag; that we should annex these islands because they were on the routes of commerce of the Orient. All this has apparently been abandoned, and the only argument now presented is that an American war vessel can not cross the Pacific without getting coal; that these islands) are absolutely necessary in order that we may reach the fleet at Manila. That is the argument now being pressed to the front. I am going to investigate this argument and see if it is honest.

1. Speech in the Senate June 22, 1898.