his mother, to be expended in his care, maintenance and education by the Girard Trust Company of Philadelphia, guardian of the estate of said child; that Mrs. Lindsay was not a proper person to have the care and custody of said child and that he does not receive proper parental care. The decree further found that Hanish was the head of a religious organization to promote the Mazdaznan religion; that said religion purports to be the teaching of oriental philosophy and religion; that Mrs. Lindsay was a believer in said religion and its teachings and recognized absolute spiritual and temporal power by Hanish over her religious beliefs, amounting to a religious fanaticism; that for a year last past she had been at divers places attending functions of said religion, had not kept the boy in school and had permitted him to reside and travel with said Hanish at different places in and through the United States and Canada, and that Hanish was not a proper person to have control over said child. The court appointed the petitioner and Ellwood C. Lindsay, of Philadelphia, Pa., guardians of William Lindsay, and authorized them to take him into their care and custody wherever he may be found, and to present to the proper court of Philadelphia a showing regarding the conditions surrounding said child when they shall have secured his custody, “and abide by the orders of said court as to such care and custody." The court adjudged Mrs. Lindsay in contempt of court for taking her child and leaving the jurisdiction of said court. To review this judgment a writ of error has been sued out of this court by Hanish and Mrs. Lindsay, and William Lindsay by his next friend.

Defendants in error have filed a plea in this court alleging that the plaintiffs in error, Elizabeth Lindsay, William Lindsay and Hanish, were all summoned to appear in the circuit court; that said William Lindsay was paroled by the court to the custody of Elizabeth Lindsay, and before the day of the hearing, for the purpose of defeating

the jurisdiction of the court, said Elizabeth Lindsay and William Lindsay departed from its jurisdiction or concealed themselves so they could not be found; that said Elizabeth Lindsay was adjudged to be, and still is, in contempt of court, and that Hanish, by his answer filed in the court below, denied that he had the custody of or that he exercised any control over the said William Lindsay. The plea prays that the writ of error be quashed. Plaintiffs in error have demurred to the plea.

The question of law raised by the plea and the demurrer thereto is, whether this writ of error can be sustained where it appears by the plea that plaintiff in error Elizabeth Lindsay is in contempt for having removed plaintiff in error William Lindsay from the jurisdiction of the court and has not purged herself of such contempt.

The decree entered in this case finds plaintiff in error Elizabeth Lindsay guilty of contempt of court for taking her child and leaving the jurisdiction of the court. The plea states that she is still in contempt of court. The suing out of a writ of error is, in effect, bringing a new suit, in which defendants below become plaintiffs and plaintiffs below become defendants. So far as Mrs. Lindsay is concerned, the question must be considered as if she were asking affirmative relief from a court whose mandates she has refused to obey.

The weight of authority seems to be that a party in contempt is not entitled to prosecute or defend an action when the nature of his contempt is such as to hinder and embarrass the due course of procedure in the cause. (Campbell v. Justices of Superior Court, 187 Mass. 509; 2 Ann. Cas. 462, and note; State v. Ackerson, 25 N. J. L. 209; VanOrden v. VanOrden, 50 N. Y. Supp. 184; Gordon v. Gordon, 141 Ill. 160.) The contempt of Mrs. Lindsay affects the due course of procedure in the case by preventing the court from enforcing its decree. So long, therefore, as she remains beyond the jurisdiction of the

court and has not purged herself of the contempt adjudged against her she cannot maintain a writ of error to review the correctness of the decree. It is not alleged by the plea that the plaintiffs in error William Lindsay and Hanish are in contempt. William Lindsay, who is represented in the writ of error by his next friend, was interested in and vitally affected by the decree of the court below, and can not be denied his right to have the decree reviewed because of the contempt of another party to the proceeding.

It is contended by the defendants in error that since Otoman Zar-Adusht Hanish filed an answer denying that he had the custody of or exercised any control over said William Lindsay he has no right to have the judgment reviewed. Notwithstanding his answer he was not dismissed from the suit, and the court called and examined witnesses upon the question whether or not he was a fit and proper person to have the custody of the boy. The decree found that he was not, and it is as binding upon him as upon the other parties to the suit. We think he is entitled to the writ. "Anyone who is a party to the record or is shown by the record to be prejudiced by a judgment or decree may sue out a writ of error and is permitted to use the names of all his co-defendants without their consent." (Cooke v. Cooke, 194 Ill. 225; Scott v. Great Western Coal Co. 220 id. 42.) The fact that Mrs. Lindsay is not entitled to prosecute the writ of error or join in the assignment of errors can no more bar the other parties from prosecuting the writ and using her name for that purpose than would her refusal to join in the prosecution of the writ if she were in a position that gave her that right. The procedure should be the same as if her name had been used by the other plaintiffs in error and she had refused to join in the prosecution of the writ or in the assignment of errors. The plea goes to the right of all the plaintiffs in error to prosecute the writ, and as two of them have a right to the writ of error for the purpose of reviewing the decree the

plea must be held bad and the demurrer sustained. Leave will be given defendants in error to join in error and file briefs upon the merits.

Demurrer to plea sustained.

THE NUTWOOD DRAINAGE AND LEVEE DISTRICT, Appellant, vs. THE BOARD OF REVIEW OF JERSEY COUNTY, Appellee.

Opinion filed October 26, 1912.

1. TAXES what personal property of a drainage district is not exempt from taxation. Personal property of a drainage district, consisting of a steam boiler, engine and machinery located in the district and used to carry on the business of the district, is not exempt from taxation under paragraph 9 of section 2 of the Revenue act, relating to the exemption from taxation of property of cities, towns and villages.

2. Drainage—a district may provide for taxes in annual levy for maintenance. A drainage district may provide for the payment of taxes on the personal property of the district by including the required amount in the annual levy made for the maintenance of the district.

AUDITOR'S Certificate of appeal to review the decision of the board of review of Jersey county.

CHARLES S. WHITE, for appellant.

W. H. STEAD, Attorney General, W. J. CHAPMAN, State's Attorney, and W. EDGAR SAMPSON, for appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE COOKE delivered the opinion of the court:

The appellant, the Nutwood Drainage and Levee District, filed objections with the board of review of Jersey county, claiming as exempt from taxation a steam boiler, engine and machinery located within the boundaries of the drainage district and used in carrying on the business of

the district, the articles being essential parts of the pumping plant. The board of review overruled the objections of appellant and assessed the property for taxation. The appellant appealed from this decision, and the Auditor of Public Accounts has certified the cause to this court under the statute.

Appellant's chief contention is that under paragraph 9 of section 2 of the Revenue act this property is exempt from taxation. While it contends that it is a municipal corporation and that the property should be exempt from taxation by reason of its public use, it concedes that the property of municipal corporations is not exempt from taxation unless it has been specifically exempted by general law. It insists that the reasonable interpretation of said paragraph 9, in view of the fact that property constructed by special assessment must be for public use, makes this property exempt. By said paragraph 9 it is provided that "all market houses, public squares or other public grounds used exclusively for public purposes; all works, machinery and fixtures belonging exclusively to any town, village or city, used exclusively for conveying water to such town, village or city," shall be exempt from taxation. In discussing the law applicable to this question in Sanitary District v. Hanberg, 226 Ill. 480, it is said, on page 483: "The sanitary district is a municipal corporation, (People v. Nelson, 133 Ill. 565,) but the mere fact that property is owned by a municipal corporation does not exempt it from taxation. The provision of the constitution plainly implies that property so owned is subject to taxation unless there is some law exempting it. (Cook County v. City of Chicago, 103 Ill. 646; In re Swigert, 123 id. 267.) It is also the rule that statutes exempting property from taxation are to be construed strictly, and that property claimed to be exempt must clearly appear to be within the terms of the statute." It must be evident that the personal property sought to be exempted from taxation by this proceeding is not included