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for the wilful obstruction or resistance of officers in the service of process.

[Sections 3 and 4 provide for the transfer to United States circuit courts, and trial there, of cases in State courts under the revenue laws.]

SEC. 5. And be it further enacted, That whenever the President of the United States shall be officially informed, by the authorities of any state, or by a judge of any circuit or district court of the United States, in the state, that, within the limits of such state, any law or laws of the United States, or the execution thereof, or of any process from the courts of the United States, is obstructed by the employment of military force, or by any other unlawful means, too great to be overcome by the ordinary course of judicial proceeding, or by the powers vested in the marshal by existing laws, it shall be lawful for him, the President of the United States, forthwith to issue his proclamation, declaring such fact or information, and requiring all such military and other force forthwith to disperse; and if at any time after issuing such proclamation, any such opposition or obstruction shall be made, in the manner or by the means aforesaid, the President shall be, and hereby is, authorized, promptly to employ such means to suppress the same, and to cause the said laws or process to be duly executed, as are authorized and provided in the cases therein mentioned by . [certain military acts of February 28, 1795, and March 3, 1807.']

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SEC. 7. And be it further enacted, That either of the justices of the Supreme Court, or a judge of any district court of the United States, in addition to the authority already conferred by law, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases of a prisoner or prisoners, in jail or confinement, where he or they shall be committed or confined on, or by any authority or law, for any act done, or omitted to be done, in pursuance of a law of the United States, or any order, process, or decree, of any judge or court thereof, any thing in any act of Congress to the contrary notwithstanding. . . .

SEC. 8. And be it further enacted, That the several provisions contained in the first and fifth sections of this act, shall be in force until the end of the next session of Congress, and no longer. 1U. S. Stat. at Large, I., 424, 425, and II., 443. — ED.

Removal of the Deposits

September, 1833

By the bank charter act the immediate control of the public deposits was vested in the Secretary of the Treasury, with the further provision that, in case of their removal from the bank, the reasons therefor should be laid before Congress. The removal of the deposits seems to have been discussed in administration circles soon after Jackson's second election; reports, however, did not become current until July, 1833. In May the Secretary of the Treasury, McLane, having declined to order the removal, was transferred to the Department of State, and Duane appointed in his place. September 18 Jackson read to the Cabinet an elaborate paper, drafted by Taney, the Attorney-General, setting forth at length his reasons for deciding upon the removal of the deposits after Oct. 1. Although Duane was opposed to the bank, he "refused to give the order and refused to resign"; Sept. 23 he was dismissed, and Taney became Secretary of the Treasury. In the meantime Amos Kendall, a member of the "Kitchen Cabinet," had been sent to visit a number of eastern cities and arrange with State banks to receive the public deposits. The first orders for removal were issued by Taney Sept. 26, and designated the Girard Bank of Philadelphia as a place of deposit. In October the Maine Bank of Portland and the Franklin Bank of Cincinnati were similarly designated.

REFERENCES.—Text of the paper read to the Cabinet in Niles's Register, XLV., 73-77; it is also in the Cong. Globe, 1833-35, I., pp. 59-62; of the correspondence relative to the removal of the deposits, in Senate Doc. 2, 23d Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 32-36. The removal of the deposits was the principal subject of debate in the session of Congress which met Dec. 2, 1833. Numerous documents are collected in Niles's Register, XLV., XLVI.

No. 88. Jackson's

Jackson's Paper read to the
Cabinet

September 18, 1833

Having carefully and anxiously considered all the facts and arguments, which have been submitted to him, relative to a removal of the public deposites from the bank of the United States, the president deems it his duty, to communicate in this manner to his cabinet the final conclusions of his own mind, and the reasons on which they are founded, in order to put them in durable form, and to prevent misconceptions.

[The paper then reviews the controversy with the bank, and particularly the efforts to obtain a renewal of the charter, and continues:]

The power of the secretary of the treasury over the deposites is unqualified. The provision that he shall report his reasons to congress, is no limitation. Had it not been inserted, he would have been responsible to congress, had he made a removal for any other than good reasons, and his responsibility now ceases, upon the rendition of sufficient ones to congress. The only object of the provision, is to make his reasons accessible to congress, and enable that body the more readily to judge of their soundness and purity, and thereupon to make such further provision by law as the legislative power may think proper in relation to the deposite of the public money. Those reasons may be very diversified. It was asserted by the secretary of the treasury without contradiction, as early as 1817, that he had power "to control the proceedings" of the bank of the United States at any moment, "by changing the deposites to the state banks," should it pursue an illiberal course towards those institutions; that "the secretary of the treasury will always be disposed to support the credit of the state banks, and will invariably direct transfers from the deposites of the public money in aid of their legitimate exertions to maintain their credit," and he asserted a right to employ the state banks when the bank of the United States should refuse to receive on deposite the notes of such state banks as the public interest required should be received in payment of the public dues. In several instances he did transfer the public deposites to state banks, in the immediate vicinity of branches, for reasons connected only with the safety of those banks, the public convenience and the interests of the treasury.

If it was lawful for Mr. Crawford, the secretary of the treasury at that time, to act on these principles, it will be difficult to discover any sound reason against the application of similar principles in still stronger cases. And it is a matter of surprise that a power which, in the infancy of the bank, was freely asserted as one of the ordinary and familiar duties of the secretary of the treasury, should now be gravely questioned, and attempts made to excite and alarm the public mind as if some new and unheardof power was about to be usurped by the executive branch of the government.

It is but a little more than two and a half years to the termination of the charter of the present bank. It is considered as the decision of the country that it shall then cease to exist, and no man, the president believes, has reasonable ground for expectation that any other bank of the United States will be created by Congress. . . . It is obvious that any new system which may be substituted in the place of the bank of the United States, could not be suddenly carried into effect on the termination of its existence without serious inconvenience to the government and the people. Its vast amount of notes are then to be redeemed and withdrawn from circulation, and its immense debt collected. These operations must be gradual, otherwise much suffering and distress will be brought upon the community. It ought to be not a work of months only, but of years, and the president thinks it cannot, with due attention to the interests of the people, be longer postponed. It is safer to begin it too soon than to delay it too long.

It is for the wisdom of Congress to decide upon the best substitute to be adopted in the place of the bank of the United States; and the president would have felt himself relieved from a heavy and painful responsibility if in the charter of the bank, congress had reserved to itself the power of directing at its pleasure, the public money to be elsewhere deposited, and had not devolved that power exclusively on one of the executive departments. . . . But as the president presumes that the charter to the bank is to be considered as a contract on the part of the government, it is not now in the power of congress to disregard its stipulations; and by the terms of that contract the public money is to be deposited in the bank, during the continuance of its charter, unless the secretary of the treasury shall otherwise direct. . .

The responsibility is thus thrown upon the executive branch of the government, of deciding how long before the expiration of the charter, the public interests will require the deposites to be placed elsewhere. . . . and it being the duty of one of the executive departments to decide in the first instance, subject to the future action of the legislative power, whether the public deposites shall remain in the bank of the United States until the end of its existence, or be withdrawn some time before, the president has felt himself bound to examine the question carefully and deliberately in order to make up his judgment on the subject: and in his

opinion the near approach of the termination of the charter, and the public considerations heretofore mentioned, are of themselves amply sufficient to justify the removal of the deposites without reference to the conduct of the bank, or their safety in its keeping. . . . [An examination of the charges against the bank follows.]

It has been alleged by some as an objection to the removal of the deposites, that the bank has the power, and in that event will have the disposition, to destroy the state banks employed by the government, and bring distress upon the country. It has been the fortune of the president to encounter dangers which were represented as equally alarming, and he has seen them vanish before resolution and energy. . . . The president verily believes the bank has not the power to produce the calamities its friends threaten. The funds of the government will not be annihilated by being transferred. They will immediately be issued for the benefit of trade, and if the bank of the United States curtails its loans, the state banks, strengthened by the public deposites, will extend theirs. What comes in through one bank, will go out through others, and the equilibrium will be preserved. Should the bank, for the mere purpose of producing distress, press its debtors more heavily than some of them can bear, the consequences will recoil upon itself, and in the attempts to embarrass the country, it will only bring loss and ruin upon the holders of its own stock. But if the president believed the bank possessed all the power which has been attributed to it, his determination would only be rendered the more inflexible. If, indeed, this corporation now holds in its hands the happiness and prosperity of the American people, it is high time to take the alarm. If the despotism be already upon us, and our only safety is in the mercy of the despot, recent developments in relation to his designs and the means he employs, show how necessary it is to shake it off. The struggle can never come with less distress to the people, or under more favorable auspices than at the present moment.

All doubts as to the willingness of state banks to undertake the service of the government, to the same extent, and on the same terms, as it is now performed by the banks [bank] of the United States, is put to rest by the report of the agent recently employed to collect information; and from that willingness, their own safety in the operation may be confidently inferred. . .

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