must be reversed for errors committed on the trial we shall not discuss the weight of the evidence.

It is contended that the court erred in refusing to permit testimony that Rinardo had said, shortly before his death, that Mascarella would have shot him during the quarrel two days before if the revolver had not been taken away. Evidence is admissible which is relevant and "tends to establish the issue or constitutes a link in the chain of proof." (Commonwealth v. Abbott, 130 Mass. 472; People v. Gray, 251 Ill. 431.) The statements or admissions of third parties are hearsay, and, as a general rule, not admissible. The admission of the injured person cannot be used by the accused, except by way of impeachment, where the defendant is on trial charged with the commission of crime, for the State is not bound by the mere hearsay testimony of the injured party. Gillett on Indirect and Collateral Evidence, 286; 21 Cyc. 903, and cases cited.

Counsel for plaintiffs in error also offered to prove that the deceased had trouble, several months before, with Mascarella and difficulty with his boarding-house keeper not long before the homicide. The court refused to admit the first offer and limited the last to the mere fact that there had been trouble, without permitting the details to be proved. One accused of crime may prove any fact or circumstance tending to show that the crime was committed by another person than himself. (Synon v. People, 188 Ill. 609.) It is difficult, in dealing with this description of evidence, to define the precise limits which must control its admission. It may be so remote in point of time as to be immaterial. "To a great extent it must be left to the presiding judge to determine, upon the facts before him, how far evidence of this description may have a tendency to throw light on the fact to be found." (Commonwealth v. Abbott, supra, p. 474. See, as bearing on this subject, Underhill on Crim. Evidence,-2d ed.—sec. 332, and cases cited; 2 Wharton on Crim. Evidence,

10th ed.—sec. 913, and cases cited; Blocker v. State, 131 Am. St. Rep. [Tex.] 772, and note.) The court did not commit reversible error in its rulings on the admission and exclusion of evidence on this subject.

The court gave the following instruction for the People: "The court instructs the jury that you should consider the conduct of the defendants at the time of the alleged killing of Rinardo and their conduct immediately afterwards, and if the jury believe, from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that they left the county of LaSalle immediately after the killing to avoid arrest, you should take that fact into consideration in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendants."

There was no evidence given on the trial as to where the plaintiffs in error were or what they were doing at the time the homicide took place, except their own evidence that they were elsewhere. This instruction assumes that the testimony shows what they were doing at that time and instructs the jury to consider their conduct then, and the jury might naturally have understood that the court thought the plaintiffs in error were present at the killing and were the two men seen running away. When the facts are controverted and the evidence is conflicting it is error for the trial court to instruct the jury that certain facts are true. (People v. Feinberg, 237 Ill. 348.) The question as to where plaintiffs in error were at the time of the homicide was a vital one. It is impossible to say what effect an instruction so worded would have upon the jury, under the facts in this case. This court has said that when the evidence was so overwhelmingly against the defendant that had the jury been correctly instructed they must still, necessarily, have found as they did, we would decline to reverse for mere error of instruction, but where the evidence of guilt is not such that all honest minds of ordinary intelligence must necessarily come to the same conclusion after proper consideration, the accused is en

titled to have it passed upon by a jury instructed with substantial accuracy as to the law applicable to the case. (Hoge v. People, 117 Ill. 35; People v. McGinnis, 234 id. 68.) This instruction was also erroneous because it called attention to particular evidence, (Hoge v. People, supra; Sheehan v. People, 131 Ill. 22; Clark v. People, 224 id. 554;) and omitted all reference to the explanations of the plaintiffs in error as to why they left town. Such explanations may not have been satisfactory, but they were entitled to be considered by the jury for what they were worth. The giving of this instruction, under the facts in this case, constituted reversible error.

People's instruction 14 is also faulty in that it directs attention to only a part of the evidence on a particular question. Several other instructions are complained of by counsel for plaintiffs in error, but while some of them are not worded with accuracy, we do not think substantial error was committed in giving or modifying them.

Whether the jury believed the testimony of Pezutto that he stayed in a house of ill-fame at Spring Valley on the night of the homicide might have had great influence upon them in reaching a conclusion as to his guilt. The testimony of the keeper of the saloon, and his bar-tender, that there was no house of ill-fame over their saloon at that time was conceded by them, on motion for new trial, to have been false. We are disposed, on the state of the record in this cause, to hold that as to Pezutto a new trial should have been granted on that ground.

For the errors indicated the judgment of the circuit court of LaSalle county will be reversed and the cause remanded. Reversed and remanded.

ANNA L. PEABODY, Appellee, vs. KATHARINE BURRI et al.

Appellants.

Opinion filed October 26, 1912.

1. LIMITATIONS-tax deed is good color of title if obtained in good faith. A tax deed regular in form is good color of title, within the meaning of section 6 of the Limitation act, if obtained in good faith, and good faith on the part of the holder of color of title is presumed until overcome by proof.

2. SAME outstanding title acquired by co-tenant in possession inures to benefit of all. A tenant in common in possession cannot acquire color of title by procuring an outstanding title for his own exclusive benefit but the title so acquired inures to the benefit of all the co-tenants.

3. SAME-CO-tenant cannot assert a title acquired at tax sale. One co-tenant cannot assert against another a title acquired by purchase at a tax sale for taxes imposed upon the property during their common ownership thereof, and the fact that one co-tenant permits the land to be sold for taxes and subsequently purchases the title based on such sale is evidence of bad faith on his part.

4. SAME-purchase by agent of co-tenant is the same as a purchase by the principal. A purchase of land at a tax sale by an agent of one of the co-tenants of the land has no effect different from a purchase by the co-tenant himself.

5. SAME-when holder of tax deed does not hold in good faith. Where one in charge of land as agent of one co-tenant permits the land to be sold for taxes and purchases at the tax sale for his principal's benefit but because of the principal's death assigns the certificate of purchase to another co-tenant, who takes out a tax deed, the latter co-tenant cannot, as against the others, rely upon her tax deed as color of title obtained in good faith.

6. SAME a will, to constitute color of title, must describe the land. A devise of all the lands belonging to the testator in this State will, by such general description, pass to the devisee title to all such lands belonging to the testator at the time of his death, but such devise is too general to constitute color of title under the Limitation act.

7. SAME-what is necessary to constitute a disseizin. To constitute a disseizin there must be outward acts of exclusive ownership of an unequivocal character, overt and notorious, and of such a nature as by their own import will impart information and

give notice to the co-tenants that an adverse possession and actual disseizin are intended to be asserted against them.

8. SAME-possession and payment of taxes do not, alone, bar rights of co-tenant. Mere possession and payment of taxes by one co-tenant, however long continued, will not constitute a bar as against the other co-tenants, but there must, in addition, be acts of the co-tenant in possession which are so overt, notorious and unequivocal as to show adverse possession as against the others.

9. SAME a co-tenant has burden of proving disseizin. A cotenant who asserts a disseizin of the others has the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that her possession was hostile, actual, visible, notorious, exclusive, continuous and under claim of title, as it is essential, in order to start the running of the Statute of Limitations against co-tenants, that they be in some way given notice that an adverse possession and actual disseizin are intended.

10. LACHES-knowledge is an inherent element of laches. It is an inherent element of laches that the parties sought to be charged therewith have knowledge of the facts, and it is only when the delay is accompanied by some other element rendering it inequitable to permit the owner to assert his title that laches will be held to bar his rights before the Statute of Limitations has run.

II. SAME-when party does not occupy position of an innocent third party. One who obtains land by devise from a co-tenant thereof, and who not only pays no consideration therefor but receives more in rents than she expends upon the land for improvements and taxes, does not occupy the position of an innocent third party when asserting laches against the claims of other co-tenants.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Montgomery county; the Hon. THOMAS M. JETT, Judge, presiding.

HILL & BULLINGTON, THOMAS WILLIAMSON, and M. J. MCMURRAY, for appellants.

EDWARD A. CRESS, for appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE CARTER delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal from a decree of the circuit court of Montgomery county quieting title in appellee, Anna L. Peabody, to a certain quarter section of land in that county.